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Abstract of Thesis: 
The existing biographies of Haig pay little attention to his pre- 
war life. This thesis attempts to correct this deficiency. The aim is 
to offer a complete picture of Haig on the eve of war and to show how 
his development was shaped by personal, professional and social factors. 
The thesis has relied mainly on material from the Haig Papers, with 
additional evidence taken from the manuscripts of Haig's contemporaries. 
The introduction reviews the existing studies of Haig and discusses 
the deficiencies of these. The need for a new approach is outlined. 
Chapter I covers the period from 1861-1879, and deals with Haig's 
childhood, family background and education, up to and including the 
period at Clifton. Special emphasis is given to Haig's important rela- 
tionship with his mother. 
Chapter II covers the period 1879-1883, when Haig was at Oxford. 
It analyses the education he received, the life he led and his eventual 
decision to join the Army. 
Chapter III deals with the period 1883-1892. It begins with Haig 
at Sandhurst, and examines the training he received. The remainder of 
the chapter covers Haig's period as a 7th Hussar, most of which was 
spent in India. A brief examination of the Victorian Army and in parti- 
cular the cavalry is included in the chapter. 
Chapter IV covers the period 1892-1897. Haig left India to compete 
for the Staff College, but failed the entrance examination. He lobbied 
to gain entry and was finally admitted in 1896. The chapter analyses the 
quality and relevance of the training he received during his two years 
at the College. 
Chapter V deals with the Sudan Campaign (1897-1898), Haig's first 
experience of active service. It shows how the experience in the Sudan, 
though not a positive one for the cavalry, did not alter Haig's faith 
in the arm. 
Chapter VI covers the Boer War (1898-1902). This is the most impor- 
tant chapter in the thesis because, as a result of the war, Haig's faith 
in the cavalry became rigid. The Boer War was the terminus of Haig's 
development as a soldier; his strategical and tactical beliefs underwent 
no significant change after 1902. 
Chapter VII covers 1902-1906, when Haig was Inspector General of 
Cavalry in India. His development as a soldier now complete, the focus 
of the thesis is shifted to the consolidation of his position within the 
Army and to the influential people who aided this consolidation. 
Chapter VIII deals with 1906-1909, when Haig assisted R. B. Haldane 
in the program of Army reform. The chapter analyses Haig's contribution 
to reform. His continued rise, professionally and socially, is charted. 
Chapter IX covers the period 1909-1914, and focuses on Haig's further rise within the Army. The first two years were spent in India 
as Chief of Staff, the last two at Aldershot as Ist Corps Commander. 
Haig's role in the events leading up to the despatch of the B. E. F. for 
France is studied. 
The final chapter is an epilogue. A brief summary of the rest of 
Haig's life is provided. The chapter then shifts to an analysis of the 
challenges presented by the Great War and examines Haig's ability (based 
on his pre-war record) to meet them. 
DECLARATION: 
This is to certify that the thesis has been composed 
and researched entirely by tie undersigned. 
Signed: 
Gerard J. DeGroot 
Preface-- 
The massive collection of Haig Papers in the National Library 
of Scotland leads one to believe that Haig must have had a 'sense of 
history'. From a very early age, he appears to have had a conception 
of himself as a man of destiny , which 
led him to preserve a record 
of his inexorable progress upwards. One's first impression on encoun- 
tering the collection is that it is a biography waiting to be written. 
It is possible to accurately describe Haig's course in life, starting 
from a very early age. The second impression one has is a sense of wonder 
over why such a biography has not been written--why historians have pre- 
ferred the mythical images of Haig to the record he has left. What 
follows is an attempt to use the collection to reveal the man. 
Three methodological notes need to be mentioned. It should be 
emphasised at the outset that the quotations from Haig's own writings 
are the closest possible approximations of the original sources. Haig, 
as will be seen, had chronic difficulties with punctuation, grammar, 
syntax and spelling. He used punctuation marks which were his own creation 
and which therefore cannot be reproduced on a typewriter. His spelling 
of words often differed from sentence to sentence. Capitalisation was 
apparently an indicator of the importance Haig gave to things. For 
instance, 'Cavalry' was almost always capitalised, while 'infantry' 
and "'artillery' seldom received the honour. Pather than employing masses 
of 'sics', I have decided to leave Haig's expression virtually alone. 
Mistakes can therefore be assumed to have been his, and not mine. The 
same caution applies to the other members of the Haig family. 
The second note concerns the use of the word 'moral'. As will 
be seen, Haig uses this word, both as an adjective and as a noun, in a 
similar fashion to the way in which 'morale' is used today. For instance, 
he often wrote of the cavalry as being a 'moral weapon'. To substitute 
'morale' in all cases where Haig would have used 'moral' would be 
clumsy and confusing. It is therefore my intention to temporarily 
revive the somewhat obsolete usage of 'moral'. 
The third note concerns the subject of military rank. As the 
rank of a soldier continually changes throughout the course of 
his career, it can be confusing to repeatedly mention it. The rank 
of a person will therefore only be given when it is, in itself, 
important to the matter being discussed: i. e. when Captain Haig 
criticised Field Marshal Roberts. 
Finally, rather than extending my thanks to those who have assisted 
in the preparation of this thesis by mentioning them here, I have 
employed a more personal and private method. This thesis could not 
have been completed without the guidance, criticism and especially 
encouragement of a few very special individuals. The reader should 
rest assured that my deepest gratitude has been expressed to those 
concerned. 
A Note on the Sources: 
In researching this thesis, the attempt has been made to rely as 
much as possible on primary sources. In some cases, however, the 
relevant sources have not been available. Perhaps the most important 
of these are the official Army records pertaining to Haig's career. 
These will unfortunately not be available until one hundred years after 
the date of the particular report. This has meant that, since Haig 
entered the Army in 1883, not even the earliest records could be 
secured. 
A second important source which could not be tapped was the papers 
of Sir Evelyn Wood which are in the library of Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina. A large amount of correspondence to and from 
Wood is, however, contained in the Haig, Kitchener and Roberts 
collections. 
The letters from Lady Haig to her husband were destroyed by her 
after the Great War, as she thought them to be of no value. The Haig 
collection does contain a large file of letters collected by her from 
persons who had memories of him. It is, however, safe to assume that 
she destroyed any that cast him in a less than glowing light. All 
the Great War letters from Lieutenant General Sir John Davidson to 
his wife were destroyed by the latter. 
The originals of some letters quoted by Haig's biographers could 
not be found, due probably to the disorganised state in which the 
entire collection is kept at the National Library of Scotland. In these 
instances, the letters have been quoted directly from the particular 
biographies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Douglas Haig's name will forever be synonymous with the 60,000 
casualties on the first day of the Somme and the 400,000 muddy 
victims of Passchendaele. Unlike any other British general, Haig has 
been judged more by the length of his casualty lists than by the 
outcome of his campaigns. The terrible loss of life has been inter- 
preted either as the burden he had to bear or the guilt he should 
shoulder. 
The middle ground in the Haig debate is sparsely populated. Disa- 
greement over Haig's responsibility for the enormous number of British 
casualties in the Great War has polarised opinion among historians. 
One side has studied the casualty figures and the characteristics of 
the fighting and blamed Haig, the commander of ultimate responsibility. 
These historians have suggested strategic and tactical alternatives 
which they believe would have resulted in victory at a lower cost of 
life. They have labelled Haig as obstinate, indifferent, unimagina- 
tive or incompetent for failing to recognise these alternatives. The 
other side stuied Haig and found what they felt to be an able commander. 
They were also impressed by his steadfast courage, devotion and patrio- 
tism; and by the principles and values which guided him. These 
qualities and his ability made him a hero in the traditional mould of 
British military commanders. With a man of such stature, it was 
natural to blame the nature of warfare at the time of Hai g's command 
for the tragically high casualties. Haig seemed all the more heroic 
for his ability to endure this ghastly war. 
The passage of time brought a hardening of attitudes toward 
Haig. The gap between the two sides now seems unbridgeable. Each side 
relies upon standards--of human conduct and of war--which the other 
side does not honour. The argument now bears little relation to the 
man himself. The pattern of Haig's life and his development as a 
soldier has been ignored in the determined effort to damn or ennoble 
him. 
The case for Haig has been argued mainly by his biographers. It 
is curious that, despite the controversy which surrounds Haig, a 
biography critical of him has not been written. In all, eleven books 
have been published which could be loosely classified as biographies 
of Haig. The first two studies, published after Haig's death in 
1928 by George Arthur and Ernest Protheroe, 
1 
were clearly intended as 
tributes to a fallen hero. Scantily researched and overly romantic, 
they are of little value to a serious study of Haig. 
The official biography, Haig, by Alfred Duff Cooper, was published 
in 1936.2 It was delayed because Lady Haig had difficulty finding 
an author to agree to her stipulation that she would control access 
to her husband's papers and would reserve the right of censorship. 
Her first and second choices, James Edmonds and J. H. Boraston, were 
both 'too busy'. She then asked Sir Frederick Maurice, who intitially 
agreed to undertake the work, but soon found her restrictions intoler- 
able. She reluctantly asked Duff Cooper, for whom she had little 
trust. His task was made slightly easier by her subsequent nervous 
collapse, which rendered her unable to pursue the role of censor as 
diligently as she might have wished. It is with Lady Haig in mind 
that Duff Cooper's work should be judged. The restrictions which 
she imposed and the general nuisance which she made of herself make the 
publication of the book itself an act of heroism. It remains the most 
complete treatment of Haig's life. Though it does little to alter 
the heroic image of Haig, there are occasional hints of a frustrated 
1George Arthur, Lord Haig, (London: Heinemann, 1928) and Ernest 
Protheroe, Earl Haig (London: Hutchinson, 1928). 
2Alfred Duff Cooper, Haig, (London: Faber and Faber, 1936). 
-to- 
author unable to expose his subject's flaws. Yet even this sanitised 
version was not acceptable to Lady Haig, who referred to it as a 
'vandalism' which 'slandered my husband's name'. 
1 
Lady Haig was able to delay for approximately two years the publi- 
cation of Duff Cooper's 'vile book'. Her indignation inspired her to 
write a book of her own, which she hoped would precede the release 
and therefore neutralise the effect of Haig. But the publication 
of her book was stopped when an interim edict was filed by Faber and 
Faber, publishers of Haig. It was ruled that it would be a breach of 
contract if she released her book before Duff Cooper's. Lady Haig's 
The Man I Knew--the glowing tribute to her husband which she had hoped 
the official biography would be--followed the publication of Haig by 
a few months. A comparison of her book and the diaries and letters 
of her husband reveals that she actually knew very little about him, 
or was conveniently blind to his faults. The book is nevertheless 
useful for the anecdotes peculiar to her and for the light it sheds 
on their relationship. 
Two other books written by persons close to Haig are useful for 
similar reasons. These are Douglas Haig as I Knew Him by George 
Duncan, Haig's personal padre at GHQ, and Haig: Master of the Field 
by J. H. Davidson, Chief of Operations from 1916-1918.3 The Duncan 
book provides valuable information on Haig's religious beliefs, and 
1Lady Haig to L. Hore-Belisha, 28 November 1938, Haig Papers, 
NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 325(a). Correspondence pertaining to the publica- tion of the official biography and The Man I Knew can be found in 
volumes 321 and 325. These reveal a paranoid woman who could tolerate 
not even the slightest criticism of the husband she idolised. 
2Tho Countess Haig, The Man I Knew, (Edinburgh: Moray Press, 1936). 
3George Duncan, Douglas Haig as I Knew Him, (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1968) and J. H. Davidson, Haig: Master of the Field, (London: Peter Nevill, 1953). 
the Davidson study worthwhile material on the command structure at 
GHQ. Otherwise, the books are of little use. The boundless, blinding 
admiration that both men felt for Haig prevented a balanced treatment 
of him. 
Field Marshal Earl Haig, 
1 by John Charteris, Haig's Chief of 
Intelligence until late 1917, is, on the other hand, one of the most 
valuable studies of Haig. Charteris, unlike Duncan and Davidson, was 
one of the few individuals ever to penetrate within the 'outer walls' 
of Haig's character. For seven years (1911-1918), he was almost con- 
stantly at Haig's side. He knew Haig professionally, and probably 
personally, better than anyone. This knowledge, when combined with 
his at times devious wit and his keen sense of human frailties, enabled 
him to see and expose certain sides of Haig that would otherwise never 
have been revealed. The book is, as intended, a glorification of Haig. 
But this did not stop Charteris from raising an occasional eyebrow 
at his subject. It is unfortunate that Lady Haig denied him permis- 
sion to consult her husband's papers during the preparation of his 
book (and then, incidentally, crticised the final result for its 
inaccuracies). It is interesting to speculate what might have resulted 
from the combination of personal insight and secure documentation. 
After Haig's death in 1928, it gradually became acceptable to 
question his conduct of the war. The book most responsible for starting 
the spate of misgivings was the War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 
2 
published 'in six volumes in 1934. The re-publication in a more 
1John Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, (London: Cassell, 1929). 
Charteris also published Haig London: Duckworth, 1933), a condensed 
version of the earlier work. 
2David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (London: Odhams Press Ltd., 
1938). This is the two-volume set which will be used throughout this 
study. 
affordable two-volume set in 1938 and the release of the Pässchendaele 
chapter in pamphlet form ensured that Lloyd George's criticisms of 
Haig received a wide audience. The more favourable treatments of 
Duff Cooper and Charteris could not compete with the enormous sales 
and publicity of the War Memoirs. 
Lloyd George attacked Haig on a variety of fronts. He saw Haig 
as indifferent, slow-witted and incompetent. He objected to what 
he saw as Haig's belief that soldiers were the only persons capable 
of conducting war. But the allegations which had the greatest impact 
were those in which Haig was accused of intentionally misleading the 
War Cabinet in order to continue carrying on the war as he wanted. 
The memoirs, while informative and interesting, must be approached with 
caution. They are, as was intended, a personal polemic aimed at 
exposing the 'incompetence of the trained inexperts'1 of GHQ. Lloyd 
George and Haig could hardly have been more different. The two men, 
as a result, found it extremely difficult to understand each other. 
The War Memoirs reveal this lack of understanding. When reading them, 
it is useful to imagine what Haig would have written about Lloyd 
George. The long-term effect of the work is that the author's subjective 
and at times embellished interpretation of events has, through extensive 
repetition and embroidery by authors eager to condemn Haig, given 
rise to a network of half-truths surrounding Haig's command. 
The work of J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart-probably the 
greatest military minds of their day-are worthy of greater respect. 
Their criticism of Haig's command is bolstered by their direct experi- 
ence of the war and by their willingness to offer plausible alternatives 
to Haig's conduct of operations. Fuller's most cogent arguments are 
'Lloyd George, War Memoirs, forward to Volume I. 
found in Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure; in which he skil- 
fully exposes the staff and command problems which undermined effec- 
tiveness at Haig's GHQ. Liddell Hart's criticisms were first aired in 
The Real War, 2 which remains the best history of the 1914-1918 conflict. 
He returned to the subject of Haig in other books, most notably Through 
the Fog of War. 
3 His thesis in all his works is that a lack of imagina- 
tion, a blinding optimism and an over-emphasis upon staff loyalty pre- 
vented Haig from understanding or adjusting to the unique war. The 
work of both authors provides the technical foundation necessary 
to any study of generalship. But, while both authors perhaps success- 
fully expose Haig's weaknesses, they stop short of explaining or under- 
standing them. 
The stature of Fuller and Liddell Hart, and the persuasiveness of 
Lloyd George, overwhelmed the arguments of the early Haig biographers. 
The door was opened for lesser individuals to pour forth their vitriol. 
This naturally provoked a reaction from the diehard proponents of 
Haig, who objected to the sometimes unfair treatment of their hero. 
The polarisation of opinion mentioned previously became evident in the 
mid-1940s. After the Second World War, in addition to the works by 
Duncan and Davidson, three revisionist biographies were published, 
all aiming at Haig's rehabilitation. One of these, Douglas Haig, 
4 
by E. K. G. Sixsmith, adds little original insight to the study of 
1 J. F. C. Fuller. Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure. 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1932). 
2B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, (London: Faber and Faber, 
1930). The book was re- ublished as History of the First World War 
(London: Pan Books, 1972), which is the edition used in this study. 
3B. H. Liddell Hart, Through the Fog of War, (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1938). 
1976). 
E. K. G. Sixsmith, Douglas Haig, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
Haig, and is therefore not worthy of consideration here. 
John Terraine's Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier is, on the 
other hand, the most important biography, if only because the author 
is the most outspoken and articulate admirer of Haig. Terraine's 
thesis is that Haig, a highly 'educated soldier', did the best that 
was humanly possible in his command of the British Army. Blame for 
the war's high casualties is, as mentioned previously, directed at the 
nature of warfare at the time of Haig's command. Terraine argues 
that 
the options open to him were severely limited and that large-scale 
death and destruction were unavoidable. This sort of fatalism is 
difficult to counter, since Terraine can provide plenty of proof for 
his assertions. He rejects as hindsight alternatives to Haig's conduct, 
and scorns as hopelessly naive protestations over the huge loss of life. 
Haig becomes a hero, in a sense, through negation--in other words, he 
qualifies as a 'modern' commander for his stoical acceptance of the 
intractable nature of modern war. 
Terraine did not intend his book to be a complete biography of 
Haig, but rather a study of his conduct of the war. But this does not 
stop him from drawing important conclusions about Haig's pre-war career, 
particularly his eligibility for the title of 'educated soldier'. 
Terrain's skill of argumentation obscures a reasoning which is essen- 
tially a priori. In other words, he appears to have begun with an 
assumption of an intractable war, upon which he constructs the thesis 
that Haig was a great leader, which in turn leads him to suppose that his 
early career must have been full of militarily enlightening experiences. 
Having concluded in advance that these experiences must have existed, 
he naturally finds evidence for them. The reader is carried smoothly 
through a series of logical conclusions all of which rest precariously 
I John Terrain e, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. (London: 
Hutchinson, 1963). 
on the 'educated soldier' argument. While Haig was educated in the 
general sense, it is necessary to look closely at the quality of his 
education. As will be seen, an investigation of the resources Terraine 
did not study reveals the many holes in his logic. 
Sir James Marshall-Cornwall agrees with Terraine on the nature 
of the war and on Haig's unique ability. But because he pays more atten- 
tion to Haig's early development, his arguments are more convincing. 
His book, Haig as a Military Commander, 
1 is, though unquestionably 
favourable to Haig, the most balanced study available. While he, too, 
tends to generalise backwards from Haig's war record, his preconceptions 
do not lead him into clumsy, impossible arguments. For instance, 
Marshall-Cornwall is able to see Haig's cavalry background for the 
impediment it sometimes was, rather than denying that it had any 
negative effects upon his development, which is the line taken in all 
of Terraine's studies. Marshall-Cornwall is the most convincing bio- 
grapher simply because he is the least dogmatic. 
A second generation of Haig critics have restated the arguments 
of Fuller, Liddell Hart and Lloyd George, albeit with much less credi- 
bility. Bitterness over the casualties has often smothered reason. 
Alan Clark's The Donkeys, Leon Wolff's In Flanders Fields and Norman 
Dixon's On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, 
2 
all contain 
unbalanced criticism of Haig. The three authors, while pursuing dif- 
ferent theses, are alike in their at times blinding desire to casti- 
gate Haig. This desire overwhelms all efforts at honest scholarship. 
Primary sources are not used. All three authors instead rely mainly 
1Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Haig as a Military Commander, (London; B. T. Batsford, 1973) 
2Alan 
Clark, The Donkeys, (London: Hutchinson, 1961); Leon Wolff, 
In Flanders Fields, (New York: Viking, 1958); Norman Dixon, On the 
Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London: Jonathan Cape, 19? 6). 
on the testimony of Haig's staunchest critics. With this sprt of 
judge and these sort of witnesses, Haig is naturally found guilty 
of the most heinous crimes. 
Dixon believes that Haig's conduct of the war is an example of 
military incompetence. Using the psychoanalytical approach, he 
explains this incompetence as a manifestation of Haig's authoritarian 
character. Having concluded that Haig was an authoritarian, Dixon then 
looks to the pre-1914 period for evidence to justify this conclusion. 
The approach is perhaps the best example of the tendency to make 
judgements on Haig's character based predominantly on his war record, 
a tendency which is evident in all studies of Haig. This a priori 
reasoning is the ultimate consequence of the strident debate over 
Great War casualties. Behind every study of Haig there is the hidden 
aim of condemning or absolving him for the loss of life. Few have 
examined him in a detached manner. His diaries and letters from the 
pre-1914 period have been used as a convenient repository from which 
the particular authors have selectively extracted evidence to coincide 
with their preconceptions. The debate over Haig's command has, as 
a result, become little more than a sterile contest of the various 
historian,. talents of argumentation. 
Haig's character developed before he became a soldier. He developed 
as a soldier before he became a commander. Because historians have 
failed to respect this process, distorted pictures of Haig have 
emerged. There is, therefore, room for a new approach. The study of 
Haig should begin in 1861, the year of his birth. His evolution at 
each stage in his life should be examined in relation to the previous 
stages, not in relation to the Great War or any preconceptions regarding 
his character. This is the approach taken in this thesis. It begins 
with a detailed examination of his family background and youth, areas 
to which biographers have generally paid only superficial attention. 
It is important to understand the shaping of Haig's character, because, 
as will be seen, certain aspects of his personality pre-conditioned the 
course which his career assumed. Haig's command in the Great War is 
examined, briefly and speculatively, in relation to his pre-war 
development--a complete reversal of the. approach taken in previous 
studies. The brevity of the treatment of the war may at first appear 
curious. But it seems that an understanding of Haig as a person is 
only possible by intentionally under-emphasising the controversial 
issues of his command which in the past have hindered such an under- 
standing. This approach also allows the reader to make his or her 
own conclusions on Haig's war record, aided by the more complete 
study of Haig's pre-war life which is provided. It must therefore be 
stressed that the epilogue is simply this author's 
. 
speculative 
conclusions, based on an incomplete study of the war and by no means 
presumed to be final. 
With these aims in mind, the available evidence has been examined 
with an open mind. Haig's life has been treated as an integrated 
whole. There have been no preconceived notions of criticising or 
praising him. This has meant that extensive amounts of previously 
unused material from the pre-1914 period hive been discovered and 
employed. In the past, historians have relied on the easily accessible 
and most impressive elements of the Haig Papers, namely the diaries 
and letters to important individuals. The neglect of much of the 
important source material in the 337 volumes of the manuscripts has 
contributed to the present sterility of the debate. This thesis 
delves deeply into these volumes, and also makes greater use of the 
manuscripts of Haig's contemporaries, and relevant secondary sources. 
The result is a work which respects the complicated process of Haig's 
development and ultimately leads, it is felt, to a better understanding 
of his command in war. 
CHAPTER I: 
Early Life, 1861-1879 
Though Edinburgh claims Douglas Haig as one of her famous 
sons, his roots in the city are not deep. He was born at 24 
Charlotte Square, a residence used by the Haig children who at- 
tended school locally. The actual family home was at Cameron Bridge, 
near Markinch. Douglas was the eleventh child of John Haig, a Fife 
landowner whose whisky distillery still bears his name. The Haig 
family has a long and proud history which is centred on the ancestral 
home of Bemersyde in the Borders. But Douglas's connection with the 
main family line was distant. His father was descended from Robert 
Haig of St. Ninian's, second son of the 17th Laird of Bemersyde. 
1 
John 
Haig was thus sufficiently removed from the Bemersyde Haigs to be con- 
sidered a member of the merchant class, not the gentry. It was whisky, 
not blood, which initially opened doors for Douglas. 
John Haig married Rachel Veitch in August 1939. He was 37, she 
a beautiful woman of 18. The marriage was a poor match for her. She 
was of the line Veitch of Eliock--a less financially stable branch 
of the Veitches of Dawyck. The Veitches also had a long and proud 
family history, which they traced to Charlemagne. Whatever their 
financial situation, they usually avoided liaisons with the trading 
community. John Haig's £10,000 a year income was, however, enough 
to overcome the disdain of the dowerless Miss Veitch. The marriage 
was a symbiotic one. It gave him respectability and her the chance 
to raise children in the style usually associated with her class. 
John and Rachel settled at C'meron House after their wedding. 
Eleven children were born--with stunning regularity--in twenty-two 
years. Three daughters and five sons survived infancy. When Douglas 
was born, on 19 June 1861, his father had aged past his 59 years. He 
CU 
'John 
Haig was six generations descended from RobertHaig. 
suffered from asthma, gout and the ill-effects of heavy drinking. 
When he died 17 years later, 'abscess of the liver" was listed as 
the cause. Every winter he spent considerable time at spas in France 
and Germany, trips which had the ostensible purpose of drying out: 
Your father is looking so well this morning he was up 
before 8. and went out before breakfast. This is the 
first time he has attempted to do so since he came and this 
is the first time he has done without Brandy, Whisky or 
Kirsche before breakfast--really Vichy has acted like magic 
on your father .0.2 
The heavy drinking and ill-health had a profound effect upon his 
disposition. He became increasingly bitter and bad tempered as he 
grew older. The children remembered him as an irritable man whose coarse 
language often frightened them. 
3 
John Haig's disposition may explain the apparent lack of affection 
displayed towards him by his children. Like all his brothers and 
sisters, Douglas was noticeably silent about his relationship with 
his father. There is little mention of him in the diaries and letters. 
It does not appear that he was overly grieved when his father died 
in 1878. A former groom at Cameron House, Thomas Houston, provided 
a revealing glimpse of the relationship between father and son: 
One incident I recall refers to when Earl Haig was quite a 
young boy. My eldest brother was. then groom to his father. 
My brother was then riding a rather restive young horse. 
. Master Douglas was behind a hedge and when my brother 
came near he jumped out and startled the horse and my brother 
had a fall, the horse's hoof catching a cheek and leaving a 
1'Notes 
on the early life of Douglas Haig', contained in John Hai to Lady Haig, 16 February 1930, Haig Papers, NLS, Ace. 3155, No. 322(a), Hereafter referred to as John Haig, 'Notes'. 
2Rachel Hai to Douglas Haig, 20 July 1877, Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 3 (a). All of the following letters from mother to son are from this collection and will be cited as 'Rachel to Douglas', followed by the date of the correspondence. 
3John Haig, Notes'. 
mark quite visible now ... Master 
Douglas was sent off 1 
to Edinburgh by his mother till his father had cooled down. 
John Haig probably had little, if any, effect upon his youngest son's 
development. He seems to have taken minimal interest in Douglas's 
welfare. There is, for instance, only one letter from father to 
son in the considerable collection of family correspondence. All 
educational matters were handled by Rachel, with assistance from the 
eldest son William. 'Willie' was the 'moving spirit in the family'-- 
in many respects a surrogate father. 
2 
John Haig devoted his time 
to various business interests, while Douglas, in turn, usually 
accompanied his mother on the frequent long retreats to the coast 
she took for reasons of ill-health. When he was nine, he was boarded 
at school, and corresponded little with his father after that time. 
It was possibly to Douglas's advantage that he was able to avoid 
significant contact with his father. 
Rachel Haig, by reasons of her more genteel birth, may have con- 
sidered herself more qualified to supervise the children's upbringing 
than their father. It will be seen that she wanted them to adopt the 
ways of her class, not his. This meant that the father's abroga- 
tion of responsibility was countered by the mother's at times 
overbearing attention. She was kind-hearted, highly moral and 
deeply religious, and willingly sacrificed a socially active life 
for her children: 
Every morning--winter or summer--she came to the nursery 
at 4 a. m. to see we were all right: Her devotion to us 
shortened her life by many years, as she died a compara- 
tively young woman of 58.3 
She was especially devoted to her three youngest sons: John, George 
1Thomas Houston to Lady Haig, 6 April 1929, Haig Papers, NIS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 324(a). 
I 
2John Haig, 'Notes'. 
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and Douglas. The son and daughter1 born prior to these three did not 
survive infancy. This meant that a considerable age gap separated 
them from the other five. They were a family within a family. 
After Douglas was born, the exhausting regularity of pregnancies 
ended for Rachel. She could devote herself entirely to her `three 
bees'. 2 She was aware that her health was failing, and so was eager 
to do as much as possible for them in the time remaining to her. 
It will be seen that Douglas experienced educational difficulties 
as a youth. These problems, in addition to the state of her health, 
caused Rachel to be especially concerned about his future. Perhaps 
because she felt Douglas needed her the most, he became the focus of 
her attention: 
Selflessly devoted to her children, she loved her youngest 
above them all, for, with the fine insight of great love, 
she knew herself to be especially blessed in her .. little son Douglas. 3 
Though Janet Haig could later rationalise the favouritism enjoyed 
by Douglas, at one time it was the source of friction between him 
and the others. Douglas was oftQ/ mocked and pestered by them. 
His long blond curls, which Rachel adored, were the subject of ridi- 
cule. On one oceasion he was held down while the curls were shorn 
with a pair of horse scissors. Douglas was sent in tears to his 
mother, the curls wrapped in his pinafore. Rachel was greatly upset 




were born in 1853 and 1855 respectively. 
2Rachel 
nicknamed her three youngest sons the 'three bees' for 
the way they constantly 'buzzed' about her. The name stayed with John, 
who was called Bee for the rest of his life. 
3Janet Haig to Douglas Haig, 10 August 1920, Haig Papers, NLS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 346(d). 
4The 
envelop containing the curls is still contained in the 
Haig collection in the National Library of Scotland. 
The excessive affection was combined with a laxity of. discipline. 
Young Douglas was a spoiled child. He was prone to severe temper 
tantrums and was difficult for his nurses to handle. Rachel did not 
discipline him when he misbehaved. Instead, she placated him with 
sweets or small gifts. Like many spoiled children, Douglas stubbornly 
opposed his mother while at the same time recognising her as his most 
important ally. She was his comfort, his confidante, his guardian 
and his friend in a world which was intitially somewhat threatening. 
She accepted his inadequacies and supported him in spite of them. 
Rachel was a 'very religiously-minded woman who could believe no 
wrong in those she loved'. 
1 
The one she believed in--and loved--the 
most was Douglas, despite his inability to justify her faith during 
her lifetime. The combined effect of the excessive affection, 
laxity and unquestioning support was to give Douglas eventually an 
over-inflated sense of his own importance, an attribute which, though 
in time moderated, was never completely discarded. 
The above description of Haig's childhood conflicts significantly 
with the picture presented by Norman Dixon in his book On the Psychology 
of Military Incompetence. He argues that Haig was an authoritarian, 
and that this characteristic rendered him incompetent as a military 
commander. He defines the authoritarian as conservative, conventional, 
unemotional, reserved, egocentric, obstinate, orderly and mean. In 
contrast to the autocrat, who exercises tight control when the situa- 
tion demands it, the authoritarian is 'always tightly controlled, 
no matter what the external situation. '2 The condition is supposed 
1Emily Hai to Lady Haig, 7 April 1928, Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 
3155, No. 322(a). 
2Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, p. 287. 
The emphasis is the author's. This book will hereafter be referred 
to as Dixon, Military Incompetence. 
to derive from repressive forces encountered in childhoods In Haig's 
case, Dixon argues, a naturally aggressive nature was rerouted and 
legitimised into sanctioned outlets such as 'hard work, a belief in 
the inevitability of punishment for wrongdoing, and a preoccupation 
with the concept of discipline. '1 Rachel's effect upon this process 
is claimed to have been decisive. Dixon connects Haig's 'military 
incompetence' with the fact that he was 'an unusually sullen and aggres- 
sive child ... pushed resolutely 
forwards and upwards by a strict 
and puritanical mother. '2 
Haig did exhibit authoritarian traits. But neither his person- 
ality nor his upbringing fall as neatly into the authoritarian pattern 
as Dixon asserts. It will be shown that Haig displayed many charac- 
teristics--such as a disrespect for authority--which do not fit the 
authoritarian nadel. Dixon mistakenly places excessive emphasis 
upon his rigid theoretical framework, which causes him to ignore 
evidence which conflicts with his preconceived conclusions regarding 
Haig's nature. Rachel did have high ambitions for her son. These 
may have caused him strain. But neither the ambitions nor the 
strain were excessive or extraordinary. Rachel was not, to Douglas, 
a strict puritanical mother. Her precepts may have been puritanical; 
her raising of him was not. 
Douglas nevertheless did adopt many of his mother's precepts, 
in addition to much of her general attitude toward life. Dixon 
explains these similarities by arguing that Douglas reacted to 
the 'heavy opposition from his mother ... by what analysts call 
introjection and repression. He incorporated his mother as an 
idealised authority figure.. . . '3 Repressed emotions are difficult 
'Dixon, 





to discover and explain at the best of times. The task becomes nearly 
impossible when the 'patient' lived over a century ago. The same 
difficulties arise when attempting to discover tendencies toward 
introjection, which is the totally subconscious adoption of the 
traits of another. In Haig's case, the evidence suggests that 
similarities to his mother resulted from conscious imitation rather 
than introjection or repression. Douglas spent his first eight 
years almost completely in his mother's company. There was no out- 
side influence from schoolmasters or tutors. He had few playmates, 
no close companions. 
' His mother was his most important role model. 
Douglas admired her and he consciously emulated her: 
Douglas revered and loved his mother ... her death in 1879 ... was a great sorrow to him, he could never speak 
of her, but it was her memory that inspired him to do his 
utmost to live up to her exalted standard of truth and up- 
rightness. 2 
Though some standards were perverted in the process of imitation, 
the statement is generally correct. To argue that Haig's assumption 
of his mother's ways was unintentional and subconcious is to ignore 
the overwhelming evidence of his devotion to and admiration for her. 
Regardless of the inspiration, the similarities between Douglas 
and his mother are remarkable and significant. His natural aggression 
and resolution mirrored her relentless ambition. Both were self-willed 
1This 
is clear from John Haig's 'Notes', the letter of Thomas 
Houston, and other accounts left by persons associated with the Haig 
family. See also the 'Nursery Duties', page 29, especially the rules 
concerning visiting. In addition, there is a letter from Alexina 
Nicholson Hunter to Lady Haig (Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 324(a), 
dated 23 February 1929) in which it is recalled how John Haig would 
sometimes leave young Douglas with Mrs. Hunter's father, while he (John) 
fished on the river Leven. "I remember how he [Douglas] used to stand 
in a circle silently, hungrily eating ... and when finished scamper 
off again to'cuddle' the minnows. We considered the 'wee chap' very 
quiet and felt very honoured to play with him as he was one of the 
'Gentry' to us: " 
2Emily Haig to Lady Haig, 7 April 1928. 
to a degree which made compromise difficult. Both believed in them- 
selves and the righteousness of their ways. Yet both were able to 
cloak their less admirable characteristics is a'quiet dignity'. 
1 
Rachel and her son--he from a very early age--could cast an image of 
moral purity-and placidity which obscured their darker sides. Reli- 
gion was an important component of this image. The intensity and 
sincerity of Rachel's conviction cannot be doubted. But her rigid 
fatalism did absolve her from ultimate responsibility for the 
course of events in her life. It was thus a great comfort to her. 
While she was certain that every man had the power to shape his 
own destiny, she nevertheless believed that everything, in the final 
analysis, was the expression of God's will. This meant that misfor- 
tune--such as her ill-health or Douglas's lack of achievement as a 
child-=did not erode her steadfast optimism. 
2 
Rachel supervised her children's religious tuition and worship 
until her death in 1879. They recited their lessons and prayed daily 
in her presence. When Douglas went to school she required that he 
send his weekly Biblical texts; accompanied by his comments, to her. 
'Your wee texts are all safely laid away', 
3 
she would reply. She 
constantly enjoined him to 'remember the All-seeing, loving Eye ever 
upon you my dear boy. '4 John found her 'perhaps too religious'. 
5 
The letters of Henrietta and Janet contain no reference to religious 
matters. Only Douglas mirrored her deep conviction, though even he 
1920. 
'A 
term used by Janet Haig in her letter to Douglas, 20 August 
2This fatalism was especially evident when Douglas failed to 
gain entrance to Rugby (See page 35). 
3Rachel 
to Douglas, 3 June 1875. 
4Rachel 
to Douglas, 15 May 1874. 
5John Haig, 'Notes'. 
was, at first, less devout than his mother. He attended church regularly, 
but otherwise approached religion with moderation. During the Great 
War, however, an intensity similar to his mother's suddenly materi- 
alised. The element of fatalism also became evident. 
' John Haig 
was certain that this sudden intensity was 'entirely due to the 
extraordinarily right-minded training he received in his early life 
from his devoted Mother. '2 
Another importänt component of the image of moral purity was the 
habit of order and cleanliness which Douglas learned from his 
mother. This habit was later reinforced by every institution through 
which Haig passed, but its source was Rachel. Though she was in general 
lax in her discipline of him, she emphasised order and regimentation 
in his daily life. She had definite, immutable ideas about raising 
children, and did not tolerate departures by nurses from her pre-set 
plans. The following 'Nursery Duties' are an example of her attitude: 
NURSERY DUTIES 
Nurses must rise every morning at 6: 00. 
The nurse must devote her time and thoughts to the comfort 
and well-being of the three little boys under her charge-- 
cheerily--and happily, always being beside them. 
Perfect regularity necessary. 
Children's porridge at 8 o'clock. Dinner at ä past one. Tea 
at 6. Lights out and nursery quiet at 10. Children bathed 
every night--their hair washed once a week--their socks 
changed twice a day. Clothes kept in good repair--and avery- thing connected with the nursery tidy, and neat. Day 
nursery scrubbed out every second night-bathroom twice 
a week, dirty things counted over and mended before the 
washing on Monday. 
Good fire, and everything comfortable for the children on rising--when out to walk they are not to go to people's houses. 
'During the war Haig's favourite Biblical text was 2 Chronicles, XX: 15--'Be not afraid nor dismayed by reasons of this great multitude; for the battle is not yours but God's. / 
, 
See Haig Papers, NLS, Ace. 
3155, No. 324(a). 
2John Haig, 'Notes'. 
Clothes brushed at night and boots and shoes before they 
rise in the morning. Nurse has to rise to wash and do'up 
her own clothes. Nurse gets to church every other Sunday. 
All children's tempers must be studied--the treatment 
which is good for one child may not suit another. 
1 
Janet once commented to Douglas that the 'Nursery Duties remind me 
of your own orderly ways. '2 Rachel's lessons on order and cleanli- 
ness were learned exceptionally well by her youngest son. 
3 
In the Victorian ethos, cleanliness and order were symbols of 
moral purity, which was in turn an important component of the gentle- 
manly image. It was this image which Rachel trained her sons to 
adopt. Part of the training was a classical education at a first- 
rate public school. Rachel felt that a public school education was 
one of the distinguishing features which separated gentlemen from 
the vulgar masses. Since she was determined to have her sons adopt 
her ways, not their father's, she paid close attention to their 
progress in school. Her aims were evident in a letter of 1859 
written to one of Willie's tutors: 
Our object is not to make Willie a distiller or anything 
in particular. We desire to develop in him to the utmost 
such gifts as he has received from God--to improve those 
intellectual qualities in which he may be deficient And to 
cultivate his moral powers: --to see him grow up a humble and 
earnest Christian--an accomplished, well-informed and liberal- 
minded gentleman--with these qualifications be his lot in 
life what may, he will command respect and be in a position 
to derive happiness in whatever position of life God may 
place him ... As for myself I attach so much importance to scholarship--especially as an antidote to the vulgarity 
and narrowness of mind which active commercial pursuits are 
apt to engender in the best .. .4 
IThe date of the document is not known. It was enclosed in the 
10 August 1920 letter from Janet to Douglas. 
2Janet to Douglas, 10 August 1920. 
3A 
schoolmate's most profound memory of Haig was his 'clean 
appearance'. See C. C. Ho er-Millar to Lady Haig, n. d., Haig Papers,; 
NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 324(a). 
4Rachel 
Haig to unnamed person, 4 April 1859, Haig Papers, NIS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 3(a). 
Rachel's plans for Douglas were no less bold, as demonstrated in a 
letter to John: 
You must write to Douglas about your prospects--and it 
will be an immense spur to him in his Greek which he dislikes 
so much--When my brothers were at school, it was considered that 
a boy who did not learn Greek was uneducated-and to my idea 
an Oxford or Cambridge University man is of a hi er stamp, 
than those who are not--of course you ... mix with men 
in 
college who, in the course of a few years will be the great 
men of the day, Statesmen, lawyers, etc. and the training 
makes a gentleman! 1 
With her guidance, a gentleman--at least in the Victorian sense-a 
was what Douglas became. 
It is curious that, in spite of Rachel's firm belief in the 
value of a classical education, Douglas's schooling was at first 
approached in a rather nonchalant and haphazard manner. He received 
no formal training whatsoever during his first eight years. The rea- 
sons for the delay are not clear. It may be explained by his ill- 
health, 
2 
or by his behavioural problems. Alternatively, Rachel may 
have been reluctant to part with her youngest, and dearest, child. 
He was sent to a Mr. Patterson's school in St. Andrews in May 1869, 
but this was perhaps simply a convenient place for him while John 
and Rachel sought cures in Vichy. Douglas stayed with Patterson for 
no more than a few weeks. There are no records of his performance, 
nor of his impressions of his first educational venture. 
John was at Patterson's school at the same time as Douglas. 
In October 1869, John went to Edinburgh Collegiate, a small day 
school located in Charlotte Square, and Douglas followed him. The 
Collegiate was run by Archibald Hamilton Bryce, a classical scholar 
1Rachel Haig to John Haig, 9 June 1885, Haig Papers, NIS, Ace. 
3155, No. 3(a). 
2He 
suffered from excessive heat rash and, like his father, 
asthma. See John Haig, 'Notes' and Emily Haig to lady Haig, 7 
April 1928. Emily was certain that he learned to control the asthma 
through self control, i. e. avoiding activities which brought on attacks. 
educated at Dublin and Oxford. The curriculum reflected 
the background 
of the headmaster and the educational preferences of the 
day. In other 
words, it was dominated by classical subjects. It was here that 
Douglas's notorious problems in the Classics originated. A master 
of the school remembered him as a'clean, well-turned out boy' who 
was slow and backward. 
1 
John felt his brother's educational difficulties had their 
origin at the Collegiate. It is impossible to ascertain exactly 
the nature of his problems. He was not of low intelligence. His 
success in the Army suggests that his mental faculties were not 
deficient. His early problems were with learning, and probably 
resulted from his late start. When he began school he was behind 
his equals in age and was swamped by material which he found incom- 
prehensible. This in turn probably caused him embarrassmeht, ý. hich 
further limited his ability to overcome his difficulties. Some 
psychological problems may have resulted, as Dixon argues. But the 
degree of anxiety he suffered and the permanentieffect it had upon 
him cannot be accurately determined. It seems unlikely that he 
incurred 'lasting impairment of his achievement motivation'. 
2 Dixon 
believes that Haig's rise to the top of the Army was fueled by his 
'pathological achievement motivation!. 
3 
He defines this as a struggle 
to achieve motivated by the ego alone. Haig's school days were not 
idyllic, but neither were they as bleak as Dixon contends. His 
struggle to achieve was partially, but not completely, ego-motivated. 
1Dr. Robertson to lady Haig, n. d., Haig Papers, NLS, Ace. 3155, 
No. 324(a). 
2Dixon, Military Incompetence, p. 250. 
3See Dixon, pp. 239243 for a discussion df the various types of 
achievement motivation, of which the pathological variety is one. 
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Haig left Edinburgh Collegiate in the summer of 1871. "-' In Septem- 
ber, he again followed John to Orwell House, a preparatory school 
run by a Mr. Hanbury. Hanbury was a skilled and conscientious 
headmaster who concentrated on preparing boys for entrance into 
Rugby. Rachel's great ambition was that her sons should be educated 
at that institution, which set the standards for the cult of 
Muscular Christianity. 
) 
Rugby symbolised the gentlemanly values 
which'Rachel tried to instil in her sons. But Hanbury was reluctant 
to recommend any boy who did not meet Rugby's high standards. Haig, 
already burdened by his slow start, had little chance of earning his 
headmaster's recommendation and thus of satisfying his mother's 
ambition. His time at Orwell House--where he was torn between the 
depressing realism of Hanbury and the blind optimism of his mother-- 
was his most unsettling educational experience. 
Haig stayed at Orwell House until October 1875. His record 
was consistently dismal. The only surviving report suggests that he 
was also a difficult child, who had problems concentrating: 
Douglas ... is very backward in Latin ... spelling 
very poor and writing careless ... Rather tiresome at 2 
times ... as he is backward he ought to be more attentive. 
Rachel reacted to these difficulties with unquestioning support. 
She did not scold her son when he misbehaved, but instead encouraged 
him to improve. 'Make no subterfuge to Mr. Hanbury', she urged. 'Tell 
him the plain truth as no good could come of it if you do not .. . '3 
'For 
a discussion of this subject, see Rupert Wilkinson, The 
Prefects, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), Chapters 1-7; 
and David Newsome, Godliness and Good Learning, (London: John Murray, 
1961), Chapter 4. The background information to Haig's public school 
education is taken from these two excellent sources. 
2The 
Countess Haig, The Van I Knew, p. 14. The date of the report 
is not given. Hereafter cited as Haig, The Man I Knew. 
3Rachel to Douglas, 25 April 1875. 
She cautiously suggested that he might benefit from 'a couple hours 
lessons of a tutor every day ... No doubt 
it would be a great help 
to you my dear boy. '1 The same tone is evident in the following: 
Mr. H. finished up by saying 'It would not do Douglas any 
harm if he worked a little harder'--so my own darling boy 
take the hint and try and work a little harder. 2 
Rachel elevated her son's rare small success to the sublime. She 
reassured him that he would overcome his failures and that he should 
not be burdened by them. 'Do tell me how your work gets on'', she 
urged toward the end of his stay at Orwell House. 'Tell me all 
about it, as there is no one, as you know, whose thoughts centre so 
much on you my darling Douglas. '3 
Rachel repeatedly reminded Douglas that 'your advancement into 
Big School is my great desire, as you know so well. '4 It is possible 
that her ambitions caused him some strain, as Dixon suggests, but this 
was probably outweighed by the positive effects of her continued 
faith in him. At times this faith caused her to question the 
irrefutable evidence of his shortcomings. For instance, in a letter 
to John she admitted that 'Mr. Hanbury tells Douglas ... it 
is 
hardly worthwhile his going up to Rugby as he would be chucked out 
in a year or so', but finished by writing that she was 'dreadfully 
vexed at this'. 
5 
Though she did not make it clear whether she was 
vexed with Douglas's inability or with Hanbury's low opinion, a 
subsequent letter to Douglas suggests that the latter was the cases 
1Rachel 
to Douglas, 15 July 1875. 
Rachel to Douglas, 21 May 1875. 
3Rachel 
to Douglas, 8 October 1875. 
4Rachel 
to Douglas, 15 July 1875. 
5Rachel to John, 24 September 1875, Haig Papers, NLS; Acc. 3155, 
No. 3(a). 
I think you have a pretty good chance of getting into. ' 
Rugby ... the boy you mentioned who 
'got in' so high 
is a precedent I hope and trust will be your case. 
. and Howell, too, 
being still in the same form, 
looks as if they were not so particular as Mr. H. would 
lead one to suppose. 1 
Finally, on 16 October 1875, Rachel indicated to her son that 
she had accepted the inevitable: 
I had a letter last Saturday from Mr. Hanbury writing 
to know where we thought of placing you, as he could not 
advise you to go up for Rugby as your knowledge of Greek 
was so deficient you would never pass. 
2 
She did her best to hide her disappointment: 
Of course, as you know, I was very sorry to get Mr. H's 
letter, but then I felt satisfied it was for your good 
as I had so completely cast it upon God to do for you 
exactly what He knew was to be for your good, and now I 
have no more regrets about it if it be for your good. 
I prayed you might be helped into Rugby, I mer5ly tell 
you the simple truth and I believe it is well. 
It was in instances like these that Rachel's belief in the inevita- 
bility of God's will gave her strength. She took Hanbury's advice 
and enrolled Douglas at Clifton in late October 1875. Douglas again 
followed John to this school. John, who did not have his brother's 
difficulties with learning had also failed to meet Rugby's standards, 
despite similar urging from Rachel. Douglas could probably console 
himself (and Rachel herself) with this thought. John's failure 
also weakens Dixon's argument, which relies on the unique problems 
of Douglas and their connection with his failings as an adult. 
In the same month (October 1875) that Douglas entered Clifton, 
John went up to Oxford. It was assumed by Rachel that Douglas 
would take his brother's place in the School House. The headmaster, 
a Dr. Percival, did not, however, agree to these plans. Upon meeting 
1Rachel to Douglas, 29 September 1875. 
2Rachel to Douglas, 16 October 1875. 
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and examining Douglas, he decided that he was not sufficiently pre- 
pared to enter the Fourth Form. He was not, as a result, allowed 
to 
reside in the School House. He was instead boarded with a master 
of the school, a Mr. Marks, for approximately fifteen months. 
During 
this time, Douglas received private coaching from Marks and some 
of the other masters. He was finally deemed eligible for the 
Fourth 
Form in January 1877, at which time he was also allowed to live 
in 
the School House. 
1 
A record of his achievement at Clifton, from the time that 
he 
entered the School House, has been provided by Mr. N. Whatley, head- 
master in 1929: 
Douglas Haig entered in January 1877. He was placed in the 
Lower Fourth on the Classical Side. At the end of his first 
term he was promoted into the Upper Fourth. After two terms 
he was promoted to the Lower Fifth. Up to that time he had 
made quite rapid progress. In the Lower Fifth he seems to 
have slowed down, and remained there for four terms, during 
which he slowly made his way up the form. He was seventh in 
the form when he left in April 1879.2 
In her biography of her husband, Lady Haig quoted school reports 
which were in her possession: 
His spirits run away with him at times, but he is a good 
honest worker and player ... a capital fellow both 
in 
work and in play. Has done thoroughly well, a capital 
head of form. 3 
It is likely that the Countess Haig culled the best remarks from 
the reports at her disposal. It is nevertheless clear that Douglas was 
'There 
are no accounts, either contemporary or otherwise, of 
Haig's time with Marks. Haig's biographers (including Duff Cooper 
and Terraine) in fact mistakenly place Haig at Clifton from October 
1875 until April 1879, while he did not technically become a student 
at the school until he entered the Fourth Form in January 1877. See 
Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 4; and Duff Cooper, 
Haig, p. 18. 
2N. Whatley to Lady Haig, 5 February 1929, Haig Papers, NLS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 324(a). 
3Haig, The Man I Knew, p. 15. These reports are no longer 
available. 
slowly overcoming the difficulties experienced at Edinburgh Collegiate 
and Orwell House. His record was not brilliant, but neither was it 
overly dismal. Despite his usual difficulties in the Classics, he 
passed first in Latin during his final term. 
C. C. Hoyer-Millar, a schoolmate of Haig's, remembered him as 
'more grown up than the average boy'. He felt that Douglas had 
'wider interests'. 
I 
This comment is similar to an appraisal made 
by John Charteris in his biography of Haigs 
His time at Clifton was short, and he does not appear to 
have made his mark in any way ... Neither his school- 
fellows nor his masters discerned in the boy any indication 
of those qualities which were to make him an outstanding 
figure in history. ... Already at Clifton he was developing 
that quality of 'aloneness! which was so prominent a charac- 
teristic of his later life. He was his own judge, his own 
taskmaster; he set the standard for himself, and he did not 
allow himself to be deflected by a hair's-breadth from his 
intentions or to be swayed by the opinions of others. 
2 
The statement above is probably quite accurate. Charteris knew Haig 
as well as anyone. He did not have access to the school reports, 
but he perhaps often heard his chief recount his Clifton experiences. 
Charteris was especially familiar with Haig's stubborness and inde- 
pendence, two characteristics evident both in adulthood and during 
the school days. His lackluster finish may in fact have been a 
symptom of these traits. Haig was easily bored by the mundane and 
unchallenging. At the Staff College, he was brilliant when an 
exercise interested him, but refused to apply himself when it did not. 
The same may have been the case at Clifton. He did well his first 
three terms, but may not have been bothered to continue this progress. 
Some of Haig's other schoolmates at Clifton objected to Charteris' 
appraisal. For instance, Douglas J. Byard claimed that: 
IC. C. Hoyer-Millar to Lady Haig, n. d., (previously cited). 
2Brig. 
-Gen. John Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 5. 
General Charteris ... gives an entirely misleading .' 
impression of Haig's Clifton days. To me he was a lovable 
boy, full of grit and by no means lacking in fun. 
1 
Byard was one of the few people ever to describe Haig as 'lovable'. 
He mirrors an attitude shared by many who had but a fleeting glimpse 
of the man. He may have felt that it was his duty to leave a posi- 
tive memory of a national hero--as if a great man must have entirely 
great qualities. Haig, both as a child and as an adult, was sullen 
and reserved. Even his closest admirers found him cold and aloof. 
He had no real friends. It is therefore unlikely that, at Clifton, 
he was uncharacteristically gregarious. 
A similar degree of doubt should be applied to a statement made 
by H. H. Nicholson who remembered Haig on the playing field as being 
'active as a cat and plucky as a lion'. 
2 
It is far more likely that 
Haig failed to meet the standards of a system which placed a high 
value on athletic achievement. John admitted that his brother was 
'never very good at games'-. 
3 
His later skill as a polo player arose 
more from his attraction to all equine activities than from an 
interest or skill in games generally. As his athletic activities at 
Oxford will be shown to demonstrate, he was too individualistic and 
aloof to be a team player. 
4 
He was not overly motivated by school 
spirit and inter-house-rivalries at Clifton. This is clear in Rachel's 
letters. She linked skill in games with gentlemanly manners, -and was 
therefore distressed when Douglas did not display the requisite 
level of athletic enthusiasm. She wrote that 'You. must try, darrling, 
1Douglas J. Byard to lady Haig, n. d., Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 
3155, No. 324(a). 
2H. H. Nicholson to Lady Haig, n. d., Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 
3155, No. 324 (a). 
3John Haig, 'Notes'. 
4 
See pages 55-56. 
try and come out well at your games so that I may get a pleasing 
report of my boy. '1 Games, especially cricket ('a better game than 
football', she thought) kept a boy from becoming a'weakly Cad'. 
3 
She assured both John and Douglas that 'these grand cricket matches 
you are having must make you strong and manly. '4 
Haig spent only two years in the School House at Clifton. 
His exposure to the traditional public school system was therefore 
limited. He did not excel in his studies. He hated the Classics. 
He was not a popular boy. He was not interested in games--the 
backbone of the system. It is therefore doubtful that the system had 
a very significant effect upon him. The values of the public school 
--loyalty, self-sacrifice, manliness, etc. --were only partially 
absorbed by Haig. It is true that he surpassed the Victorian standards 
of cleanliness, order and regimentation. But these traits were first 
taught him by his mother and only reinforced by each successive 
institution through which he passed. He was not the typical public 
schoolboy and was not therefore affected by Clifton in the customary 
manner. Alec Waugh described the usual effect of the system 'upon 
the schoolboy in his novel The Loom of Youth: 
The average person comes through all right. He is ... 
easy-going, pleasure-loving, absolutely without a conscience, 
for the simple reason that he never thinks. ... He has learnt to do what he is told, he takes life as he sees it 
and is content .. .5 
Such contentment and complacence never characterised Haig. 
1Rachel 
to Douglas, 7 December 1872. 
2Rachel 
to Douglas, 29 May 1875. 
3Rachel 
to John, 18 June 1875, Haig Papers, NLS, Ace. 3155, No. 3(a). 
Rachel to Douglas, 18 June 1875. The above letter to John con- 
tains an identical statement. 
5Alec Waugh, The Loom of Youth, (London: Cassell, 1929), p. 344. 
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Elements of the public school ethos can nevertheless be found 
in Haig's character. They were demonstrated in a speech given to 
his old school in 1921: 
Courage, manliness, truth, clean-living and honest-dealing 
are the qualities that have made our nation great and must 
be preserved if that greatness is to last. Nothing can 
take their place. Cleverness and skill in arts and science 
are not enough if other qualities are absent. 
Tanks, guns, aeroplanes would not have sufficed to bring us 
victory ... If the character of our people had been 
other than it was. In the years that you are spending 
here at my old school you are all of you building up your 
characters and helping to form the characters of others. 
Let your actions and your thoughts be worthy of the burden 
you will one day have to bear as a citizen of the greatest 
Empire that has ever taken manliness, liberty and justice 
for its purpose and ideals. 1 
In his speech, Haig extolled virtues which, it will be seen, were 
only superficially present in his own character. The speech was 
typical of him. He could easily preach, but had the common diffi- 
culty of following his own sermons. As Charteris wrote, 'he set the 
standards for himself'. Those he set for others were decidedly 
more strict. For instance, subsequent chapters will show that 
he expected subordinates to be loyal and subservient to a degree 
which he never matched in relations with his own superiors. The effect 
of his education was therefore more evident in the expectations he 
held for others, rather than in the guidelines he imposed on himself. 
1Douglas Haig, speech to Clifton College, 30 June 1921, Haig 
Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 337(k). 
CHAPTER II 
Oxford, 1879-1883 
In the last chapter, it was shown how Norman Dixon's analysis 
of Haig's childhood and schooldays is flawed. From the evidence at 
his disposal, Dixon concludes that the period was fraught with 
anxiety and failure. This, he feels, gave rise to 'pathological 
achievement motivation' which made Haig capable of handling 
neither success nor failure. Dixon portrays Haig as a person pushed 
resolutely forward by his and his mothers unquenchable ambitions. 
He was, the author believes, a person totally unable to enjoy life. 
Projecting further, Dixon maintains that the strains of youth and 
adolescence resulted in an adulthood marred by an inferiority 
complex, authoritarianism, anal-sadism and, finally, military 
incompetence. 
In the following chapters, it will be seen that Dixon's analysis 
consists of a series of misconceptions eventually leading to even 
greater misconceptions. Far from a feeling of inferiority, Haig 
seems to have enjoyed a comfortable sense of superiority. While 
he exhibited authoritarian traits, he was definitely not a classic 
authoritarian. The allegations of anal-sadism are drawn from the 
evidence of authoritarianism, and are as tenuous. Finally, while Haig 
may or may not have been incompetent as a commander, it is misleading 
to treat his conduct on the Western Front as influenced solely 
by characteristics of his individual psyche. Haig's military personal- 
ity was shaped by a variety of social, personal and professional 
factors, many of which Dixon fails to take into account. 
Dixon's errors stem from the incomplete picture of Haig's 
youth which he develops. He had accurate evidence of a difficult 
childhood, failure in school and an ambitious mother. But the 
evidence which he ignores is perhaps the most important in regard 
to Haig's development. Dixon fails because, as shown in the last 
chapter, he misinterprets Haig's relationship with his mother. 
While she was definitely ambitious and puritanical, she was also, 
more significantly, loving, supportive and kind. While Haig no 
doubt felt pressure as the youngest in a family of 'achievers', 
this was more than balanced by the fact that he was also his mother's 
clear favourite. His failures in school were counter-balanced by 
her continued confidence in him. This confidence was gradually 
transmitted to him. By the time he was ready to go to University, 
he had grown into a self-assured, resilient. and impressive young man, 
able to hold his own with his fellow students. 
Hear the end of his final term at Clifton, Haig passed first 
in Latin. In view of his earlier problems with the Classics, this 
was a very significant achievement. His mother's reaction is indica- 
tive of her overall attitude towards him. She treated the success 
not as something unexpected, but as conclusive proof of the beliefs 
which she had long held; 
Ohl Such pleasure it has given me! Your report! So satis- 
factory and delightful and to me so true! So true too! I 
am sure-Very satisfactory! I am very much pleased with the 
decided imporvement this Term. This 'decided improvement' 
is to me the more satisfactory since your time at Clifton 
is so short. I should like you to leave the best of characters 
behind you-wand so would you. yourself my darling. 1 
Douglas's success, though long in coming, indicated to Rachel that 
he was ready to leave school. She had always wanted him eventually 
to enter University, where the experience, she felt, 'makes a 
gentleman'. She believed her son was now ready and that any additional 
time spent at Clifton would be an unnecessary delay to an even more 
enriching experience awaiting him. 
Douglas was not as sure that he was ready for the next step in 
1Rachel to Douglas, 4 March 1879. 
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his education. The events surrounding his preparation for. 'University 
reflect how he was often less confident of his abilities than his 
mother, and how, when this happened, she gently prodded him. 
Dixon feels that this caused him excessive anxiety, In fact, 
it probably enabled him to believe in himself as she did. She 
refused to allow him to underestimate himself. For example, in 
March 1879, Douglas relayed his masters' ojections to his leaving 
Clifton: 
J. P. does not think I should go to a coach, neither 
does my form master ... Percival does not think I should leave ... as you saw by his letter to Willie. And what he said to me is that one's school time only comes once and 
when it is over it is gone. l 
Rachel refused to accept this argument. She replied as follows: 
I hope Asquith will inform Dr. Percival of your intentions, 
as soon as he can, to go to Oxford or Cambridge early, for 
as Willie says by going early you will be finished early and 
ready to begin your Profession or Trade at once when you 
pass--Willie seems to think that you are 'quite fit to pass 
and go into residence in October'--and You have heaps of time' 
he says to get up for your 'Matric. ' and no time is to be 
lost--'You are not too young' and the time would be lost 2 
dort you think, were you to delay ... going to College. 
Rachel's actions were motivated by her abhorrence of idleness, her 
belief in her son, and her concern for her own health. She probably 
felt that she would not live much longer, and wanted to see her son 
3 
safely at University before she died. When he balked, she stub- 
bornly persisted, and finally got her way. 
Once the matter of Haig's early departure from school was settled, 
there remained the choice of a University and a College. Again Rachel 
1Douglas 
to Rachel, n. d. (probably early February 1879), Haig 
Papers, NLS, Ace. 3155, No. 3(a5. 
2Rachel to Douglas, 28 February 1879. It is not clear who Asquith 
was, but he was probably Douglas's form master. 
30n 12 July 1878 Hachel wrote to Douglas that she hoped . it may please God to spare me a little longer to my children. ' 
took charge, with assistance from Willie. 'Willie will write to 
you as to what he thinks the best', 
' 
she wrote. Douglas, she 
advised, should simply 
. do as I have always done 
in such cases seek to be 
directed--and you may rest assured God will shew rou--and 
my dear boy isn't it delightful to feel that you will be 
wisely directed and that you may rest passive in the matter 
.I trust that you will ask for guidance as the matter 
concerns much of your future hap'ness in life and we know i 
nothing can prosper without God. 
On 8 March Rachel wrote: 'I think Willie is right in having put your 
name down for both Colleges and you may rest assured all is well. '3 
Eventually Brasenose College, Oxford was selected. The whole process 
of Haig's entrance into University illustrates the relationship 
between mother and son. She gently but persistently imposed her 
will upon him when she felt he lagged. She convinced him in language 
that had the greatest effect upon him, appealing to his trust in her 
and in God. Though she manipulated him, it was benign manipulation, 
and had his best interest in mind. 
Rachel and Willie decided that Douglas should leave Clifton 
in April 1879 and then go to a private tutor to prepare for the 
University matriculation examination. John Haig had earlier been 
coached for the exam by Mr. H. J. Rhoades of Rugby. Rhoades was 
contacted, but it was found that he no longer took pupils. He did, 
however, suggest that his brother--'a better tutor than I ever was'4-- 
might be suitable. Willie presented this information to Douglas on 
15 March : 
tRachel to Douglas, 3 March 1879. 
2Rachel to Douglas, 25 February 1879. 
3Rachel to Douglas, 8 March 1879. 
4H. 
J. Rhoades to W. H. Haig (Willie), 16 March 1879, Haig 
Papers, NLS, Ace. 3155, No. 3(a). 
My dear Douglas, 
You see what Mr. Rhoades says. Please let me know if 
you will go to his brother and read and prepare your- 
self for College in October. If you will, please go 
at once and give notice that you will not return to 
Clifton after Easter, and if it is necessary I will 
send written notice. If you decide on going to James 
Rhoades, wire me on receipt and I will put matters in 
trim for you. 
There is however no time to be lost if you are going to 
a tutor and to Oxford in October. You ought to go to 
him at once and take no holidays at Easter. Bournemouth 
would be a nice place for mama to go to but if she were 
there you would do no work at all. 
W. H. H. 1 
Though Willie maintained that the choice was Douglas's, this was 
in actuality a fait accompli. 
The plans were upset by the sudden death of Rachel on 21 
April 1879.2 With both parents dead, 
3 Douglas became a free agent. 
His future was secure no matter what he chose to do. Had he wished, 
he could have foregone the plans for University, and lived the life 
of a wealthy gentleman. That he did not do so testifies to the 
force of his mother's guidance. He was grieved by his mother's 
death, but his grief did not turn into despair. 
4 
Her work with 
him was essentially complete. She had given him the confidence essen- 
tial to his future progress, the firm base upon which to build his 
life. Whether he could not allow himself to abandon her precepts 
or whether those precepts had by this time been completely absorbed 
by him and become his own, will never be known. The fact is that 
1Willie 
to Douglas, 15 March 1879, Haig Papers, NISI Ace. 3155, 
No. 3(a). Either this date or that of the Rhoades letter is wrong 
as the latter was enclosed in Willie's letter. 
2Douglas 
was unable to see his mother before she died. 
3Douglas's father died a year earlier. His death is not mentioned in any of the surviving correspondence. 
4See 
Chapter I, page 27. 
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he eventually became exactly the type of person she had wished. 
Haig did briefly exercise the freedom brought about by his 
mother's death. The Oxford plans were shelved. He accompanied his 
brother Hugo on a trip to America on which they visited the principal 
cities and the Yosemite Valley in California. The trip, a chance 
for Haig to play the role of the wealthy gentleman abroad, was 
probably also a time to overcome the grief caused by his mother's 
passing. According to John, Douglas 'made up his mind to go to 
Oxford" while in America. The suggestion is that his mother's death 
caused him to consider foregoing University altogether. If so, 
his diversion from her directives was brief. When he returned he 
was certain about his next step. He went to Rhoades as planned, 
prepared for the examination, and passed it with no apparent difficulty. 
2 
Haig entered Brasenose College in October 1880. Though only 
nineteen, his chiselled features and refined good looks suggested 
maturity and strength of character beyond his years. He was the 
type of person ideally suited to Oxford of the 18ROs. The fortune 
he had inherited gave him financial independence. He was able to 
3 
afford all the pleasures and accoutrements generally associated with 
the upper class student. His brief travels set him apart from his 
peers, most of whom came directly from public school. The self- 
sufficiency which now characterised him did not at this stage cause 
him to be reclusive. He was a serious student, but not bookish. 
Though not an outstanding athlete, sports did not matter to the extent 
'John Haig, 'Notes'. 
2It is also possible that he was influenced by the need to leave open the option of an Army career. See pages 63-64. 
31t 
is not known what size this fortune was, but it is clear that, after being wisely invested, it was substantial enough to pro- 
vide him with the comforts he desired for the rest of his life. 
they had at Clifton. As will be seen, he was easily able to earn 
the respect and admiration of his fellow students. He was fully 
equipped to flourish in the Oxford environment. And flourish he 
did. 
For a young man of Haig's backgroud, Oxford was more like 
a finishing school than an academic institution. At University, 
young men of good birth put into practice the lessons of gentle- 
manly behaviour which they had acquired at school. In other words, 
they learned how to enjoy themselves according to the socially 
accepted modes of the day. Intellectual pursuits were decidedly 
less important than social ones. Haig was no exception to this 
format. Lord Askwith,, a, fellow studbnt, maintained that 
No dinner and no club ... deterred Haig if he was not 
prepared for a particular lecture or essay. ... His 
, I) 
object was to pass his Schools and to pass them quickly 
and he cut or left a social gathering for his books with 
singular tenacity of purpose. 
1 
It appears that Askwith tried to portray Haig as a more conscientious 
student than he actually was. In truth few sacrifices had to 
be made. While Haig did not allow the social life to become 
intoxicating, neither did he. ever become too concerned with his 
studies. The two seldom clashed. This is evident from the following 
average day: 
I passed the morning drawing and reading in my rooms. I 
lunched in College with Popham. In the evening I dined at 
Barton's and Melville's ... Where was also Lubbock and2 
some others--at 8 o'clock we went to Vincent's election. 
1Lord Askwith, 'Haig at Oxford', Oxford Magazine,, Vol. 46 (21 
February 1928), p. 347. George Rankin Askwith, 1st Baron Askwith, 
was at Brasenose at the same time as Haig. He later served on a 
variety of Royal Commissions and was created a baron in 1919. 
2Haig Diary, 21 January 1883, Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 1. 
All diary quotations, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Nos. 
1 or 2, and will hereafter be cited as, simply, Diary, followed by 
the date of the entry. 
The quote is typical of many others. Haig's mornings were usually 
spent reading; the rest of the day was his to enjoy. Studies were 
no more than an unavoidable nuisance. 
In addition to the required Greek, Latin and Rudiments of 
Religion courses, Haig read three special 'Groups': French Litera- 
ture, Elements of Political Economy and Ancient Histopy. These 
subjects were chosen, and read, with little interest. Neither his 
diary for the period nor his interests later in life reflect any special 
attraction to the subjects studied for his Groups. There is nothing 
to suggest that his reading of them affected his outlook on life 
in any way. The same can be said of the influence of his tutors. 
The only tutor mentioned more than once in the diary is Walter 
Pater, with whom Haig studied Homer. Askwith claimed that Haig 
attributed his skill in writing English to Pater. But, as will be 
seen, Haig's written expression was only slightly less clumsy than 
his oral. Pater's effect could not have been profound. Another 
tutor was Dr. Heberden, later Principal of Brasenose and Vice- 
Chancellor of the University. Askwith claimed that Haig and Heberden 
formed a close personal bond, but again there is no evidence for this 
in the diary. Haig remained aloof from both courses and tutors. 
They commanded his attention when required, but very seldom his 
interest. 
The social life at Oxford naturally proved far more important 
than the intellectual in developing Haig's character. Duff Cooper 
wrote that Haig's University days gave him a 'sense of his own 
importance'. 
I 
No phrase better describes Oxford's effect. It 
was through his social success that his self-esteem grew to quite 
1Duff 
Cooper, Haig, p. 20. 
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monumental proportions. Though not himself an aristocrat, he be- 
came an accepted member of an aristocratic circle--a well-mannered, 
agreeable and impressive young man. He put behind him the negative 
characteristics of his youth--the sullenness, ill-temper, and 
outward aggression--and became the type of person his mother 
had wanted him to be, in other words, a gentleman. She would have 
been immensely proud of him. 
His newly developed self-esteem was manifested in his decision 
to begin a diary. For Haig, the diary was never a vehicle for 
introspection. If he was ever introspective, which seems doubtful, 
he left no permanent-ýrecord of his self-examination. Instead, the 
diaries are dominated by descriptions of important events in which 
Haig had a part. 
I 
The sense of self-importance is evident from 
the outset. He began by writing: 
Having oftentimes heard of the advantages to be derived 
from keeping a diary I determine to keep one. The diffi- 
culty is to have a good day to begin upon. 
I think it is well to start with the 19th day of last June 
upon which day I was twenty-one and put down as many events 
as I can remembIr with accuracy which happened from then 
until this day. 
The above was written around the middle of February 1883. Despite 
his stated intention of beginning on his twenty-first birthday, 
his first entry pertains to two days earlier, the occasion of a 
polo match with Cambridge. It is easy to see why Haig began thus, a 
I got the only goal on our side but we ought to have had 
several had our fellows backed me up. The Cambridge team 
got one also, so the match was a draw. 3 
'One 
common aspect of these descriptions was a listing of persons sitting on either side, o± and across from him at dinners. It was as if he felt his reputation was enhanced by the proximity of important persons. 
21882-83 
Diary, frontispiece. 
3Diary. 17 June 1882. 
The teams met again on the next day. 'We got two goals, all of 
which I obtained. 'I Thus he began in a style which would charac- 
terise his diaries for the rest of his life. The diary, though 
lacking introspection, was nevertheless private. It allowed him 
to complain, boast or gossip in a manner which would have been con- 
sidered vulgar elsewhere. 
2 
The first diary covers only a portion of Haig's last year 
at Oxford. The picture it presents is therefore incomplete. Yet 
as a tool for understanding Haig's personality, it is immensely 
valuable. It was the first personal account left by Haig, the first 
evidence of his self-image. Its importance also lies in the fact 
that it covers a unique period of Haig's life. Oxford life was 
dominated by pleasure and devoid of pressure. Competition was at an 
abnormal ebb. The anxiety caused by Haig's earlier academic failures 
disappeared. He found real relaxation for the first, and probably 
only, time in his life. He rode, played polo and cards, attended 
race meetings and luncheons, drank fine wines and discussed the 
'important' issues of the day. In the 1880s, this style of University 
life was beginning its eclipse. A glimpse of it is available from 
Askwith's description of his first meeting with Haig. As Haig's 
'wine had not arrived', they sat in Askwith's room and 
sipped a bottle of claret together. We laughed over 
our interviews held that morning with Dr. Craddock who 
had been Principal at that date for twenty-seven years. 
1Diary, 18 June 1882. 
2As Haig grew older and more famous, the diary and correspondence 
became noticeably less private. There is evidence that he began to 
think of future readers. This will be demonstrated in Chapter IX. 
It is also evident in his war letters to his wife. The early ones 
began 'My darling Little Body'. After he became Commander-in-Chief 
this was soon discarded in favour of 'My darling Dorothy' or, simply, 
'Dear Dorothy'. See Letters, Haig to Lady Haig, Haig Papers, NIS, 
Ace. 3155, Nos. 141-153. 
To me he had finally ended by saying 'Drink plenty of 
port, sir. You want port in this damp climate. ' To 
him he had remarked 'Ride, sir, ride. I }ike to see 
the gentleman of Brasenose in top boots. ' 
For Haig, Oxford was a brief but immensely enjoyable experience. 
His diary presents aspects of his character which could only surface 
in such an environment. More important, his ultimate rejection of 
the leisurely Oxford life is a clue to his future character and 
self-conception. 
The diary reveals the naivete of these young gentleman who were 
comfortable in their ivory tower. Outside affairs were seldom mentioned. 
The important matters were club politics, athletics, and the beha- 
viour of fellow students. When outside issues did intrude, they 
were usually discussed with a false sagacity, betraying confidence 
borne of isolation: 
After dinner we have a great argument on the present evils 
of the Church, notably the narrow-minded views of Clergymen 
and their hypocracy [sic . Mac talked loudly but did not 
listen to our arguments, he was all in favour of the 'good 
works done by the Church'. Jumbo (Bentinck) listened but 
said little, Noll stammered out his views on 'Charity' 
which, he said, 'were never preached to the people'. I 
must say I thought he had right on his side tho' he could 
not express his feelings. Something does seem to be wrong 
in younger sons entering the Church because there is a 
living in the family and not because they have any inclina- 
tion to it. 2 
Haig played the mediator and Tinished the argument amicably . As 
was the case in similar instances, itwas not the subject that was 
important, but rather the lively conversation that was generated. 
The young men were role-playing. They sat on comfortable couches, 
puffed cigars, sipped wine or brandy, and discussed important 
issues in imitation of their elders. 
1Askwith, 'Haig at Oxford', p. 347. 
2Diary, 




Club politics was conducted in a far less amicable and 
civilised manner. The extensive wrangling and in-fighting 
betrayed the youth of the politicians (though perhaps politics at 
any level causes men to act like children). The diary demonstrates 
that Haig played a central role in many of the political battles 
of the day. On one occasion an officer was sought for the 
governing body of Vincent's, a prestigious social club. Haig 
described the process as follows: 
Rather than have a split in the College, I said I had no 
intention of standing. Owing however to the pressure of 
all the other colleges and of some of the members in B. N. C. 
Puxley and his committee decided to run himself and me-- 
with Ascher as a third man. At 8 we went to Vincent's. 
... No one had ever seen so many at an election. ... 
Thanks to Noll everyone had agreed to vote for me! His 
endeavours were really wonderful, and excitement intense. 
The result was that I got 65 votes, Puxley 21. ... 
This 
result was due entirely to Noll who really worked very 
hard. Most of the papers were 'Old Committee and Douglas 
Haig' . 
The result would obviously have received less mention hul it not 
been in Haig's favour. He was fascinated with the struggle and 
delighted to be involved in it. But his standards of ethical 
political behaviour varied according to who was victorious. During 
the previous term a student named Adamson used a similar ploy and in 
the process kept a member of Brasenose from winning., Haig condemned 
him as a 'viper nourished in the bosom of Brazenose'. 
2 
Vincent's imitated the Victorian social clubs like the Marl- 
borough which were in their heyday. Members met to drink, smoke, 
dine, converse and be seen. Askwith claims that Haig 'seldom came 
1Diary, 22 April 1883. Another successful candidate in this 
election was Sir Edward Grey, later Viscount Grey of Fallodon. 
2Diary, 21 January, 1883. The spelling of 'Brasenose' varies 
throughout the diary. It will be seen that punctuation and spelling 
caused Haig a great deal of difficulty, another trait which he seems 
to have inherited from his mother. 
to Vincent's', 
I 
but again the diary indicates otherwise. In fact, 
he was an active member of a number of prestigious social clubs. 
He regularly attended the Vampyres, a Sunday luncheon group where 
the politics was as fierce as at Vincent's. In his first year he 
was a member of the Octagon Wine Club, another group which met 
weekly to play cards, converse and imbibe. He left it in his second 
year and joined the Junior Common Room, or Phoenix, which had 
similar habits. Rules of etiquette in all clubs were strictly 
observed. The members were supposed to act like gentlemen. Those 
who did not were punished. On one occasion, for instance, Haig wrote: 
Had the usual Sunday meeting of Phoenix ... Puxley 
made a fuss thinking I had passed the wrong toast. 
He was fined! 2 
A more serious infraction occurred when a member of Vincent's was 
caught cheating at cards. Haig sat on the adjudication committee. 
'Macdonnell laid down the case in a lawyer like fashion. Rather 
comic had not the occasion been so serious. '3 After two days delibera- 
tion, the committee asked for the individual's resignation. 
One club which Haig particularly enjoyed was the Bullingdon. 
It was formed to promote sports, especially those involving horses. 
Haig had, quite literally, grown up on a horse. 
4 
His interest in 
equine activities was one of the few distractions he allowed himself 
later in life. His equitation skills made him a valuable and 
popular member of Bullingdon. Terraine alleges that Haig did not 
enjoy hunting, 
5 but there is no evidence to support this. He 
IAskwith, 'Haig at Oxford', p. 348. 
2Diary, 16 January 1883. 
3Diary, 29 April 1883. 
4As 
an infant, Haig was carried in a pannier on a horse's back. 
SSee 
Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 21. 
seldom missed an opportunity to participate in a hunt, though it 
is possible that he was attracted more to the social contacts 
which inevitably accrued than to the chase itself. Haig's hunting 
skills were important attributes in his social circles. The same 
can be said for his interest in all forms of horse racing. Though 
he was not overly keen on betting, he evidently enjoyed being 
seen at the races. 
Haig's favourite equine sport was undoubtedly polo. He was 
active in the game from his Oxford days onward. It was the only 
sport in which he was truly expert. The pleasure he derived from 
it was matched by the pleasure he gave to those fortunate enough 
to watch him play. More than any other sporting activity, it 
allowed him to keep an eye open to valuable social contacts. 
In the Army, it brought him professional advantages. But he no 
doubt would have enjoyed the game as much had no such perquisites 
accompanied it. It brought him immense satisfaction. It was in 
matches that his emotional and spiritual intensity was most evident. 
Polo was, for Haig, never just a game, but a test of character. 
Haig learned polo while at Oxford. He had played the game 
informally as a youth, but did not acquire the necessary technical 
skills until his second year at Brasenose. During his first year 
he followed his mother's earlier expressed wishes and rowed. But 
he soon found that he was neither physically nor emotionally suited 
to the sport. His frame was too slight and he 'could not bear the 
monotony of tubbings or the upbraidings of coaches. '1 Polo was more 
in tune with his independent spirit. His talents made him instantly 
a leader, a position to which he was naturally attracted. Ironically, 
he was taught the game by an American, Tommy Hitchcock, a highly 
IAskwith, 'Haig at Oxford', p. 347. 
talented player who later participated in a number of international 
matches 
1 While at Oxford, Haig and Hitchcock formed the first polo 
team in the University's history. In so doing they encountered 
resistance from University officials who, for no apparent reason, 
were reluctant to sanction the sport. Permission was finally 
granted, but less success was met in the efforts to secure a suitable 
playing field. The refusal to allow the team to play in the University 
parks angered Haig: 
While changing Henry Portman came in to see me. ... 
lie shows me note that he had received from Jowett about 
leave to play in the Parks this term. On my return last 
Friday I received reply to my application of February 
24th stating that the Curators could not give us leave. 
These Dons are very narrow-minded! They gave no reasons 
of course. How strange it is that everyone should regard 
the sport of others as stupid and unworthy of any considera- 
tion: ' 
Permission to play in the Port Meadow was eventually gained from 
City officials. 
Haig regularly kept at least two horses in the College stables. 
He spent considerable sums on polo ponies and their upkeep. He 
required, for instance, a full-time groom, to whom he paid 16/- 
per week. Veterinarians were regularly consulted. These expenses 
were only a small part of the costs of his 'education'. He loved 
fine clothes, though he was not foppish. Askwith remembered him 
'scrupulously dressed ... with his tails showing through a short 
cover coat, as was the fashion. '3 He insisted on the same degree 
of quality in other areas as in his clothing. His food and wine 
were always the very best. He usually dined out, preferring this 
1Haig 
also ticipated in some of these, and on one occasion 
played on the oppö ite side to Hitchcock. 
2Diary, 17 April 1883. 
3Askwith, 'Haig at Oxford', p. 347. 
to the dismal offerings in the College Hall. In his diaries, he 
regularly described menus and wine lists for the status symbols 
which they were. His expensive tastes in all areas must have meant 
that his costs were considerable, though this did not seem to con- 
cern him. Throughout his life he was parsimonious in most areas, 
but imposed few restrictions when spending on himself. At Oxford 
he was atypical of the penurious Scots student who, according to 
the traditional image, was in a constant financial struggle to 
educate himself. The following entry reveals his attitude toward 
personal frugality and the possible state of his own finances: 
At dinner we discussed the meanness of some fathers to 
their sons up here in the hopes of making them acquire 
the knowledge of the value of money--such as the Duke 
of Westminster to Harry Grosvenor who is obliged to bet 
a little in order to get some money and Puppy Weymouth 
who is allowed £300 a year by the Marquess of Bath his 
father. 1 
Though Haig seldom gambled more than token sums, he excused the 
practice when it was necessary to compensate for the 'meanness' 
of one's father. 
Haig harmonised well with the type of life he found at 
Oxford. He found relaxation, friendship and enjoyment at a level 
not subsequently duplicated in the competitive atmosphere of the 
Army. He warmed to the admiration of his peers. His membership 
in the most elite clubs, and his officership in some, is adequate 
evidence of his popularity. According to Askwith, Haig 
.. knew and was pleasant to everyone.. .. but by no 
means courtij popularity. He liked to talk quietly to 
his neighbour and generally about a subject interesting 
to his neighbour or affecting the life or athletics of 
the College rather than his own interests. He was keenly 
desirous that the community should succeed, and loved to 
hear of a successful bump on the river or a win of the 
1Diary, 
18 April 1883. 
Cricket XI. He loved also a quiet joke but I never 
heard him make one. i 
In contrast to some of Askwith's other statements, this account of 
Haig's social conduct was probably very accurate. It will be seen 
that this statement was echoed by many others who encountered Haig 
at various stages of his life. Haig possessed a strong sense of 
superiority, but, except in subtle instances in diaries and letters, 
this superiority generally remained unexpressed. In public, when 
there was no crucial issue over which to disagree, Haig had the 
ability to get on well with others. His attraction lay in the 
fact that he was quiet without being self-effacing; he was a listener 
rather than a talker. But while he did not court popularity, he 
did play close attention to the image he projected. He dressed well, 
spoke properly and had impeccable manners. He successfully made 
himself worthy of respect. These talents, which became fully developed 
at Oxford, were of immense value later in life. 
Within Haig's social circle there were a number of men who 
attained subsequent distinction. Hitchcock has already been mentioned. 
'Grey', a fellow officer in Vincent's, was Sir: Edward Grey, later 
Viscount Grey of Fallodon. At least four close acquaintances, 
R. H. F. Rawson, Seymour Ormsby-Gore, Beresford Melville and Henry 
Bentinck served in Parliament for terms of varying lengths and distinc- 
tion. Lord William Cecil, later Bishop of Exeter, and his brother, 
Lord Robert, were also members of Vincent's and other clubs. Both 
were men of individual instincts and habits. Haig found their lack 
of conformity curious. Lord William, 'the Fish', was a 'clever chap' 
who could 'talk away most amusingly'? But the impeccably attired 
lAskwith, 
'Haig at Oxford', p. 348. 
2Diary, 
23 April 1883. 
Haig found his dress most unacceptable. 'His clothes, poor fellow, 
are not of the most swagger! In fact very seedy resembling the 
garb of a scholar. 'I Lord Robert failed on the same count. 'This 
Cecil like his brother does not waste much money on clothes. ... 
Riding he does not care for. '2 While Haig displayed an independent 
and self-reliant spirit, in his outward appearance and in his 
activities, he stressed conformity. He likewise found it difficult 
to understand those of different mind. 
. 
Women had no place within Haig's social circle. The College and 
the clubs were obviously reserved for males. But women were excluded 
from his life entirely. There is no evidence of any efforts or desire 
to break out of his all-male cocoon. According to Askwith his only 
outside visitors were family members or Old Cliftonians. The diary 
confirms this. Nor did Haig take part in the conversations common 
to groups of men. 'I have seen his face set in silent but obsti- 
nate protest, against any loose jokes about women', Askwith wrote. 
'My impression was and is that he disliked any remarks derogatory 
to women, and showed it, without speaking, so clearly that any would 
be raconteur "dried up': '3 
The origins and nature of Haig's attitude toward women are not 
entirely clear. In common with many upper class men of the period, 
his attraction to the opposite sex was either slow to develop or 
intentionally repressed. It can be stated with some certainty that 
he had no intimate relationship with a woman before his marriage. 
When he finally married, at 44, the time, as much as the mate, was 
1Diary, 23 April 1883. 
2Diary, 28 April 1883. 
3Askwith, 'Haig at Oxford', P" 348. 
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opportune. Before that time (and probably after) he saw warnen as 
inferior beings who distracted him from serious pursuits. They 
were incapable of enlightening conversation. During an 1883 
trip to Europe, he was dismayed because 'Women predominate. Such 
a cackle. '1 A card game in which these women participated was 
'most stupid, but evidently suited for those of childish disposi- 
tions. '2 He harshly criticised men who displayed 'womanish' ways. 
Haig quite simply preferred the company of men. This was partly due 
to the fact that he was uncomfortable in and unaccustomed to the 
presence of women. But his main objection to women mirrored that 
of his male contemporaries. Women in Victorian society were con- 
sidered flippant, frivolous, mentally deficient and physically weak. 
Haig abhorred weakness and a lack of intensity wherever he found 
it. His rejection df women was a manifestation of this attitude. 
Haig'd disdainful attitude toward women did not pertain to 
all women. Three women--his mother, his sister and his wife-were 
exposed to a side of him which no one else saw. His irrational 
prejudices against females were not applied completely to them. 
The sincere bonds of affection which were established with these three 
dissolved some of the more rigid aspects of his character. Though 
he could be condescending to Henrietta and especially to his wife, 
he trusted them as he trusted no one else. His letters to them 
are the most candid of his correspondence. This is not to say that 
he was entirely open with Rachel1Henrietta and Dorothy. They saw a 
softer side of him, but he did not look to them in times of deep 
emotional turmoil. If he endured any such turmoil, he certainly 
1Diarx 6 March 1883. 
2Diary, 14 March 1883. 
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did not leave a record of it. Perhaps in conversations with 
his mother, his sister or his wife his deep feelings were expressed, 
but this is unlikely. He was an emotional recluse. Few were allowed 
to penetrate within the outer walls of his character. No one 
reached the centre. He appears to have derived comfort and security 
from this isolation. He may have felt incapable of intimate personal 
relationships and the inevitable demands which they imposed. 
This possibility is demonstrated by his relationships with the 
three women in his life, which followed each other but did not over- 
lap. At no time was he deeply involved with more than one person. 
Haig's attitude toward close personal relationships will of 
course be developed in depth later. It is nevertheless necessary 
to study the nature and extent of his emotional ties in order to 
understand the relationships he formed while at Oxford. One of these 
was with his sister Henrietta. Henrietta and Douglas were not close 
prior to the death of Rachel. While he was at Clifton, they did 
not correspond regularly. She was ten years older and had married 
and moved to Ireland by the age of eighteen. They therefore saw little 
of each other for the next eleven years. When Rachel died, they 
were drawn together, each for different reasons. Henrietta had much 
in common with Rachel. She combined a surface serenity with an inner 
determination. Her ambition for Douglas eventually became as pro- 
nounced as Rachel's had been. Douglas, therefore, was probably drawn 
to his sister because she was best ableýto fill the vacuum caused 
by Rachel's death. But he would not have felt attracted to her 
had she not displayed a similar desire to be close to him. Perhaps 
because she was herself childless, she was drawn to her orphaned 
brother who still seemed to require support and guidance. Their 
subsequent relationship was more like mother to son than sister to 
brother. 
The relationship brought happiness to both, but it was especially 
beneficial--socially and professionally--to Douglas. Henrietta's 
marriage in 1869 to Willie Jameson, a distant cousin, brought 
her into the inner circle of the English social elite. 
1 
Jameson 
was wealthy, good-looking, fun-loving and, in the Victorian sense, 
'manly'. He combined the attributes of the traditional gentleman 
with a playful adventurism which endeared him to his contemporaries. 
He was among the most active of the 'idle' rich, earning fame through 
his success as a transatlantic yachtsman. This hobby brought him into 
close contact with the Prince of Wales, a devoted follower of the 
sport. The Jamesons were frequent guests at Sandringham, Cowes 
and Balmoral. When Douglas came of age and his relationship with 
Henrietta blossomed, she introduced him into this elite circle. She 
was his contact, guide, tutor and mentor in the world of the privi- 
leged. 
Henrietta's presence was especially welcome during a trip 
through Europe in March 1883. The trip was prompted by Hugo Haig's 
supposedly serious illness. When Douglas heard of his brother's 
condition, he took a one month leave from University, and subsequently 
followed Hugo from spa to spa in a desperate search for the right 
'cure'. The experience was an unpleasant one for Douglas. Upon 
arrival at his brother's side, he was dismayed to find that Hugo 
was not so ill as they made out'. 
2 He was quickly irritated by 
Hugo's malingering nature and the petty quarrels between his brother 
and his wife Archie. Tears flowed daily. Equally regular were the 
1The 
marriage also linked two great whisky families, though 
it does not seem that the match was motivated by commercial interests. 
2Diary, 2 March 1883. 
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'final' marital breakups. Haig's descriptions of this continuing 
melodrama are among the few comic parts of the diary, though this 
was obviously not his intent. The 'holiday' left him miserable 
and bored. He kept busy by studying his French and shopping for 
horses. then Henrietta later joined him, the depressive atmosphere 
was relieved somewhat. Together they enjoyed the sights, the food 
and wine, and the nightly trips to the theatre. 
It is possible that Henrietta and Douglas discussed his future 
career during the European trip. He may have made a firm decision 
to enter the Army. This is suggested by his new seriousness when he 
returned to Oxford in April. He may have felt that he had had enough 
of the leisurely life and decided to leave University as soon as 
possible. For whatever reason, more time was spent on his studies. 
He devoted himself to the preparation for his forthcoming exams. 
Evidently to gain the needed privacy, he moved to lodgings outside 
the College. The diary entries stopped completely, which indicate 
that he gave up his social life in order to study. 
' He passed his 
exams with no apparent difficulty and left Oxford at the end of the 
summer term 18fß. 3. Because he had earlier missed one term due to 
influenza, he was denied the B. A. degrees since he had spent insuffi- 
cient time in residence. 
Haig's decision to enter the Army probably explains his 
different attitude toward Oxford and his education when he returned 
from Europe. A brief explanation of the Sandhurst entrance require- 
ments will illustrate this point. Haig entered the Army before the 
policy of granting direct commissions to University graduates had 
been instituted. Despite his three years at Oxford, he was admitted 
'On 
two other occasions, at Sandhurst and at the Staff College, 
Ilaig abandoned his diary in order to concentrate on his studies. 
on a par with young men straight from the public schools. As a 
'University Candidate', Haig had to pass his Oxford exams, but he did 
not have to earn a degree. He also had to be under 23 years old. 
This may explain why he did not return to Oxford for a final term. 
He turned 22 during June 1883. Had he returned for another term, 
he would not have had enough time to prepare for the Sandhurst 
exam. The Sandhurst admission system may also be a factor in his 
decision to go to University in the first place. 'Fegular' candidates 
--those direct from school--had to be under 19 years old. 
Haig was 
already 19 when he returned from America. He therefore may have de- 
cided to go to Oxford in order to leave open the option of an Army 
career. 
Whatever the reason for his decision to leave Oxford before 
he earned his degree, there is no evidence that he rued his failure 
to get one. Oxford had served its purpose as far as he was concerned. 
He had gained the training which Rachel had claimed would make him 
a gentleman. More specifically, Oxford opened the doors to the 
Army. A degree was superfluous. It was not worth the extra time 
required. More serious pursuits lay ahead, and Haig was eager to 
embrace them. The reaction shows how much he had progressed in the 
previous four years. His urgency and resolve were similar to that 
displayed by Rachel when she pushed him into leaving Clifton early. 
Like her, he had developed a disdain for frivolity and idleness. 
Though he enjoyed his Oxford years, he placed unalterable limits 
on the term of his enjoyment. Enjoyment was a privilege of youth. 
Haig was now a man. To delay the assumption of manhood was sinful. 
Oxford was a stimulating experience for Haig. He matured quickly. 
Success in academics, polo and society reinforced his self-confidence. 
Yet despite the fact that Oxford was his first real success, in 
addition to the only enjoyable and carefree experience in his life, 
he retained no fond attachment to the University. He was devoted 
neither to it nor to its principles. Fellow students with whom he 
shared many pleasurable experiences were neglected and forgotten 
after he left. Though he saw some of them later in life, he did not 
actively seek their company. He took what he wanted from Oxford 
and then turned his back on it. What he gained was skill at polo, 
social talents and a sense of his own importance. Everything else 
was interesting while it lasted, but did not concern him when it 
was gone. This attitude, it will be seen, was typical of Haig. 
Throughout his life, most institutions and almost all people were 
treated in this same unsentimental and detached manner. His major con- 
cern was for his own progress and he was never more than slightly 
distracted from this pursuit. 
CHAPTER III 
The Young Soldier, 1883-1892 
There was probably no distinct point at which Haig decided 
upon a military career. His decision to enter 
Oxford, it was 
pointed out, may have been influenced by the 
Sandhurst entrance 
requirements, but this decision aimed only at keeping the 
Army 
option open, and was hardly final or conclusive. 
There is no 
evidence of a subsequent determination to become a soldier. 
Rather, 
it appears that social, personal, and educational factors caused 
Haig to drift slowly but inevitably into the Army. There was 
precedent in the fact that the military was a common career among 
his 
ancestors. Each generation since the twelfth century saw at least 
one member of the Haig line become a soldier. In addition, Haig's 
education at Clifton and Oxford pushed him in the direction of the 
Army. This-educational system was a traditional source of officers. 
Haig's temperament, personality and intellectual characteristics 
made him less suitable to the other careers--the Church, politics, 
foreign or civil service, etc. --for which the system also prepared 
young men. When he left Oxford his choices were therefore limited 
to two: to join the Army or to join the idle rich. Though he 
always appreciated certain aspects of the leisurely life, he required 
an intensity and seriousness which such a life could not provide. 
An Army career was therefore his only realistic alternative. 
The seriousness and intensity which characterised Haig after his 
return from Europe in April 1883 was even more evident once he entered 
the Army. For many officers, the regiment was similar to a social 
club; the Army was for them simply a continuation of public school 
or University life. The comfort and security of the military far 
outweighed the dangers and sacrifices. But Haig rejected this sort 
of life when he left Oxford. He approached the Army with an attitude 
unique among his contemporaries. 
Leeson Marshall, an Oxford acquaintance of Haig's, maintained 
that this attitude was already evident at the University. 
He described 
a conversation which took place at a club function: 
I said I thought the Army did not shew much of an opening. 
His chin went out squarer and more determined than ever 
as he replied: 'It all depends on a man himself how he 
gets on in any profession. If I went into the Church 
I'd 
be a Bishop. '1 
The authenticity of the above statement might be questioned. 
Marshall 
was an acknowledged admirer of Haig and may have fabricated the story 
in order to enhance his image. Yet it bears striking resemblance 
to 
a statement made by George Drummond, who met Haig when both were pre- 
paring for the Sandhurst entrance examination: 
We were the usual careless lot of youngsters. Haig, 
though we were all the best of friends, did not join 
freely in our frivolities but plodded on ... with 
his own work, and that he had made up his mind to a 
serious career in the Army early in life the following 
incident proves. We were playing Roulette in my bedroom 
when Haig came into the room. We at once tried to make 
him play too. He refused abruptly saying 'It'-. s all very 
well for you fellows, you are going into the Army to play 
at Soldiering, -I am going 
in it as a profession, and I am 
going to do well in it. ' 
Both statements reflect the sense of self-importance and confidence 
which Haig developed at Oxford. He sincerely believed that he could 
shape his life as he wished. While this may seem like the usual 
youthful optimism, Haig was not simply optimistic. He was also 
determined that his dreams be turned into reality. 
Immediately after he left Oxford, Haig took a short holiday in 
France. Upon his return he began to prepare for the Sandhurst 
entrance examination. He enrolled with a crammer named Litchfield 
who ran a reputable establishment in Hampton Court. The use of a 
1Leeson Marshall to lady Haig, 9 October 1929, Haig Papers, NLS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 324(a). 
2George Drummond to Lady Haig, 10 January 1929, Haig Papers, NLS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 324(a). 
crammer was not a reflection on the qualifications of the candidate. 
) 
Seventy per cent of all individuals who sat Army exams prior to the 
Great War employed a crammer. 
2 Those who did not usually failed. 
The popularity of cramming was a reflection on the Army's examina- 
tion system, and upon its educational programme in general. According 
to Lord Wavell: 
... the efforts of the 
Army schoolmasters ... were 
devoted almost entirely to the passing of examinations 
rather than to the production of general knowledge. } 
As will be demonstrated, the Army did not know how to judge soldierly 
potential, and as a result relied on a system which was neither 
accurate nor fair. The Army measured ari individual's promise by 
his results on examinations which were hardly more than tests of 
memory. Thus the would-be officer was compelled to employ a man 
like Litchfield to 'cram' vast amounts of data into his short-term 
memory--where it was stored until the examination was successfully 
passed. 
The content of the Sandhurst examination also reflects the 
Armyb inability to appraise the potential of candidates. The exam 
did not consist of subjects even remotely related to the abilities, 
attitudes or values generally associated with military personnel. 
There were two compulsory areas: mathematics and English. In addition 
the candidate had to compete in three optional areas. A combined 
total of at least 900 points was required from these. But the 
options were not weighted equally. The Classics paper had a total 
of 3600 points possible, while no other area exceeded 1200 points. 
IDixon (p. 250) uses Haig's employment of a crammer as evidence 
of his overall incompetence. 
2Field 
Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1953), p. 146. 
31bid. 
The student of the Classics had a decided advantage. 
I 
This'was pro- 
bably intentional. A knowledge of the Classics, according to the 
Victorian ethos, was an essential component of the gentlemanly image. 
Gentlemen, in turn, were believed to make good officers. 
Haig was very impressed with his crammer. 'Litchfield', he wrote, 
'seems a sharp, well-read fellow about 50. He says I have a look of 
determination. '2 Though the compliment may have been motivated by a 
desire to please a paying customer, it was no less accurate. As 
Drummond mentioned, Haig was not one of the 'careless lot of young- 
sters'. After the first week at Hampton Court he abandoned his diary 
altogether and concentrated upon his studies. Haig chose Classics as 
one of his options, though he noted that 'I found I had forgotten 
-Latin greatly. '3 He also chose French. His third option is not 
known, nor is it clear how long he spent with the crammer. Whatever 
the duration, the venture proved beneficial. He passed the exam on 
his first try and entered Sandhurst on 12 January 1884. 
Just as the entrance exam had been inadequate for selecting offi- 
cers, so the Sandhurst system was inadequate for training them. Haig 
encountered an educational approach at the College which essentially 
duplicated that of the public school. Classics were over-empha. aised. 
4 
'Other 
options included languages, ancient history, moral philo- 
sophy and other subjects borrowed from the public school curriculum. 
2Diary, 19 July 1883. 
3Diary, 23 July 1883. 
4Colonel 
Addison, superintendant of the College in 1868, wrote 
that 'To anyone who will consider the intellectual exercise that a good lesson in first-class Greek or Latin authors involved, and who will 
compare this with the formal, though in their way valuable studies 
which constitute military science, the conclusion would be obvious that to drop Classics, just at the time when the mind is beginning to 
open to their full appreciation is, educationally, a misfortune. ' The 
opinion was written before Haig entered Sandhurst, but the attitude 
survived until after the Great War. Source: Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, 
Victorian-Army and Soviet , 
(London: Houtledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 
p. W. 
The emphasis upon character over intellect and the cult of. 
. athleticism 
were found to a similar extent at Sandhurst as at the public schools. 
While the system may have suited young boys, it was not suited to 
preparing young men for careers as professional soldiers. Army edu- 
cators had failed to appreciate the lessons of the 1870-71 Franco- 
Prussiandiar. The foundation of Prussian professionalism lay in the 
early training given to cadets. The Prussian system stressed a firm 
base in the liberal arts, supplemented by heavy doses of practical, 
scientific and technical instruction. While the British admired 
Prussian professionalism, they rejected this practical training as 
plebeian and thus degrading to their elite officer corps. 
I 
A result of this bias against practical training was that the 
military instruction at Sandhurst was insufficient and mostly 
irrelevant. Courses such as logistics, military law, administration, 
communication, transportation and hygiene--of obvious use to the 
young officer--were not included in the curriculum. The cadet was 
not introduced to artillery or engineering problems. There was no 
attempt to familiarise him with the life of the N. C. O. or ordinary 
soldier, a move which would have aided communication between the 
ranks. 
2 The military subjects which were included were of greater 
relevance to senior officers. There were three required subjects: 
1Information 
on the Sandhurst system and the Victorian Army's 
attitude toward professionalism can be found in John Smyth, Sandhurst, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961); Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
19577; Alfred Vagts, The History of Militarism, (London: Hollis and 
Carter, 1959); Corelli Barnett, 'The Education of Military Elites', 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 2 (July 1967); and Harries- 
Jenkins, Victorian Army and Society. The information on the German 
system is taken from Huntington, Vagts, Barnett and Martin Kitchen, 
The German Officer Corps, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
2This 
practice was begun at West Point and the Canadian Royal 
Military College at mid-century, with success. See Harries-Jenkins, 
Victorian Army and Society, p. 148. 
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mathematics, fortification and surveying. The purpose of the extensive 
maths instruction was not male clear. The cadet also had to choose 
two options from a list which included French, German, siege opera- 
tions, landscape drawing, military drawing and the ubiquitous 
Latin. Because of their background and experience, most cadets chose 
the latter as one of their options. Military history was not offered. 
Haig's record at Sandhurst was a drastic departure from his 
earlier academic performances. While at Oxford, he did the minimum 
necessary in order to pass. At Sandhurst, he worked harder than 
was required. He evidently wanted to make a favourable first 
impression. Again, he abandoned his diary in order to concentrate 
upon his studies. But he also realised that the Army did not admire 
soldiers who were 'bookish'. He therefore tried to excel in all 
areas. Polo naturally proved an asset. He also mastered the drill 
and parade routines to perfection. The Army especially wanted men 
who looked and acted like soldiers. Haig's habitual attention to 
his dress and deportment was a valuable attribute. But this approach 
had its disadvantages. Haig's attention was focused inward--toward 
making himself a model soldier. He cared little about his fellow cadets. 
As a result, they found him aloof and taciturn. He made no close 
friendships. A contributing factor was no doubt the difference in 
age. Haig was five years older than the average cadet. But more 
important was that fact that Haig, as was often the case, found 
friendships superfluous and distracting, 
ICharteris (pp. 8-9) wrote that Haig 'left Sandhurst as he entered 
it, without any close friendship for any of his contemporaries. ' This 
is supported Brig; ýGen. Sir James Edmonds who wrote 'The late General 
Sir Walter Congreve ... told me that he was in the same room with Haig when a cadet at Sandhurst, and that Haig was taciturn and rough, 
but after a lecture would sit down and write out his notes,, which few 
R. M. C. cadets have done, before or since. ' Source: Edmonds' unpublished 
autobiography, Edmonds Papers, 111/2/10. 
Haig's determination was rewarded during his second term when 
he was appointed Under Officer of his division. The appointment 
generally went to the most promising cadet in each division. It 
gave Haig his first taste of command, and probably distanced him 
even further from his fellow cadets. But it is doubtful that this 
effect overly bothered him. He did not mind being alone, as long as 
he was alone at the top. At the graduation ceremony his resolute 
approach was further rewarded. He was presented with the Anson Memorial 
Sword as Senior Under Officer. He also passed first in order of merit, 
with athletic distinction. 
I The attributes which Haig demonstrated 
at Sandhurst--determination, ambition, detachment, conservatism 
and meticulousness--were ones upon which the Army as a whole placed 
a high value. His prospects for success inhis-chosen career wero 
therefore very bright. 
2 
Haig's success at Sandhurst loses significance when considered 
in relation to the low quality education he received there. The course 
lasted only one year. In that time the instructors sought to sup- 
plement the cadet's general education, introduce him to military 
subjects, and teach him discipline, drill and routine. The College 
set too many goals for itself, and achieved few of them. The super- 
ficial approach would have been excusable had the cadet left Sandhurst 
with an eagerness to continue his studies. In most instances, this 
1The 
athletic distinction was earned from his prowess at polo, 
and should not be seen as inconsistent with his earlier failures in 
games. 
2An instructor at Sandhurst is supposed to have remarked: 
'A Scottish lad, Douglas Haig, is tops in almost everything-- 
books, drill, riding and sports; he is to go into the cavalry, and, before he is finiahed, he will be top of the Army. ' The statement has been widely quoted, but its origin cannot be traced. It is 
quoted from Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier,. p. 5. 
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did not happen. An 1870 Royal Commission which investigated the 
system concluded that the average cadet, inundated with abstract 
and irrelevant subjects and dogmatic military routine, was 'inclined 
to lose interest in his studies and to regard them as a nuisance 
which need trouble him no more once he has obtained his commission. ' 
An equally serious fault was the failure of educators to encourage 
imagination and scepticism. The highly stratified curriculum 
caused the officer to 'regard with horror any deviation from a sealed 
pattern. '1 As was the case with most commissions of inquiry of the 
type, no significant reforms followed. 
The Commission referred to the average Sandhurst graduate. 
Haig was not average. He was highly motivated toward the study of 
his profession. But his areas of interest were as restricted and 
dogmatic as the Sandhurst curriculum. His class origins, educational 
background and pedantic nature combined to make him, as will be seen, 
suspicious of progress. He was neither imaginative nor sceptical. 
He certainly 'regarded with horror any deviation from a sealed pattern. 
His Sandhurst training therefore reinforced his natural narrow- 
mindedness. The effect was that he approached his profession in 
a very rigid and orthodox manner. From the', ver-y beginning of his 
career, he conceived of himself as a guardian of tradition. This 
does not mean that he was against reform. The reforms he was to 
support were, however, mostly backward-looking. He tried to fit the 
ideals, values and concepts of the past into a modernised bureaucratic 
structure. He aimed to polish and oil an essentially obsolete 
machine. Though this approach resulted mainly from his conservative 
outlook, pragmatism may also have played a part. Unconventional 
1'Report 
of the Royal Commission on Military Education' (1870), 
quoted in Harries-Jenkins, Victorian Army and Society, p. 148. 
soldiers were likely to be regarded with suspicion and thus'denied 
promotion. Haig saw in the Army the opportunity above all to advance 
himself, to succeed and to erase memories of past failings. In order 
to achieve these objectives it was necessary for him to harmonise 
with most of the obscurantist attitudes which prevailed in the 
Army. His desire for rapid promotion therefore further reinforced 
his naturally conservative inclinations. 
Haig left Sandhurst in February 18¬5 and joined the 7th (Queen's 
Own) Hussars. The choice of a regiment was based on a practical 
analysis of the options available to him. In the Oxford diary, Haig 
mentioned several meetings with an individual named Munn who was 
then a member of the regiment. It is possible that Munn gave him 
details of prospects with the regiment. It is doubtful that senti- 
ment played any part, for there is no reason for him to have had a 
sentimental attachment to the 7th Hussars. There is no evidence 
that he oven considered a Scottish cavalry regiment. This is further 
evidence of his pragmatism. By joining a Scottish regiment, he would 
have been left prey to the intra-service rivalries and factionalism 
which distorted regular patterns of promotion. In other words, by 
joining, for instance, the Scots Greys, Haig would have risked being 
labelled a Scottish soldier and thus incurring the prejudices of non- 
Scottish senior officers outwith the regiment. Haig sought to be, 
above all, a British soldier. He avoided factions and labels wherever 
possible, and tried to make himself attractive to all sectors within 
the Army, government and society. 
Terraine feels that this detachment was one of Haig's 'noble 
attributes'. 
1 Whether or not it was noble, it was certainly profes- 
sionally advantageous. Terraine errs when he uses Haig's attitude 
1Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 7. 
toward the cavalry as a further example of this detachment: ' 
Not even the Cavalry itself could be said to have commanded 
his full allegiance; it was the arm that he had joined and 
he made himself proficient in it. But to call him a 'Cavalry 
General', placing him in a category of which such disparate 
examples exist as Oliver Cromwell, Loyd Cardigan and Sir John 
French ... 
is to miss a main truth. 
Haig never had a detached attitude towards the cavalry. He believed 
devoutly in the arm--in its tactical merits as well as the ideals 
it represented. Throughout his career he argued that the cavalry 
remained indispensable in spite of technological advances in warfare. 
2 
These were not the actions of a man who wished solely to be 
'proficient'. The question of whether or not he was a 'Cavalry 
General' will be discussed later. Nevertheless, from the very 
beginning of his career, Haig's devotion to the cavalry inevitably 
tainted his appreciation of the wider aspects of warfare. 
Haig's allegiance to the cavalry was one of the few exceptions 
to his general avoidance of factions. It was obviously imperative 
that he join one branch of the Army. The cavalry suited him best. 
His talents as a horseman and his gentlemanly habits made him an 
ideal cavalryman. But the arm also offered him the best prospects 
for the future. This was because it was the dominant branch within 
the Army. Though it comprised, from 1£370-1914, only nine per cent of 
1Terraine, Douglas Haig: The, Educated Soldier, p. 7. 
2A few months before he died, Haig wrote a treatise entitled 
'The Future Uses of Cavalry'. In it he wrote: 'I judge the large 
reduction in our cavalry cadres since the War to have been unwise 
and ill-timed. Unwise, because, given thoughtful reorganisation 
and methodical training the role of the Cavalry in modern War is as 
important now as ever: and ill-timed because it is well known that 
"Cavalry cannot be improvised" and that once that splendid Cavalry 
spirit--the result of years of tradition and loyal service to the 
Country--is lost it cannot be reproduced the moment War breaks out 
and the Country's safety again depends (as in 1914) on the immediate 
mobilisation of trained Cavalry Regiments. ' Source: Haig Papers, 
NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 346(h). 
-76- 
the total forces, its officers held a disproportionate number of 
the senior command posts. 
' The cavalry officer therefore had 
advantages not available to the members of the other arms. Both 
from a pragmatic and an aesthetic point of view, then, the cavalry 
was Haig's best, perhaps his only, choice. And in order to derive the 
most benefit from the arm's dominant position, it was advantageous 
for him to become one of its most ardent spokesman. 
An examination of the character of the Victorian Army and the 
peculiar position of the cavalry within it aids an understanding of 
Haig's career. Victorian society was marked by distinct class 
divisions which the Army mirrored. The officers, N. C. O. s and regular 
soldiers were roughly drawn from the upper, middle and working classes, 
respectively. Within the officer corps there were further divisions 
which reflected those of upper class society. In the hierarchy, 
the cavalry was the highest, followed by the infantry, artillery. 
and, finally, engineers. The latter two had the least prestige 
because of their shorter history and because their increasingly techni- 
cal nature had over the years forced them to recruit middle class 
individuals with scientific or professional training. This diluted 
the social purity of these arms. It also made them the most progres- 
sive branches of the Army. The cavalry was the most elite group 
because of its long, distinguished history and because it had been 
]east affected by the advent of technological warfare. It was the 
military equivalent of 'old money'. The cavalry attracted men from 
the aristocracy whose influence in society was easily translated 
into military terms. Though there were certainly exceptions to this 
1The best example of this domination by the cavalry is the fact 
that on the Western Front during the Great War, both Commanders-in- 
Chief, both of Haig's Chiefs of Staff, and five out of the nine Army Commanders were cavalrymen. 
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upper class, cavalry domination, such as Lords Roberts and Kitchener, 
behind these men was a unified body of cavalrymen who wielded signi- 
ficant control over Army affairs. 
l 
The British cavalry retained its dominance in spite of the 
fact that in military terms the arm had älready begun its gradual 
decline into complete obsolescence. The cavalry's secure position 
was partly due to the Victorian Army's stubborn resistance to 
change. In the nineteenth century the British Army was the most 
reactionary among the armies of the major powers. 
2 
This was because 
Britain, from 1814-1914, experienced no wars or revolutions similar 
to those which transformed the societies and armies of Germany, 
France. and the United States. Britain's wars were mostly small 
colonial conflicts which reinforced, through success, the status quo 
within the Army. This was especially true with the cavalry, because 
despite its general decline, the arm remained a potent offensive 
weapon against militarily unsophisticated peoples. To most within 
the Britsh Army, there appeared to be no real need to imitate the 
Prussian successes of the decade 1860-1870. The Army's role was per- 
ceived as a police force for Empire, and it was generally successful 
at the tasks imposed on it. Though it was not suitable for a conti- 
nental war, few foresaw it taking part in one. Finally, Victorian 
society's attitude toward the Army reinforced this obscurantist, 
small war mentality. Officers were respected, but the Army as a 
1The 
relationship between Victorian Army and society and those 
between armies and societies generally are discussed at length in 
Harries-Jenkins, Victorian Army and Society; Huntington, The Soldier 
and the State; Shelford Bidwell, Modern Warfare, (London: Allen Lane, 
1973); Stansilaw Andreski, Military Organisation and Society, (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968); and Morris Janowitz, The Professional 
Soldier, (New York: The Free Press, 1960). 
2If Russia is considered to have been a major power, then, it is 
granted, her army was the most reactionary. 
whole was loathed. Since Cromwell's time the British have feared 
a large military force under the control of the government. The 
Victorian Army was grudgingly tolerated as long as it remained 
small and silent. 
Isolated in this manner, the Army retained its traditional 
power structure. The hierarchy was also perpetuated because of the 
cavalry officers' steadfast refusal to surrender the privileges 
which had been theirs for generations. They fought resolutely 
against what was essentially a threat of extinction. Technological 
advances such as smokeless powder, long range rifles, improved 
artillery, and, somewhat later, machine guns, had severely limited 
the effectiveness of cavalry. In wars between industrial powers, 
its role had shrunk to auxiliary and protective services performed 
behind the front lines. 
' 
The cavalry traditionalists within the 
British Army conducted a desperate, but no less imaginative, defence 
against this threat of obsolescence. Their main tactic was to reject 
the historical evidence which was detrimental to their position. 
For instance, in the American Civil War, the relevant cavalry successes 
arose mostly when mounted infantry tactics were used. Mounted infantry 
were troops who took advantage of the horse's mobility, but did most 
of their fighting dismounted, and usually behind cover. British 
observers of the war claimed that the Americans were too ill-trained 
or uncivilised to be worthy of imitation. Those who argued otherwise, 
men like Henry Havelock, a British observer of the war, were scorned 
as heretics by the cavalry orthodoxy. 
2 
The same attitude was applied 
ISee Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, (London: Rupert 
Hart-Davis, 1961), pp. 7-8,1 1-112,117-118 and elsewhere. 
2The best discussion of this topic is found in Jay Luvaas, The 
Military Legacy of the Civil War, (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1959), chapters 2,5 and S. 
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k 
to the Franco-Prussian War. When the French cavalry, fighting 
according to traditional standards, was slaughtered by Prussian 
riflemen at Froeschwiller and elsewhere, the British, in the main, 
/ 
simply averted their eyes. 
One regiment of Lancers demonstrated their contempt of progress 
by ceremoniously depositing their first issue of carbines on a 
dung heap. Brian Bond describes this gesture as a 'last, desperate 
effort to withstand the depersonalisation of war. '2 This is only 
partially accurate. There is a more fundamental reason for the 
determined resistance of the traditionalists against the inexorable 
progress of technology. To men like Haig, cavalry constituted a 
'moral' weapon. They constantly repeated Napoleon's maxim about the 
moral being to the physical as three is to one. Moral force-e. g. 
the light4ing charge and cold, terrible steel of cavalry--could 
not, they maintained, be quantified scientifically. It was war's 
most important factor--the difference between two otherwise evenly 
matched sides. Moral strength was believed by this group to be a 
trait of character. Character was in turn a product of birth. The 
traditional cavalry argument was therefore related to the argument 
in support of class distinctions. In other words, if, in war, 
technological skill was shown to be more important than moral 
qualities, then intellect would prevail over character. If military 
might were a talent which could be learned, instead of a birthright, 
the doors to power and influence within the Army would be thrown open 
to those from outside the traditional elites. 
Haig played an important part in the cavalry reaction. From 
0 
Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, pp. 111-112. 
2Brian Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry, 
1870-1914', in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard, (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 120. 
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his earliest days as a 7th Hussar, he tried to enhance the 
arm's 
image. He encouraged strict discipline, reorganised training 
methods, and emphasised the chivalric ideals which had given the 
cavalry its honoured reputation. But, unfortunately for him, this 
energy and enthusiasm was not at first complemented by a welcoming 
professional environment in which he could thrive. Haig's first 
ten years in the Army were frustrating and uneventful. The period 
was the most peaceful of Victoria's reign. He had no chance to 
take part in the few small engagements in which the Army was involved. 
Unlike his contemporaries Herbert Kitchener and Henry Wilson, Haig 
stumbled upon no lucky coincidences such as enabled them to demon- 
strate boldly their potential early in their careers. Instead, he 
had to content himself with regimental life, and had to capitalise 
on the infrequent opportunities for recognition which this stulti- 
fied regime offered. The average young officer would have been 
satisfied with this arrangement. Haig, however, was too ambitious 
and impatient. For him the 7th Hussar were simply a stepping stone 
to,. g'eater things. 
l 
The early diaries reflect the frustration and impatience 
which Haig felt. This was not communicated openly because the 
diary was never used as a place to record emotions. But his feelings 
can be safely inferred from the type of entries which exist. The 
legitimacy of these inferences will later be demonstrated by his 
actions. In the diaries for 1885 and 1886 military topics are 
hardly mentioned. These diaries in fact vary little from the Oxford 
volume, in which social engagements were given the majority of mention. 
After the impressive achievements at Sandhurst, the disappointment 
1Haig 
never had the same emotional attachment to the 7th Hussars 
as to his later regiment, the 17th Lancers. 
which this unstimulating life caused him must have 
been considerable. 
The routine of his mundane regimental duties was only occasionally 
broken by a polo tournament or hunting trip. In fact, during 
his 
first three years in the 7th Hussars, polo provided the only signi- 
ficant opportunity for recognition. In August 1886, Haig was 
selected to play for England against the United 
States. The tour 
took place in the New England States and was enormously successful 
for the English team. It also gave Haig the chance to play against 
Tommy Hitchcock, his Oxford polo companion. Haig always enjoyed 
polo, but he joined the Army to be a soldier. The diaries indicate 
that his first two years offered him little chance to be one. 
When he returned to Britain, Haig learned that the regiment 
had been ordered to Secunderabad. The 7th Hussars were garrisoned 
in India for most of the remaining time Haig spent with the regiment. 
At first, he welcomed the change. India was still one of the more 
militarily active parts of the Empire. Before his departure, Haig 
took a short leave in Scotland where he said goodbye to his family. 
He recorded no sadness nor emptiness when he sailed on 25 November 
18E? 6. Instead, the diary entries for the trip fall into two rather 
curious, but definitely idiosyncratic, categories. The first consists 
of his daily technical observations. Every day, Haig recorded 
statistics on the weather, miles cruised, average speed, total 
distance sailed, etc. He also occasionally wrote long entries 
describing certain parts of the ship or naval procedures. 
l The 
habit was continued on every subsequent voyage throughout his life. 
His fascination for this meaningless detail was at times obsessive. 
Though he was definitely interested in the phenomena, the real plea- 
ISee 
Diary, 2 November to 10 December 1886. 
sure was evidently derived from meticulously recording it. 
'Ills 
attraction to the precise presentation of this data was perhaps 
a result of the highly ordered manner in which he was raised. 
The second category consists of the impressions of fellow 
passengers which were often recorded. The best example is the 
following: 
The passengers are as a whole an uninteresting lot. 
Several newly married couples, greatly taken up with 
each other. One Colonel, going out to command a Batta- 
lion of the Rifle Brigade, is dubbed by the laddies the 
Sentry' from the care he takes of his young wife. 5 or 
6 Doctors on board, mostly married. One, styled 'the 
dirty Dr. ', a German looking creature, excites the jealousy 
of an infantry captain: both have just lately entered the 
matrimonial state, and both men's wives are in the same 
cabin. The Dr. has the pull over the other, he can visit 
his wife's cabin to administer physic. The other feels 
angered no doubt, there are words, and recourse is had to 
the Captain of the ship! But women are at the bottom of 
all quarrels. 
t 
Again, this habit was repeated on subsequent voyages. In each case, 
Haig wrote from the point of view of the highly detached observer. 
The people he observed were always strangers. An entirely different 
tone was used with persons with whom he was familiar. Along with 
the detachment there is an evident sense of superiority. It is as 
if those being observed displayed imperfections totally foreign to 
the observer. 
In his book, Duff Cooper ponders whether the last sentence in 
the above entry is evidence of an unfortunate affair. He concludes 
that it is not. 
2 This seems a safe conclusion. Similar comments 
occur throughout the Haig diaries and letters. Their function was 
similar to the restraints used by Ulysses to resist the tempting 
call of the Sirens. By repeating them, Haig bolstered his resolve 
1Diary, 
n. d., This was probably recorded around the first 
week of December 1886. 
2Duff Cooper, Haig, p. 35. 
to avoid the dangerous influence of women. Ambitious as he vlas, 
he could not afford to be distracted by them. This explanation 
accords with the fact that, despite his apparent contempt for women, 
Henrietta--who posed no such threat--was his highly valued advisor 
and confidante. He probably did not have as low an opinion of 
women as the evidence would indicate. He simply decided that his 
career prospects dictated a conscious avoidance of 'eligible' females. 
As Duff Cooper suggests, given the way he meticulously recorded 
each day's activities during his yearly leaves, he would hardly have 
had time for a secret affair. The safest assumption seems to be 
that he was 'in truth wedded to his profession'. 
I 
Haig's first year in India was a repeat of the monotonous 
regimental routine which he experienced in England. The dissatis- 
faction with the slow progress of his career was exacerbated by con- 
cerns over his health. The problems began in March 1887 when he 
contracted enteric fever and missed a polo tournament as a result. 
He was ill for a month, during which time his temperature rose to 
105.8. From that point on, the dreadful regularity of illness caused 
him considerable strain. In almost every letter to Henrietta, he 
spent at least one paragraph describing in detail the state of his 
health. Charteris felt that Haig had tendencies toward hypochondria. 
2 
It is therefore possible that he was not ever as ill as he maintained. 
But it is not important how ill he actually was, but rather how i13 
'Duff Cooper, Haig, p. 35. 
2For instance, Charteris wrote that while at Aldershot from 
1912-1914 'One peculiarity became pronounced ... Though still in 
perfect physical health and in the prime of life, he became obsessed 
with a dislike--almost amounting to horror--of the approach of old 
age and infirmity. Special diets appealed strongly to him, and he 
would devote himself assiduously to every one which attracted his 
notice. "Sour milk", "whole meal bread" and "Sanatogen", each in turn 
had its trial. ' Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 65. 
he believed himself to be. At one point, he wrote dejectedly to 
Henrietta: if I get any more fever I shall probably leave India 
at once'. 
1 He was obviously worried that his health would not be 
the equal of his ambition. 
Haig's first major opportunity to prove himself professionally 
came in 1888, when he was appointed adjutant of the regiment. The 
appointment suggests that--despite the lack of evidence in the diary-- 
he must have made a favourable impression during his first three 
years. As adjutant, he was given authority in the training and disci- 
pline of the enlisted men. He used the opportunity to the fullest. 
Suddenly there is evident an extraordinary sense of urgency in his 
approach to his profession which, because of the lack of opportunity, 
had not been expressed earlier. As adjutant, Haig finally earned the 
chance to demonstrate his resolve. 
This sense of urgency is revealed in a description of Haig 
left by Sergeant Major H. J. Harrison, who served with him in India. 
Harrison's comments balance an admiration for Haig with a frank 
acceptance of his faults. The faults in most cases resulted from 
his overzealous approach. His urgency at times overcame him. Harri- 
son wrote that Haig was 'obsessed' with his profession: 
On the drill ground, in the riding school, on the field, 
and in Camp or barracks, Haig was the same brilliant 
worker. At all times and in all weathers, Haig went about 
'Soldiering', and Haig's soldiering was admitted by all who 
mattered, to be unrelated to ordinary drills and tactics, 
but was embellishV with a kind of finishing off process 
exclusively Haig. 
Haig's zeal arose from two sources. The first was his belief in the 
ideals the cavalry represented. He saw himself as the arm's spokes- 
1The letter is no longer available, but Haig'mentions it in his 
diary, on 17 August 1892. The quotation is from there. 
2H. J. Harrison to Lady Haig, 17 April 1937, Haig Papers, NLS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 324(a). 
man. The second source was his eagerness to be recognised and pro- 
moted. He was five years older than the majority of men with his 
seniority. While age was not particularly important at this stage, 
there would come a time when it would be a factor in promotion. 
The ideals which Haig imparted were made clear to Harrison at 
their first meeting. When Harrison arrived in India as a new recruit, 
Lt. Haig in plain soldierly language made it clear to 
every member of that draft that a soldier in the famous 
regiment must be a man, and that effeminate or sentimental 
qualities would prove a menace, and a detriment to promotion 
which in after years proved correct. Exactitude, Prompti- 
tude,, Smartness and strict veracity were a few of the virtues 
our adjutant tenaciously adhered to, and sympathy for a 
technical error was unknown ... Procrastination, 
Slowness 
of Perception, untidiness and Nerves, were items calculated 
to make Lt. Haig spit fire. ... A dull-witted man was 
Haig's pet aversion. 
In order to uphold the ideals of the regiment, certain sacrifices 
were required. Haig had sacrificed a leisurely life, close contact 
with his family, friendships and intimacies. He expected the same 
from his men. He wanted them to be 'blindly devoted to their duties 
... with ... human sentiments totally eradicated. ' The good 
soldier was the one who learned to 'ostracise the mind from everything 
soft or sentimental. ' As Haig was wedded to his profession, he 
wanted men similarly attached. 'He was solidly against a soldier 
being married, ' Harrison wrote, 'and a man who approached him with 
an application to take unto himself a wife did so with fear and 
trembling. ' 
Despite his profound admiration for Haig, Harrison admitted 
that 'Haig of the early nineties was a Martinet'. 
1 His overzealous 
approach at times worked to the disadvantage of his men. He occa- 
sionally lost his sense of fairness and decency. For instance, 
1A11 
quotations on this page are from the Harrison letter to 
Lady Haig. The punctuation and capitalisation are his. 
Harrison described how a signaller was pilloried by Haig after the 
soldier lost control of an over lively horse during a parade. The 
incident embarrassed Haig, who took out his anger on the unfortunate 
man. He first accused the signaller of being of low mentality. 
He then ordered him to the infirmary, where he was checked for a 
mental disorder. At the infirmary, on Haig's instructions, the 
soldier was given a draught of Croton Oil, a drastic cathartic. 
Upon his return to the regiment, Haig placed him on a twenty-eight 
day C. B. 
1 
One reason for the drastic treatment was that the signaller was 
a 'staff man'. These were soldiers with special duties, such as 
servants, farriers, saddlers and cooks. Their special duties occa- 
sionally excused them from drills, parades and lectures. For this 
reason, Haig loathed them. Harrison, also a signaller, once experi- 
enced for himself the effects of Haig's prejudice. Harrison was 
being examined for promotion to Sergeant, and Haig was one of the 
judges for the practical portion of the exam. The other judges 
felt that Harrison had completed the necessary exercises perfectly. 
Haig,. however, did not agree, and since the judges' decisions had to 
be unanimous, Harrison was denied the promotion. He appealed to the 
Colonel of the regiment, who in turn consulted Haig. 'Haig admitted 
that the move was perfectly done, but that I was a Staff man, a 
Signaller. ' Haig did not believe that members of the staff belonged 
in positions of responsibility. The Colonel, reversed the decision 
and Harrison was promoted. This incensed Haig, and, according to 
Harrison, 'Haig and I never afterwards were pals. '2 
'Confined to Barracks. 
2All 
quotations on this page are from the Harrison letter to 
lady Haig. 
Haig did not mention the incident in his diary. It was not 
his habit to record instances when he had been humiliated, however 
mildly. Yet despite the lack of corroborative evidence, it is 
doubtful that Harrison fabricated the story. He held no grudge 
against Haig. His letter to Lady Haig was intended to convey his 
deep admiration and respect for his former adjutant. In spite of 
the injustice, his feelings toward Haig remained constant: 
I have followed your remarkable soldier husband your 
Ladyship, through all his career ... and have 
thrilled 
with pride on reading of his exploits, thinking of him as 
a brother who at the initial stages of his career chose 
to renounce sentimentality, human inspirations, and affec- 
tionate feelings, to embrace a real hard, irrevocable task 
of producing soldiers for his country and Queen. 
The image of Haig which is conveyed in Harrison's letter is of an 
immensely proud individual who was devoted to his profession. His 
faults were the result of his overenthusiasm and impatience. They 
were therefore partially excusable. Despite the faults, Harrison, 
like so many of his contemporaries, believed that Haig was an 
extraordinary soldier who was destined to succeed through sheer 
force of will. 
The diaries which followed Haig's promotion to adjutant 
reflect the intensity which Harrison described. He no longer 
simply recorded social activities and his impressions of indivi- 
duals. Though there are still entries of this type, the majority 
deal with matters affecting the regiment or the Army in general. 
For example, in February 1889, Haig was an umpire at cavalry manoeu- 
vres. As umpire his duties included filing an official report on 
the exercise. The diary allowed him to express criticisms which 
would not have been acceptable in the report: 
1Harrison to Lady Haig, previously cited. 
Col. Butler has no idea of manoeuvring an army. ... 
his 
chief fault seemed to be that he gave no order as to were 
he could be found, so all his information went astray. 
On the next day, Haig became an active participant. Again, he 
found the handling of the troops faulty: 
Our Cavalry under Walter was utterly useless. He has no 
'method' in reconnoitering, sends out too many patrols, 
missed his road and did not send word ... he had 
done so!? 
Haig had little patience for performances like these. His criticisms 
were probably entirely justified. He believed that manoeuvres of this 
type were essential to cavalry efficiency. He loathed the commander 
who did not approach them with the seriousness which he felt was 
necessary. Part of his anger no doubt arose from his belief that 
he could do better. He was impatient to prove himself and frustrated 
when less able, albeit senior, officers were given such opportunities. 
He may also have been bitter because these men were often nearly 
equal to him in age. 
Though Haig firmly believed in the value of manoeuvres, parades 
and drill, he rejected exercises which he thought were irrelevant 
or ill-conceived. For instance, on 29 November 1889, he wrote 
the following: 
Divisional Field Day-- 
Regiment divided up. But Cavalry is quite out of place on 
such occasions as the opposing forces start so close to 
each other: how a man calling himself a General can think 
such field days of use for Cavalry I can't think? --They 
are quite a waste of time and do Cavalry harm in making 
the men ride loosely and get wild. 
3 
The above entry conflicts with Dixon's analysis of Haig as an 
authoritarian soldier. In the first place, the authoritarian blindly 
1Diary, 12 February 1889. 
2Diary, 13 February 1889. 
3Diary, 
29 November 1889. 
respects authority. 
' 
More important, the authoritarian soldier, 
according to Dixon, is characterised by his enthusiasm for gratuitous 
drill and other meaningless activities not directly related to 
military efficiency. Dixon collectively terms these 'bullshit'. 
Bullshit is defined as any practice which aims solely at destroying 
the enlisted man's individuality 
2 
Haig devised exercises with the 
aim of maximum utility and relevance. He may have believed in 
destroying individuality--as most commanders do--but his exercises 
simulated, as closely as possible, actual battlefield situations. 
Whether or not he was always correct in his appraisals, the fact 
remains that Haig rejected any exercise which he felt was solely 
'bullshit. 
The above entry also contradicts Terraine's contention that 
Haig aimed only to be a 'proficient' cavalryman. Had this been the 
case, he would not have been as bothered by the actions of the 
'man calling himself a General'. Poorly conceived exercises were 
detrimental to the cavalry's shaky image. Haig, as a self-conceived 
guardian for the traditional cavalry, devised exercises to enhance 
that image. His efforts on behalf of the cavalry also involved 
courting senior officers who were favourable to the traditional 
tactics. When in the company of these men, Haig made extra efforts 
to impress. This is the approach he took with General Bengough, 
Adjutant General of the Bombay Army. After the manoeuvre which 
Haig umpired, Bengough, according to the diary, 'expressed himself 
1Though 
Haig did not have the chance to air his criticisms in 
any other way than in the diary at this stage, this would not always 
be the case. It will be seen that as he rose in prestige he became 
more open and vocal in his criticisms, to the point where he eventu- 
ally felt quite secure in openly questioning the policies of a senior 
officer, to his face. 
2See Dixon, Military Incompetence, pp. 176-188, for a discussion 
of 'Bullshit'. 
much pleased with Haig's efforts. Later in the year came another 
chance for Haig to make an impression: 
General Bengough dines quietly with us in the evening. I 
sat next to him. He is evidently very keen about Cavalry. 
We discussed several2points connected with the training of 
the British Cavalry. 
Sometimes Haig performed tasks on behalf of the Cavalry which were 
totally unrelated to his regular regimental duties. For instance, 
he noted on one occasion that he 'Gent off registered letter to 
General Bengough with remarks on a scheme for teaching cavalry recon- 
naissance. '3 Bengough replied as follows: 
I was much interested in your remarks on Cavalry reconnais- 
sance and in the little pamphlet that you sent me all of 
which appear to me excellent. If all or most Cavalry 
officers took as much practical interest in instructing 
their men, we shojld soon have our Cavalry ... equal 
to any in Europe. 
By doing work of this type, Haig did both the cavalry and his career 
a favour. 
One individual with whom Haig maintained particularly close 
contacts was Colonel John French, who was at the time commanding 
officer of the 19th Hussars. The first mention of French occurs 
on 24 November 1891, the occasion of a large cavalry camp. There 
are many subsequent references to him, both at social and profes- 
sional gatherings. Haig's interest in French was due to the latter's 
status as an ardent cavalry traditionalist. It will be seen how 
the two led the resistance against the pollution of cavalry by 
mounted infantry units. Though they had similar tactical opinions, 
1Diary, 18 February 1889. 
2Diary, 10 April 1889. 
3Diary, 8 June 1891. 
4Gen. 
Bengough to Haig, 20 June 1891, Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 
3155, No. 6(e). 
Haig and French had little else in common. They differed 
in social, 
political and most military aspects. Nevertheless, 
it will later 
be shown how Haig went to extraordinary lengths to maintain 
his 
connections with French. 
1 
His efforts reflect the extent to which 
he was prepared to go in his support for the orthodox cavalry. 
The leaves which Haig spent in Britain provided further 
opportunities for courting favour with influential persons. These 
leaves usually extended over three months, and were timed to coincide 
with Ascot and a portion of the summer season. One individual whom 
Haig met via the social round was Major General Sir Evelyn Wood, 
who immediately recognised Haig as a soldier of immense potential. 
Their subsequent liaison was beneficial to both officers. 
2 During 
leaves from India, Haig usually stayed at Henrietta's London residence, 
where he had the added advantage of socialising with her influential 
friends. His amusements while on leave included parties, dinners, 
race meetings, grouse shooting in Scotland and hunts in various parts 
of England. Occasionally he spent part of his leave at a continental 
spa. In 1890, he rather uncharacteristically visited Monte Carlo. 
Once inside a casino, however, he behaved in a more consistent 
manner, betting small sums and quitting when he broke even. 
In 1891 and 1892, Haig did not visit Britain on his leave. In- 
stead, he used the time in 1891 to visit Ceylon and the Northwest 
Frontier, while in 1892 he toured Australia. The 1891 trip was taken 
with a fellow officer named Dalgety. The two employed native guides 
to show them the noteworthy sights and to act as beaters when they 
hunted,, ;. The mode of travel was consistent with the level of comfort 
1These included a £2590 loan to French in 1899. See page 178. 
2The 
relationship between Wood and Haig will be examined in 
detail in subsequent chapters. 
to which Haig was accustomed: 
Our camp is carried on twelve camels and is most exten- 
sive quite regardless of weight to be carried. For beds 
we have two charpoys (which do not take to pieces) with 
mattresses, most comfortable. There are three tents, so 
that one can be sent on over night for use at breakfast. 
Get to bed about 10: 30 and send the coolie on witý about 
8 camels to have breakfast ready for us next day. 
While in Australia, the luxuries were, of course, even more plenti- 
ful. Haig stayed at the residence of the Military Governor, and 
was treated to elegant dinners, shows and parties. He was also taken 
on a quite extensive tour of the country. 
Despite the luxuries, Haig's attention never seemed to stray 
completely from military matters. While in Ceylon and on the 
Northwest Frontier, he paid constant attention to the strategic 
and tactical aspects of the land. In Australia, he wrote his comments 
on the Melbourne harbour defences. These military problems would 
never concern him in an official capacity. His attention to them 
reflects how completely his career had consumed every aspect of his 
daily life. During the trips Haig also continued to record techni- 
cal observations-similar to those on his first voyage to India-- 
in extraordinary detail. While on the Afghan border, he wrote 
copious notes on the Khojak Tunnel including data on length, width, 
gradient and type of construction. The same detail is evident in 
his description of a tea factory, visited a few days later. While 
in Australia, he wrote three diary pages full of almost microscopic 
print following a visit to a coal mine. As was the case before, 
though he was obviously interested in what he observed, he evidently 
took considerable delight in testing his memory and powers of 
observation in this way. 
Aside from these leaves, Army life varied little as the years 
1Diary, 
2 May 1891. 
passed. Haig's promotion to adjutant brought him new responsibilities 
and prestige, but once he became accustomed to these, the new routine 
was similar to the old. He had to await the recognition of senior 
officers, instead of making his mark through bold and impressive 
achievements. He had little control over his destiny, a fact which 
conflicted with the self, -assurance he demonstrated earlier. 
Without 
war, or even a threat of war, the prospects for a drastic change 
in his fortune were few. In 1891, he was chosen to act as Brigade 
Major at a cavalry camp. He performed well, but the camp lasted 
only a few days. The appointment is only impressive when viewed 
against his otherwise mundane responsibilities. The same can be 
said of his selection for special duty at a similar camp the fol- 
lowing year. This time, however, he did not even experience minor 
command. His duties were administrative only. The commanding 
officer, General Gatacre, instructed Haig to 'ride about with him, 
take notes and then report on the camp. '1 He fulfilled his instruc- 
tions perfectly. Gatacre was so impressed with the report that he 
ordered it printed for distribution. 
Haig was again saddled with administrative duties in August 
1892 when he was selected for special service with the Bombay Army, 
at Poona. He was asked to sort out a variety of bureaucratic pro- 
blems which had been allowed to fester for some time. A typical day's 
work was as follows: 
I finished the files on the action of Govt. regarding 
. the arming of 
Native Re iments with swords or lances. 
They date back to 1867. ' 
The selection. of Haig for these duties was an acknowledgement of his 
1Diary, 3 January 1892. 
ZDiary, 10 August 1892. 
highly developed administrative skills. His work was widely admired. 
For instance, his superior officer at Poona, Colonel Hunt, praised 
him by saying: 
.. whatever he undertakes 
he puts his whole heart and 
soul into it and always, you may be sure, he makes things 
a success. 
Haig was developing into a perfect administrative staff officer. 
He was energetic, dependable, conscientious, and exact. He believed 
sincerely in the importance of the tasks he was given. While not 
a brash, outspoken upstart, neither was he a self-effacing sycophant, 
blindly obedient to authority. He knew how and when to speak his 
mind. But the outlook for Haig was not totally positive. The fact 
that these special administrative appointments were the most impres- 
sive achievements of his first seven years in the Army shows how 
lackluster his career had been. His lack of battle experience and 
his proven organisational powers were combining to label him as an 
office soldier, in spite of the fact that he yearned to be otherwise. 
India was developing into a morass which threatened to smother 
Haig's career. There was no way that his talents could be fully 
recognised and appreciated as long as he stayed there. This was 
because the Army of the 1890s was divided into two factions, one 
led by Lord Wolseley, the other by Lord Roberts. Wolseley's domain 
was Britain; Roberts' was India. While in India, aaig did not 
become a 'Roberts man'. Terraine feels this was another example 
of his noble detachment. 
2 This is only partially correct. It is 
true that Haig avoided factions. He did, however, court favour 
with individual officers from time to time. The reason he did not 
'The 
quotation it from the Diary, 14 August 1892. Haig was 
quoting a tribute given to him by Hunt at a farewell dinner. 
2Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, pp. 6-7. 
do so with Roberts was because he had little to gain from him. Nor 
did Roberts have much to gain from Haig. The two were decidedly 
different soldiers. Both were serious professionals, but that is 
where the similarities ended. Roberts was an independent, practical 
soldier who had a distaste for theory. He was a fighter-a general 
who believed the only truly valuable lesson was war. Haig, partly 
because of circumstance and partly a result of his nature, became 
one of the new breed of soldiers who stressed organisation and 
efficiency. These officers believed that new training programs 
and administrative restructuring was essential to the profession- 
alisation of the Army. Haig and Roberts were also of different 
social classes, though both came from modest origins. Haig had 
veered toward the aristocracy, while 'Bobs' had become the soldier of 
the people. Because of their class differences, they had contrasting 
views with regard to the cavalry. Roberts was a supporter of the 
mounted infantry movement which Haig considered an anathema. 
Haig, out, of place in Roberts' domain, was not very well situated 
for promotion. In Britain, -on the other hand, the administrative 
changes which suited him (and which Roberts ignored) were becoming 
a reality. He was too old to wait for opportunities. Realising 
this, he decided to go to Britain to compete for admission to the 
Staff College. By doing so, he hoped to sidestep the regimental 
route to promotion. At the Staff College he would meet officers 
who appreciated his talents. The option was one which he had con- 
sidered for some time. His experiences at Poona finally convinced 
him of its wisdom. In a letter to Henrietta, he revealed that 
he believed India had little left to offer him: 
I have found out all I want to know in the A. G. 's office 
and as the exam for the Staff College is very hard I think 
the sooner I come home the better. ... This ought to be 
my last letter to you from India for some time. I am 
going to wire you that I am leaving before the 24th, 
but it is difficult to find a word to let you know that 
I have finished my business here and so am returning for 
that reason and not because I am unwell. I... have 
very little to do here except amuse myself but as I can do 
that better at home I think it is best to start. 1 
Haig left India on 9 September 1892. He had optimistic hopes for 
the change in his fortune which would soon materialise. When one 
considers how the promise which he had demonstrated at Sandhurst 
had been allowed to stagnate in the unsympathetic Indian environ- 
ment, i-ý is doubtful that he was overly saddened at his departure. 
1Haig 
to Henrietta Jameson, 1 September 1892, Haig Papers, 
NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 6(b). All of the following letters to Henrietta 
are from No. 6(. b-d), and will hereafter be cited as 'Haig to 
Henrietta', followed by the date of the correspondence. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Staff College, 1892-1897 
On 9 September 1892, Haig left India aboard the Peninsular. He 
described the departure in his diary: 
Find Regimental Sergeant Major Humphries waiting at launch 
for me. We all go on board Peninsular--quite melancholy 
parting. Humphries wrung my hand and said I was the 'best 
sort he had ever had to do with. ' They go down the ladder 
into a small boat, the tide running very strong towards 
the lighthouse. I watched them with my glasses until they 
were quite a small speck, and were out near Colaba point. 
It was about 6 p. m., 1and getting dark. I feel quite sorry 
at leaving them all. 
He had mixed feelings about leaving India. The country had been a 
professional wasteland. Yet it was still his first military home. 
Tepid expressions such as the above were typical of Haig. 
2 Seldom 
did any sentimentality intrude into the diary. On the rare occasions 
when sentiments were recorded, the diary had a purgative effect. 
Once the sadness was recorded, it seems to have quickly dissipated. 
Haig then focused his attentions forward. 
Haig eagerly anticipated entering the Staff College. He hoped 
the College would enable him to sidestep the regimental route to 
promotion, wherein an officer rose slowly from lieutenant to Colonel 
and then--usually in the twilight of his career--to command of a 
brigade. This process took an extremely long time, time which 
Haig, at 31, did not have. He hoped that a p. s. c. 
3 
would enable him 
to enter the Army's mainstream. He could then land a staff appoint- 
ment with an influential commander, and the light which shone on that 
officer would be reflected in his direction. This alternative had 
become increasingly popular with eager young officers of the late 
IDiary, 9 September 1892. 
2A 
similar expression was recorded on 28 April 1889 on the occa- 
sion of Haig's departure on leave: 'Beresford, Iawley and Reid drove 
to the station with me in the brake. Quite sorry to leave them all. ' 
3The 
Staff College Degree, short for 'passed Staff College'. 
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Victorian Army. But there were risks. There were still groups 
within the Army which rejected the trend toward professionalisation 
which the staff College symbolised. Moreover, a staff appointment 
did not always follow a successful stint at the College. Finally, 
an incompetent general could ruin the careers of his staff officers. 
In such cases, the two years at the College would be wasted. But 
these were risks which advancing age and a lack of other opportuni- 
ties forced Haig to take. 
Haig took an extended leave of absence from September 1892 
until the following June in order to prepare for the entrance 
examination. His preparations were similar to those taken before 
Sandhurst. 'Everyone goes to James or some coach', he wrote to 
Henrietta, 'as he saves one so much time and knows whether one can 
pass or not. '1 Again, he seems to have abandoned his diary. 
2 He did, 
however, write frequent letters to his sister, which give an adequate 
account of his activities. While she was on a yachting trip, he 
benefited from the comfort and privacy of her London residence, 
where he studied quite diligently. He spent every weekday from early 
morning until 5: 00 p. m. with James. 'What rubbish it is to say it 
is dull for me here', he commented, 'I haven't time to think about 
much else than the subjects for examination: '3 Henrietta made sure 
he did not neglect his diet by leaving one of her servants to look 
after him: 
The good plain cooking of 'Mrs. Baxter' is just what my 
digestion requires. You have no idea what a difference 
'Haig to Henrietta, 1 September 1892. 
2The 1893 and 1894 diaries are missing. Their absence cannot 
wholly be explained by the preparations for the exam. 
3Haig 
to Henrietta, 3 November 1892. 
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the cooking and eatables makes when one has work tQ do 
and no time to investigate details regarding food! 
Henrietta's relationship with Douglas was often more like that 
of a mother to her young son than of a sister to her brother. 
Likewise, his letters to her often resemble those written to Rachel 
many years earlier. 
Henrietta was particularly concerned about her brother's 
health. The illnesses he contracted in India worried her acutely. 
She therefore insisted, upon his return, that he undergo an extensive 
physical examination: 
In order to set your mind at rest regarding health, I 
went and saw a Dr. after leaving James tonight at 5 p. m. 
One Hamilton Brown of a certain fame and certainly a most 
careful and painstaking Physician. He looked at me all 
over! My tongue of course, chalked with a pencil the size 
of my liver on my skin, put things in his ears and listened 
to my lungs and heart and so forth. He said he would pass 
me as a 'thoroughly sound man' but a little below par. So 
I hope you will be satisfied now. All I want is plain food 
and a certain amount of exercise. This I am getting now and 
I'll be as fit as ever in a short time. 2 
In view of the concern over his career which the illnesses had 
earlier caused him, it is likely that he was as delighted as 
she to hear of his general fitness. 
Haig studied with James until March, when he suddenly left his 
crammer and went to Germany. It is not entirely clear why he did 
this. Though he used the visit to undergo cxa andto improve his German, 
these were apparently not his main reasons for going. Rather, it 
appears that when the Jamesons returned to London Haig found the 
social whirl which continually surrounded them too distracting. 
'I ... was real sorry to leave you', he explained to his sister, 
'but I fancy it is the best thing to do to come away by oneself in 
1Haig 
to Henrietta, 10 October 1892. 
2Ibid. 
order to read up for this beastly exam. '1 
He spent most of his time 
with family friends in Dusseldorf. Here he found 
the privacy he 
needed and the comforts he desired. The 
'frau ... a nice 
looking 
old woman ... has taken a 
heap of trouble to make me comfortable. 
Nevertheless, Henrietta made certain her brother was properly cared 
for by loaning him her butler, to whom she gave precise instructions 
regarding his care. 'Metcalfe', wrote Haig, 'does first rate. 
Brings me beef tea, by your orders at 11 a. m. '3 Despite the comforts, 
he complained that it 'is no pleasure coming to these foreign parts'. 
4 
The pressures of studying weighed on him, though this did not cause 
him to relax his efforts. 'You will see', he wrote sarcastically, 
'I have taken Easter holidays like the rest of the world! '5 
He did take a short break at Schwalbach, one of the family's 
favourite spas. Though he did not have much time to study during 
his cure, neither did he neglect his work entirely. His description 
of the daily schedule is typical of many subsequent visits: 
I am getting on nicely here, thank you, and am feeling all 
the better for the waters. My times are somewhat earlier 
than the ones you followed. I am out by 7 a. m. and get 2 
half glasses drunk in time to have breakfast at 8 o. c. I 
then go out again about 10: 30 take 2a glass and bath at 
11 o. c. Walking about between drink and bath of course. 
Then another ä glass and a bit of a walk and back here at 
12. The lunch at 1: 15. At about 4I have some chocolate 
as I have a grand hunger here! and at 4: 30 the Herr 
Rektor comes. We do some German till 5: 30, then he and I 
go for a walk: I lecture to him on all topics in the 
German tongue ... it is his business to correct the 
language. I get back about 7: 30 and have dinner. I have 
omitted the afternoon drink which we take on the way for 
'Haig to Henrietta, 17 March 1893. 
2Ibid. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 19 March 1893. 
4Haig 
to Henrietta, 17 March 1893. 
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to Henrietta, 4 April 1893. 
the walk. The time passes most quickly: ij is almost as 
well I have some work to do in this place. 
Haig's methodical nature was perfectly suited to cures of this type. 
He did not visit the spas for the active social life which he found 
there. Instead, he sincerely believed that his ailments could be cured 
by a rigid adherence to the schedule of rests, waters and exercise. 
Haig returned to England in mid-May to begin final preparations 
for the examination. He stayed in Richmond 'rather than interfere 
with the "family arrangements" at the flat'. 
2 He returned to James 
for the two weeks prior to the test. The exam was held from 29 
May to 12 June, and totalled forty-two hours. It was arranged similarly 
to the Sandhurst exam, with compulsory and optional areas. Haig's 
long months of intensive preparation proved futile. Though he finished 
in the top twenty-eight candidates (the statutory number selected via 
the exam) and therefore technically qualified, he failed mathematics, 
3 
one of the compulsory subjects. In this section, a total of 200 points 
(out of a possible 400) was required. 
4 
Haig scored 182. The failure 
was probably the most bitter disappointment of his career, and 
caused him a great deal of personal embarrassment-5 He had placed 
1Haig to Henrietta, 6 May 1893. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 27 April 1893. 
3Terraine, in Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 8, states that 
Haig failed arithmetic, but it was actually mathematics. See 'Regulations 
Regarding the Staff College', HMSO, 1894. 
4In 
other words, an individual who otherwise qualified by being 
in the top twenty-eight, was disqualified if he failed to get at least 
5c% in all of the compulsory subjects. 
4In 
a letter dated 21 May 1935 to Duff Copper, H. J. Creedy, of the 
Staff College wrote: 'With reference to your letter of 7th May about 
D. H. and the Staff College, I first consulted Edmonds who was a fellow 
student. He writes that Haig never "let on" to his fellow students that 
he had failed for the Staff College. His story was that he had qualified 
in 1894--that is with the "year" previous to that with which he entered 
the College--but for private reasons had not wanted a nomination until 1895, to join the College in January 1896. ' Copy in Edmonds Papers, 
I/2B/18b. 
so much store in the advantages of a p. s. c. There was, however, 
one remaining option open to him. Each year the Commander-in-Chief, 
the Duke of Cambridge, nominated four officers from among those who 
failed to gain entry via the competitive exam. The Duke made his 
decision from a short-list provided him by the Adjutant General. In 
order to gain the nomination, the candidate's qualifications had 
to be attested to by his senior officers-first to Sir Redvers Buller 
(the A. G. ) and then to the Duke. Haig's superiors in India, Generals 
Bengough and Graves, sent glowing recommendations. But Buller refused 
to forward Haig's name to the Duke. 
In a letter dated 10 August, 
1 
Buller explained his refusal. 
He maintained that the Army Health Board, in an examination held 
prior to the entrance exam, had discovered that Haig was colour 
blind. The disability was slight: he could not distinguish pink 
from other shades of red. Haig refused to discuss the ailment for 
the rest of his life, due apparently to the disappointment and 
embarrassment it caused him. Some biographers intimate that the 
ailment was the sole reason for Haig's failure to enter the Staff 
College in 1891+2 They conveniently ignore the poor performance in 
mathematics. In actuality, the colour blindness was a minor issue 
which caused a major disagreement. Since the eye test occurred 
prior to the entrance examination, while the disability was not men- 
tioned until later, it seems that Buller used the colour blindness 
'This letter no longer exists, but it is mentioned in later 
correspondence by Haig, found in Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, 
No. 6(e). 
2See Ernest Protheroe, Earl Haig, p. 17; and George Arthur, 
Lord Haig, p. It. Both authors claim that Haig failed to gain 
entrance because of the colour blindness. Protheroe, in fact, 
claims that Haig 'passed the examination for admission with distinc- 
tion. ' 
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as a convenient excuse to reject Haig's recommendation to the Duke. 
Buller was fully justified in refusing Haig's application on the 
grounds of his mathematics results. By bringing in the eye test, 
he demonstrated that his motives were not the most honourable. 
Haig tried to appeal against Buller's decision. He compiled 
a lengthy petition which argued that he had been unfairly treated. 
Referrring to the exam, he maintained that: 
The. Secret. ry of State for Wat stated in the House of Commons 
that a new Examiner had been detailed for the recent Exami- 
nation in Mathematics, and that the previous papers set were 
different to those set in previous years-- Now in every 
'Official Report on Examination for Entrance to the Staff 
College' the attention of the intending candidates is called 
to the papers previously set, and they are directed to make 
them as guides as to what is required of them- This years 
candidates have been misled in the Mathematical Papers. 1 
The fallacy in this argument--the fact that the exam was the same 
for everyone, and no one else failed the mathematics part-apparently 
escaped Haig. His complaint regarding Buller's action on the colour 
blindness issue was, however, on firmer ground: 
Is it not rather late to fall back on the medical report 
now, because had I made 18 more marks on a paper which is 
acknowledged to be somewhat unfair I would have entered 
the Staff College without further question. 2 
Haig further argued that only a fraction of the candidates were 
tested for colour blindness. 
3 He even found a Professor Mohren--'the 
great German oculist'--who testified in writing that he was not 
colour blind. But the petition had no effect. 
When Henrietta found that Buller did not intend to reverse his 
1Draft 
copy of Haig's petition to the War Office, 
Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 6(e). 
2Ibid. 
n. d., Haig 
30nly those candidates who had their medical examinations in London were tested for colour blindness. 
4Petition 
to War Office. It is not known whether Dr. Mohren 
was worthy of this distinction. 
decision, she tried to use her influence on her brother's 
behalf. 
She printed a resum4 which listed Haig's academic and military 
qualifications, dating back to Clifton. She enclosed the resume 
in letters to Evelyn Wood (then Quartermaster General) and Sir 
Keith Fraser, the Inspector General of Cavalry in England. She 
pleaded for their assistance. It is possible that others were also 
contacted. 
1 
Replying on 19 August 1893, Fraser explained the 
problems which blocked Haig's admission: 
My dear Mrs. Jameson: 
It is most vexatious that this should have happened to your 
brother who is the very man the Cavalry require as a Staff 
Officer, a man who has been an adjutant and a very good one. 
I hope to meet the Duke about the 3rd of September and hope 
it is not too late. 
I wrote to the Acting Military Secretary on the subject and 
he says that it is Sir R. Butler who submits names--and he 
does not raise any hopes saying there are others with higher 
claims who ... are more likely to be selected. 
It is too cruel that such a mathematical paper should have 
been set. Would not Mr. Campbell-Bannerman be the man to 
get at if this fails. Unluckily the House of Commons is 
full of other matters or this should be brought upon it. 
I fear as a Cavalry man I have no influence whatever. If 
your brother was a Rifleman, he could have a better chance. 
I am so sorry. 
Yours v. sincerely, 
Keith Fraser2 
The cavalry's prestige and influence was evidently minimal in this 
area. Buller, an Infantryman, was expressing his prejudice against 
the cavalry. 
With no more options open, Haig had to return to his regiment. 
Before doing so, he visited Touraine, where he attended the French 
cavalry manoeuvres. The visit was undertaken on Haig's own volition. 
1There is some speculation that Henrietta may have enlisted the 
help of the Prince of Wales. See page 124. 
2Keith Fraser to Henrietta Jameson, 19 August 1893, Haig Papers, 
NLS, Ace. 3155, No. 6(g). 
( 
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It demonstrates his intense interest in his profession. He may also 
have been motivated by the possible effect it would have on his 
career prospects. In other words, he may have wished to demonstrate 
conclusively his merits as a serious, professional soldier while 
still in the company of men who appreciated these qualities. If 
this was his aim, he certainly succeeded. Upon his return, he 
submitted a report to the Intelligence Department. The report 
was subsequently printed for general distribution. It was praised 
by those in the highest echelons of the Army, as evidenced by the 
following letter to Major General Galbraith, Commander-in-Chief in 
India: 
Sir: 
I am directed by His Royal Highness the Commander-in- 
Chief to request that you will convey to Captain Douglas 
Haig, 7th (Q. O. ) Hussars, now serving under your command, 
His Royal Highness' appreciation for the most valuable and 
interesting report made by that officer during his recent 
leave of absence. 
E. F. Chapmanl 
A great deal of the report's attraction resulted from the fact 
that it was unsolicited. Haig had demonstrated that he was not an 
ordinary, complacent regimental officer, but a man prepared to go 
to extraordinary lengths on behalf of the Army. 
In his usual meticulous and methodical manner, Haig analysed 
all aspects of the French cavalry. The manoeuvre was particularly 
enlightening because it was organised on a scale unknown in Britain. 
British cavalry exercises usually consisted of a few regiments 
loosely drawn together for three or four days. The French at 
Touraine exercised two entire divisions-each with a unified and 
highly organised command structure--for a fortnight. Many of the 
`E. F. Chapman to Maj. Gen. Galbraith, 5 January 1894, Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 6(e). Chapman was at that time Director of Military Intelligence. 
1 
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French practices were similar to those which Haig had recommended 
for years. The manoeuvre therefore allowed him to test his own 
theories of cavalry organisation and training, with the advantage 
of detachment. His French report, as a result, is a distillation 
of his military ideology--an ideology which, it will be seen, did 
not alter drastically during his career. The main point which 
he emphasised was the high degree of initiative given to the brigade 
leader. Though each officer conformed to the division commander's 
general directives, he was free to adapt as he saw fit. This meant 
that the actual formation of the brigade, the direction of its attack 
[and number of squadrons employed at any point' accorded with the 
'ever-changing conditions of the fight'! This method assured maxi- 
mum effectiveness: 
A cavalry division manoeuvred on such principles reminds 
one of a well-disciplined polo team playing a polo match. 
And are not much the same qualifications required for suc- 
cess in both cases? I mean that, just as the four players 
combine to get the ball through the goal--some by riding 
off or backing up, so as to enable one of their number to 
hit the ball, as much as possible unmolested, towards .. 
the goal-so, according to French cavalry tactics, one 
brigade attacks the enemy at that point where the best re- 
sult is likely to be produced, while the others support it 2 
as best they can, and do their utmost to ensure its success. 
Haig felt that the British did not appreciate the value of this 
decentralised approach. He was convinced that the continued ignorance 
of it was detrimental to the cavalry's effect, and therefore to its 
survival. 
He was also impressed with the French staff system. Though 
the billets and food of the officers 'were at times of the simplest!. 
3 
Douglas Haig, Report on the French Cavalry Manoeuvres in Touraine 





he admitted that this was 'not the fault of the staff'. In other 
areas, the French performance was admirable: 
Those staff officers whom I met seemed to go about their 
work with method and common sense; any suggestion from regi- 
mental authorities was treated with consideration and, if 
possiple, acted upon. There was no fussiness apparent in 
their movements, and an 'obstructionist' for the pleasure 
of posing as a 'person in authority' seemed to be unknown 
here. Moreover they knew they work--seemed practical men 
and not merely a body of theorists. It was noted that 
regimental and staff officers -were on the best of terms, 
and all seemed to appreciate the necessity to have 'union' 
in order to have strength. 
Haig realised that staff officers often exploited their power and 
position. When they did so, they impeded the army as a whole. The 
French had apparently learned to control this bad habit. They 
were the type of staff officers Haig himself wished to emulate. 
In his conclusion, Haig reiterated his argument in favour of 
large-scale, practical manoeuvres such as he had observed at Touraine: 
The necessity for simple manoeuvres of all ranks if a force 
of cavalry is fit for what they will have to do in war seems 
most evident. Not only are many regulations and instructions 
which seem excellent in theory practically put to the test, 
but all ranks are made to take more interest in their work, 
and seem to acquire as their standard of efficiency, 'readi- 
ness for war' instead of 'that amount of training which will 
pass muster before the inspecting General' .2 
It will be seen that 'readiness for war' was the guiding principle 
behind all Haig's training and organisational schemes. He was 
impressed with the French acceptance of this basic principle. 
The report is full of praise for their technique. Though he felt 
that 'they might be a great deal better than they are, ' he empha- 
sised that 'their methods deserve full as much attention as do the 
actions of their neighbours across the Rhine. '3 





Haig returned to India when the report was completed. 
" 
His 
emotions must have been similar to those of a defeated general 
returning home. But he did not let his disappointment alter his 
determination to succeed. He approached his regimental duties with 
the usual intensity and devotion. This is proved by a letter from 
his commanding officer, written 5 April 1894, on the eve Haig's 
second departure from the regiment and India: 
My dear Douglas 
I cannot let you go without saying that I appreciate what 
you have done for the Regiment. You came back to a position 
that a great many people would have disliked extremely ... Instead of making a grievance of it all, I know what a lot 
of pains you have taken and how much improvement in that 
squadron had been owing to you; and up to the last moment 
when you were off, you have taken just as much interest in 
the preliminary musketry of the squadron as if you would be 
able to see the results. I cannot say how much you will be 
missed by all of us, officers, N. C. O. s and men. Your example 
to the regiment has been worth everything to the boys. You 
know I wish you every luck. You are, I think, bound to suc- 
ceed because you mean to. I hate saying 'Goodbye' as I am 
sadly afraid I shall never soldier with you again, but only 
hope I may. 
Yours very sincerely, 
Hamish Reid2 
Reid's letter demonstrates that Haig's efforts were never motivated 
solely by self-interest. Though he had little to . in in India, he 
did not simply bide his time, but did much more than was expected of 
him. His belief in what he was doing precluded a half-hearted approach. 
Haig returned to Britain to be Sir Keith Fraser's A. D. C. It 
is not clear why Fraser chose him for the post. Perhaps Henrietta's 
efforts on her brother's behalf had had an indirect effect. It is, 
however, more likely that Haig's report on the French cavalry had 
back in India. 
as tnere is no diary it is not entirely clear when Haig arrived Tý 12. 
2Hamish Reid to Haig, 5 April 1894, Haig Papers, NLS,. Ace. 3155. 
No. 6(e). 
established him as an authority on the training and organisation 
of modern cavalry, and therefore a man who could benefit the 
Inspector General. Fraser, like Haig, was a cavalry traditionalist; 
he rejected the growing enthusiasm for mounted infantry. Fraser 
also agreed with Haig on the need for structural re-organisation 
and on the value of practical full-scale exercises. They were thus 
perfectly compatible, and were able, as a result, to effect a wide 
range of necessary reform. Haig worked especially hard during 
his time as A. D. C. In a letter to Henrietta, he gave a revealing 
description of an average week: 
I am off to Frensham (near Aldershot) this afternoon as 
we have the 4th Hussars out tomorrow for a reco; Cnnoitering 
day in that direction tomorrow. Tuesday we inspect the 
Greys in the morning and the 4th Hussars in the afternoon 
in the field. On Wednesday we see the Greys reconnoitering 
in forenoon and then we come back to London. 
Thurs., Fri. and Sat. we inspect the Ist and 2nd Life Gds. 
here--so this week we are quite full up. 
The reconnoitering means a scheme to be set, which requires 
a little arrangement. I enclose one just to shew you. 
(Destroy it please and keep to yourself). Then I have to 
look over the reports and comment on what was donet this 
takes time. So you see I am fairly busy. 1 
His responsibilities--inspections, devising schemes, etc. -were simi- 
lar to those of his adjutant days, except that the scope was so 
much wider. Though only a captain, he exerted significant influence 
over the shape of British cavalry for years to come. 
The responsibilities under Fraser continued as described above 
for most of 1894. In October of that year, he again attended French 
cavalry manoeuvres on his own initiative. This time the force 
practiced mobilisation exercises near Limoges. Though this action 
was not as instructive as the last, Haig did file a report with 
the Intelligence Department. The work was again widely appreciated. 
Justýpriör , to,, the, French trip, Haig received the following letter, 
'Haig to Henrietta, 15 July 1894. 
dated 20 September 1894, from the Adjutant General's office: 
Sir: 
I am desired by Sir Redvers Buller to acquaint you that 
he has placed before H. R. H. the certificates regarding 
your eye sight which you left for him on Thursday. 
H. R. H. has expressed himself satisfied with them, and 
has desired that your name be retained on the list of 
officers who wish to obtain the Commander-in-Chief's 
nomination for the Staff College-- It will be considered 
with others when H. R. H. makes his next selection. 
Yours faithfully, 
F. G. EillsI 
His hopes for admission to the Staff College had been rather 
unexpectedly revived. Though the letter indicates that the 
Duke was satisfied with the oculist's findings, these were the 
same reports which Buller had refused to accept the previous year. 
It is therefore probable that Haig's French cavalry reports and 
his performance with Fraser--perhaps combined with pressure from 
other quarters--were the deciding factors in Buller's change of mind. 
Haig was therefore eligible for the 1896 class. 
2 Though 
he still had to receive the Duke's final nomination, it appears 
that some confirmation of his eventual admission must have been 
given to him at this time. Otherwise, he would have returned to his 
regiment when his duties with Fraser were completed in February 
1895. Instead, he spent the rest of the year performing a variety 
of tasks, while he was in theory connected with no officer or 
regiment. This suggests that, since he would be entering the 
College in January 1896 it was felt (either by him or by his 
superiors) that it would be pointless for him to return to India 
1F. G. Eills (Military Secretary to the A. G. ) to Haig, 20 
September 1894, Raig Papers, r'LS, Acc. 3155, No. 6(e). 
2The 
students for the 1895 class would have been chosen by 
early summer 189+. 
for such a short period. 
Though he lacked a formal appointment, Haig was not idle. The 
year 1895 turned out to be the most rewarding of his career to 
date. 
During January and early February, he finished his work with Fraser, 
which included a new programme for reconnoitering instruction and 
a scheme for the spring manoeuvres. On 11 February he noted that 
Fraser's 'successor had been appointed and that he was "most 
grateful to me" for having come home to be his A. D. C. '1 During 
? larch and April he took leave, and finalised the purchase of Radway 
Grange in Warwickshire. From there he participated in the local hunts, 
in which Henrietta occasionally joined. Henrietta also at this 
time urged him to undergo another physical examination: 
. saw Weber M. D. just to please you. He examined me 
with the greatest care, compared my present condition with 
the last notes 1891 also the Gov'nr and Mama's constitu- 
tion enquired into with the help of his books. He says 
that I must live carefully--meat only once a day and 12 
bottle of claret as a maximum allowance for a whole day TH 
etc. If I attend to this he says my constitution is simi- 
lar to a large number of people who live to great ages! 
So you and I will be Methuselas together it seems! His 
present recommendation is Kissengen for a month, say after 
4 or 5 weeks at Potsdam, then a month at Pontresina or 
Malaga 'without overexertion' ... I am quite sound, no 
disease but liver enlarged and wants attention. 4 
Haig rather uncharacteristically did not follow the advice of his 
doctor to the letter. His career apparently came first. 'I cannot 
well spend time for so much water curing as Weber recommends', 
3 
he explained. 
He could not spare the time because of an anxiously anticipated 
trip to Germany, similar in purpose to his French ones. After he 
1Diary, 11 February 1895" 
-Haig to Henrietta, 23 April 1895. 
3 1bid. 
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arrived in Germany, he explained to Henrietta on 
4 May 1895: 
I cannot leave this country for a couple of months at 
least: I should say rather this part of Germany: for 
I have a good opportunity of seeing here all about the 
cavalry and their methods of training. It will then 
be July or at any rate the last week of June. 
1 
The Prussian Army's efficiency and organisation naturally appealed 
to Haig. Yet his interest in the Prussian cavalry had an ironic 
twist. In 1870, the Prussians demonstrated their understanding 
of modern tactics by mauling the French cavalry, a force structured 
according to traditional standards. Unlike their European counterparts, 
the Prussians had willingly accepted the limited role of cavalry in 
the face of modern firepower. Yet in 1895 Haig attended manoeuvres 
which involved large forces of traditionally organised cavalry. 
The impulse for this apparent retreat toward orthodox cavalry stan- 
dards came with the accession of Wilhelm II in 1888. The Kaiser 
loved pomp, and the cavalry were the arm best able to provide it. 
His revitalisation of the German cavalry was a hollow one, misunder- 
stood by British observers. While Haig saw it as a return to the 
fold, it was in actuality no more than the creation of a plaything 
for the Crown. 
While in Germany, Haig was aided by letters of introduction 
supplied by Fraser. 'I am getting on very well here', he wrote 
to Henrietta, 'all the German officers I have met do everything to 
make my stay agreeable and show me anything I want. '2 Unfortunately, 
not everyone was as hospitable. Colonel Swaine, the British Military 
Attache, resented iaig's intrusion. On one occasion, according to 
Haig, he cunningly tried to block Haig's attendance at a parade. 
1Haig to Henrietta, 4 May 1895" 
2Md. 
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Haig was bitterly angry over the incident. His explanation for 
Swaine's attitude was that 
. he being an 
Infantry man has never said much about 
Cavalry matters in his reports home. However'I am inde- 
pendent of him. Outwardly he pretends to be most friendly 
to me, offers to assist me in anything I wapt, but when I 
ask a thing he throws obstacles in the way. 
Swaine and Haig clashed throughout the entire visit. But, with 
Fraser's assistance, he was able to side-step the Military Attache. 
He became acquainted with General von Loe, Governor of Berlin; 
General von der Planitz, head of the Cavalry; and other senior 
officers. These men allowed him access to exercises usually closed 
to foreign observers. He realised the difference their assistance 
made, and at the end of his visit gave Henrietta the names of eight 
of these men so that she could purchase gifts for them. 'You can 
spend £30 or more if you like', he instructed. 'But I must have 
genuine articles that will last: for of course it would never do 
to say to me next time I come back "what rubbishy things are made 
in England. "'2 
The high point of the trip was a meeting with the Kaiser. 
Swaine at first stood in the way, but eventually Fraser's influence 
prevailed. The meeting took place during a 'Parade Tafel at the 
Emperor's Schloss'. Haig described the scene: 
I found myself not among the foreign officers but at the 
end of the table opposite the Emperor. ... On my right was 
a"Ctilonel Crosigh who commands the Fusilier Guards here-- 
and a friend of the Emperor. After we had been a certain 
time at dinner the Emperor drank his health, then signalled 
to him that he wished to drink my health. So I stood up and 
emptied my glass to the Kaiser in the usual style--'mae 
hieltaps'. He did the same .. 
After dinner we went into the picture gallery and the Emperor 
IHaig to Henrietta, 4 May 1895. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 9 June 1895. 
came and asked me about my regiment, about Keith Fraser 
and what I was anxious to do and the length of1the leave 
which I had. Altogether he was most friendly. 
Haig always enjoyed occasions like the above. He basked in the 
attention paid him by such an eminent personality. The opportunity 
was particularly sweet after the long, dreary years in India. 
On the practical side, Haig's observations of the German 
cavalry proved even more valuable than his earlier French ones. 
He had great admiration and respect for the German military character, 
and was therefore eager to learn as much from his stay as he could. 
Despite his usual reserve, he described one unit as 'the finest 
squadron I have ever seen--pace, direction, all perfect, and cohesion 
always maintained. '2 He also praised the performance of the German 
staff : 
. General of Division usually details one officer, 
perhaps more, to ride well ahead ä mile or more to keep 
in sight of patrols and gallop back and report as soon 
as any change of enemy's intentions is noticed. Chief 
Staff Officer receives reports and only passes on to the 
G. O. C. the more important ones. Necessity of reconnoit- 
ering ground well before hand is fully recognised and 
impracticality of sending in written reports when cavalry 
are in presence is acknowledged. 3 
As in the French study, Haig demonstrated his understanding of 
staff problems. He was aware that poor reconnoitering could lead 
to an inaccurate appreciation of the tactical situation. More 
importantly, he realised that administrative functions could 
be magnified out of proportion, thus creating a 'paper war' and a 
staff unresponsive to the real needs of the army as a whole. 
His awareness of these problems was further demonstrated in the 
1Diary, 31 May 1895. 
2Diary, 17 May 1895. 
3Diary, 10 May 1895. 
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report he submitted to the Intelligence Department--a welcome sequel 
to the French studies. As was the case in those reports, Haig 
placed extra emphasis on the high degree of flexibility and ini- 
tiative given to the junior officers within the German system. 
The Germans went even further than the French by giving a great 
deal of authority to the captains of the individual squadrons. 
He admitted that the British were beginning to accept the wisdom of 
this system, but criticised the regimental colonels who had been 
reluctant to surrender central control of operations: 
... in our army there are many men of sound judgement 
who cannot shake off the prejudices due to their old 
fashioned training ... These officers of the old school 
maintain that the colonel should show his authority by a 
constant interference in the captain's sphere of activity. 
Haig argued that under the traditional system the colonel and his 
staff 'have more to think of than they can manage. ' The result 
was a confusion over the real needs of the separate units within 
the regiment, which was in turn 'detrimental to the regular pro- 
cess of training'. 
2 
He admitted that the traditional system--what he ironically 
termed the 'orderly staff system'--had advantages. By focusing 
obedience on a single figure--the regimental colonel-it was 
'eminently conducive to the establishment and maintenance of disci- 
pline. 
3 While he believed in the value of strict discipline, he 
could not agree to retain the old system on this ground alone. 
To do so, he argued would be to ignore a fundamental principle of 
military organisation: 
IDouglas Haig, Notes on German Cavalry, 1896, Haig Papers, 





. if the Army had been 
instituted merely for the 
purpose of working in a regular and symmetrical manner 
in time of peace ... we should 
be the first to recog- 
nise that the orderly staff carries out this object to 
perfection ... But just the reverse 
is the case; not 
only was the Army not instituted with this particular 
object in view, but it has another, which is to prepare 
itself for active service .. .1 
Here again is the distinguishing feature of Haig's military 
ideology. He saw his ultimate responsibility to be the preparation 
for war. With this in mind, though he may at times have been incor- 
rect in his judgements, he analysed every scheme in terms of its 
relevance to wartime conditions. 
The application of this criterion caused him to reject the 
orderly staff system. In the heat of battle, he alleged, the 
system disintegrated. The influence exercised by the Colonel and 
his orderly staff--the 'mainstay of discipline' in peacetime-- 
. completely vanishes'. 
He further maintained that, in consequence, 
'the whole weight falls back on the shoulders of the captain'--a 
strain for which he would not be prepared. 
2 Chaos would result. 
Haig's preference for a more decentralised system on the German 
model demonstrates his awareness of the problems of communication 
in the age before wireless telegraphy. In Haig's time, when a 
unit went into battle, it was almost completely cut off from 
communication with, and therefore control by, the regimental 
commander behind the lines. The ubiquitous 'fog of war' was of 
extreme density. As Haig recognised, this meant that a high degree 





Haig, German Report, p. 45. 
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A further advantage of the German technique was that it reduced 
the bureaucratisation of staff work. Haig emphasised this in his 
report. The office work, which is enormous in our army and which 
absorbs such a numerous staff ... is absolutely reduced to nothing. 
'1 
Even in peacetime, centralised control under the orderly staff system 
meant that the colonel and his staff were out of touch with the men 
in the squadrons. This resulted in the issuing of unnecessary 
and irrelevant orders. When the individual squadron leader was given 
greater control over the affairs of his unit, as in Germany, the 
central bureaucracy was kept to its minimum size. Haig admitted, 
however, that one reason for the smooth running of the system'-. lay 
in the nature of compulsory service: 
The military year begins with the enlistment of recruits, 
and ends with their discharge. Each year is a counterpart 
of the year before; month succeeds month, and day succeeds 
day, bringing with them duties anticipated by and known to 2 
all concerned. 
This was the sort of order and regularity which Haig coveted. 
though he did not venture into the realm of politics by arguing 
in favour of national service, this was clearly his message. 
Finally, Haig stressed that the oil which made the German system 
run smoothly was its unique. discipline: 
Discipline in the Prussian cavalry service is very strict. 
I venture to think, however, that it is based not upon fear 
of punishment but rather upon the general all around effi- 
ciency of the officers in whom the rank and file are 
taught from the day they join the army to place implicit 
confidence. It has been for years acknowledged in this army 
that no officer is able to command and instruct men unless 
by his personal worth and thorough knowledge of his duties 
he can impress upon his subordinaxtes and inspire obedioice.. The discipline thus seems natural, Sand 
being so it is less likely to slacken on service than if it had punishment as its base. 3 
IHaig, 





He believed that the discipline originated from two sources. The 
first was that the officers 'are really up to their work and are 
intellectually superior to those whom they command. ' The second source 
was 'the way in which the army is organised and duty discharged 
tend 
to show up the commanders at all times as superior beings to the 
rest. '1 For Haig, therefore, the German Army demonstrated the 
continued importance of character. The system depended on the 
social superiority of the officer. At the same time, however, 
Haig admitted that national service meant 'the presence in the 
ranks of individuals from all classes of society. '2 He apparently 
did not notice that this contradicted his statement that the officers 
were the social superiors of their men, and that, therefore, German 
discipline could not be explained simply as a result of class 
differences. 
Haig's visit to Germany was shortened by an unexpected summons 
from home. The Army was preparing for a staff tour--one of the 
first of its kind--on Hayward Heath. Colonel John French was to com- 
mand a cavalry force, and he asked Haig to be his Staff Officer. 
As expected, Haig replied that he would be 'delighted', 
3 
and then 
hurried home from Germany. Staff tours were manoeuvres conducted 
without troops. As such they provided the chance to solve orgaisa- 
tional problems without the chaos and expense of large troop movements. 
The tours were organised at the instigation of the Army's 'progres- 
sive' wing--men like Wood and Wolseley who stressed practical 
exercises as the best preparation for war. Haig, one of this group, 
1Haig, German Report, p. 44. 
2Ibid., 
p. 44. 
3Diary, 12 June 1895. 
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was of course enthusiastic about participating. His participation'. 
in this one, so soon after the German trip, provided an excellent 
opportunity to apply his recently gained knowledge of 'modern' 
cavalry tactics. 
The staff tour was, on the whole, quite successful. It had 
added benefits for Haig, as it was his first opportunity to work 
closely with Wood. It is clear from the following excerpt of a 
letter from Wood that Haig made a favourable impression with the 
Quartermaster General: 
It gave me much pleasure to meet you and have a talk 
and the more so because I knew you pretty well on paper 
before--I think I may honestly say of you, what we can- 
not always say, that the expectation, though great, was 
even less than the pleasure you gave me by your conversa- tion. 1 
In his letter, Wood also requested information on the role of N. C. Os 
in the training of the young German conscript. Haig replied that he 
was an authority only on the cavalry, not on the entire German 
Army. He reiterated the point covered in his cavalry report, 
again placing special emphasis on the subject of discipline and what 
he saw as its class foundations. The information supplied hardly 
satisfied the original request, but Wood was no less delighted. 
As a result, Haig's stock rose even further. In a subsequent letter 
to Henrietta, he confided that 'Sir E. W. is a capital fellow to have 
upon one's side as he always gets his own way! '2 The statement could 
not have been more accurate. 
After the Staff Tour, Haig took a six week rest at the spas 
in Kissengen and Freudenstadt. Again, he sedulously complied with 
1Evelyn Wood to Haig, 1 July 1895, Haig Papers, NIS, Ace. 3155, 
No. 6(g). All letters between Wood and Haig are from this file 
and will hereafter be referred to as 'Wood to Haig', or vice versa, followed by the date. 
2Haig 
to Henrietta, 4 July 1895. 
the prescribed schedules of drinks, baths, rests and exercise. 
Henrietta joined him near the end of his cure. They then toured 
the countryside, staying with German officers with whom Haig had 
become friendly. This visit was also cut short by a summons from 
home. This time, Haig was appointed Brigade Major for a full-scale 
cavalry manoeuvre to be held near Aldershot. At first he understood 
that he would be teamed with French, but when he arrived he found 
'a little difficulty as to which Brigade I should go'. 
1 He was 
finally assigned to a Colonel Brabazon who commanded a brigade 
formed from the 7th Dragoon Guards and 9th Hussars. As Haig had lit- 
tle respect for Brabazon's talents, he was disappointed with this 
posting. 
After the first few days of the manoeuvre, Haig analysed 
Brabazon's performance in the diary: 
Drill of Squadrons and Regiments bad. C. O. s too intent on looking at their commands in place of what is going on. 
Direction seldom right: wished for B. Major to direct the 
base squadron as of old-- The custom at Aldershot! 
Pace uneven. It seems like trying to run before they can 
walk, doing Brigade movements before squadrons are trained! 
Jumping Secctions!! This should be done by squadrons at this 
time of year. 
Haig was probably fully justified in his remarks. Though he had 
never commanded a brigade, his experiences under Fraser and his 
observations of continental cavalry made him an expert on the 
correct handling of large forces. He had helped to devise the scheme 
used in this very manoeuvre. Of all the officers present at the 
exercise, Haig was gutte possibly the most knowledgeable in the 
training and organisation of cavalry forces. 
His criticisms reflect his experiences of the previous two years. 
1Diary, 14 August 1895. 
2Diary, 15 August 1895. 
For example, he again stressed the importance of decentralised 
command. He was disappointed at the slow acceptance of this system 
by some British cavalry officers: 
0. C. 9th lancers moved his regiment all round the compass 
before forming it in Brigade Mass. With such C. 0. Is the 
rapid independent leading of regiments impossible 
(sic). 
.. 
One form of attack formation always practised. Front 
line 
of 7 or 8 squadrons always reinforced by three squadrons of 
second line. This practice seems to destroy initiative of 
subordinate commanders and is impractical. 
1 
The most severe criticism was directed at the senior commanders. 
These were the men whom Haig felt were the greatest obstacles to 
progress. For instance, he chastised General Combe, who commanded 
a division, for his antequated technique: 
Combe took the Division about noon and manoeuvred much in 
the old cut and dried style. Then took the Division back to 
the same old place and did his theatrical performance again. 2 
Combo, it seems, was one of the 'officers of the old school' whom 
Haig criticised in his Notes on German Cavalry--a man who could not 
'shake off the prejudices of ChiE)old-fashioned training'. The 
problem with his 'cut and dried' manner was that it meant that 
'nothing [was left to the initiative of the individual leaders'. 
3 
The manoeuvre was officiated by the Duke of Cambridge. The 
Duke had by that time been Commander-in-Chief for thirty-nine years. 
1Diary, 21) August 1895. 
2Diary, 21 August 1895. 
3Diary, 22 August 1895. These criticisms are some of the first 
examples of the subtle blend of the progressive and the traditional 
which characterised Haig throughout his career. This was first men- 
tioned on page. 74. Haig believed wholeheartedly in the continued 
relevance of traditional cavalry. But he recognised that officers 
like Combe were destroying the cavalry through inefficiency and back- 
ward training practices. He advocated progressive procedures for the 
organization, training, education and administration of the cavalry. 
But beneath this progressivism, as will be seen, there was a solid 
core of traditional tactical and strategic policies which were, and 
continued to be, immutable. 
He was just beginning to accept, albeit grudgingly, that the Army was 
slipping from his grasp. At one of the formal lunches during the 
manoeuvres, 
. H. R. H. 
(who sat at the end of the horseshoe table 
while I was nearly opposite in the bend) expatiated against 
The Times and Lonsdale Hale who said that he was 'too feeble 
as C. in C. ' He then made a short speec and a dramatic 
exit without sitting down after talking. 
It is rather ironic that around this time the Duke finalised Haig's 
nomination to the Staff College. The Duke had become increasingly 
reactionary as certain groups within the Army embraced reform. 
'There is a time for everything', he frequently emphasised, 'and the 
time for change is when you can no longer help itl'2 Yet by nominating 
Haig, the Duke advanced the career of one of the Army's new geed of 
progressive, professional soldiers, who favoured the administrative 
and training programs which the Duke considered anathemas. Uncertainty 
and controversy still surrounds this nomination. A number of historians 
maintain that pressure which Henrietta placed upon the Prince of Wales 
was decisive. 
3 There is no concrete evidence to support this claim. 
It is more likely that Haig had by this time successfully demonstrated 
to all concerned that he was worthy of a place at the College. Even 
if the Prince did intervene, the fact remains that Haig's claim was 
as legitimate as that of any other member of his class. 
Prior to entering the Staff College, Haig was asked to complete 
the new edition of the Cavalry Drill Book. French began the revision, 
but abandoned the task when he was promoted to Assistant Adjutant 
General late in the year. Though the work did not offer Haig as 
1Diary, 28 August 1895. 
2Quoted in R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, 
(London: Constable, 1927), p. 225. 
3Dixon (Military Incpnmetence, r. '250), makes this unsubstantiated 
claim. 
wide a scope for expounding his military ideology as the earlier 
continental cavalry studies, the book did reiterate the principles 
of training which he held dear. As Duff Cooper rightly maintains, 
'That such a task should have been entrusted to so junior an 
officer is evidence of the high opinion generally held of his 
attainments. '1 It is also evidence of how much he had accomplished 
in the three years since he first left India. He had become the 
authority on modern cavalry organisation. His position within the 
Army hierarchy--even without a p. s. c. --was an advantageous one. 
As 
the letter requesting his assistance accurately maintained, there 
was 'no one better able to do it than yourself'. 
2 
When Haig entered the Staff College in January 1896, the institu- 
tion had just entered what has been termed its 'golden age'. 
3 The 
College had had a long and difficult struggle to establish itself. 
It was founded in 1808 as a 'Senior Department' to the Royal Military 
College, Sandhurst. The Army's general disdain for professional 
education, in addition to a lack of funds, stunted its early growth. 
The first fifty years were characterised by inexperienced instructors 
and lazy students. The scandals of the Crimean War, however, focused 
attentions on the need for comprehensive staff training. As a result, 
the Senior Department was permanently separated from Sandhurst in 1858 
and moved to Camberley, where it became, formally, the Staff College. 
A few minor changes were also made in the curriculum and the teaching 
staff. But the enthusiasm for reform was short-lived. The Army as 
a whole had not accepted the need for professionalisation. The College 
1Duff Cooper, Haig, p. 46. 
2Walter James to Douglas Haig, 21 October 1895, Haig Papers, NLS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 6(e). 
3Lonsdale Hale, 'The Staff Work in the War', Nineteenth Century, 
Volume 48, (September 1900), pp. 369-370. 
was caught in a vicious circle. It did not have the reputation to 
attract promising young officers, yet without these officers, it was 
impossible to improve its reputation. It thus became a haven for 
married officers or those seeking to avoid service abroad. 
I 
The Franco-Prussian War again alerted people's minds to the need 
for professionalisation, to which the Cardwell reforms were a partial 
response. 
2 The Staff College was significantly affected by this 
change of attitude. Colonel Edward Bruce Hamley, the distinguished 
military scientist and historian, became Commandant of the College 
in July 1870. He improved the curriculum, adding more military theory 
and reducing the emphasis upon mathematics and other less relevant 
subjects. The p. s. c. slowly gained prestige as a result of Hamley's 
efforts. As a result, the number of men applying tb the College 
began to exceed the number of positions available, a rare occurrence 
previously. With competition came improved quality in ali areas. The 
vicious circle was broken. But there was still a limit to the College's 
popularity. While many in the Army accepted Cardwell's maxim that 
'neither gallantry nor heroism will avail without professional 
training 3 many others did not. 'Professionalism', according to 
Harries-Jenkins, 'because of its association with Utilitarianism, 
seemed to ... these objectors to be a middle class phenomenom, the 
adoption of which threatened external recognition of the Army as an 
1The best source on the Staff College is Brian Bond, The Victorian 
Army and the Staff College, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972). Other 
sources used in this portion of the chapter include those by Godwin- 
Austen, Huntington, Barnett and Harries-Jenkins, previously cited. 
2Edward Cardwell, Liberal Secretary of State for War, 1868-1874. 
His three great reforms were the abolition of purchase, the institu- 
tion of short-service, and the creation of a reserve. 
3Quoted from Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 
p. 19. 
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elitist organisation .4 This group was strong enough 
to limit the scope 
of reform. 
The resistance was led by the Duke of Cambridge. He considered 
the Army his army and could not bear to see it disfigured by the 
reformers. Early in his career he had been an ardent supporter of 
the College. But the institution, in its maturity, rejected the 
principles of its patron. The Duke characteristically ridiculed 
professionalisation and its middle class roots by describing Staff 
College graduates as 'very ugly officers and very dirty officers'. 
Z 
As long as he remained Commander-in-Chief this attitude prevailed 
and the College could not hope to emulate its German counterpart. 
The men who supported reform-Wolseley and Wood, among others--were 
themselves aristocratic in their outlook. They still adhered to 
the belief that character was more important than intellect. But 
they maintained that professionalism and elitism coud co-exist. Haig, 
for example, praised German professional standards, while emphasising 
the importance of the German officer being the social superior 
of his men. Wood, Wolseley and Haig realised that the increasingly 
technical nature of warfare demanded a sophisticated professional 
organisation which they planned to incorporate in the traditional 
class structure. 
The year Haig entered the Staff College was a watershed for 
the Army. The Duke retired as Commander-in-Chief, and Wolseley 
replaced him. The progressives had triumphed. Though the resultant 
changes were not as drastic as during the tenures of Cardwell and 
Richard Burdon Haldane, there were significant reforms of the Army. 
1Harries-Jenkins, Victorian Army and Society, p. 121. 
2Quoted in Godwin Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 
214. 
Large-scale practical manoeuvres were carried out for the first 
time in years. The possibility of a General Staff on the German 
model-as suggested by the Hartington Commision--came under active 
discussion in political and military quarters. The College itself 
was also affected. The staff of instructors was its finest to date. 
A p. s. c., as Haig's efforts attest, was considered essential to the 
young officer seeking rapid promotion. But there remained within the 
Army some uncertainty over the necessary extent of reform. The 
progressives retained many conservative beliefs. They embraced 
the German system with half-hearted enthusiasm. Most of them maintained 
their faith in traditional cavalry tactics. They did not entirely 
understand, and often discounted, the importance of technological 
changes. This was partly due to a continued distrust and fear df 
the middle class technician. The best example of this prejudice was 
the maintenance of Staff College quotas throughout the period prior 
to the Great War. Every year, only six men from the artillery and 
engineers (combined) were admitted to the College. The Army justified 
the quotas by claiming that the artillerymen and engineers already 
possessed the training the Staff College provided. This does not ex- 
plain why there was a need for a Staff College at all, if these 
officers were ready-trained for staff positions. They did not 
in fact have equal access to these positions. The quotas were, in 
truth, a thinly veiled effort to protect the status of the privileged 
classes within the Army. 
' 
'Sir John Adye pointed out that in his year, 1886, the top eight 
places at the Staff College examination were won by R. E. or R. A. men. According to the quotas, only six of these men were at first admitted. Adye, who was placed seventh overall, was only admitted after the Duke reluctantly nominated him. There were not enough infantry and 
cavalry officers who had passed the examination remaining to fill 
the places alotted to men from those arms. 2iather than admitting 
the extra R. A. or R. E. men who had passed high, the Army instead 
admitted seven infantry and cavalry officers who had failed. See 
Sir John Adye, Soldiers and Others I Have Known, (London: Herbert 
Jenkins Ltd., 1925), pp. ý137.. 199. 
Another aspect of the progressive dilemma involved the concept 
of a professional staff. The problem was in part one of definition. 
Bond offers seven separate definitions for the term 'general staff'. 
Simply stated, these fall into two broad categories: (1) a general's 
staff and (2) a staff of generals! The first concerns an administra- 
tive, logistically orientated body, devised to deal with the problems 
of transport, communication, intelligence, etc. for the military unit 
to which it is attached. The second category entails the concept 
of the 'brain of the army'2 of which the German General Staff of the 
19th and 20th centuries is the best example. The British did not 
fully understand this idea. Their acceptance of a General Staff on 
the German model was blocked by a fundamental concept of British 
military history, which can be termed 'the cult of the omnipotent 
commander'. Victories were traditionally, and perhaps justifiably, 
attributed to the leadership and brilliance of a single individual. 
Wellington and Marlborough spring to mind. In smaller campaigns, 
Roberts at Kandahar and Kitchener at Khartoum are further examples. 
Failures--those of Cardigan, Gordon and Buller--equally were seen to 
have arisen from the mistakes of one man. The British customarily 
looked to a single general as the fount of all strategy and tactics 
during a battle or campaign. This was not an unusual practice, but 
it was the antithesis of the German system. The Germans had great 
generals such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Moltke. But each of these 
men led a staff of generals-- a 'brain of the army'. The duty of 
this highly trained staff was to advise and inform the leader. The 
'See Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp. 30-32 
for an excellent discussion of the various definitions of 'general 
staff' and the implications for British staff training. 
2The term is borrowed from Bond. 
leader could not--nor would he wish to--act independently of the 
staff. The main premise of this system was that genius was super- 
fluous. It was not supposed to depend upon a brilliant leader. Rather, 
every member of the staff was trained to be able to assume general 
control without any significant change indirection or effect. 
Without 'a General Staff, the British concept of a staff officer, 
and the role of the Staff College, was confused. In some ways the 
duties of the British staff officer were more diffuse than those of 
his German counterpart. The Staff College trained its students to 
handle all the administrative and logistical problems of an army 
at war. The Germans compartmentalised these problems and trained 
specialists for each separate branch of military activity. Yet in 
other respects the British staff officer's training and eventual 
duties were severely restricted. The College, unlike its German 
counterpart, did not teach grand strategy. It saw its role as that 
of training administrators only. In other words, it did not prepare 
its students for positions in a 'brain of the army'. To this extent 
it reinforced the cult of the omnipotent commander. But there was 
a paradox in this approach. While the College did not prepare its 
students for the positions and duties of high command, but rather 
those of the lower staff, it was exactly those higher positions to 
which the graduates aspired. The students of the 1890's were the cream 
of the Army. These men had high ambitions and did not look forward 
to a future as a lowly staff officer. Haig, for instance, spoke of 
becoming Commander-in-Chief. 
1 It was not clear where men like Haig 
were supposed to obtain their training in grand strategy, if the Staff 
1H. J. Harrison, in the letter to Lady Haig quoted in the last 
chapter, wrote that Haig often mentioned that 'to rise to the rank 
of C. in C. ... was his own ambition. 
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College was the highest rung on the Army's educational ladder. It 
was apparently still believed that leadership qualities, in addition 
to strategical creativity could not be learned. For Haig and his 
contemporaries, therefore, the College was a largely irrelevant pre- 
requisite to high command. 
The confusion regarding the Staff College's purpose was reflected 
in its curriculum. Significant improvements had been made during 
the College's ninety year history. The courses were at least militarily 
relevant by 1896, something which had not always been the case. But 
the curriculum for the first year, according to Brigadier General 
James Edmonds, consisted mainly of topics which the serious officer 
should already have mastered: 
We sat at a few lectures--the good boys in the front row, 
the idle asleep in the back row--and heard what amounted to 
no more than the reading of some paragraphs of the regula- 
tion books (mostly out of date) and some pages of military 
history. ... we did a great deal out of doors mostly making 
ordinary sketch maps ... With our own fair hands, under an 
artillery instructor, we dug trenches, put up wires, made 
temporary bridges ... and amid a scene of indescribable 
confusion we laid a few railway rails. i 
The education improved during the second year, but the scope remained 
limited: 
We worked on a number of 'schemes' out of doors, comprising 
most of the small tactical operations of war, writing little 
appreciations and operation orders for a mixed force, not for 
a brigade or a division. 2 
1James Edmonds, typed carbon of unpublished memoirs, Chapter 
XIV--'The Staff College', Edmonds Papers, III/2/1-34. Hereafter 
cited as Edmonds Memoirs. Edmonds was perhaps too harsh in the 
above criticism. The outdoor exercises which he mentioned were ones 
with which he, as an engineer, would have been familiar, but a 
cavalryman like Haig would not have been. They were actually quite 
progressive innovations designed to acquaint the officer with the 
tasks engaged in by his men. But Edmonds correctly maintained that too much time was spent on these exercises to the detriment of training 
more relevant to actual staff duties. He remembered, for instance, 
only one war game during his entire time at the College, which ended 'in a complete fiasco'. 
2Ibid. 
Haig's notebooks for his two years fall into six categoriest Military 
History, Strategy and Tactics, Fortification, Staff Duties, Cavalry 
Studies, and Applied Sciences. As was the case at Sandhurst, the 
College tried to accomplish too much. The list testifies to the 
British Army's conception of the staff officer as a jack of all 
trades. Unfortunately, the training also made him a master of none. 
Edmonds acidly commented that the only valuable lessons were 'how 
to make a march "graphic" and how to use a Playfair Cypher. ' He 
added that 'I shall never consider that the Government returned me 
value for the two years of my life, the engineer's pay I had to 
give up and the additional £400 I had to spend. 'I 
The staff at the College, though the most impressive up to that 
time, still fell hopelessly short of the ideal. The Kriegsakademie, 
the Prussian equivalent, had a staff of forty-four fully trained 
professors and instructors. The Camberley group consisted of 
six military officers and two civilian instructors--one of whom Edmonds 
described as 'bone idle'. 
2 Only one instructor, Major C. R. Simpson, 
had served on a staff, though he was 'conspiculously silent' about his 
3 
experiences. The Commandant was Colonel H. Hildyard, a man who held 
generally progressive educational beliefs and who valued profession- 
alism. He tried to reverse the past emphasis upon written examinations 
and partially succeeded by abolishing the final exam. 'We do not 
want any cramming here', Hildyard argued, 'we want officers to 
absorb, not to cram. '4 The 'schemes' which Edmonds mentioned were 
an example of Hildyard's emphasis upon exercises which demanded the 




The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 1}}. 
application of general knowledge to specific practical problems, 
without the aid of resources, notes, or intensive cramming. 
The dominant staff member was Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, 
author of the classic Stonewall Jackson. He was a military historian 
of the highest repute, and had the 'unique ability to train the 
judge- 
ment of the students by placing them in the shoes of the various 
actors in the drama. '1 Henderson differed from most of his 
contemporaries by emphasising the relevance of the American 
Civil War. The Franco-Prussian War, on the other hand', he regarded 
as relatively unimportant. His approach therefore lacked balance-- 
neither war deserved to be ignored, and dangers could result from the 
over-emphasis upon either. The respect for Henderson's scholarship 
also at times undermined his progressive teaching. As Bond points 
out, his study of Stonewall Jackson became the Staff College bible. 
2 
As such, it encouraged the cramming which Henderson and Hildyard 
abhorred. As a primer for unalterable military truths, it was 
invaluable. But, as Liddell Hart points out: 
... the method of study was one of excessive concentra- 
tion on detail rather than an inquiry into the broad princi- 
ples of the leader's art and comparison of that with the 
great captains of all ages. ... to be able to enumerate 
the blades of grass in the Shanandoah Valley and the yards 
marched by Stonewall Jackson's men is not an adequate 
foundation for leadership in a future war where conditions 
and armament have radically changed. 3 
A perusal of Haig's exam papers shows that Liddell Hart was not being 
facetious. On one problem--'Report on the Valley of Virginia indicating 
the strategic points'-Haig was criticised for neglecting to mention 
1 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 155. 
2Ibid. 
, p. 157. 
3B. H. ýiddell Hart, The Remaking of Modern Armies, (London: John 
Murray, 1927)t PP- 170-1. 
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one bridge. 
' On another problem he was marked down for failing 
to remember that the sun sets earlier in Virginia than in Engla. nd. 
2 
While both of these points were important to Stonewall Jackson, by 1896 
they were mere trivia, hardly worthy of Haig's attention. 
Haig's Staff College class was an exceptional one. It included 
some of the most able military minds of the generation, men like 
Edmonds, George MacDonogh, 3 Thompson Capper, 
4 
and Richard Haking. 
5 
The class also included men who reached very high rank-such as 
Haig and Edmund Allenby6--though this was partly due to the 
coincidence of war. Edmonds broke down the careers of the 1896 
class as follows: 
Of the batch of thirty-one, four (two generals) were 
killed in action or died of wounds; one was wounded and 
died of enteric in Ladysmith; one died in France of 
exposure; two were wounded and invalided. Of the remainder, 
two cavalrymen became field-marshals and peers; fifteen 
became generals (of whom eight were knighted); one (the 
youngest) got no further than colonel; three retired for 
reasons of health before 1914; one resigned as he had 
come into a fortune; and one, 'the bravest of the brave' 
shot himself, his mother-in-law and her lawyer in une 
drama passionelle. 7 
In the final class standings, Edmonds and MacDonogh finished far 
ahead of the rest. At the end of the course it was the custom 
to publish the graduates' names, ranked in order of their total 
points scored. In order to disguise the huge gap between these 
1Douglas Haig, 'Military History Papers--1896', Haig Papers, 
NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 10. 
2Ibid. The comment referred to a paper on General Jackson's 
orders for 24 May 1862. 
3Later Director of Military Intelligence and Adjutant General. 
4Later 
Major-General, killed in action 1915, while commanding 
the 7th Division. 
5Later Commander of the XI Corps during the Great War. 
6Later 
Field Marshal and Viscount, hero of Palestine Campaign. 
7Edmonds Memoirs, Chapter XIV. 
two officers and the rest of the field, the list was changed to an 
alphabetical one, which omitted the scores. As would be expected, 
neither officer found the course challenging. 'I did not find 
it necessary to work very hard at Camberley'1 Edmonds wrote. 
He compiled a history of the American Civil War in his spare time, 
while MacDonogh used his to qualify as a barrister. 
In contrast to Edmonds and MacDonogh, Haig allowed himself 
no free time nor outside interests. He applied the same technique 
which had been successful at Sandhurst. The diary was again abandoned. 
He isolated himself from other officers and concentrated upon his work. 
The effect upon the other officers was as would be expected. - They found 
hip aloof, taciturn and rather arrogant. Edmonds wrote: 
My fellow students ... were a cheery lot, with the excep- 
tion of Captain Douglas Haig ... who worked harder than 
anybody else, was seldom seen in the mess except for meals, 
kept himself to himself, and had only one intimate, Arthur 
Blair ... He had rather outraged our finer feelings by 
writing in the Leave Book, on arrival, a request fDr three 
days leave 'to shoot, to meet the Prince of Wales' ... 
Edmonds further described Haig's manners as 'abrupt and unsympathetic'. 
3 
This attitude made him quite unpopular. When the students had to 
choose a Master for the Staff College Drag Hunt, they chose Allenby-- 
'because we did not want D. H: --even though Haig was by far the better 
rider. 
4 
George Barrow, a member of the 1897 class, wrote that 'as 
an instance of Haig's unpopularity at Camberley, no one would sit next 
to him at mess if there was a place vacant elsewhere. '5 




Edmonds to Lord Wavell, 27 August 1936, Allenby Papers, 
6/III, (papers collected by Wavell about Allenby at the Staff College). 
5George Barrow to Lord Wavell, n. d., Allenby Papers, 6/III. 
On one outdoor examination, Haig and Blair were teamed- with 
Edmonds. Haig wrote the required outline of the tactical situation 
and then gave his paper to Edmonds, instructing him to 'provide 
the jargon which the examiners expected. 7,1 Terrain cites this 
incident as an example of his extremely practical nature, of his 
refusal to be overly concerned with problems which did not interest 
him. This may be true, but at times, as will be seen, Haig pro- 
vided far more 'jargon' than the examiners expected, on exercises 
which were equally uninteresting. The exercise described by Termine 
was designed to test the officer's ability to work with others, as 
much as his tactical knowledge. Haig's behaviour is an example 
of his egocentricity and his overall sense of superiority. It is 
also rather hypocritical, in the light of the glowing praise Haig 
gave to the French staff officers for their cooperative spirit 
during the 1893 manoeuvres which he observed. 
The resolute approach was not as successful at Camberley as it 
had been at Sandhurst. Granted, the ability of the class as a 
whole was higher at the Staff College. But the different result 
can also be attributed to the different system of education. Haig's 
failure to duplicate his earlier achievement reflects the College's 
progress away from the pedantic Sandhurst system, one to which 
Haig was ideally suited. His talents lay in his ability to digest 
large amounts of data which he then would spew out in a highly 
ordered but unoriginal fashion. Barrow felt that one could always 
tell from Haig's plan for a 'ride' which military text he had 
last read. 
2 'If I commanded an Army and was opposed by Haig, I 
iTerraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 12. Termine 
provides no source for this incident which Edmonds fails to mention. 
2George Barrow, The Fire of Life, (London: Hutchinson, 1942), 
p. 105. 
should always know what he would do. '1 The 
Staff College dbmanded 
a higher, though perhaps not high enough, degree of independent, 
creative thought. Edmonds, in fact, found Haig 'terribly slow on 
the uptake'. 
2 When Haig and Blair asked Edmonds if they could 
accompany him on a three-day exercise held near the end of the 
course, Edmonds refused. He later explained to Haig that 'I could 
not afford to be handicapped by you and Blair any longer'. 
3 Haig 
did not do poorly at the Staff College. His exam papers in fact 
show that he did quite well. But the fact that Edmonds and MacDonogh- 
two men of a very different type of intellect-scored so much 
higher proves that the system demanded some talents which Haig did 
not possess. 
4 
Haig's inadequacies were most evident in outdoor exercises 
in which he was required to think quickly on his feet without the 
aid of a text. In written exams, his methodical, painstaking 
approach was rewarded. For instance, Henderson's comments on one 
assignment--to 'Write General Jackson's orders for the Battle 
of Kernstown on the 23rd of March 1862'--reveal Haig's particular 
approach: 
This is excellent work, but don't make your reasons too 
long-that is don't give up more time than you can pro- 
fitably spare to my problems. 
5 
1Barrow to Wavell, n. d., (previously cited). 
2Edmonds Memoirs, Chapter XIV. 
31bid. 
41t 
is unfortunate that the only placings for which there is 
certainty are those of Edmonds and MacDonogh. It is not known 
where Haig finished because official reports are not available. 
Edmonds, however, intimates that Haig finished near the middle of 
his class. 
5Douglas ftaig, 'Military History Exam Papers--1896'. 
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On another essay, the remarks were similar: 
A very satisfactory piece of work. The only criticism 
I would make is that the memoir is too elaborate. In- 
cluding te extracts in the margin, it is longer than 
intended. 
Haig would become so involved with a question-quoting sources 
and citing extensive examples--that he often lost sight of the 
purpose of the original lesson. A frequent fault was that he 
was unable to finish the question due to a lack of time or 
space. He spent days preparing his answer to a tactical problem 
which, on an actual battlefield, he would have had but hours in 
which to respond. The approach contradicts Haig's earlier emphasis 
upon practical and relevant training for officers. 
Aside from the tendency toward excess, Haig 's written work 
was generally of high quality. Most of the exercises had comments 
similar to the following: 
I congratulate you on this memoir. In every respect 
it fulfills the requirements laid down in the instructions, 
and it bears evidence on each page of painstaking work 
the style of the memoir is ý11 that would be wished and 
the maps are most complete. 
It is interesting to note that the instructorns frequently criti- 
cised Haig's prose and grammar, though this was not ordinarily 
an area of consideration in the grading of the work. Henderson 
remarked that his stops were put in 'pepper-pot fashion'3, a 
complaint which is supported by any perusal of Haig's correspondence. 
Haig's problems with grammar and punctuation probably resulted in 
part from the fact that he read neither noels nor magazines, nor 
1Douglas Haig, 'Military History Exam Paper on Wellington's 1815 Campaign', "n. d., Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 29. 
2Douglas Haig, 'Military History Exam Paper on Confederate Operations in Virginia, June 1862', n. d., Haig Papers, Acc. 3155, No. 30. 
3Haig, 
'Military History Exam Paper on Wellington's 1815 Campaign'. 
indeed any non-military literature. Both his interests and'his 
energies were confined to military areas. On one occasion Henderson 
brought this deficiency to Haig's attention. 'I do not think', he 
remarked, 'that some study of good authors would be wasted. It is 
very useful for a Staff Officer to be able to write very good 
prose. '1 
In the 1890's, the Staff College had made some progress toward 
the professional ideal. But much more was needed. The problems 
of the College were similar to the ones which had plagued it since 
its inceptions a lack of funds, an incomplete understanding of. 
professionalism, an inexperienced staff, class prejudice and poorly 
defined goals. The College also suffered from the inadequacies 
which characterised upper class education throughout the Victorian 
period. There was still a distaste for technology, an over-emphasis 
upon rote learning, an over-valuation of character and a tendency 
toward pedantry. All of these faults, and the failure to correct 
them, can be explained by the fact that the College was an organ 
of what remained essentially a very conservative Army. This was 
unfortunate, especially when it is considered that the students 
themselves included some of the best military minds of the day. 
The dedication of these men can not be questioned. They believed 
wholeheartedly in the value of professionalism. They aspired to 
the highest echelons of the service. With adequate funds, an'experi- 
enced staff and a proper definition of its goals, the College could have 
developed the enormous potential of these men. Instead, these men 
were left to learn the higher skills of their profession by them- 
selves, while the College put them through a course of mundane, 
1Haig, 
'Military History Exam Paper on Wellington's 1815 
Campaign'. 
sometimes dreary and largely irrelevant training. 
The Staff College had a minimal effect upon the late-Victorian 
Army. Officers entered with firmly entrenched military ideologies 
and left with their minds virtually unchanged. This was certainly 
true of Haig. Termine claims that the two years at Camberley 
were of 'great profit to him'. 
1 Charteris likewise maintains 
that he 'carried away with him a belief in the "educated soldier"'. 
2 
But neither biographer is able to give any real evidence of the 
profound effect the College was supposed to have had. He developed 
no new insights, no new skills. It was his character, not his educa- 
tion at the Staff College (or anywhere else), that fueled his rise 
in the Army. Barrow feels that the power of Haig's character was 
evident even at Camberley: 
Haig did not stand out among his fellows at the College 
because of any intellectual superiority. It was not 
brains that brought him forward; there were those who 
had bigger and better-stored brains than he. Neither was 
it tact, of which he had little; nor imagination, of 
which he had none. It was not hard work, for others worked 
as hard, some harder. It was his personality and power 
of concentration, 'the one prudence in life', the source of 
strength in war, the secret of success in business, trade 
and all the affairs of life. His was the dominant person- 
ality that made itself felt in every company, in every 
place in the office, on the polo ground, in the mess, on 
the field. 3 
According to General W. T. Furse (a fellow student, and later Commander 
of the 9th Division on the Somme) Henderson thought Haig was the 
most promising student in the 1898 class. But it seems that this 
judgement was based, as Barrow described above, on aspects of Haig's 
personality such as his single-minded will to succeed, not on his 
1Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 12. 
2Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 13. 
3Barrow, The Fire of Life, p. 43. Barrow made a similar comment 
in the letter to Wavell cited earlier. 
actual performance in the College exercises. 
1 
Haig is an excellent example of the College's failure. He 
had inexhaustible energy and dedication. But Barrow felt, perhaps 
correctly, that his 'power and habit of concentration was to no 
small extent accountable for the dwarfing of the imagination. '2 
His ambition had severely restricted the horizons of his perception. 
The Staff College did nothing to broaden them. Because Haig mirrored 
many of the characteristics of the College--pedantry, distrust of 
technology, elitism, etc. --he was encouraged along the path he 
had so long ago chosen. The College failed because it lacked the 
resources and dynamism to make Haig not simply an educated soldier, 
which he was even before Camberley, but a thinking soldier, which, 
in the broadest sense, he was not. 
1W: T. Furse to Lord Wavell, 17 November 1936, Allenby Papers, 
6/III. In the letter, Furse recalled a conversation with Henderson 
in which the latter described the 1896 class as 'a good batch, and 
the best man in it was Douglas Haig. ' Terrain (p. 12) and others 
are fond of an incident in which Henderson supposedly said to a 
group of officers which included Haig, 'There is a fellow in your 
batch who one of these daysiWillllbe Commander-in-Chief. ' Edmonds 
(Memoirs) is the source of the quotation. But biographers like 
Terraine do not quote Henderson's next sentence which, according 
to Edmonds, was 'No, not any of you Captain Haig. ' A small point 
this, but regardless of whom Henderson meant, the prophecy could 
not have come true because the post of Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army (which is technically the one to which Henderson referred) 
was abolished in 1904. Far too much has been made of this rather 
cloudy incident. 
2Barrow, 
The Fire of Life, p. 44. 
CHAPTER V 
The Sudan Campaign, 1897-1898 
- THE WAR iN rW SvoAJv 
e MIlt1 lee 
e KILeMIf alf tre 
In early January 1898, Major General Sir Herbert Kitchener 
requested three officers from the graduating class of the Staff 
College. The men were to join his campaign against the Dervish 
tribes in the Sudan, a campaign which had been inspired partially 
by a desire to revenge the killing of General Charles Gordon at 
Khartoum fifteen years earlier. The choice of the officers was left 
to Sir Evelyn Wood, who was at that time Adjutant General. Based on 
the favourable impression formed of Haig over the past few years, 
Wood selected- him as one of the fortunate three! The selection 
of Haig demonstrates the importance of influence within the 
military structure. While Haig was an impressive soldier, the 
same could be said of many of his fellow graduates who were not selected. 
Wood's patronage came at the perfect moment in Haig's career. Had 
he returned to his regiment, he might have slipped quietly into 
obscurity. Instead he was given active service, the most coveted of 
military assignments. The gesture was repeated two years later. 
His experience in the Sudan, and later in South Africa, catapulted 
him into the front rank of the Army. 
Wood's choice of Haig is understandable. But the Adjutant 
General had other ideas than simply rewarding an officer for whom 
he had high regard. His selection of Haig had a devious side to it. 
Wood did not entirely trust Kitchener. The two generals had little 
in common. Wood was therefore eager to keep a close watch on the 
commander. This was to be Haig's function. Wood used the appoint- 
ment as a surety by which to guarantee Haig's loyalty. Haig's 
duties were probably implied rather than formally arranged. Wood 
simply expressed a keen interest in knowing Haig's opinions on how 
1The 
other two officers selected were Thompson Capper and Arthur 
Blair. The former certainly deserved the selection. Blair was, 
however, one of the less impressive graduates. His selection is curious. 
the war progressed. Each of his letters contained a sentence or 
two to the following effect: 
Write to me as frankly as you will, you may be sure 
'I shall not quote you to anyone ... 
While the above was certainly not a direct order, Haig responded 
as if it were one. 
Before leaving for Cairo, Haig stayed with the Prince and 
Princess of Wales at Sandringham for the weekend of the 22nd and 23rd 
of January. Other guests included Wood and Boyd Carpenter, the 
Bishop of Ripon. The Prince discussed the forthcoming campaign 
with Haig, and urged him to 'write regularly'2 from the Sudan. On 
Sunday, the group Gathered for a service given by the Bishop. 
Haig described it in his diary: 
Excellent sermon from the Bishop on Gordon, text Hebrews 
11th Chapter, 8th Verse, 'and he (Abraham) went out and 
knew not whither he went. -3 
This is one of the rare mentions of Gordon in the diaries. Haig 
did not mirror the public fervour for revenge. This insouciance 
was typical of him. Haig was not inspired by imperialistic, 
nationalistic, nor overly sentimental motives. His patriotism was 
sincere, but it was never used as a trumpet call. His ir1piration 
was instead highly individualistic. He was driven by an intense 
desire to do his duty and to succeed. This meant that he never 
questioned the justification ýor motives behind a military action. 
He fought where he was ordered, did his utmost, and perceived-of 
1Wood to Haig, 13 April 1898. In the 25 April 1898 letter 
Wood similarly wrote: 'You may depend upon it that I shall not show 
your letters to anybody, and you may write me as frankly as you like. ' 
A typical response by Haig can be found in the 14 February 1898 letter 
to Wood quoted on page 148. 
2Diary, 23 January 1898. 
31bid. 
no factors other than purely military ones. 
Haig's first campaign differed significantly from other Victorian 
wars. The Sudan campaign was a deliberate act of policy, not a 
sudden, rash reaction to a colonial threat. The impetus came 
from two sources: the desire for revenge and the need to counter 
French encroachment in the upper Nile. The revitalisation of the 
Egyptian economy and military over the previous few years made the 
exercise viable. In other words, the campaign became politically 
acceptable to the British because the Egyptians would bear the 
greatest burden. There was to be little strain placed on British 
taxpayers and only a negligible loss of British lives. Since 
funds were limited, the emphasis was placed on efficiency and 
organisation--a rare occurrence in previous wars. Kitchener, an 
engineer renowned for his organisational abilities, 
1 
seemed the 
perfect commander. He justified the confidence in him by building 
a railway from Wadi Halfa across the Nubian Desert to Berber. Many 
had believed this to be an impossible task. Gordon, fatally for him, 
had previously vetoed the construction. The railway brought troops 
and supplies to within 150 miles of Khartoum. It avoided a danger- 
ously long line of communication and saved many lives as a result. 
The eventual success of the Sudan Campaign showed how well 
the British had trained the Egyptian Army. The change since its 
defeat in 1882 by Wolseley was remarkable. The Army consisted of 
20,000 conscripts, mostly Egyptian fellaheens, but including also 
a large contingent of black Sudanese. Each Egyptian battalion 
had three British officers, each Sudanese four. British officers 
were seconded for two-year stints, which could be broken at the 
organiser was not entirely deserved. 
It will be seen that Kitchener's reputation as a brilliant 
individual's discretion. Those who joined were rewarded with pro- 
motion to a rank immediately above their British one! But despite 
the vast improvements in all areas, the Egyptian Army in 1898 was 
still an untested commodity. Many British officers believed that 
the force would dissolve the minute it came in contact with the 
raving Dervish hordes. 
2 The Dervish, according to Cyril Falls, 
were 'among the most formidable and dangerous savages the British ever 
had to face., 
3 
The weakest link in the Egyptian Army was the 
cavalry. It consisted solely of fellaheens, as the Sudanese could 
not be trusted to care for their horses. The officers were Egyptian 
and British, with no set proportion. Many British officers believed 
that the Egyptian, whether aficer, or fellaheen, could not be 
imbued with the moral qualities central to the arme blanche. 
Haig arrived in Cairo on 3 February, after an uneventful seven- 
day journey. He formally enlisted in the Egyptian Army, and then 
boarded a steamer to Wadi Halfa. While on the Nile, he recorded 
one of his usual observations of his fellow passengers: 
There was rather an amusing incident the first night on 
board this steamer. There are about 7 or 8 Germans out 
of the 32 passengers on board. At dinner one of them sent 
to have the saloon door shut. Some non-Germans insisted on 
its remaining open. The Germans at first retaliated by 
putting up their coat collars and the lady sent for her 
jacket which she slung vigorously around her expansive 
1For instance, Captain Haig was promoted to Bimbashi, the rank 
equivalent to Major. 
2Colonel John French was one of the many sceptics. Witness Haig 
to Henrietta, 11 April 1898: 'If you see Col. French you might show 
him this letter confidentially, for the Gyppie Cavalry is really 
better in some respects than he thinks. ' 
3Cyril Falls, 'The Reconquest of the Sudan', in Victorian Military 
Campaigns, ed. B. Bond, (London: Hutchinson, 1967), p. '293. Background 
information on the Sudan Campaign is taken from this source. It is 
the most balanced treatment. The war has not received much attention 
from historians, though some less reliable sources were published immediately after it. 
shoulders! ... Many of us 
laughed and the Germans no doubt 
felt uncomfortable and got up en masse and left the table, 
like many petted children. No doubt they felt as if they 
had withdrawn from the Concert of the Great Powers. So in due 
course they will receive a telegram from 'Wilhelm' to con- 
gratulate them on their spirited conduct in supporting 
his 
Kolonial Piolitik and 'Mailed Hand' theory on the banks of 
the Nile! 
The passage is one of the rare bits of humour in Haig's letters. It 
perhaps show that he was in unusually high spirits at this time. He 
felt extremely fortunate to be given active service. 'The longer 
I stay here the more lucky I seem to be', he commented. 'The crowds 
of fellows that have asked to be taken and refused is very great. '2 
He assured Wood that 'I am ever mindful of how much I am indebted 
to you. '3 
Haig met Kitchener at Wadi Halfa. He found the Sirdar 'very 
cordial'. 
4 
Kitchener, evidently mindful of Haig's reputation as an 
efficient organiser and expert instructor, outlined a plan to send 
him to Debbeh to train a squadron in 'bad order'. 
5 Haig optimistically 
(but wrongly) predicted that 'if anything doing Debbeh will be the 
direction of the attack'. 
6 
He was 'looking forward to going to 
Debbeh where I shall have a free hand and be able to train the 
squadron .sI like. '? These plans never materialised. A few days 
later, on 20 February, Kitchener ordered Haig to Berber. In a 
rather impatient and disappointed tone Haig wrote that 'I don't know 
'Haig to Henrietta, 11 February 1898. This is a reference to the 
Kaiser's telegram to Kruger after the failure of the Jameson raid. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 6 February 1898. 
3Haig to Wood, 14 February 1898. 




7Haig to Henrietta, 17 February 1898. 
at all what he wants me to do. '1 
Before leaving for Berber, Haig asked his sister to send him 
'2 or 3 boxes of supplies, each box not to exceed 150 lbs in weight 
and to be about 3 ft long by 1? goad and 1 deep. '2 In the boxes 
she was to pack: 
jams, tinned fruits, cocoa, vegetables, haddock in 
tins, tongue, biscuits, some hock, and a bottle or two of 
brandy or any other sort of drink. 3 
He also asked for soap, toiletries, extra blankets, sun shades, hats 
and silk underwear. The boxes were designed to be mounted on the 
side of a camel, of which Haig had three, along with-four horses, 
a donkey and a goat. The latter supplied his milk. To look after 
him and his animals, he engaged: 
a cook, ... the black fellow 'Suleiman' as a 
body servajt ... a syce for every two horses and a 
camel boy. 
Later his 'retinue' grew larger, with additional servants and animals. 
He did not feel that this was at all excessive. He pitied, but felt 
no guilt about the officers of the British Brigade who were 'limited 
to 30 lbs of kit .. . 'S Haig's attitude was not uncommon among 
Victorian officers, who saw no reason to abandon gentlemanly habits 
simply because they were at war. 
Haig arrived at Berber on 28 February. His arrival coincided 
with the northward advance of a large Dervish force under the Emir 
Mahmoud. Kitchener responded by concentrating his force at the 
1Haig to Henrietta, 20 February 1898. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 17 February 1898. 
31bid. 
4Ibid. 
5tiaig to Henrietta, 2 March 1898. He also commented-on 1 April 
that the officers of the British Brigade 'live in the greatest 
discomfort'. 
junction of the Atbara and the Nile--subsequently called Fort 
Atbara. 
Haig's appreciation of the situation was characteristically optimistic, 
as evidenced in the 2 March letter to Henrietta: 
It would be great luck if they did come on because then 
they would bring the whole matter to a conclusion at once. 
For if they gave fight and are beaten we would probably 
pursue them right on to Khartoum. Certainly over 150 
miles, but no doubt the tribes on the flanks of the dervishes 
would rise and assist in annihilating them as they fled. 
A short time later, he made great issue out of rumours that the 
Dervishes were reduced to a diet of date-like fruits. 'Not very 
sustaining, I should think 
2 
he commented in a letter to Henrietta. 
Unfortunately, the events did not proceed as smoothly as Haig had 
optimistically predicted. 
To strengthen his force, Kitchener called upon the British 
Brigade mentioned above. This was a force entirely separate from 
the Egyptian Army. In order to reach Berber when Kitchener wanted 
it, the troops had to march 100 miles in six days. While the feat 
was widely admired by officers in the Sudan and at home, Haig was 
not impressed. As he pointed out in a letter to Wood, a battle 
was not imminent. Aside from the glory gained by the commanding 
officer, the march achieved nothing. Furthermore, Haig argued, it 
damaged the morale and fitness of the men: 
When the Brigade got to El Hassa (7 m. from Berber) the 
majority were very weary, and the feet of some officers 
and men were sore and bloody. So, without knowing the 
reason for such forced marching, I very much question 
whether, if it had been necessary, actually to oppose the 
enemy on the Atbara, these men could have fought effectively. 
I mean that my conclusion is, do average marches and hay the 
bulk of the command fit for battle and any emergencies. -' 
1Haig to Henrietta, 2 March 1898. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 25 March 1898. 
3Haig 
to Wood, 15 March 1898. 
The brigade was commanded by Major General W. F. Gatacre, whom 
Haig first met in India. Haig believed that he was partially 
to 
blame for the condition of the force. Gatacre, he wrote, was an 
'awful fidget' who 
had them out for all kinds of parades. Even here, 
at a distance of 18 miles from the Enemy's Camp, he has 
his whole Brigade on duty in two hour reliefs all night 
through fear of a night attack. This must be rather 
fatiguing as the days are hot and men can't rest then. 
At home, Haig rejected practices which he considered irrelevant or 
frivolous. He especially loathed them in wartime. 
The Egyptian Cavalry Brigade which had been moved to Berber 
consisted of ten squadrons, seven of them commanded by British 
officers. One of these, the 7th, was supposed to go to Haig. Haig's 
annoyance with Kitchener's indecision increased when, on 13 March, 
he learned that this plan had also been shelved: 
Letter received from Broadwood that 7th Squadron has 
arrived at Berber 'but Sirdar does not want a change 
of Squadron leaders made at present while Dervishes 
still threaten to advance: things must develop one 
way or another in a week or ten days. ' 
What does this mean? The Dervishes are certainly not 
threatening to advance! Is the Sirdar prepared to 
do so? 2 
Haig felt like a spare part. He joined in patrols and did his best 
to learn the Egyptian system, but the work was hardly satisfying. 
He evidently believed his talents were being wasted. On one 
especially frustrating patrol, he was in the saddle all day and 
saw no sign of the enemy. Afterwards he recorded that 'the tactical 
training of British officers not necessary for this kind of patrols 
A native might well have been sent! '3 
1Haig to Henrietta, I April 1898. 
2Diary, 13 March 1898. 
3Diary, 17 March 1898. 
Haig blamed Kitchener for the continued uncertainty surrounding 
his duties. Though in part self-important pique, these complaints had 
justification. But he was not being singled out for ill-treatment. 
Rather, Haig's dilemma was a symptom of the Sirdar's chaotic method 
of command. On the surface, things seemed to run smoothly. The 
big tasks, such as the railway, were completed on time and in order. 
Underneath, however, there was disorder and confusion. Kitchener 
tried to maintain complete control over all aspects of his command. 
This meant that minor tasks usually handled by staff officers were 
left in disarray. On 1 April, Haig eave an accurate account of 
Kitchener's methods in a letter to his sister: 
He is a man that does everything himself and in fact has 
no Head Quarters Staff at all! Indeed General Hunter, who 
has hitherto commanded the troops in the field, cannot get the Sirdar to tell him what his position in the Army is! 
In addition the Sirdar is most silent and no one his even the 
slightest notion what is going to be done until he gives his 
orders! 
He has 2 aides-de-camp who have a hardish time but beyond 
them he employs no staff at all. Sometimes it might be better for the comfort of the troops if he had a Staff. 1 
Haig believed that the size and sophistication of modern war 
demanded a large, efficient staff. He considered Kitchener's 
methods obsolete and dangerous. He communicated these criticisms 
to Wood, who sympathised in a letter to Haig dated 25 April: 
I can well understand that when a General tries to run a 
force without any Staff, which is practically what the 
Sirdar has been doing, there will always be a waiting for 
orders, and some uncertainty. I have pointed out to him 
.. that however well he may be able to command large bodies of troops without any intermediate links, yet as 
he is not immortal, should a bullet or sickness strike 
him down, it would be hard on his successor. 2 
Haig's dilemma at Berber foreshadowed future confrontations with 
'Haig to Henrietta, 1 April 1898. 
? 'Wood to Haig, 25 April 1898. 
Kitchener over the role, and indeed necessity, of a trained staff. 
While waiting for an appointment, Haig made observations 
of the Egyptian. -Army. He recorded his opinions in various letters 
home. Contrary to many of his fellow officers, Haig did not dis- 
count the fighting value of the average soldier., ,. For , instance, he 
wrote of the Sudanese that 'they seem fine strong fellows and 
mole well. ' Their 'battle-training and march-discipline's were 
poor, but this was not their fault, but their officers'. He 
reiterated the point made in his earlier cavalry studies that 
responsibility and initiative had to be given to the junior officers, 
especially the British ones. 'The real pity is that so many valuable 
and keen young officers are not more used to train the men. '2 
He was specifically referring to Blair and Capper who 'find it 
3 
difficult to find work to do'. He was, however, not impressed with 
the Egyptian officers: 
My chief complaint against this cavalry is that many of the 
officers (Egyptian) are duffers. We play polo with them 
twice a week, to make them ride and be a bit more manly, 
but the majority don't improve much. They sigh after a 
life of ease at Ciro, and want 'medaille d'or' to wear 
with the ladies: ' 
Haig felt that good officers, able to provide proper training and 
discipline, could make the Egyptians and Sudanese into fine soldiers. 
He realised, however, that the raw material was not what he was 
used to, which meant that flexibility was needed. For instance, 
he recognised that the poor march discipline of the Sudanese was 
due in part to the fact that their wives accompanied the columns. 




to Wood, 25 June 1898. 
While this could not be stopped, Haig believed it could be-con- 
trolled. 'The blacks won't march without them', he argued, 'Why 
not recognise the fact and allow the women, within moderate pro- 
portions? '1 He even went so far as to advocate feeding the wives. 
Since the soldiers could not be stopped from sharing their rations 
with their wives, not providing for the women would only lead to 
a hungry and dispirited force. 
Similar conclusions on the value of proper training and disci- 
pline followed Haig 's first encounter with the enemy. On 21 March 
the Cavalry Brigade scouted the Atbara south of the fort. The main 
force halted at Abadar. Two squadrons, with Haig accompanying them, 
then patrolled further south. They were followed on their return 
to the camp by a small Dervish force. The enemy had cleverly eluded 
the advanced outposts and was in position to harass the main body 
of troops. By revealing only a small portion of their force, the 
Dervishes enticed a squadron of cavalry to pursue them into the 
scrub. An ambush resulted, causing ten killed and eight wounded 
among the Anglo-Egyptian force. After the successful ambush, the 
Dervishes quickly and characteristically withdrew. Their losses 
were slight. 
Though he should not be faulted for the impression it had upon 
him, the incident received more emphasis in Haig's diary and letters 
than it probably deserved. Nevertheless, the conclusions which 
he drew are significant: 
1. The outpost service, tho' theoretically right, was 
carelessly done. When I passed the picket in question, 
many were lying down, apparently asleep. 
1Haig to Wood, 15 March 1898. Though this would appear to be 
a dramatic reversal of his hitherto mysog4riy, it was actually a 
purely pragmatic approach to fighting a war with largely. untrained, 
native contingents. 
2. The eyesight of the Egyptian vedette can't be relied 
on. For the Dervishes passed the front line of vedettes. 
3. The pluck of the Egyptian cavalryman is right enough 
in my opinion. 
4. The Horse Artillery against enemy of this sort is no 
use. We felt the want of machine guns when working along 
side of scrub for searching some of the tracks. 
1 
Point number three is especially important. This was Haig's response 
to the critics of the Egyptian Cavalry. The point referring to 
machine guns is also significant. After the Great War, critics 
accused Haig of having rejected the gun as a viable weapon. 
2 
Yet just prior to his departure for the Sudan, he notably took a 
special trip to Enfield to study the Maxim gun? During the 
campaign he repeatedly commented upon its indispensiblity. 
After this first encounter with the enemy, though evidently not 
as a result of it, Haig was finally given a formal appointment. 
On 25 March the Commander of the Cavalry Brigade, Kamaikim R. G. 
Broadwood, made Haig his staff officer. Broadwood was probably as 
perturbed as Haig at Kitchener's indecision. He recognised Haig's 
enormous potential as a staff officer. The post was a prestigious 
one. It was in line with his earlier experience with Keith 
Fraser and his staff appointments in various Army manoeuvres. 
But it also meant that command of a unit in battle--experience 
which Haig desperately needed--was denied him. His knowledge 
of the behaviour of soldiers imbbttlE: Lconxquently suffered. 
'Haig to Wood, 26 March 1898. 
2See 
especially C. D. Baker-Carr, From Chauffeur to Brigadier, 
(London: Ernest Benn, 1930), pp. 71-101. There is a file in the 
Haig Papers (Acc. 3155, No. 337-1 which contains a memorandum by 
Termine on this point. He refers to a letter by Liddell Hart in 
support of Baker-Carr's assertion that Haig felt 'the machine gun 
was a much over-rated weapon'. Termine admirably refutes the 
statement. Though Haigs cavalry background may have adversely 
influenced his use of the weapon, he never doubted its worth. 
3Diary, 19 January 1898. 
As March progressed, Mahmoud retreated southward in hopes of 
lengthening the Anglo-Egyptian line of communication and enticing 
Kitchener into making mistakes. Haig, as a staff officer, joined 
a number of reconnaissance patrols which scouted the Dervish posi- 
tion. On one of these, a much more serious clash with the 
enemy occurred. On 5 April, the entire Cavalry Brigade, with 
horse artillery, two maxim batteries, and camel corps, reconnoitred 
the Dervish position at Nukheila. The force had viewed the right 
of the camp, when General Hunter' ordered a move to the left. As 
the force retired in order to move in that direction, it was attacked. 
One group of Dervish cavalry advanced on the Anglo-Egyptian flank from 
upstream, while another blocked the line of retreat by advancing 
from a position downstream. At the same time the Dervish infantry 
left their trenches for a frontal assault. 'The situation was a 
difficult one', Haig admitted, 'and to add to it a strongish north 
wind prevented our seeing clearly the moment a squadron moved. '2 
Subsequent events are not entirely clear. The only eyewitness 
account which can be found is Haig's. He therefore naturally takes 
centre stage in the description of the action. It nevertheless 
appears that he performed admirably: 
I had just been to Baring to get him into a position on 
the right of the guns to cover them during our withdrawal 
when I noticed our left rear (Le Gallais) attacked. Broad- 
wood was at the left of the guns retiring at a trot. I 
galloped to him and told him the left rear was strongly 
attacked. He could not see this from where he was because 
of the dust. Broadwood attacked with the two squadrons (Le Gallais), and fortunately the en3my (infantry and 
cavalry mingled) gave way before us. 
'General Archibald Hunter was Commander of the Egyptian Army. 
Kitchener was Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Campaign. When Kitchener 
assumed-this position, Hunter's duties became quite naturally confused. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 11 April 1898, 
31bid. 
After the initial disaster had been averted, Broadwood sent"Haig 
to look after the horse artillery. The battery was found 'trotting 
gaily to the rear'. In the same vicinity Haig found Captain Mahon, 
in charge of three cavalry squadrons: 
Mahon ... said 'I can't see what 
has happened, what do you 
suggest? ' I at once said 'Place one squadron on flank of 
guns and support Le Gallais with your other two on his left. 
I will then bring Baring and remaining three squadrons on 
your-left rear as a third line. ' Mahon advanced. I gave 
Baring his orders, putting all three squadrons under him. 
I then galloped on to find Broadwood (who I knew must be 
with Le Gallais' squadrons) in order to know his wishes 
as to the actions of the guns. On my way I found the two 
squadrons coming back at full gallop. We-were able to 
stop them ... and they advanced a little way. I thought 
there was no time to lose to ask for orders so I went 
directi, to the maxims and told them they must come into 
action against the most threatening of the enemy (which I 
indicated) as soon as the cavalry cleared the field of 
fire. 
Haig returned to Broadwood, apprised him of the situation, and 
advised him to lead a flank attack. When Broadwood's men cleared 
the field, the Maxims poured a deadly fire on the Dervish lines. 
The plan worked perfectly. 'We were able to fight our way out of 
the infantry fire. ' 
Allowing for the inevitable embroidery, it is clear that 
Haig played a major part in averting a rout. 'Broadwood was much 
obliged to me for my assistance and told the Sirdar so", he wrote. 
Kitchener responded by awarding him a Brevet Majority. Haig's 
steadiness in the midst of utter confusion was the most notable 
feature of his performance. The role of leader seems to have 
come naturally to him. His conduct was unlike that of an officer 
in only his second action. Yet Haig was not surprised by his 
performance. The aplomb in his letters is unmistakeable. Even the 
danger of the situation did not affect him, as evidenced by the 
lAll 
the quotations on this page are from the it April 1898 
letter to Henrietta. 
reassurances given to Henrietta: 
You say that you are anxious ... That 
is all nonsense, 
because neither the Dervish horseman for the bullets of 
their infantry worry me in the least. 
This attitude seems foolish, but it was probably genuine. Courage is 
sometimes simply a blatant disregard of danger. Haig's courage was 
partially of this type. It was undoubtedly considerable. His 
bravery arose in part from a sincere belief that he was destined for 
greatness. He seems to have been unable to consider the possibility 
of an insignificant death in the Sudan. 
'Our casualties', wrote Haig, 'were pretty severe, 30 wounded 
and ten killed'. 
2 Yet the action was a valuable test of the 
Egyptian cavalry, who were immensely proud of their performance. 
This time(,, Haig was not impressed: 
The Gyppie Cavalry acted steadily on the whole, but there 
was no glorious charging home, as some of the tales I 
have heard would have us believe. Moreover, if the Dervish 
horsemen had really come on, I feel sure that few of the 
Brigade would have escaped. Indeed General Hunter gave it 
as his opinion just before the maxims opened fire, he 
thought a 'sauve qui peut' must be the only ending. How- 
ever all's well that ends well and the Gyppie Cavalry are 
considered heroes. That is rubbish ... 
The only performance which Haig praised was his own. He felt that 
his action had averted disaster. His commanding officer, on the 
other hand, had nearly caused a catastrophe. 'He, Broadwood, was 
wrong to charge as he did with the front line, for the whole Brigade 
then passed from his control. '4 Here Haig revealed one of his 
pet aversions: the cavalry officer so eager for glory that he loses 
sight of his responsibilities as a leader. But Haig forgave Broadwood 
1Haig to Henrietta, 11 April 1898. 
2Ibid. 
3Haig to Wood, 12 April 1898. 
4Haig 
to Henrietta, 11 April 1898. 
this momentary lapse. 'He is a very sound fellow and is expellent 
at running this show. 'I 
From Haig's account, it seems clear that the Maxims stabilised 
the situation enough to effect an orderly retreat. If this was 
the case, he did not emphasise the fact. For him, the action demon- 
strated the lightning effect which cavalry could produce. Once 
order had been restored, momentum shifted away from the Dervishes. 
They 'ran away the moment we showed a bold front. '2 The doctrine 
of the arme blanche. had, for Haig, been vindicated in a single 
action lasting less than an hour. First impressions of this magnitude 
and type are highly significant. It is interesting to speculate what 
effect an outright disaster might have had. The importance of 5 
April was enhanced by the fact that Haig took part in no further 
cavalry actions of equal intensity for the duration of the campaign. 
The remaining battles were static ones involving little scope for 
the arme blanche. No other experiences in the Sudan rivaled this 
one in its effect upon Haig. 
The Battle of the Atbara followed two days later. Through 
cavalry reconnaissance, the Dervish position had become well known. 
Kitchener moved his entire force to within 600 yards of the enemy 
and then waited for something to happen. The Dervish force reacted 
like a cornered animal. First their cavalry made a disordered 
attempt to harass the Anglo-Egyptian lines. Broadwood's men 
cleared the enemy cavalry from the field and then retired for the 
day. The Maxims and artillery took over, and softened the Dervish 
trenches. After a suitable interval, the infantry advanced. Mahmoud 
1Haig 
to Henrietta, 11 April 1898. 
2Ibid. 
was confronted by a force superior to his own in numbers, organi- 
sation and technology. His men reacted by bolting. The 
Anglo- 
Egyptian casualties numbered 650, the Dervish over 2500. Mahmoud 
was among the captured. 
Haig sent Wood a detailed critique of the action. Since his 
role was over early, he had 'a good view of what took place'' He 
was not pleased: 
. why was the attack frontal? 
It seemed to me, from 
the very first day that we reconnoitered the place, that 
an attack on the enemy's right offered great advantages. 
The enemy would have been forced to retreat across the 
open desert to the Nile without being allowed time to 
fill water skins, etc. ... 
Next what about the use made of the Artillery? Distant 
fire was not required: in fact the first and only range was 
some 700 yards. Our side says the guns did tremendous 
damage: N'ahmoud and 'over 30 men' (Enemy) questioned by 
Fitton (who is sort of an Intelligence Officer here) say 
'We did not mind the guns, they only hurt camels and 
donkeys .. .' 
Another point is the formation of the force for the attack. 
... Looking on, it struck me that our formation was 
extraordinarily deep. This may have accounted for our 
severe losses. 
Haig included a battle plan of his own. He would have placed the 
neglected cavalry, an infantry brigade and some guns on the 
opposite side of) the river. This force: would have enfiladed the 
enemy lines and cut off their escape route. The main attack, by 
only two brip_des ('as many ... as the frontage admitted'3) 
" would have been concentrated on the enemy's right. 
Haig admitted that his plan was faulty because it included an 
unjustified assumption: 
The weak point in my plan is that I calculate as if I 
had troops that can shoot and manoeuvre! It would be 




unwise to rely on the blacks doing either well. So 
all the more credit is due to the Sirdar for limiting 
himself to a more moderate victory instead of going 
for annihilating the Mahmoud's army. l 
Despite the above reservations, Haig's plan reflects a significant dif- 
ference in attitude between himself and Kitchener. The engineer was 
basically a siege corrmander. His plan took into account an erratic 
enemy who did not fight according to classical patterns. Kitchener 
manoeuvred his army into a safe position from which he could handle any 
eventuality. Victory came easily but not brilliantly. Kitchener al- 
lowed many Dervishes to escape. Haig's plan was more in accord with 
classical patterns. It climaxed with the bold release of the cavalry 
and aimed at annihilation. Haig abhorred the moderate victory which 
allowed the enemy to fight again. His plan was the product of his 
cavalry mind. 
2 
Haig ended his letter to Wood with a significant criticism of the 
medical facilities during the battle: 
The wounded ... have had a terrible time. The forma- 
tion of a hospital at Vindabia and Abadar for a week 
immediately after the battle would have saved many a limb, 
not to say lives. As it was, the D5s. had to march all 
night and dress the wounded by day. 
Haig's criticisms were echoed in the press at home. Kitchener's 
economies had caused him to cut medical services to the absolute mini- 
mum. In a letter to Henrietta, Haig maintained that there was not a 
single stretcher bearer with the British Brigade. The wounded were 
carried solely by the Egyptians. These 'poor creatures ... were 
so fatigued that they slept as they stood at every short halt 
1Haig to Wood, 29 April 1898. 
2Haig 
was both aggressive and conservative. He aimed at annihila- 
tion, but could not easily depart from classical patterns. Thus, in the 
Great War, when deprived of the use of the cavalry, his exploitative 
arm, his conduct of the war was basically conservative. These points 
will be emphasised in subsequent chapters, and the epilogue, pp. 364-365" 
3Haig to Wood, 19 April 1898. 
during the night on the return march with the wounded. '1 Despite 
the overwhelming evidence of cruel shortages, Haig quite curiously 
reserved judgement on Kitchener's guilt. 'It is a pity to be too 
severe on what could not have been foreseen'2 he maintained. He did 
not, however, explain w1y the need for provisions for the wounded 
could not have been foreseen. In light of his usual eagerness 
to criticise his superiors, his reluctance here seems strange. 
Though the Battle of the Atbara provided little scope for 
cavalry heroism, Haig did have his moment of glory. He described 
it in a letter to Henrietta: 
. when the squadrons were retiring just before the 
Maxims came into action, I was able to pick up a poor 
wretch of an Egyptian who was wounded in the shoulder 
and had given himself up for lost, and put him in front 
of my saddle and carried him to the guns where we had 
some spare horses and the Dr. was ... In doing this I did not incur the slightest danger, tho' there is no 
doubt that had I not taken this man the dervishes would 
have got him. 3 
The incident was related to a newspaper artist with the force, 
who sketched his interpretation. The drawing, which bears little 
resemblance to Haig but is indeed supposed to be him, appeared 
in the Graphic on 28 May 1898. 
The Battle of the Atbara was followed by a victory celebration 
in Berber. Haig ridiculed the plans in a letter to his sister: 
Tomorrow the Sirdar is to make a triumphal entry into 
Berber--a sort of Roman triumph with Mahmoud tied to his 
horse's tail I suppose. The order is to 'decorate 
Berber! A lot of mud wells and dust and only palms 
available for the job! 
'Haig to Henrietta, 10 June 1898. 
2Ibid. 
3Haig 
to Henrietta, 11 April 1898. 
Ibid. 
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Phillip Magnus mentions that Kitchener was immensely proud of 
his achievement, and considered it the turning point of his 
career. 
I 
The Sirdar's pride was evident to Haig. He described 
the victory ceremony in his diary on 13 April: 
Triumphal entry of the Sirdar into Berber at 7 a. m. 
5 Squadrons Cavalry met him on S. side of town and guard 
of honour of 100 men. 
Sirdar arrived with Cavalry escort. The latter fell back 
and 1st Bde. preceded by dervish prisoners headed by 
Mahmoud followed Sirdar through Berber. In front of 
Mahmoud was calico screen with inscription: 'This is 
Mahmoud, the commander of the Army which said it was 
going to capture Berber. ' 
After 1st Bde followed the Ai`tillery, then Cavalry. The 
natives lined the road and cheered. 
Finally the Sirdar halted under-the Dais in the market 
place and saw troops pass. 2 
Magnus describes how Kitchener rode into Berber on a white horse, 
followed by Mahmoud, collared and chained. Natives were instructed 
to throw stones at the Emir. 
3 Though Haig's ceremonies in the 
Great War were full of grandeur, he found spectacles like the above 
vulgar. He apparently did not believe they had anything to do 
with fighting a war. Haig's imperialistic emotions were always 
more muted than Kitchener's. He believed that, even in war 
against savages, certain moral standards had to be maintained. 
Haig's most virulent scorn was directed at the Press. 
He found Bennet Burleigh of the Daily Telex--the most famous 
of the war's correspondents--a particularly loathsome 'creature'. 
After the battle he commented on the 
... rubbish the British public delights to read. The 
exaggeration of some of the reports almost makes. a good 
1Phillip Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist, (Rondon: 
John Murray, 1958), p. 121. 
2Diary, 13 April 1898. 
3Magnus, 
Kitchener, p. 122. 
day's work appear ridiculous. The headings of the D. T. 
are so overdrawn that instinctively one says 'Waterloo 
Eclipsed'. 1 
He was horrified when Henrietta asked him to assist Hugo Depree, 
a cousin who wanted to go to the Sudan as a correspondent: 
I think my letters to you and Jenty will have shown the 
class of creature which represents the press in this 
part of the world. ... The idea of coming as a corre- 
spondent is absurd. Briefly my reasons are first: the 
Sirdar has no intention of having a thorough criticism 
of his methods. So the correspondents are only allowed 
to see and report what he chooses. 2ndly: The class of 
correspondent is so very low indeed (only one man, Stevens 
of 'Daily Mail' at all educated as a gentleman) that I 
should be sorry to have to live, mess, and spend long 
days with such. 3rdly: The work performed by all news- 
paper correspondents is most degrading: they can't tell 
the whole truth even if they want to do so. The British 
public likes to read sensational news, and the best war 2 
correspondent is he who can tell the most thrilling lies. 
I 
This was Haig's first real encounter with the Press. His surprise 
was as great as when he later began to have dealings with poli- 
ticians. He simply could not understand the values, motives and 
habits of individuals of a class so completely different from 
his own. 
The Battle of the Atbara was followed by four months of exten- 
sive preparations for the final assault. The next move was to 
be in the direction of Khartoum and Omdurman, where the Khalifa's 
main force was situated. Kitchener's prestige had risen sharply 
as a result of the success of 7 April. He used this prestige to 
press for additional support: four British battalions, a cavalry 
regiment, an engineer company and additional artillery and auxiliary 
corps. All demands were met. The Anglo-Egyptian strength was 
considerable. The force, however, needed to be properly trained and 
coordinated before it could be used in battle. During the period 
1Haig 
to Wood, 29 April 1898. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 5 June 1898. 
-164- 
I 
of preparation, Haig finally received a squadron of 
his own. His 
duties brought him satisfaction and enjoyment: 
You would be surprised at how quickly the time passes 
here: I have 35 young horses now, making 148 in all 
in my squadron. I have a parade every morning except 
Friday (which is the Egyptian Sunday) and sometimes 
I have the young horses out in the afternoon as well. 
We have an unlimited drill ground (from here to Suakim) 
compare that with Wormwood Scrubbs, Hounslow Heath and 
Wimbledon Common for training Cavalry! So I have grand 
manoeuvres against men with flags to represent an Enemy 
--not exactly dervish tactics, but still if a squadron 
can keep together at rapid paces one is all right against 
Dervishes! 
He proved an excellent squadron leader. On 16 July 'the Sirdar', 
he noted, 'came round riding with General Rundle. Introduced me 
to latter. Complimented me on improvement in squadron. '?, 
The period was one of hard work coupled with much relaxation and 
entertainment. The troops took part in shooting, fishing, racing, 
polo and other sports. For Haig, life continued to be as comfort- 
able and enjoyable as he could make it. In July, the parcels from 
Henrietta arrived, including three cases of champagne. The added 
baggage required extra men and animals. 'War' seemed good for him: 
For myself they all say I look far better than I ever did 
in England. The days are hot, but the nights are cold. 
That is to say, from 6 p. m. to 6 a. m. the climate is 
excellent. I have the squadron to play with in the morning 
and three days a week play polo. At present we have not 
got our fizzy water yet and the soda water machine has 
broken down. Still the Nile water is excellent at this 
date. We ilter it and cool it. This with sour claret is 
excellent. 
There were also the inevitable diversions which arise during war. 
These included a murder trial in which Haig served as Chief 
Prosecuting Attorney. He noted with particular emphasis that a 
1Haig to Henrietta, 7 July 1898. 
2Diary, 16 July 1898. 
3Haig 
to Henrietta, 29 April 1893. 
woman--'called Guz, a shrill voiced, ugly wench'Lwas at the centre 
of the controversy. The trial provided considerable interest for 
Haig. It ended with the successful conviction of a fellaheen, 
who was subsequently executed. 
During the build-up to the final battle, Haig continued to 
place unwarranted store in rumours of the enemy's condition. 
On 21 April he speculated that an insurrection in Omdurman was 
likely2 He recorded the same belief a while later. 
3 On 5 June, 
he wrote the following to Henrietta: 
You ask about Khartoum. Some deserters arrived here 
yesterday direct from there. They say ... murders in the streets and fighting amongst the Emirs. But 
of course one can't say whether they are speaking the 
truth or not. Still there-is just a phance of the 
Khalifa's power breaking up entirely. 
He ended the letter by remarking that it was more likely the troops 
would fight to the last. Yet he was consistently credulous when 
confronted with idle gossip. Rumours of the enemy's condition 
serve no use whatsoever. They can easily mislead an army commander 
as to the nature of the problem confronting him, and often spawn 
unjustified optimism. 
In July, Kitchener slowly moved his force forward to Wadi 
Hamed, about seventy miles from Omdurman. Haig still commanded 
a squadron, as he did for the rest of the campaign. His squadron was 
one of the last to reach the camp, arriving on 11 August. At Wadi 
Hamed, Haig found a 'muddle' which further shook his confidence 
in Kitchener. Two diary entries show his frustration: 
'Haig to Henrietta, 19 May 1898. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 21 April 1898. 
3See Haig to Henrietta, I May 1898. 
4Haig 
to Henrietta, 5 June 1898. 
11 August: 
Great delay and much bungling in laying our camp. Had 
to shift my squadron lines three times. 
12 August: 
Again shifted our lines::: Is this good staff work? 
' 
He detailed his criticisms in a letter to Wood: 
I'll merely remark that I shifted my squadron lines 
3 
times on the 11th and once on the 12th of August. My 
experience is not singular in this respect. Nor indeed 
did this delay in settling down occur merely in this one 
camp, but it was the chief feature whenever the force or 
any part (except Cavalry alone) moved. The cause was due 
to the fact that the Officer in Chief Command for the time 
being (be he the Sirdar or Hunter) insisted on doing every 
detail himself, in place of trusting a staff officer to 
allot the camping areas to units. 2 
Haig found Kitchener's methods increasingly difficult to tolerate. 
His frustration was similar to that experienced by David Lloyd 
George and William Robertson in the Great War. Their experiences 
helped to explode the myth of Kitchener as a brilliant military 
leader. Yet in 1898, Kitchener's prestige remained formidable, 
and Haig was one of few to question it. 
The Battle of Omdurman broke out on 2 September. For the 
preceeding few days, the opposing armies had manoeuvred into 
position. The Dervishes were situated on a plain north of the 
city. Their position was bordered by two strategic heights: the 
Kerreri Hills to the north and Jebel Surgham to the south. Their 
'Diary, 11 and 12 August 1898. 
2Haig to Wood, 7 September 1898. It is interesting to note how 
openly Haig criticises his superior officers, especially Kitchener. 
It is true that Wood asked for Haig's opinions, but his eagerness 
to give them is startling. Witness his comment in the 29 April 
letter to Wood: 'You must not think that I am trying to find points 
to criticise (I'll tell you much more when I get back! ). But as I 
owe my presence here to your kindness, it pleases me to write to 
you and tell you of any odd event which may not otherwise reach 
you except with the accopanism [sic] of an official colouring. ' Haig 
was fulfilling perfectly (and apparently enjoying) Wood's intended 
purpose for him. 
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force was divided in two, the southern group led by the Khalifa 
and the northern by his son, Osma Sheikh ed Din. Their plan-- 
if one existed--seemed to call for a flank attack by the Khalifa, 
followed closely by a frontal assault by his son. The Anglo- 
Egyptian force was situated between the Dervish position and the 
river, supported by a number of gunboats. 
t The Sirdar's plan 
was as sketchy as the Khalifa's. As had been the case at the 
Atbara, Kitchener moved his force into a strong position and then 
left the next move to his enemy. The battle, naturally enough, 
turned into a defensive one for the Anglo-Egyptian force. The 
Dervishes threw themselves first in one direction, then in another. 
The attacks were well ordered, but an overall strategy was missing. 
Haig was impressed with the enemy's courage. They 'seemed to come 
in countless numbers and in rank after rank. ... their order and 
maneuvering power was wonderful. '2 To Henrietta he confessed that 
'I could not have believed it possible for human beings to advance 
in the way they did against such a fire. '3 The battle soon deteri- 
orated into a series of mindless, bloody assaults which werB success- 
fully repulsed by the stiff Anglo-Egyptian defence. The superior 
firepower and organisation of the Sirdar's force caused the 
Dervish strength gradually to dissolve. The Khalifa's men had 
suffered enormous losses. Faced with complete annihilation, they 
chose to run. 
In his study, Falls points out that had the Khalifa been able 
to concentrate both wings of his force in a simultaneous attack, 
'One 
of the gunboats was commanded by David Beatty, later Admiral 
of the Fleet Earl Beatty of the North Sea. 
2Diary, 2 September 1898. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 6 September 1898 
'obviously the risks and the trials of the Sirdar's troops would 
have been far heavier. '1 Haig made virtually the same point in 
a letter to Wood. He believed the battle had been lost by the 
Khalifa, not won by Kitchener. He described how the Dervish 
leader erred by not 
4e4ing the two strategic heights. 'What losses 
would we not have suffered in turning him out? '2 He also maintained 
that Kitchener failed to capitalise on the enemy's divided force: 
. the Sirdar's left should have been thrown forward 
and gradually drawing in his right and extending 
his left south-westwards, he might have cut the enemy off 
from Omdurman and really annihilated the thousands and 
thousands of Dervishes. In place of this, altho' in pos- 
session of full information, and able to see with his own 
eyes the whole field, he spreads out his force, thereby 
risking destruction of a Brigade. He seems to have had 
no plan, or tactical idea, beyond allowing the latter to 
attack the camp. 3 
Kitchener was criticised for over-caution at the time of the battle 
and since. Yet his strategy probably accounts for the low casualty 
figure of 48 killed and 434 wounded. Haig' s plan, another example 
of his preference for the aggressive offensive, may indeed have 
'annihilated ... thousands and thousands of Dervishes'. But the 
cost probably would have been higher. As it was, 11,000 Dervishes 
were killed, over one-quarter of their force. 
Haig was especially disappointed with the handling of the 
cavalry. The first attacks by the Dervishes were repulsed by the 
cavalry, but otherwise they played little part in the action. When 
the Dervish forces dissolved and fled, Kitchener regrouped his men 
for the final advance. He was eager to reach Omdurman before 
1Falls, 'The Reconquest of the Sudan', p. 298. The description 
of the battle and the statistics on casualties are taken from this 
source. 
2Haig to Wood, 7 September 1898. 
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nightfall. The cavalry, eager for glory, was allowed to attempt a 
dramatic charge into the city. A frontal assault was impossible as 
the battle field was littered with individual Dervishes who were 
still fighting. It was decided that the Cavalry Brigade should 
attempt to skirt the resistance by approaching the city in a wide 
arc from the south. Haig took off in a group of three squadrons, 
but soon found the task impossible. They were fired on from all 
directions. Dervishes who seemed to have surrendered shot at 
the cavalry after it had passed. 'My men seemed to bend their 
heads as one does to escape a storm of rain! ', he wrote. 'I had 
seen 8 horses go down on my front rank .. . '1 The advance was 
abandoned. The three squadrons, cut off from the rest of the 
brigade, retired to the river where they spent the night. A number 
of horses died of exhaustion; others had to be shot. No supplies 
were available until late the next day when a cargo boat--after 
extreme difficulty--finally manoeuvred to the shore. Haig did not 
arrive in Omdurman until 4. September. By that time the excitement 
of victory had abated. He was tired, hungry and disappointed. 
He was also extremely angry with those who had ordered the charge. 
It was a ridiculous idea for three squadrons to attack some 10 or 
more thousands of armed and resolute men all scattered across the 
plain. ' 
2 
The battle demonstrated how, in the pursuit of glory, men often 
lose their common sense. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
the cavalry, much to Haig's annoyance. The cavalry could not 
afford such fools. One an whom Haig singled out was Colonel 
Martin, commanding officer of the 21st lancers. The lancers, among 
1Diary, 2 September 1898. 
2Ibid. 
them Winston Churchill, 
' had joined the campaign when Kitchbner 
strengthened his force after the Battle of the Atbara. They operated 
independently of the Egyptian Cavalry Brigade. Martin and the Lancers 
were eager to make a mark. Unfortunately, they chose the wrong occa- 
sion to do so. The consequences were disastrous. Churchill described 
how Colonel Martin, on the basis of intelligence he should have rea- 
lised was faulty, decided to charge a Dervish position, with the 
result that 
. before 
(the distance] was half-covered, the whole aspect 
of the affair changed. A deep crease in the ground--a dry 
water course, a khor--appeared where all had seemed smooth, 
level plain; and from it there sprang, with the suddenness 
of a pantomime effect and a high pitched yell, a dense 
white mass of men nearly as long as our front and twelve 
deep ... The collision was prodigious. 
2 
The charge of the 21st Lancers resembled that of the Light Brigade 
at Balaclava in both magnificence and futility. Sixty-five men and 
119 horses were killed or wounded in less than two minutes, attacking 
a position which was of no strategic importance. As if to encourage 
similar actions, three Victoria Crosses were later awarded. 
Haig was a firm believer in -the moral effect of the cavalry 
charge. But he always felt that the charge had to have an object 
other than simply glory. He vented his anger with Martin in a letter 
to Wood: 
You will hear a lot of the charge made by the 21st Lancers. 
.. The regiment seems to have advanced without any 
patrols in front.. .. While in column of troops they were 
1Haig 
was against Churchill joining the force. See Diary, 12 
July 1898: 'Le Gallais and I are sent for by the Sirdar at 12 noon. 
He told us that he was much bothered by people with influence forcing 
useless officers on him. Asked If I thought young Churchill suitable. 
Said I did not want him in my squadron... . .' Haig did not explain his lack of enthusiasm for Churchill. 
2Winston Churchill, The River War, (London: Longuians, Green and 
Co.: 1899), vol. II, pp. 135-136. 
under a hot fire, so 
Martin's) 
suspicions ought to have'been 
aroused especially as Slatin before had told him of the 
nullah. ... The loss inflicted on 
the enemy (judging by 
the corpses) was trifling, 14 or 15 at most. ... We 
onlookers in the Egyptian Cavalry have feared this all 
along, for the regiment was keen to do something and 
meant to charge something before the show was over. They 
got their charge, but at what cost? I trust for the sake 
of the British Cavalry that more tactical knowledge exists 
in the higher ranks of the average regiment than we have 
seen displayed in this one. Yet this Commanding Officer 
has had his command extended. ... Really 
I cannot think 
that the Promotion Board fully appreciates the responsi- 
bility which rests Iwith them when they put 
duffers in com- 
mand of regiments. 
Earlier, Haig had pointed out that good officers could turn the 
fellaheen into an adequate cavalryman. Here he showed how 'duffers' 
could destroy valuable men and horses. Wise leadership was at the 
heart of successful cavalry. Selfish nonsense was not to be 
tolerated. 
On. 4 September, a moving service was read for Gordon in Khartoum. 
Kitchener was so affected by it that he shook with sobs. The 
dignity of the event was tarnished two days later when the Sirdar 
ordered the destruction of the Nahdi's tomb. The great leader's 
corpse was exhumed. The body was burned and thrown in the Nile, and 
the skull presented as a trophy to Kitchener. Some of his close 
associates suggested that he mount it in silver or gold, to be 
used as a drinking cup or inkstand. Kitchener, impressed by the 
unusual size of the skull, toyed with the idea of sending it to 
the Royal College of Surgeons. The suggestion caused a great outcry 
in Britain. The subject was raised in Parliament. Finally the 
Sirdar relented. The skull was secretly buried in a small cemetery 
1Haig to Wood, 7 September 1898. Haig was incorrect in his 
statement that Martin had had his command extended. Kitchener 
removed him not long after the event, and Savo command of the 
regiment to Major R. G. Cole-Wyndham. 
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near Wadi Haifa. 
I 
Haig missed the memorial service due to his late arrival in 
Omdurman. He did not apparently regret his absence. He only 
briefly mentioned the issue of the skull, as if to show his 
distaste for the whole affair. The war was over and he felt that 
his job was done. He ridiculed officers who wished to stay in 
the Sudan with the Egyptian Army, in the hopes of decoration 
or promotion. 'To me there were no such fancies'? he claimed. 
He was eager to return to Britain, where Wood had reserved him a 
position at the Horse Guards. He described his feelings in a 
letter to the Adjutant General dated 21 September: 
I thank you very much indeed for your kindness in saying 
you would like to get some work for me to do at the Horse 
Guards. I think that in spite of the feeling in this Army 
against new arrivals that they will give one credit for 
training my squadron and doing my best always for the show, 
not for myself. I don't want credit for it because it pleased 
me and kept me well during the trying heat at Berber all 
summer. Now I think this show is pretty well over and though 
I am ready to remain if the Sirdar requires a Squadron leader, 
I think your kindly advice about slackness in hot countries 
very much to thq point and I am ready to come home in any 
minor capacity. 
In a subsequent letter, the last from Egypt, he emphasised the 
experience he had gained. 'For all this I have only you to thank'. 
4 
He left Omdurman on 17 September and arrived in London eighteen 
days later. 
Haig was right to stress the experience he had gained. The 
campaign proved that he could lead in a crisis. It demonstrated the 
ISee Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist, pp. 131- 
134 for a description of the Controversy surrounding the Mahdi's 
skull. 
2Haig to Wood, 21 September 1898. 
3Haig 
to Wood, 7 September 1898. 
4 
Haig to Wood, 21 September 1898. 
value of discipline, organisation and training. It showed what 
good cavalry could accomplish and what foolish leadership could 
destroy. More importantly, the war proved that control of a battle 
could only be maintained through an aggressive offence. None of 
these ideas were new to Haig. The war did not surprise him. There 
were perhaps only three unexpected experiences. The first was his 
encounter with the Press. The second was the behaviour of men 
eager for glory. The third, and most significant, was the performance 
of Kitchener, who was supposed to have been a 'great' leader, but whom 
Haig found disorganised, inefficient and at times incompetent. Other- 
wise, the war confirmed old doctrines rather than introducing new 
ones. It provided Haig with the added impetus to pursue even 
more resolutely the approach to his profession which he had long 
ago assumed. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Boer War, 1898-1902 
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The campaign in the Sudan was a disappointing one for the British 
cavalry. Reconnaissance and protective duties were performed ade- 
quately. But Kitchener's strategy and the limitations of the fella- 
heen reduced to a minimum the arm's offensive capacity. In addition, 
vain, weak leaders caused disasters which damaged the cavalry's 
reputation. In spite of this showing, Haig's faith in the arm was 
not affected. He was able to explain and accept every failure with- 
out weakening his basic belief that the arm. remained an indispensable 
moral weapon. This faith was rewarded in South Africa, or so it 
seemed to Haig. As 'will be seen over the next three cbapters, opinions 
regarding the performance and contribution of the cavalry in the 
Boer War differ widely. 
1 But what is important to this study is how 
traditionalists like Haig perceived their role in the war. To them, 
the war was an indisputable affirmation of the importance of cavalry 
trained along traditional lines. It was due to their experiences 
in South Africa that cavalrymen like Haig were able to resist all 
serious efforts at modernising their arm prior to 1914. 
Haig returned to Britain in the autumn of 1898 and rejoined the 
7th Hussars at Norwich. 
2 Life was tedious after the excitement of 
the Sudan. His fortunes changed in May 1899 when he was appointed 
Brigade Major of the Ist Cavalry Brigade, Aldershot. The appointment 
was a well-deserved reward for Haig's services in the Sudan. But, 
as in January 1898, there was an unseemly side to Haig's selection. 
IEdward Spiers, in an excellent article on the post-Boer War 
cavalry controversy, points out that 'the South African War did not 
produce any self-evident lessons, only a range of common experiences, liable to whatever interpretation suited the subjective preferences 
of the interpreter. ' See Spiers, 'The British Cavalry 1902-1914', 
Journal of the Society for Arm Historical Research, Vol. 57, No. 
230, (Summer 1979), p. 76. 
2fihe 
position which Wood promised Haig at the Horse Guards did 
not materialise. It is not known why. 
The commander of the Aldershot Brigade was Colonel 
(temporary Major 
General) John French. French was on the verge of bankruptcy, as a 
result of unwise speculation in South African mining shares. In the 
same month as his selection as Brigade Major, Haig agreed to loan 
French £2500 to satisfy the most impatient creditors. Had French 
been declared bankrupt, his career would have been ruined. The 
loan was perfectly legitimate--a formal contract was signed and an 
interest agreed upon--yet there is no doubt that it tied Haig to 
French in an unorthodox manner. Haig explained why he was willing 
to loan the money in a letter to his sister: 
It would be a terrible thing if French were made a Bankrupt 
-such a loss to the Army as well as to me personally. For 
of course we can do a lot here together towards improving 
things. 
Haig could not have been more correct. As subsequent events proved, 
Haig gained immensely by French remaining solvent. The £2500 was 
a worthwhile investment in his career and in the cavalry. 
2 
Haig spent only four months at Aldershot. He devoted himself 
to his duties, and brought about notable improvements in the Brigade. 
On 14 September, French was selected to command the cavalry in the 
force preparing for war in South Africa. Six days later, Haig was 
confirmed as his Chief Staff Officer, or Assistant Adjutant General 
'Haig to Henrietta, 16 May 1899. 
2The loan was finally repaid ten years later, despite French's 
problems in meeting the payments. See Haig to Henrietta, 9 December 
1903: 'I am astonished at what you say, re the loan to General F. 
.I am afraid the trustees have been hustling for payment and 
in fact I felt I would prefer to lose the money myself than that 
General F. should be pressed for it. ' A rare bit of charity on 
Haig's part. French's predicament in 1898 did not, however, cause 
him to shy away from similar investments in the future. By 1901, 
he was again speculating on the South African gold market, this 
time, however, with the perhaps more secure guidance of Lt. Col. 
Brinsley Fitzgerald, his A. D. C. See French to Fitzgerald. 30 
October 1901, Fitzgerald Papers, PP/MCR/118/2/4. 
(A. A. G. ). Hardly a year after the Battle of Omdurman, Haig was 
again on his way to war. During the passage on the S. S. Norman, 
he commented on this fact in a letter to Henrietta: 
You and I always seem to be saying 'Goodbye' to each 
other, and yet practice in this does not stem to make 
the process easier but rather more trying. 
The emotions were characteristically set aside once they had 
been expressed. Haig settled into the voyage, and used his spare 
time to prepare mentally for the war. French generously gave Haig 
a room in his cabin, which meant that he avoided the regular berths, 
which were 'smaller than most dog kennels'. 
2 There was a strange 
collection of passengers on the ship: 'Uitlanders, Boers .. 
Newspaper Correspondents, and some 20 or 30 soldiers'. Included 
3 
in the latter were two of Paul Kruger's nephews. The irony of 
men travelling together for 17 days in order to fight each other 
on the other side of the world escaped Haig's mention. 
He arrived in Cape Town on 10 October, at which time he heard 
that the Boers had demanded the withdrawal of all British troops 
by the following day. 'It is generally agreed', Haig wrote, 'that 
even Lord Salisbury cannot knuckle under to this piece of Boer 
swagger .. . '4 He was eager to begin fighting, but complications 
caused delay. The overland route to Fast London, where the cavalry 
was gathered, was closed. Haig and French as a result had to wait 
'Haig to Henrietta, 26 September 1899. 
? -Diary, 23 September 1899. It should be noted that the Boer 
War Diaries (part of 1899, all of 1900, and part of 1901) are kept 
separate from the other diaries in the Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, 
No. 38. The diary for 1901 is imcomplete, and the one for 1902 
is missing. 
31bid. 
4Diary, 10 October 1899, 
for the next available steamer to take them to Durban. They spent 
their time 'hanging about the Staff Office"--both considerably 
frustrated. Haig blamed the delay on 'the actions of Govt. officials, 
i. e. a general want of foresight all round: e. g. deficiency of 
troops in South Africa::! '2 The early news of the siege of British 
troops in Mafeking compounded his annoyance. 
Haig and French finally arrived in Durban on 18 October. The 
force they found on their arrival consisted of the garrison troops, 
supplemented by local volunteers. The latter were of uncertain 
quality. The total British force in Durban was composed of four 
cavalry regiments, eleven infantry battalions, six field artillery 
batteries, and 2,000 irregular horse, raised in the Colony. During 
the waiting period in Cape Town, Haig prepared a document which 
suggested possible uses for the mounted troops. The document was 
presented to General Forrester-Walker, the local commander. In it 
Haig demonstrated a remarkable understanding of Boer strengths and 
strategy. He recognised that the enemy had a number of advantages. 
They were fighting on terrain which they knew well. They were pre- 
pared for war and certain of their cause. The Boers also possessed 
a number of tactical advantages over the British troops. As men 
who shot game for food, they were excellent marksmen. They were 
very frugal, and could live for days on meagre rations. Those 
factors, along with their adequate horsemanship, made them amazingly 
mobile. While Haig scorned the Dutch Afrikaner as an inferior 
being, he had complete respect for his fighting abilities. He there- 
fore advised a cautious policy for the first few months of the 
hostilities. The few troops available would be used on a 'passive 
1Diary, 11 October 1899. 
2Diary, 18 October 1899. 
defence' aimed to 'have as many horses ... fit and in hard condi- 
tion, when the moment for the general advance arrives. ' This 
offensive, he argued, had to await the arrival and proper training 
of British reinforcements. In view of Haig's usual advocacy of 
boldness, this attitude of caution is highly significant. 
The source of this insight lay in a study of the Boer problem 
carried out by Haig prior to the war. In his 'Notes on the Transvaal', 
he examined, in characteristic detail, past campaigns in South Africa. 
From these he culled ideas relevant to the situation at hand. The 
first action he examined was the Battle of Boomplatz (August 1848), 
in which Commandant Pretorius was soundly defeated by Sir Henry 
Smith, then Governor of Cape Colony. 'The Boers fought well', 
wrote Haig, 
This 
But against them was a general of great experience having 
the capacity of infusing his spirit of energy into the 
men he commanded. 2 
was a point central to Haig's military philosophy: the able 
leader could inspire his men to do as he wished. The same argument 
had been used in letters from the Sudan. Able leadership was missing 
in the second encounter Haig studied, the 1880-1881 Boer War. The 
Commander, General Sir George Colley, was 'very clever', but . 
'he 
lacked experience'. He failed because he could not morally inspire 
his men. His inadequacies were brought home at Majubm Hill: 
... why did men bolt from Majuba? There had been two 
defeats under the same General. How can officers or men 
have confidence in a man who has twice in succession been 
badly defeated? 3 
1Outline 
of memorandum to General Forrester-Walker. Contained 
in 1899 Diary, following entry for 13 October. 
2Douglas Haig, 'Notes on the Transvaal', n. d., (unpublished). 
Haig Papers, HIS, Acc. 3155, No. 38(1). 
31bid. 
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As if supporting a heresy, Haig reluctantly admitted that 'even an 
English force becomes demoralised after a defeat. ' 
Colley's failure was not, Haig argued, solely a result of poor 
leadership. He cited other causes, including a lack of preparation 
and a disdain for the enemy; 
Both the civil and military authorities began by despising 
the enemy and remained in absolute ignorance of the Enemy 
against whom a campaign would be prosecuted. No one took 
the trouble to consider the conditions of the problem. 
Haig was determined not to make the same mistake. He examined 
the cgmpobition of Colley's force and concluded that it was inade- 
quate for the task faced. Its main deficiency was the lack of adequate 
cavalry. The Boers were 'mounted men able to shoot'. To defeat them 
an army had to be equally mobile. 
The third encounter which Haig examined also demonstrated the 
necessity of a large force of highly mobile cavalry. In the Jameson 
Raid (1895, failure resulted because the Boers 'kept prolonging 
their line'. They could do this because they were so mobile. 'They 
cannot readily be outflanked', yet this was in fact the best way to 
beat them. Haig again borrowed from history for a solution to this 
dilemma: 
It is a question whether we should not follow Moltke's 
plan at Konigsgratzisi --Crown Prince coming up on 
Austrian's right and widely separated from Prince Frederick 
Charles--or as Blucher came up at Waterloo--or as Napoleon 
used Regulars to turn the Allies' right flank at Baritzen 
--20th-21st May 1813. No doubt it is dangerous to divide 
one's force but it must be risked. Otherwise our tactics 
will merely drive the Boers back from position to position 
and a series of rearguard actions will result. When we 
meet them our plans must be such as to insure the annihila- 
tion of their field force. 1 
While the above was written in response to the Boer threat, it 
was a general, not a specific remedy. Holding and compressing the 
All quotations on this page are from 'Notes on the Transvaal'. 
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enemy front while manoeuvring for the flank was at the heart of 
Haig's strategical thinking. It was a basic military principle 
which had stood the test of time. With slight modification, it 
was relevant to the Boer problem. Haig found security, as usual, 
in the refuge of historical evidence. 
In his 'Notes on the Transvaal', Haig included a breakdown 
of what he foresaw as the responsibilities of the various British 
arms. The Boers, he argued, were a relatively primitive people 
who lacked military organisation and sophistication. They could 
not, therefore, be expected to field a force of more than 10,000 
men at any one place or time. To counter this threat, it was 
only necessary to maintain infantry superiority. Haig emphasised 
that an overwtilming infantry predominance would be counterproductive 
in that it would cause logistical difficulties and reduce mobility. 
The cavalry would be the main offensive weapon. He reiterated that 
this arm had to be larger than usual. Artillery, on the other 
hand, would be almost useless. 'A Boer enemy is not a suitable 
objective for artillery', Haig claimed. This was because 'he fights 
as an individual who looks after himself with the greatest care'. 
In other words, he did not expect to find large concentrations of 
men, suitable for artillery bombardments. For this reason, the 
artillery only had to be large enough to maintain mastery over the 
enemy guns. Any larger, and the precious mobility would be impaired. 
Haig concluded his study with a number of ironically relevant 
points. He stressed the importance of the first strike. The British 
had to begin with boldness. 
' 
-'An ignorant army like the Boers will 
'This is not a contradiction of his earlier-mentioned advice 
to General Forrester-Walker, which called for a passive defence. 
The 'Notes on the Transvaal' was written prior to Haig finding 
out the small size of the force available. All quotations on this 
page are from the 'Notes on theTransvaal '. 
be impressed by the vigour of the first blow struck. ' Likewise, 
the enemy could not be allowed early successes. Secondly, because 
this was to be a mobile war, the duties of engineers would be limited 
to road building and some demolition. Hdig did not expect sieges 
or counter-attacks, so fortification work would be minimal. Finally, 
he summarised the 'Objective': 
The Boer Army: Defeat that and the country is at our mercy. 
How is that to be got hold of? Aim at some strategic point, 
which the Army is sure to cover. 
The strategic point is PRETORIA. 
1 
The inaccuracies of the above predictions are obvious. The Boers 
fielded a larger force than Haig anticipated. There were sieges 
at Mafeking, Kimberley and Ladysmith. The Boer Army did not defend 
Pretoria. The capture of the city did not end the war, but rather 
ushered in a long, demoralising guerilla campaign. Yet if Haig's 
clearly stated requirements--a large cavalry force, wise leadership, 
a bold first strike, etc. --had been satisfied at the outset, the 
campaign probably would have developed as he predicted. When these 
requirements were not satisfied, the war assumed a shape for which 
neither he nor anyone else was prepared. 
Haig's first action was exactly as he anticipated. After their 
declaration of war, the Boers moved into Natal in a three-pronged 
attack. The southernmost advance, led by General Koch, swept through 
the Biggarsberg Hills and siezed Elandslaagte on 19 October. Further 
north, a British force of 4,000 men fought an inconclusive battle 
at Dundee. On the 20th, these troops retired south towards Ladysmith. 
In order to ensure a safe British retreat, Koch's force had to 
be cleared away. General George White commanded the garrison at 
Ladysmith. He gave responsibility for clearing Elandslaagte to French. 
1All 
quotations on this gage are taken from 'Notes on the Transvaal'. 
French scouted the position with his cavalry, then called for 
reinforcements. Half a battalion of the 1st Manchesters, seven 
companies of the Devonshire Regiment and five of the Gordon 
Highlanders were supplied to him. He also received two field bat- 
teries, squadrons of the 5th Lancers and 5th Dragoon Guards, and 
local volunteers unier the banner of the Imperial Light Horse. 
French had, in all, 3,000 troops. The Boers had 1,000, mounted and 
armed in the usual mannner. 
1 
The battle adhered so completely to Haig's pre-war plan that 
it is safe to assume that French relied heavily on his Chief Staff 
Officer's advice. ' The infantry was ably led by Colonel Ian 
Hamilton, who had fought at Majuba. Hamilton and French fitted 
perfectly into the role of Haig's 'able leaders'. At 3: 00 P. M. on 21 
October, Hamilton pushed the Devonshires forward in a frontal attack 
on the Boer position. The men came under heavy fire, but were 
able, as Haig predicted, to keep the enemy front concentrated. This 
enabled the flank to be turned by the Manchesters and Cordons. The 
attack faltered once during the afternoon, but cries of 'Remember 
Majuba' restored order and courage. It soon became clear that the 
battle would evolve into hand-to-hand fighting. The Boers, terri- 
fied of the bayonet, chose to run rather than face this prospect. 
When they ran, French released the cavalry. The first charge through 
the Boers caused utter confusion. The cavalry then turned and charged 
back through the disordered ranks, completing what Haig properly 
1Details 
of battles and other general information are taken 
from John Selby, The Boer War: A Study in Cowardice and Coura , (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 19 and Edgar Holt, The Boer War, 
(London: Putnam, 1958). 
1later General Sir Ian Hamilton, commander of the Gallipoli 
invasion during the Great War. 
called an 'annihilation'. 
Haig was delighted with the success of the battle, as evidenced 
by the 26 October letter to his sister: 
We were very lucky to have the fight at Elands Laagte. 
General French in command and self Chief Staff Officer. 
The Boers fought to the end with extraordinary courage. 
This is accounted for by the fact that the commands ... 
were entirely composed of high class Boers, who had more or 
less organised the present revolt and so must sink or swim 
by the result of the campaign. 
The Imperial Light Horse fought well and carried on the 
Gordons with them when the latter were a bit faint-hearted. 
... The Boers say they nTver thought the British could 
have taken their position. 
Haig spent the next day questioning prisoners. He was surprised 
to firxi 'Boers, Germans, Hollanders, American-Irish, British 
naturalised Boers, etc. ' among Koch's force. Equally surprising for 
him was the Boer reaction to the cavalry charge. 'They are wild at 
the way'the fugitives were killed with the lance! They say it is 
butchery, not war. '2 After the battle the Boers vowed that in 
future they would shoot captured Lancers. Selby has commented on 
this issue: 
According to their rules they should be able to lie down 
and fire at an enemy to within twenty yards and then 
demand and receive individual quarter. Such conditions 
precluded cavalry and bayonet charges; yet almost only in 
the use of cold steel were the British superior to the Boers. 
It is therefore greatly to the credit of the British that 
they yielded this advantage and fought the war generally in 
the Boer way. 3 
Selby in fact exaggerated the British sense of fair play. What 
Elandslaagte demonstrated was the British willingness to charge 
and to exploit the advantage of the arme blanche. In subsequent 
1Haig to Henrietta, 26 October 1899. 
2lbid. 
3Selby, 
The Boer War: A Study in Cowardice and Courage, p. 65. 
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encounters, this willingness, by itself, had the desired effect. 
In other words, whenever the British cavalry showed a bold front and 
readied for the charge, the Boers usually retired rather than 
face a repeat of Elandslaagte. 
Elandslaagte was followed by a similar success at Rietfontein 
which ensured the safe retreat of the British force. On 26 October 
this force entered Ladysmith. Haig recorded that the retreat had 
been 'quite unmolested, this no doubt due to the moral effect of 
the victory at Elands Laagte. 'I Yet the fact remained that a large 
concentration of British soldiers was now being invested in Ladysmith. 
As October ended, the circle around the town tightened. On 30 
October--'Mournful Monday'--White tried to break the Boer hold by 
an attack north of the city. His effort lacked the energy and 
determination displayed by French on the 21st. Each separate com- 
mander was given far too much independence, which made the attack 
totally uncoordinated. White, far away from the action, had no clear 
idea how the battle progressed. For instance, Haig noted that an 
order for the cavalry to retire-prompted by the defeat of an 
infantry detachment on its left-was given while his men were actually 
forcing the Boers to retire. 'The position held by the Cavalry 
was a strong one and might have been held against large oddsl'2 It 
might have. But with a weak commander and a dispirited force on 
both sides of them, the cavalry's effect was neutralised. Retirement 
was the best policy, and probably kept White's blunders from turning 
'Douglas Haig, 'Diary of the Operations of the Cavalry in Natal, 
October 20th to November 2nd 1899', Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 
33. The entry is for 26 October. This diary is the official staff 
diary and is explained in more detail on page 197. Hereafter cited 
as 'Cavalry Diary'. 
2'Cavalry Diary', 30 October 1899. 
into a disaster. 
Mournful Monday was followed by an equally mournful Tuesday. 
A small British force under Major John Adye was cleverly out- 
manoeuvred north of Ladysmith by a Boer detachment led by Christian 
De Wet. Over 800 prisoners were taken, Adye among them. Haig felt 
that the loss was inexcusable. It demonstrated the indispensability 
of well-trained cavalry: 
It should be noticed that this detachment moved without 
any Cavalry at all. As well let a blind man out without 
a dog, as Infantry yithout some horsemen to attend and 
reconnoitre for it: 
Adye's defeat virtually closed the circle around Ladysmith. Haig 
began to ponder the possibility of a long, demoralising siege-- 
hardly a situation suited to an offensive-minded cavalryman. 
The siege of Ladysmith lasted until 28 February 1900. But 
neither Haig nor French-to the obvious advantage of their respective 
careers--had to endure it. At 11: 00 A. M. on 2 November, White 
received the following telegram from Buller in Cape Town: 
French should take command of the Cavalry Division on the 
way from Home, and it isIIy wish particularly that he and 
Haig should come here if you can spare them possibly. 2 
Haig, French, two A. D. C. s, seven servants and nine horses left 
Ladysmith two hours later. It was the last train to leave the town 
for four months. 
3 'I was sorry to leave them all in Ladysmith but 
we could not help it as we were ordered away'4 Haig explained. 
Besides, he claimed, the risk of leaving was far greater than the 
1Diary, 31 October 1899. 
2Buller to White, telegram, 1 November 1899. A copy is in the 
Haig Diary, following the entry for 2 November 1899. 
3Actually, 
Haig's train was followed by an armoured train which 
was technically the last train to leave Ladysmith. 
Haig to Henrietta, 3 November 1899. 
risk of staying: 
The train which started at 10: 00 a. m. had been fired on, 
and the railway authorities doubted our getting through. 
About half an hour after leaving the train came under 
heavy fire from both sides of the railway. We heard 
shells bursting and bullets hit the carriage. 
We all lay down on the seat and floor! Not a very 
dignified position for the Cavalry Division Staff to 
assume--but discretion is sometimes the better part of 
valour! 
1 
A 2? inch shell passed through one of the vans, causing damage to 
Haig's 'nice mule trunks'. 'I did not mind', he wrote, Tor if this 
shell had hit a wheel or the engine boiler, we would certainly have 
been now on our way to Pretoria instead of Durban! ' 
The rest of the journey to Cape Town, via Durban, was uneventful. 
Haig saw Buller on 8 November. He and French were informed that 
the Army Corps despatched from Britain had not yet arrived. While 
waiting for the troops whom he was to train, Haig again took 
up his pen. He recorded his reflections on two weeks of fighting 
Boers. This 'Notes on Operations: 20 October to 2 November' was given 
to Buller. The paper outlined the inadequacies of the British 
effort and suggested uses for the reinforcements. The paper is 
significant because it demonstrates how Haig's attitude had changed 
since his pre-war study. The war was more complicated than he had 
anticipated. Though he had earlier warned against underestimating 
the Boers, he himself had been guilty of this fault. Haig realised 
that victory required a more determined and concentrated effort on 
the part of the British. One aspect which he cited was the need for 
more efficient and accurate intelligence. He recognised that poor 
intelligence had, by reporting a 'phantom force' at Elandslaagto, 
1Diary, 2 November 1899. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 3 November 1899. 
'deprived the Army of the fruits of their victory. '1 He played 
close attention to this subject for the duration of the war. 
Haig included a series of 'Tactical Notes' in the report he 
gave to Buller. In these, he revised his opinions on the roles of 
the various arms. The Artillery was given even less scope than 
before. 'The effect of the Artillery is more moral than physical', 
he claimed. 'The teaching of the peace manoeuvres and text books 
must be modified. ' His interrogation of prisoners after Elandslaagte 
revealed that the 'shells bursting over their positions ... killed 
no one! '2 This was not a fair judgement upon the artillery's 
effect. It is true that few, if any, Boers were killed by artillery 
fire at Elandslaagte. But early in the battle the British seven 
pounders did destroy the outbuildings of the station, a defensive 
stronghold which would have been difficult to secure by any other 
means. 
3 It is also significant to note that while Haig argued that 
shrapnel was ineffective against entrenched Boers, he did not suggest 
the use of high-explosive shells. Rather, he favoured a further 
reduction of the arm as a whole, in the interests of greater mobility. 
Haig favoured a similar proportionate reduction of the infantry. 
On the defensive, he argued, infantry were valuable. But he was 
certain that the British would not be on the defensive for much 
longer. On the offensive, 
... the value of the Infantry ... is small, owing to the 
superior mobility of the Boers. Sufficient only is required 
for the assault of a position which the Boers hold with 
guns as a pivot on which they can manoeuvre. The remainder 
1Douglas Haig, 'Notes on Operations: 20 October to 2 November', 
Haig Papers, NLS, Ace. 3155, No. 38(c). 
2Ibid. 
3See Selby, The Boer War: A Study in Cowardice and Courage, 
p. 59, for a discussion of this point. 
of the attacking force (say the half) must be mounted 
troops to oppose the Boer turning movements. 
1 
Haig also reiterated a point made during the Sudan campaign, namely 
that the increased firepower of infantry demanded a looser formation. 
This was a point which officers in the arm had been slow to grasp. 
Haig argued that many lives were lost because the British attacks 
had been too highly concentrated. He admitted that Hamilton at 
Elandslaagte had shown improvement, but a 'still looser, formation, 
and deeper, seems best against modern rifle fire. '2 
As expected, Haig repeated his demand for more cavalry, this 
time with even greater urgency. The arm's offensive capacity had, he 
felt, greatly increased. Cavalry armed with carbines could fight 
dismounted, while retaining their mobility. More important to Haig 
was the fact that the charge had recovered its respectability after 
the disasters in the Sudan. While the charge at Elandslaagte was 
not of the classical knee-to-knee type, this did not seem to matter 
to Haig. Open spaces and a highly mobile enemy had, he rightly 
recognised, given unusual offensive scope to the cavalry. The 
cavalry, and particularly the use of cold steel, was, as Selby 
maintains, distinct British advantages. The war thus played into 
the hands of the cavalry romantics. Haig misinterpreted this 
fleeting renaissance as a harbinger of twentieth century tactics: 
That Cavalry, armed as it is now, with a good firearm 
is a new element in tactics was abundantly proved by 
these operations. T 
With this in mind, he advocated a number of changes designed to 
IHaig, 'Notes on Operations, 20 October to 2 November'. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid. Haig's praise of the rifle here should not be taken as 
a contradiction of the attitude he assumed in the post-war cavalry 
argument, to be discussed in the next chapter. He always favoured 
arming cavalry with rifles, but was against the abolition of the lance. 
make the arm even more mobile. He openly admitted that many of these 
measures were borrowed from the Boers. 'Cavalry', he urged, 'should 
be organised to go for three days without any wheeled transport. ' 
Rations carried on the horse should be increased unnecessary 
equipment discarded. One item in the latter category was the dragoon 
lance which 'hamper them in their duties'. 
1 
In his( Notes on Operations', Haig emphasised the need for 
extensive peacetime dismounted training. On the surface, this 
appears to be an endorsement of the mounted infantry, which he had 
earlier scorned. Yet Haig remained an ardent opponent of M. I.: 
The one thing required here is 'Cavalry'! I think the 
country ought to be alive now to the fact (which we have 
always pointed out) that we don't keep enough of the arm 
in peacetime! This mounted infantry craze is now I trust 
exploded. So far they have proved useless and are not 
likely to be of use until they learn to ride! You had 
better not give these views to Sir Evelyn, for both he 
and Lord Wolseley are the parents of the Mounted 
Infantry. 2 
Mounted infantry, Haig believed, were superfluous. There was 
nothing the M. I. could accomplish which well-trained cavalry could 
not do better. At the same time, cavalry had the ability to fight 
mounted--and the moral effect attendant therein. N. I. were not trained 
to fight mounted. Haig's attitude was best expressed in his praise 
for the Imperial Light Horse after the Battle of Elandslaagte: 
'When for a moment there was a check in the advance, ... the 
I. L. H. first went forward again. ' This was because the 'I. L. H. are 
cavalry, not M. I. being organised as cavalry. 13 
Haig spent most of November in Cape Town, where he organised 
1Haig, 'Notes on Operations: 20 October to 2 November'. 
2Haig 
to Henrietta, 26 November 1899. 
3Haig, 'Notes on Operations: 20 October to 2 November'. 
p 
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a cavalry camp on the outskirts of the city. The slow arrival 
of British reinforcements increased his frustration and anger with 
the government at home. The politicians, he felt, were too eager 
to rely on the locally raised M. I. units: 
This class of M. I. s is useless. It would be better to 
call up all reservists of the Cavalry and send them out here 
to ride horses of the country. In any case the Sec'y of 
State for War must be strongly condemned for not, sending 
out ample Cavalry in fast ships to this country. 
Though he was impatient for the beginning of a bold offensive, 
he realised that the poor quality of the troops required a con- 
tinuing policy of caution. The disasters of Black Week--Colenso, 
Magersfontein aril Stormberg--demonstrated how some had not appre- 
ciated this fact: 
If we only had sufficient Cavalry with fit horses, we 
could do anything we liked with these Boers. It is 
because self-advertising men like Gatacre push on without 
realising the value of well-formed Cavalry, that we have 
been checked at so many points. This war will do the 
country a lot of good: already many, who held reputations 
for skill in savage warfare, have been found useless. 2 
The criticisms were justified and the prediction turned out to be 
a fairly accurate one. 
In stark contrast to the disasters of Black Week and Buller's 
ineffective efforts to relieve Ladysmith were French's operations 
around Colesberg. Here, a Boer force of 5,000 men was poised ready 
to invade Cape Colony. French's containment of the threat was in 
the finest traditions of British improvisation. By keeping con- 
stantly on the move, and by making impressive use of surprise and 
1Diary, 23 October 1899. The . lack of well-trained troops was 
a source of constant worry for Haig. For instance, on 1 December 
he commented in his diary: 'A 2nd Lieutenant, a photographer, sent 
to join us to photograph positions! We get everything except 
fighting men! ' 
2Haig to Henrietta, 12 December 1899. 
-193- 
deception, French neutralised the Boer force until February; when 
the offensive begun by Roberts changed the character of the war. 
1 
Haig described the operations to Henrietta on 23 December: 
At present we only carry out small reconnaissance round the 
enemy's flanks and do our best to keep quiet so as to rest 
our horses as much as possible. ... Our usual day's work 
is to go out about 4: 30 a. m. to one or other flanks of the 
Boer position and have a look to see if they are going on 
all right! For this we take out usually some dozen or more 
men as escort to the General and to look out when we halt. 
... It is very satisfactory to have kept so many 
(about 
5,000) of the Enemy to their positions near Colesberg. We 
have, all told, about 2,000 men here, and half that number 
at Nauuwpoort .. .2 
By containing the Boers at Colesberg, the British were granted the 
time to train the newly-arrived reinforcements. For French and 
Haig, the success increased their prestige still further. After 
five months of war, they had shared in most of the British successes, 
and avoided all the disasters. 
While involved in the Colesberg operations, Haig had additional 
responsibilities: 
I'm really very busy: so many things to arrange. We 
have the line of communication from Port Elizabeth to con- 
trol as well as this place and the enemy (some 5,000) to 
retain at Colesberg. The civilians get excited and we are 
flooded with telegrams from magistrates who think the sea- 
side is the only safe place. ... We administer Martial Law of course. Rough and Ready. 
3 
The Boer Army was a citizen force raised among Dutch farmers through- 
out South Africa. This gave rise to unwonted eicpeiiences for a 
regular soldier like Haig. He was not used to dealing with the 
problems of a population divided by pro-Boer and pro-British 
sentiments. After fifteen years in the Army, he had become isolated 
from the emotions of men for whom military action was a new and 
1French loft the Colesberg area in January, but his policies 
continued unchanged in his absence. 
2 
Haig to Henrietta, 23 December 1899. 
3Haig 
to Henrietta, 12 December 1899. 
9 
frightening experience. This isolation bred intolerance. At one 
point, for instance, he felt 'ashamed of the men at the way they 
showed their fear. '1 
In mid-January, French was called away from Colesberg, in 
order to take command of the now battle-ready Cavalry Division. 
The long awaited offensive under Roberts and Kitchener was due 
to begin. At this time, Roberts ordered a change in French's 
staff. Colonel the Earl of Errol, who had only recently arrived 
from Britain, was to replace Haig as French's A. A. G. Haig was 
to become D. A. A. G. French protested in a telegram to Roberts: 
I point out that the appointment of A. A. G. to Cavalry 
Division was promised by Sir Redvers Buller to Major 
Haig with the local rank of Lieutenant Colonel. I 
earnestly beg that Field Marshall will be pleased to 
confirm this. Major Haig has performed duty of C. S. O. 
to division since landing in Natal. He has acted in this 
capacity under my command in three general engagements 
and many smaller fights. His services have been invalur- 
able. 2 
Kitchener, Roberts' Chief of Staff, replied in a sympathetic but 
firm tone: 
The F. M. C. in C. fully realises the very excellent services 
rendered by Major Haig and much regrets not being able to 
meet your views as regards his taking position of A. A. G. of 
the Cavalry Division that position however the Field Marshall 
thinks must be fitted by the appointment of a senior officer 
and he feels sure you will find in Colonel the Earl of Errol 
an efficient officer. 3 
When seniority is used as the reason to supersede an officer, it 
is often to mask less legitimate reasons. This was probabaly the 
case here. Roberts and Haig had managed to avoid each other for 
most of their careers. Nevertheless, it would have been clear to 
1Haig to Henrietta, 8 November 1899. 
2French to Roberts; telegram, 18 January 1900, Haig Papers NLS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 6(c). D. A. A. G. is Deputy Assistant Adjutant General. 
3Kitchener to French, telegram, 19 January 1900, (same source). 
both that they had little upon which to agree. There was no 
justifiable reason to replace Haig, a soldier who had up until 
that time performed exceptionally well. It is quite obvious that 
on this occasion Robertp eagerly grabbed the opportunity to use 
seniority to demote an officer fbr whom he had little fondness. 
French was not willing to let the matter lie. He realised that 
he owed much of his success to Haig. He therefore sent an A. D. C., 
Captain J. F. Laycock, to try and persuade Roberts to change his 
mind. Laycock pointed out to Roberts that Haig knew the country, 
Boer tactics, and the men of the Cavalry Division better than Errol. 
Roberts did not budge. 'On the third time of making my appeal', 
Laycock recalled, 'I was so seriously shut up that it was impossible 
to carry the matter further. ' When Laycock returned to the Division, 
Errol assumed his position, and Haig his. Laycock related how 
Haig, though 'very annoyed' was 'all the time maintaining a most 
correct attitude. '1 This attitude is revealed in a letter written 
to Henrietta from Cape Town: 
Everyone I meet down here consoles with me on being super- 
seded by Erroll tsicl etc. ... As a natter of fact I think less about this appointment than my friends. But of course 
it is gratifying to think that one's work is appreciated in 
the Division. 2 
The attitude was probabaly genuine. Haig felt at ease because the 
change was really only a formality? He remained in the role of 
French's trusted adviser, with Errol probably feeling like a spare 
1J. F. Laycock to the Countess Haig, 13 February 1930, Haig 
Papers, HIS. Acc. 3155, No. 334(e). 
2Haig to Henrietta, 4 February 1900. 
3The 
best evidence that Haig's role did not change can be found 
in the Cavalry Division Staff Diaries (Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, 
Nos. 34-36), in which Haig recorded each day's activities and the 
duties he performed. There is no noticeable change in either after 
Errol joined the staff. 
part. 
In his letter to the Countess Haig, Laycock described the 
quality which made Haig an exceptional staff officers 
The thing that struck me most was his extraordinary abi- 
lity to express in concise form, capable of being copied 
into a notebook on the field, impor. ant orders for the 
movement and disposition of troops. 
Laycock's opinion is supported by the four staff diaries which Haig 
compiled during the war. These cover the period from October 1899 
to October 1900, and contain concise accounts of each day's operations, 
supplemented by relevant maps, telegrams and orders. The staff 
diaries are distinct from Haig's personal diaries for the period, 
in which he recorded his own opinions. The staff diaries are mostly 
too technical for this study, consisting mainly of highly detailed 
data which, though central to the situation confronting Haig and 
French, *provide little retrospective insight. They nevertheless 
reveal Haig's remarkable administrative abilities. Few aspects 
of the command escaped his notice and mention. After the war the 
diaries were used by the Staff College as examples of excellent 
staff work. The Commandant of the College, H. G. Miles, upon 
receiving them, wrote that 'they will be of immense practical use 
for they are indeed an example to be worked up to. ' He further 
admitted that he had seen 'no records of the war which equalled 
them in completeness or in interest. '2 
Soon after Errol retiaced Haig, the British offensive began. 
While the first strike came later than Haig had anticipated and hoped, 
J. F. haycock to the Countess Haig, 13 March 1930. 
}i. G. Miles to Douglas Haig, 4 January 1903. Found in the 
'Cavalry Dividions Diary and Orders Vol. I' (8 November 1899 to 13 
March 1900), Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 34. Hereafter cited 
as 'Cavalry Division Diary'. 
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it was delivered with the boldness he desired. By containing the 
Boer force at Colesberg, the British were able to move northward 
virtually unimpeded as far as Modder River Station. Here Roberts 
concentrated 30,000 men of all arms. He aimed his first strike 
at the besieged town of Kimberley. Here, 50,000 inhabitants had 
been held captive since early October. One of the captives was 
Cecil Rhodes, whose De Beers group had valuable diamond mines and 
workshops in the area. Kimberley was surrounded by 4,000 Boers, 
led by General Piet Cronje. The British garrison was led by 
Colonel R. G. Kekewich, a capable officer. Kekewich and Rhodes 
had fallen out early in the siege, making real control of the 
town uncertain. Kekewich controlled the military, but Rhodes-- 
as the principle employer-had the citizenry in his pocket. As the 
siege dragged on, Rhodes became increasingly impatient and insuf- 
ferable. On 10 February he demanded that Kekewich inform him how 
and when the town would be relieved. He threatened to call a public 
meeting if his demands were not met. Kekewich perhaps correctly 
interpreted this as a threat of mutiny and possible surrender. He 
telegraphed his fears to Roberts, who instructed the Colonel to 
arrest Rhodes if necessary. Rhodes subsequently calmed down, 
and claimed that he had not considered surrender. The situation 
nevertheless remained critical. 
Rhodes' intransigence probably forced Roberts' hand. He had 
to act quickly in order to save Kimberley. This meant that a 
prolonged battle with Cronje was impracticable. Cronje expected 
a frontal attack or, failing that, an approach from the west. Roberts 
encouraged these expectations through ingenious deception carried 
out by his Intelligence Officer, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson. 
Roberts' real plan was revealed only to his closest advisors. He 
boldly intended to abandon his rail link, march east and then north 
through the Orange Free State, and then approach Cronje from the 
east-the enemy's left. The plan was risky, but Cronje was weakest 
here. If the British could complete the long march without disaster, 
the final assault promised to be relatively easy. Relief of the 
city would come quickly and without heavy losses. By attacking 
in this direction, Roberts also hoped to cut Cronje off from 
retreat into the Orange Free State or north into the Transvaal. 
Roberts made it clear that since speed was essential, the 
burden would weigh heaviest on the cavalry. As Haig recorded on 
10 February: 
11: 00 a. m.: Lord Kitchener arrived at Cavalry Camp to see 
French. He explained the difficulty of the situation, not 
merely in South Africa, but the risks to the Empire generally 
if Kimberley was not relieved. All hope of relieving Lady- 
smith directly had gonj. 'The Cavalry must relieve Kimberley 
at all costs', he said. 
Roberts pressed the point further when he personally addressed a 
meeting of cavalry officers later on the same day: 
... I want to tell you that I am going to give you some 
very hard work to do, but at the same time you are going 
to get the greatest chance Cavalry has ever had. I am 
certain you will do well. I have received news from Kim- 
berley from which I know that it is very important the town 
should be relieved in the course of the next five days, and 
you and your men are to do this. The enemy have placed a 
big gun in position and are shelling the town, killing women 
and children, in consequence of which the civilian popula- 
tion are urging Colonel Kekewich to capitulate. You will 
" remember what you are going to do all your lives, and when 
you have grown to be old men you will tell the story of 
the relief of Kimberley. ... The Enemy are afraid of the British Cavalry, and I hope when -you get 
them into the open 
you will make an example of them. 
With the cavalry in the van, the advance began the following day. 
1Cavalry Division Diary, 10 February 1900. 
2Quoted in Selby, The Boer War: A Study in Cowardice and Courage, 
p. 168. 
In the eastward movement, important victories were gained 
at Belmont 
and Graspan. A Boer force under De Wet threatened the British 
advance at De Kiel's Drift, but was no more than a nuisance. 
At De Kiel's Drift the advanced shifted northward and increased 
in speed. Horses collapsed from exhaustion. At each stop a large 
number of animals had to be destroyed. At 5: 00 P. M. on 14 February, 
French siezed Klip Drift, twenty miles from Kimberley. The hardest 
part of the task was complete. Cronje had been successfully out- 
manoeuvred. All that lay between French and Kimberley was a small 
Boer force. It was, however, in a defensive stronghold on two 
converging ridges just north of Klip Drift. The position had to 
be taken before the final advance could proceed. During the night 
the infantry caught up and freed the cavalry for the next day's 
assault. French intended to use three brigades of cavalry--led 
by Colonels Porter, Gordon and Broadwood--for the attack on the 
Boer position. 
The next morning the advance began. The last thing the Boers 
expected was for French to drive his men between the two ridges. 
But, in line with Roberts' habit of misleading the enemy, this is 
exactly what French did. Captain C. Boyle, a galloper on the 
cavalry staff, wrote a stirring description of the action for The 
Times: 
The moment was one I can never forget. There was a pause 
during which we all looked at each other. I watched the 
General, wondering what he would do. It would have been 
simple enough to manoeuvre and fight, had we nothing to do 
but fight the enemy in front of us. But we had to get to 
Kimberley that night or fail. Suddenly the General decided 
to make a dash ... He sent for the brigadiers, ordered three batteries up to play on the enemy, and the 16th and 9th 
Lancers to make a dash at once.. .. a terrific fire opened 
up on them and as they disappeared into the dust one wondered 
how they could have fared. As the dust cleared the General 
decided to ride for it himself ... We sat down and rode 
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all we knew, expecting the same fire on us. To our great 
surprise not a shot was fired. The moral effect of the 
cavalry charge across their front and the fear that we 
should work around their flank had been too much for the 
Boers and they had bolted. Still more remarkable was the 
little loss they had inflicted--a few dead horses and some 
wounded, was all I saw on the plain. The whole thi. g was 
a marvellous example of what a cavalry dash can do. 
French was now in position to attack the rear of Cronje's laager. 
But instead of wheeling to the west, he ordered Broadwood on to 
Kimberley. French and Haig followed at a safe distance, and were 
greeted by the mayor as they entered the town. They dined that night 
with Rhodes, and celebrated their success with 'plenty of champagne'? 
The relief of Kimberley was the high point of the war and cer- 
tainly the most impressive spectacle of Haig's career. It was the 
last great charge of British cavalry. It deserves greater acclaim 
than the heroics at Balaclava, because not only was it dramatic, it 
was also successful. Success was, in addition, achieved at low 
cost. Only seven men were killed. But the charge should not have 
succeeded. In 1900, a cavalry force, no matter how morally inspired, 
should not have been able to overrun a well-fortified position. It 
was not the charge, but rather thefour day march which preceded it, 
which saved Kimberley. Roberts found and manoeuvred to the Boer weak 
spot. 
3 French then pierced it. While French was undoubtedly sur- 
prised by the ease of the final assault, he would not have ordered 
it had he not been certain of success. French was not a rash glory- 
seeker like Colonel Martin. Unlike Martin, he had thoroughly scouted 
the obstacle. This is not to discount the spectacular nature of the 
1The Times, 6 April 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 22 February 1900. 
3The Boers had 900 men and two guns on the two ridges. Attacking 
them was a British force of 8,000 cavalry, 6,000 mounted infantry and 
56 guns. See Spiers, 'The British Cavalry, 1902-1914', pp. 74-75. 
attack, nor the bravery of those involved. But it must be emphasised 
that the relief of Kimberley was more a testimony to wise prepara- 
tion than to moral inspiration. 
These distinctions and qualifications escaped the men involved. 
To them, the charge was all that mattered. Roberts had told them 
that they would remember what they were going to do all their lives. 
He could not have been more correct. As old men, they continued 
to tell the story of the relief of Kimberley. Every year on the 
15th of February, until long after the Great War, these men gathered 
in London to recall their day of glory. It had been, as Roberts 
predicted, 'the greatest chance cavalry hai ever had, because it had 
been so certain of glory and, in the end, so free of danger. The 
effect upon Haig was predictable. His self-assurance and confidence 
in the cavalry swelled to yet greater proportions. To Lonsdale Hale, 
he wrote: 
You will I think agree with me that the Cavalry-the 
despised Cavalry I should say--has saved the Empire. 1 
He urged Hale to make this point clear to those at home: 
I trust to you to insist on a large and efficient Cavalry 
being kept up in time of peace. At least two Divisions 
complete ... 
You must rub this fact into those wretched individuals 
who pretend to rule the Empire! And in any case before they 
decide on reorganising the Army let them get the experience 
of those who have seen the effect of modern firearms and 
have learnt to realise that the old story is true, viz. that 
'moral' is everything, and not merely guns but men who can 
use them is what is wanted to defend the Empire. 2 
The post-Boer War cavalry reaction led by French and Haig which, 
as will be discussed in the next three chapters, blurred modern 
1Douglas Haig to Colonel Lonsdale Hale, 2 March 1900, Haig Papers, 
NIS, Ace. 3155, No. 334(e). Hale was a sometime lecturer at the Staff 
College and an active. supporter of the cavalry. 
2Ibid. 
developments in military science, was born at Kimberley. 
The relief of Kimberley isolated Cronje. His only escape 
route lay between Roberts' advance troops at Klip Drift and French's 
cavalry in Kimberley. Lord Methuen had been ordered to stay at 
Modder River Station to guard against such an eventuality. Through 
lack of initiative, however, he let Cronje escape. This forced 
Roberts to again call upon the cavalry to save the situation. French 
scraped together a brigade from among his beleagured force. He raced 
these men to Koedoesrand Drift, which lay directly in Cronje's path. 
This slowed the Boer retreat long enough for the infantry and artil- 
lery to arrive. The result was the Battle of Paardeburg, in which 
Cronje and his 4,000 men were forced to surrender to a superior 
British force. The ending was impressive, but the manner in which 
it was achieved was not. Just before the final assault on the 19th, 
Roberts took ill. He handed control to Kitchener, to the conster- 
nation of divisional commanders senior to him in rank. The battle 
was marred by Kitchener's usual indecision and the jealous, childish 
behaviour of Generals Colville and Kelly-Kenney, who refused to 
pull their weight. 
Haig reflected on the shameful performance at Paardeburg in his 
letter to Hale. He rightly claimed that Cronje would have escaped 
had it not been for the cavalry. During the actual battle, the 
arm again made a significant contribution: 
... we were called upon to send 'a Brigade' to support 
the infantry on the left flank!! But we scarcely had a Brigade to send! However we sent all we could and Broad- 
wood's account of how Kitchener welcomed him as a deliverer is instructive. He (K) likened our infantry to the Egyptian 
fellaheen, ready to allow themselves to be killed without an 
effort, ignorant and unthinking. 1 
'Haig to Hale, 2 March 1900. 
Kitchener was referring to the enlisted men and N. C. O. s. Haig took 
the criticism further. 'Personally I think there is something far 
wrong with our infantry from the Generals downward. ' He did not 
exclude the Commander-in-Chief. He railed at the 'state of muddle 
and confusion existing at Roberts' headquarters'. Roberts' staff 
was composed of 'old Simla warriors, grey with the experience of 
years of office work' along with a collection of 'lordlings and 
social lights'. There was also 'Kitchener's youths from Egypt'-- 
officers with whom the Sirdar had perhaps more than a strictly pro- 
fessional relationship. 'I was at Head Quarters 7 days', wrote 
Haig, 'and If I described all that I saw going on, you would say 
I was a "croker"'1 
Haig was more specific in his criticism of Roberts after the 
Battle of Bloemfontein: 
The Field Marshall has fairly made a mess of things 
since we reached Bloemfontein. Instead of organising 
his Army into three or four parts he tries to command 
every little detachment and to command each little part 
himself by telegram! ... Roberts is now at Brandfort 
but Lady R is here and as far as I can gather runs the 
show-12 
'Haig to Hale, 2 March 1900. It has already been shown how 
Haig openly criticised his senior commanders in letters to Wood writ- 
ten fgoft the SudM. He continued this habit in the Boer War. Some 
of his criticisms, either directly or indirectly, reached the Prince 
of Wales. The Prince felt that Haig should have been a bit more 
discreet. Duff Cooper (p. 88-89) deals with this issue and quotes 
a letter Haig wrote to b. friend (probably either Wood or Hal: 
'Curiously enough Henrietta writes me ... of advice which the Prince of Wales was good enough to give to Willie Jameson for my 
benefit. The same advice was administered to me by Holford after 
the Soudan Campaign--namely, that I am too fond of criticising my 
senior officers. My, "criticisms" says H. R. H. "may be correct, but it does not do. "Now I never criticise people except privately, and 
what a stupid letter it would be if I did not express an opinion. Besides, I think we would have better Generals in the higher ranks 
and the country would not have had to pass through such a period of 
anxiety had not honest criticism, based on sound reasoning, been more 
general in reference to military affairs during the last twenty years. ' 
2Douglas Haig to Hugo Haig, 5 May 1900, Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 334(e). 
The criticisms were similar to those levelled at Kitchener during 
the Sudan Campaign. Both Kitchener and Roberts were slow to acknow- 
ledge the necessity for a modern administrative staff. For both 
the staff was a useful haven for their cronies. Both tried to main- 
tain direct control over every aspect of their commands. In the 
Boer War, the armies were still small enough for a commander of 
Roberts' ability to be successful without the aid of a staff. Haig's 
criticisms, though correct in theory, were not entirely fair. When 
Roberts took over, the character of the British war effort changed 
almost overnight. Despite his antequated attitude toward the staff, 
he must be given credit for placing his army on a victory footing. 
Haig's criticism of Roberts was probably fuelled to some extent 
by continued ill-feeling over the Errol affair. The matter was re- 
solved in Haig's favour after the Battle of Paardeburg, but not 
before another confusing round of promotions and appointments. On 
22 February, Haig wrote that he had been given command of the 3rd 
Cavalry Brigade, with the local rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He 
confided to his sister that 'it is a great piece of good luck 
being given command of this Brigade, for of course we have any 
number of old fossils about-full Colonels etc. ' Two paragraphs 
later, in the same letter, he informed Henrietta that 'since writing 
above I have been appointed Chief Staff Officer of the Division 
(that is A. A. G. ) Ld. Errol being moved to Roberts' staff .. . 11 
According to Laycock, the change resulted from a conversation he 
had with Kitchener. Laycock told Kitchener that as C. S. O. Errol 
was potentially dangerous and 'definitely harmful,. 2 Kitchener 
acted immediately. Haig was reinstated in his old position, one 
1Haig to Henrietta, 22 February 1900. 
2J. F. Laycock to the Countess Haig, 13 March 1930. 
which he felt 'will suit me very well'. Nevertheless, the whole 
affair must have left him with a bitter taste. 
After Kimberley and Paardeburg, Buller finally relieved Lady- 
smith on 28 February. The British momentum was virtually impos- 
sible for the Boers to counter. Roberts next aimed for Bloemfontein, 
the capital of the Orange Free State. President Kruger of the 
Transvaal, aware that his country would be Roberts' next objective, 
urged President Steyn to make a determined resistance at Bloemfon- 
tein. Steyn agreed. The defence was organised at Poplar Grove, 
twenty-five miles south of the city. Here, a twenty-five mile 
string of kopjes--a remarkable defensive advantage--lay perpendicular 
to Roberts' line of advance. But Poplar Grove fell almost as easily 
as Klip Drift. The battle assumed a familiar form: the infantry 
were poised for a frontal attack while the cavalry slipped around 
to the flank and rear. On this occasion, the infantry had little 
to do: 
... Wednesday, 7th March we marched at 3 a. m. and moved 
around the left, or Southern flank, of the Boer position 
which they had been strengthening with entrenchments for 
some days. We got completely around the enemy and quite 
surprised them. The Boers left their trenches and some took 
up new positions to try and check our advance, we lost fairly heavily in turning some Boers out of a farm and off a ridge; but nothing of course compared to what infantry would have 
suffered had they triad to dislodge the Boers by an attack 
on the position .. 
The Boers fled from Poplar Grove in disarray. They rallied again 
at Abrahm's Kraal, but then panicked when the cavalry showed a 
bold front. Their courage could not be restored for the defence 
of the capital. Bloemfontein fell, anticlimactically, on 13 March. 
Roberts rested his troops for seven weeks in Bloemfontein, 
1Haig to Henrietta, 22 February 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 16 March 190b. 
probably to his own disadvantage. It was here that the infämous 
epidemic of enteric fever raged out of control. Nearly 15,000 of 
the 200,000 British soldiers in South Arica contracted the 
disease. Haig avoided it, probably because of the immunity he 
developed in India. The seven weeks in Bloemfontein was nevertheless 
a time of great frustration and anxiety for him. The cavalry had 
done the majority of the fighting for the past month. They were as 
a result a dilapidated remnant of the force which left Cape Town. 
Haig repeatedly complained of the situation in letters to his 
sister: 
So you see we are continually on the move and our horses 
are quite done up. Whenever there is an alarm, Lord 
Roberts at once orders out French and the Cavalry. I 
don't know what we will do for horses. 
Not only was the supply of horses inadequate, so too was the supply 
of men: 
The Colonial Corps raised in the Cape Colony are quite 
useless, so are the recently raised Mounted Infantry. 
They can't ride and know nothing about their duties as 
mounted men. Roberts' Horse and Kitchener's Horse are 
good only for looting and the greater part of them dis- 
appear the moment a shot is fired or there is a prospect 
of a fight. You will then see that the success of the 
Cavalry Division has been in spite of these ruffians, 
and notwithstanding short rations. 2 
These complaints were not entirely fair. They are a reflection of 
Haig's often irrational prejudice against the mounted infantry and 
irregular troops. These men were not, in all cases, 'ruffians'. 
They had unfortunately been plunged into a situation for which 
they were ill-prepared. Blame for this lack of preparation belonged 
to those in higher quarters, as Haig sometimes acknowledged. 
Haig was also angered by Roberts' 'sideshows' around Bloemfontein. 
1Haig to Henrietta, 7 April 1900. 
2Haig 
to Henrietta, 16 March 1900. 
These, he felt, did not aid the eventual advance on Pretoria, but 
instead wasted valuable men and material. On one sideshow, a cavalry 
brigade was sent to Thaba N'Chu to try and stop a Boer force of 6,000 
men moving north to the Transvaal: 
On hearing of our approach, however, they altered the 
direction of their march and took a road further to the 
east and close to Basuto-land--passing iy Ladybrand. We 
did not start soon enough to stop them. 
In a subsequent letter, Haig again questioned Roberts' motives: 
You will remember I told you of our going to Thaba N'Chu, 
and we thought it a mistake to engage in a secondary 
operation in that direction instead of making good our 
communications and prgssing the Enemy at a decisive point 
--that is northwards. 
On this occasion the criticism was justified. The action gained 
nothing and ended in disaster. Broadwood's brigade, while returning 
to Bloemfontein, fell into a trap at Sannah's Post. The trap had 
been set. for a smaller British force also in the area, but De Wet, 
the Boer commander, took full advantage of his extraordinary luck. 
Broadwood eventually retreated in order, but only after one-third 
of his 1600 men were forced to surrender. He also lost seven guns 
and eighty-three loaded wagons. When Broadwood returned, Haig 
showed his bitterness by sarcastically remarking that 'he has got 
off very cheaply. One almost thinks Lord Roberts likes losing 
guns, judging by the way he received B. on his return. '3 
Haig also disagreed with Roberts' treatment of Free Staters 
loyal to the Boer cause. The situation wherein a man could be a 
peaceful farmer one day and a commando the next made Haig uneasy. 
He reacted by advocating more repressive measures: 
1Haig to Henrietta, 22 March 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 7 April 1900. 
3Haig 
to Henrietta, 14 April 1900. 
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It seems high time we treated these people with greater 
severity. Up to the present we have made the war too 
pleasant for the Free Staters, and so they allow it to 
continue. If we were only to loot and burn a few farms, 
the inhabitants would wish to gyt us out of the country 
soon and at once sue for peace. 
On Roberts' leniency he commented: 
At Thabanchu many poor creatures brought in their guns 
and swore an oath not to fight against us again. Then 
we withdraw our troops and the Transvaalers burn all the 
farms. 
Such conduct merely brings us into contempt, altho' Roberts 
no doubt expected to gain popularity with the Britisý Pub- 
lic by being generous and merciful to the conquered. 
When guerilla warfare arose after the fall of Pretoria, Haig had 
his chance to be severe. At this stage, however, leniency was 
probably the best policy. Severity probably would have made the 
Boers more determined. Haig's advocacy of sterner measures betrays 
his ignorance of subtleties of this nature. 
The 300 mile advance to Pretoria began on 22 April. The 
British fielded an impressive force. 100,000 men, divided into 
five groups, advanced northwards, while another 50,000 guarded 
the rear. Roberts took the central column of 38,000 men which 
followed the railway. Hamilton, with the mounted infantry, 
advanced on the right, while Methuen, with a force of all arms, 
moved on the left. Buller, as usual slowed by over-caution, advanced 
at a snail's pace through Natal. French, with the cavalry, was at 
his accustomed place in the van. The advance was uneventful and . 
largely unimpeded. By 4 June, the British were on the outskirts of 
Pretoria, ready for a prolonged siege. General Botha, in charge of 
the garrison, decided that the city was impossible to defend. He 
collected his men and arms and escaped to the east. Roberts raised 
'Haig to Henrietta, 14 May 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 7 April 1900. 
the Union Jack above Pretoria on 5 June. 
The cavalry led the way over the entire march to Pretoria. 
As a result, they did most of the fighting. Haig commented on 
this fact in a letter to Henrietta: 
I hear from several sources that the Infantry are quite 
jealous of the successes of the Cavalry. The poor crea- 
tures merely carry their guns without loosing off! In 
fact they simply wear out their boots to no purpose!! 
All the same but for the Cavalry ... many of them 
would now be below ground. .. 
The success of the cavalry gave rise to jealousy on Haig's part 
also: 
You will see in the Diary how the Iandvost of Kroon- 
stad came out to surrender the town to French, but we 
packed him off into the town again to wait for the Field 
Marshall! The latter meantime having helio'd that no 
patrols were to enter the town. We came on here with the 
Cavalry and Roberts marched in at the head of the Infantry! 
I am afraid he is a silly old man and scarcely fit to be 
C. in C. of this show. 2 
As commander of the British force, Roberts had every right to 
enter the town as he pleased. 
3 His direction of the campaign 
had been mostly brilliant. True, the cavalry had borne the brunt 
of the fighting. But its success had had a blinding effect upon 
Haig. What he failed to appreciate was that the cavalry was like 
a bullet, while the rest of the British Army was the gun. The 
bullet would have been impotent without the gun to fire it. 
In his pre-war study, Haig predicted that the capture of 
Pretoria would spell defeat for the Boors. He did not immediately 
change this view when he arrived in the towns 
1Haig to Henrietta, 14 May 1900. 
2Ibid. 
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I fancy that if Buller would only come on, and if an able 
man was sent to sweep up the N. E. corner of the Free State 
this war would soon be finished. 1 
Eventually, Buller moved north and the cavalry advanced northeast, 
seizing Machadosdorp. But the war continued. Uncertainty crept 
into Haig's letters, though he generally remained optimistic 
about an early conclusion: 
It is impossible to say whether the Boers will continue 
fighting ... Spring is now coming on and the sun gets 
warner daily so-, that =the bushh"veldt and lower valleys 
will soon be unbearable and unhealthy. So I expect a 
good many will try to get back to their farms. I am 
therefore inclined to believe a report that the war will 
be practically over bXX the time you get this letter 
(beginning of Sept. ). 
In a sense, the war was over when Haig expected. Botha retreated 
north into the mountains. Other Boer commands fractured into small 
groups and scattered. On 13 September Roberts issued a proclamation 
declaring hostilities ended. He and Buller made preparations to go 
home. But a new war soon started, one for which the British were 
as unprepared as they had been a year earlier. 
In a letter to his brother Hugo dated 2 August, Haig explained 
why his prediction of an early end to the conflict had not come 
true: 
I thought at one time that everything would have been 
settled here to enable me to be back in time to join you 
all at the Cabrach. 
For several reasons my forecasts have not turned out correctl 
The chief one is becauRe Lord Roberts thinks he can make war 
without running risksi 
He did not mention what the other reasons were. In his view, the 
IHaig to Henrietta, 17 June 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 15 August 1900. 
3Douglas Haig to Hugo Haig, 2 August 1900, Haig Papers, NLS, 
Acc. 3155, No. 6(c). 
war--as he had maintained all along--had to be made unbearable for 
the Boer farmer. Though the continued fighting came as a surprise 
to him, he was quick to perceive the need for new tactics: 
What is wanted now is to form detachments all about the 
country so that movable columns can sweep the country 
without having to take waggons with them. One column 
by-itself does no good: the Boers merely move out of 
the road until it has passed, sending out a few snipers 
to worry its flanks and rear. 
.. I think that the Cavalry Division must 
be broken 
up as a Division, and the regiments spread out with vari- 
ous columns and posts. There is now no enemy in formed 
bodies to be dealt with but merely a lot of bands of 
marauders numbering 30 to 200 men each. But as yet we 
know nothing of what Roberts' scheme may be: 
i 
These policies were soon adopted but they, too, proved unequal to 
the Boer menace. 
The possibility of an end to the war caused Henrietta to 
focus her attention on her brother's post-war career. She was 
mainly concerned with two subjects: decorations and promotion. 
Though the fighting would drag on for another nineteen months, she 
continually returned to these two topics in her letters to Douglas. 
The matter of decorations she discussed at length with Evelyn Wood. 
Henrietta felt that her brother deserved any of a number of different 
medals. Wood apparently agreed. Haig, however, maintained that the 
matter did not concern him, and he would rather it did not concern 
her. 'I hate to think of these self-advertising people like B. P. 
and family'. Furthermore, he wrote, 
As to Sir E. W. 's questions, it is interesting to note 
that there is not a single officer on this staff from 
French down who has a single decoration! As I have often 
said, decorations and small wars ruined the French Army 
before 1870: the same causes have done much to render our 
1Haig to Henrietta, 19 October 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 9 July 1900. 'D. P. ' is Baden Powell. 
own inefficient. So really I am not at all anxious for 
rewards which after all mean very little. 
1 
Haig maintained a similar attitude throughout his career. He often 
insisted that he was not interested in rewards or decorations--so 
often, in fact, that one wonders whether the opposite was actually 
the case. His true opinion will never be known. The interpretation 
depends on the judge. Nevertheless, it is possible that Haig was 
so certain of his ultimate success that he really cared little 
for the meaningless decorations he collected on the way to the top. 
Decorations are symbols of past achievements. With regard to his 
own career, Haig continually looked forward. 
Henrietta likewise discussed her brother's promotion with Wood. 
Her meddling in this area interested Haig a great deal more. His 
letters reveal that he spent much time deliberating his future. 
For instance, on 9 July he wrote that 
French wants to get me made an A. D. C. because that at once 
gives one the rank of a full Colonel. 
As to commanding a regiment, of course if it is necessary 
I'll do it, but there is no catch in going to command some 
regt. which has to be wheeled into line a bit .. .2 
He returned to the matter a month later: 
By the way French had a letter from Evelyn Wood this morning 
about me, stating briefly that the Cavalry had not done well 
in this campaign except when under French, and suggesting 
that the cause was a deficiency in Cavalry leaders. So in 
his opinion it was to the interests of the service to put 
me soon in command of a regiment, and he directs him to 
take what action he (French) thinks fit in the matter. 
French is replying that I had once been appointed to a 
Brigade, and that I might now be in command of one were 
it not to the interests of the service that I should remain 
in my present billet. My present appointment of Chief Staff 
Officer of a Cavalry Division of 4 Cavalry Brigades is 
superior to any regt. appointment. 3 
1Haig to Henrietta, 9 July 1900. 
2Ibid. He was referring to being A. D. C. to the Queen. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 7 August 1900. 
4 
Haig ended this letter by claiming that 'I don't care much what 
happens to me'. 
1 This appears to have been false modesty. Promotion 
-unlike decoration--meant both power and prestige. The latter 
may not have interested him. The former definitely did. 
In November 1900 the Cavalry Division was broken up, as Haig 
had advised. French was given command of a force of all arms 
which was to guard a district centred on Johannesburg. Haig 
remained his Chief of Staff. He was pleased with the new assign- 
ment: 'I suppose Johannesburg is quite the best part of the country 
to stay in, so we can't complain. '2 The work was neither difficult 
nor time-consuming. `The District is subdivided into smaller com- 
mands so that there won't be a great deal of active work to be done 
by General F. and his staff. '3 French and Haig had simply to watch 
for disturbances and, when they occurred, apply the relevant degree 
of force. This was hardly war, as evidenced by Haig's living arrange- 
ments: 
This is a grand house on the top of a hill overlooking 
Johsburg, two bath rooms with hot and cold water, so 
that we are living in luxury now. I play polo 3 days 
a week. 
4 
The life was so easy that Haig urged his sister to come and visit 
him. He promised that he could entertain her in the style to which 
she was accustomed. He even postulated that the war would be over 
by the time she arrived. 'At present all is at a standstill waiting 
for Lord Roberts' daughter to get well and his departurell', he 
explained. 'Lord Kitchener will then take up the command and no 
'Haig to Henrietta, 7 August 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 31 October 1900. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 14 November 1900. 
4Haig 
to Henrietta, 30 November 1900. 
doubt will quiet the country very soon. '1 
The comfortable existence did not last long. It soon became 
obvious to the military command that greater severity was required 
to tame the Boers. In December, De Wet threatened to invade 
Cape Colony. Haig and French were sent to Bloemfontein as part 
of a plan to surround the elusive Boer leader. Haig remained 
optimistic. He doubted that De Wet could accomplish much in 
Cape Colony: 
Last year when the situation there was much more favour- 
able for a ring the Dutch kept quiet. Why then should 
they rise now. 
He did not understand that the Cape Colony Dutch were tired of the 
war and as a result were becoming increasingly anti-British. For 
this reason raids like those by De Wet had a greater effect than 
they had had previously. Despite his general optimism, a degree of 
uncertainty was revealed in his letters during this period: 
We have pretty well cleared this district of inhabitants 
and carried off most of the supplies, but there are still 
in parts mealies and forage hidden. So the idea is ridi- 
culous to think the Boers can be starved into submission 
when they have such a vast area from which they can draw 
supplies .. .3 
De Wet was headed off, but not captured. The war became increasingly 
ugly. Haig finally admitted that it was likely to last a long 
while. He told Henrietta to cancel her trip. 'I am afraid this 
country is so disturbed that I shall have ... to ask you to delay. '4 
Despite the setbacks, Haig remained confident of an eventually 
favourable outcome. He continually mocked soldiers and politicians 
1Haig to Henrietta, 14 November 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 7 December 1900. 
31bid. 
4Haig 
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who were overcome by the 'funks'. One so afflicted was Kitchener: 
French was at Pretoria yesterday and from what he tells 
me I gather that Kitchener is not in the best of spirits 
about the outlook. In fact from what I have seen myself, 
he (K) occasionally gets alarmed without real cause and 
hurries troops to this or that point without sufficiently 
considering, what the effect must be of denuding certain 
places of troops. So one is forced to conclude that the 
Sirdar is not the large minded man capable of taking a 
broad view of thr whole situation whigh the papers would 
have us believe. 
To emphasise the difference between himself and Kitchener, Haig 
ended the letter with reference to his own high degree of composure. 
There had been setbacks. Things were not moving as quickly as 
he had hoped they would. But the ending was no less certain. 
'Every day shows a little progress and brings us nearer the end. '2 
This steadfast belief in the inexorable progress towards a favour- 
able conclusion was the source of Haig's strength and composure 
during every campaign in which he fought. 
Some of this confidence undoubtedly resulted from Haig's high 
degree of self-assurance. He had done well in the war. As the 
campaign progressed, his fortunes continually improved. For instance, 
in January 1901 he was given a column of his own and sent to Cape 
Colony, where Boer raids had escalated. He commanded a force of all 
arms numbering 2,000 men. He described his duties in a letter to 
Henrietta: 
If you will look at the map you will see the great area 
over which troops under my control are operating. The 
question of feeding, and keeping in communication with, the several parts of the column is at times difficult, 
while at the same time I have to assist in the adminis- tration of the districts thro' which I passed-all the 
magistrates nearly are disloyal and of the population: indeed I may say all farmers are dutch. 3 
1Haig to Henrietta, 18 December 1900. 
2Ibid. 
3Haig 
to Henrietta, 20 January 1901. 
Haig welcomed the high level of activity. 'We are having a"tremen- 
dous hunt after these wretches', he wrote. 'I enjoy myself very 
well. ' He especially enjoyed his independence. The command was 
'much more interesting than a Cavalry Brigade because ... I can 
get no orders from anyone but merely move as I think best in pur- 
suit of the Enemy. '1 
Much of Haig's time was spent chasing Commandant Kritzinger, 
a particularly wily raider. Haig claimed that he nearly caught 
him 'once or twice' but failed when 'somehow everyone did not do 
exactly as required to ensure success'. 
2 He did not elaborate. 
In March, Kitchener decided that Kritzinger was too big a problem 
for Haig's relatively small force to handle. He consequently put 
French on the chase with a larger force. Haig meanwhile was trans- 
ferred to the Orange River Colony (previously Orange Free State) 
where he commanded a column of 2,700 men from a base at Thaba N'Chu. 
He had moderate success against raiders there. One month later, 
however, he was back in Cape Colony, on Kritzinger's trail again. 
Kitchener had lost his patience. The rapid shifting back and 
forth of troops is a measure of his frustration. This time, he 
instructed Haig to use even greater severity: 
... I got an urgent order on the 7th of April ... to go to Cape Colony at once to take command of certain 
columns. ... I got a telegram on arrival here (Nauuwpoorq from Lord K telling me to 'Take command of all columns 
operating in the Midland area of Cape Colony. Act vigorously 
with the objet of clearing Cape Colony of the enemy as soon 
as possible. ' 
In the early months of 1901, the Middleburg peace initiatives between 
'Haig to Henrietta, 20 January 1901. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 12 February 1901. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 11 April 1901. 
Kitchener and Botha caused the former to stay his hand somewhat. 
Botha's rejection of the British offer on 16 March, and the 
anxiety caused by Kritzinger and others, brought about a change of 
policy. 'Act vigorously' was a euphemism for farm burnings, con- 
centration camps, blockhouse lines and executions. 
These measures had been used since January, but were applied 
with even greater frequency and intensity after April. This was 
especially true in Cape Colony, where Boer raids caused the 
greatest danger; 
It is fully more difficult hunting Boers in this colony 
where all farmers are secretly their friends, and the 
Govt. almost seems to assist the invader, than in the 
Free Statt or Transvaal where one can trust everyone as 
an enemy. 
Haig had advocated more severe measures throughout the war. Now 
that the command agreed with him, he welcomed the change of policy 
and devoted himself to its ardent execution. He was honoured 
to be given such responsibility: 'It is very satisfactory to be 
again chosen for this job when things have got into a mess. '2 The 
moral questions did not seem to bother him. Always a professional, 
he was interested solely in performing his duties with the maximum 
vigour: 
I like the change of work down here to what I had in the 
Orange River Colony--there we merely cleared farms and made 
raids on them at night. But here the situation is different, 
some people say it is the most serious operation of the war, 
and causes a certain amount of anxiety. 3 
Neither the concentration camps, nor the suffering of women and 
children in them, were given much mention in his diaries or letters. 




to Henrietta, 19 April 1901. 
Despite the change of policy, Haig still believed even greater 
severity was required. He felt that, in some cases, his hands 
were unjustifiably tied. On 8 July, for instance, he wrote that 
I am afraid the authorities won't be able to hang the 
rebels we got here over a month ago: tho' I think they 
ought to be hung as two of our men died of wounds. 
There is too much 'law'and not enough rough and ready 
justice in this land. r 
He welcomed the change which came two months later: 
The authorities are all for blood now I hear! This will 
have a good effect. There were three men shot at Coles- 
berg when I was there. I did not care to go and see the 
spectacle but all the local dutch magnates had to attend 
and a roll was called to see that they were present. I 
am told the sight was most impressive and everything went 
off well. 2 
In the Great War, Haig refused to visit casualty clearing stations 
because he feared they would damage his resolve? When war became 
too ugly, he saw fit to isolate himself from its ugliness. Such 
action was not, he believed, reprehensible. Necessity demanded it. 
One method which Kitchener used to control raiders was his 
system of blockhouse lines. In early 1901, he bggan to crisscross 
the country with barbed wire. The wire was reinforced at regular 
intervals by blockhouses manned with small numbers of troops. As 
the year progressed, the amount of wire and the frequency of the 
blockhouses increased. Haig was very proud of the line which he 
supervised: 
Our blockhouse line seems a more complicated obstacle 
to cross than those in the Transvaal as we start with 
an obstacle between the houses of a dozen or more strands 
of barbed wire and then keep the garrisons of the block- 
1Haig to Henrietta, 8 July 1901. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 7 September 1901. 
3See Haig Papers, Acc. 3155, No. 347/43 (file of miscellaneous letters and articles) for extensive discussion of this issue. 
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houses busy every day strengthening it with ditches 
and spring guns etc. 
The blockhouse system was the least effective of Kitchener's methods 
for controlling raids. De Wet felt it was more aptly called the 
'blockhead system'--after the man who devised it. It was not an 
obstacle to the determined raider. 
The English have been constantly boasting in their 
newspapers about the advantages of their blockhouses, 
but they have never been able to give an instance of 
a capture effected by them. 
2 
De Wet concluded by remarking that 'the English seemed to think that 
a Boer might be netted like a fish. '3 
Haig did not question the effectiveness of the blockhouse 
system, nor of any other measure. All contributed to the eventual 
success of the operation. 'Every day the situation here improves; 
he again wrote on 25 August 1901. While Kitchener was accused of 
barbarity by the British public, Haig, in contrast, felt he was 
too lax. 'His periodical fits of funk's disturbed the orderly and 
efficient execution of policy. In addition, Haig alleged that 'Lord 
K seems to meddle rather and does not give French quite, a-, free hand'6 
As to the overall effect of thetarsh measures on the Colony, Haig 
believed it was positive: 
the more Cape Colony farmers who get ruined the bet- 
ter it will be for the country. The Dutch own the best farms, 
and the English farmers are beneath contempt! So both ought 
1Haig to Henrietta, 26 April 1902. 
2Christian De Wet, Three Years War, (London: Archibald Constable 
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to be cleared out; and so I feel sure that S. Africa 
is deriving good from the continuance of this war. 
1 
The inferior character of the Dutch and English Afrikaner was a 
constant theme: 
The dutch are so terribly indolent, that it is not to be 
wondered at that the country is so backward. The average 
English colonists too seems to have been (in the past) 
inferior to the Dutchman! Hence the secondary position 
which our colonists were content to occupy in the pre- 
sence of the Dutch element. 
The war would solve the problem. Farm burnings and the forced 
movement of people would result in the undesirable elements being 
cleared away. New English settlers could then rush in to exploit 
the country's vast potential. Haig even advised his sister to 
invest some of her 'millions' in the 'new' South Africa. 
In addition to his other duties, Haig reorganised the Cape 
Colony Intelligence Department in May 1901. The appointment was in 
recognition of his earlier success in this field. When he first 
was given a column in January, he became immediately aware of 
British inadequacies in Intelligence work. He improvised a system 
which had impressive results: 
There being no system of Intelligence as yet organised 
under my command, I at once engaged several farmers and 
local men assisted by natives to act as scouts and spies, 
and I appointed Lt. Struben of the Middleburg Mounted 
Rifles to supervise and enlarge this intelligence service. 
These intelligence agents were sent out in various dis- 
guises, such as horse dealers, ostrich egg buyers, men in 
search of work, etc., towards the West, Southwest and South, 
so as to get ahead of the enemy, and report back by tele-. 
graph whey the Boers had appeared and where they were 
expected. 
'Haig to Henrietta, 14 September 1901. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 26 October 1901. 
3Douglas Haig, contact copy of 'Report on Operations: January 
to March 1901', entry for 2 January. Haig Papers, NIS, Ace. 3155, 
No. 38(g). The emphasis upon enemy intentions is notably' different 
than during the Great War, when morale factors were the focus. See 
epilogue, pp. 370-371. 
Throughout his career, Haig was keenly interested in Intelligence 
work. This was part of his determination to perform his duties in 
as complete a manner as possible. While the ruthlessness which 
he sometimes applied to his tasks can be questioned, his devotion 
to and enthusiasm for his work cannot. 
This enthusiasm and devotion was noticed by his superiors. 
Both Kitchener and French frequently complimented Haig on his 
efficiency. Both looked to him whenever a difficult problem 
arose. Kitchener's praise is especially significant because it 
was seldom openly conveyed to anyone. On 8 February 1901, he 
sent Haig the following telegram: 
You seem to be getting at them well ... a little more 
and they will be done... .. Tell all troops under your 
coiAmand I am very pleased with their exerlions. and hope 
they will soon finish with these raiders. 
Early in the war, French wrote a particularly ebullient letter 
to Hugo Haig: 
I cannot tell you what a comfort and assistance Douglas 
has been to me here and throughout the whole campaign. 
He is a perfect Staff Officer--and my great hope is that 
I may live to see him rise to the highest position in the 
service. The further and higher he rises the better for 
the country and its Army. 2 
Because of his fine record in South Africa, French was given command 
of the Ist Army Corps, Aldershot, after the war. Yet it must be 
emphasised that his success, and therefore his promotion, was in 
large part due to Haig. 
3 
1Kitchener to Haig, telegram, 8 February 1901, Haig Papers, NLS, 
Ace. 3155, No. 6(c). 
2French to Hugo Haig, 20 April 1900, Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, 
No. 334(e). The irony of the letter in relation to 1914 and 1915 is 
striking. See epilogue, p. 360. 
3The 
extent to which French relied upon Haig is evident in the 
former's Boer War diaries, included in the French manuscripts at the 
Henrietta did not feel that French had sufficiently demonstrated 
his gratitude to her brother. She continued to discuss this matter 
with Wood, and conveyed her annoyance to Douglas. He replied: 
. don't think for a moment that French has not done his 
best for me. He is only too anxious to help me on, but I 
think, in remaining as his Chief Staff Officer, I did the 
best for the Cavalry Division, for him and for myself. One 
did not foresee this war lasting so long, otherwise I might 
have taken some skallywag corps or others So don't make 
a fuss about my being now in the same position I started 
in. Recollect also many have gone lower downsl 
Haig's pleas did not alter Henrietta's conviction. She felt he 
had been wronged and was determined to do something about it. 
She continued to pressure him, which caused him to respond as follows: 
By the way the General mentioned to me that you had written 
to him some time ago and apparently conveyed the impression 
given you by Old Evelyn that he (General F) had not done 
all he could and might have done to push me on. Now as 
I have told you often, the General wrote to Evelyn several 
times about me, and to others recommending me for all sorts 
of things, so you are quite under a misapprehension and if 
anyone is to blame because I have not been made Commander- 
in-Chief, K. G. K. T. etc. etc. you must blame the late lady 
killer of Pall Mall and not poor French 12 
Henrietta may have had some grounds for complaint. French did, 
in a letter to Haig on the subject of rewards, write 'I feel they 
have treated you very badly' and 'they won't get men to stand this 
treatment, and they will have then to put up with an inferior 
Imperial War Museum. Though these provide little quotable material 
-largely due to French's appallingly illegible handwriting--they 
are useful evidence of the Haig-French partnership. 
1Haig to Henrietta, 14 December 1900. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 26 November 1901. The 'lady killer' was 
apparently Buller, who, after returning from South Africa, was forced to resign from the Army due to a still obscure scandal. On 26 October 1901, Haig wrote to Henrietta, 'How is your old lady killer 
getting on now that he has left Pall Mall? I am very sorry for the 
old man because he has really done a lot of good work in his time 
... I only hope that if I reach the ago of decrepitude that I'll 
have the sense to go and grow cabbages, or do anything else but clog the military machine with antequated fads of a past generation. ' 
kind. ' He added that he had repeatedly argued Haig's case 'kith 
assorted individuals, including 'Evelyn Wood, Ian Hamilton, and 
even Bobs himself'. 
1 But no evidence has been found to support 
this contention. The papers, -of Hamilton, Roberts and Kitchener 
contain many letters from French, none of which address this topic. 
When a vacancy in the command of the 17th Lancers developed, both 
Roberts and Kitchener wanted Haig for the post. French apparently 
did not. As Kitchener wrote to Roberts on 19 April 1901: 
I have just heard from French that he thinks Lawrence 
should get the 17th, not that Haig is in every way fit 
but that Lawrence has more claim. 2 
To be fair, French favoured Herbert Lawrence because the latter 
had more seniority than Haig and was already a member of the regi- 
ment. But it is clear that French did not go out of his way to 
push Haig forward. It seems that, at least early in the war, 
this was due to the fact that French was not willing to part with 
such a valuable assistant. 
French's advice was not taken, and Haig was given command 
of the 17th Lancers in May 1901. Roberts explained why in a 
letter to Kitchener which was in reply to the one quoted above: 
I have telegraphed to you to send Herbert home. He ought 
not even to have been given the 17th lancers. Haig has 
been selected to succeed him, and though you would, I 
daresay, like to keep him with a column, it is desirable 
he should take over command of the 17th ... I would have 
appointed Lawrence as you suggested, but Haig seems to be 
the more capable and distinguished of all the younger 
cavalry soldiers .. .3 
1French to Haig, 20 May 1901, Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 
334(e). 
2Kitchener to Roberts, 19 April 1901, Roberts Papers, 7101/23/33/24. 
3Roberts to Kitchener, 4 May 1901, Roberts Papers, 7101/23/122/1. 
Roberts was referring in the first instance to Colonel J. Herbert, 
the incumbent commander of the 17th Lancers who was removed largely 
The Lancers were on active service in South Africa. The appoint- 
ment included promotion to full Colonel. After worrying about 
whether he would land an inferior regiment, or one which required 
a large income, this one perfectly suited Haig's tastes and means. 
I 
'They seem to be a lot of nice fellows', he wrote after his first 
visit to the regiment in June. The post of regimental colonel 
did not, contrary to Roberts' letter, supersede his other duties 
as a column commander: 
I took over command of the 17th lancers last Thursday as 
I thought it best to identify myself with the regiment 
as soon as possible. ... I have them here with me, 
and find I can easily look after the regiment in addition 
to directing the other columns. I know the country so 
well now that it does not bother me much to make up my 
mind where to send the latter to hunt the Enemy. Besides 
I am giving the Squadron Commanders a chance of having 
a little show occasionally on their own account. There 
is nothing so good as responsibility for making good 
officers. 
On one of these 'little shows', disaster struck. On 17 September'; 
'C' Squadron was ambushed while defending a difficult position. 
Out of 130 men, 29 were killed, another 41 wounded. All the offi- 
cers were either killed or wounded. Haig had become fond of the 
men of his regiment quite quickly. He was saddened by the loss. 
'It made me miserable to see what had taken place', he wrote. 'The 
wounds were terrible, the brutes used explosive bullets. '4 
due to incapacity as a regimental commander. Lawrence, angered that 
Haig had been chosen over him, left the service and became a banker 
in London. He returned to the Army in 1914, and, ironically, became 
Haig's Chief of Staff in 1918. 
1Haig to Henrietta, 10 June 1901. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 1 July 1901. 
3This date is estimated from Haig's correspondence and is not 
certain. 
4Haig 
to Henrietta, 22 Sept 1901. The allegation regarding 
explosive bullets may have been justified, since both sides used 
The war changed little as 1901 ended and 1902 began. 'Progress 
was measured by the increasing size of the British force and the 
greater ruthlessness of the measures employed. April 1902 brought 
the first chance of a settlement since Middleburg. Botha, Steyn, 
Burger, De Wet, De la Rey and others met at Klerksdorp to discuss 
peace terms. The package they presented to Kitchener on the 12th 
was remarkably reasonable, but it did not include a surrender of 
independence by the Boer states. The British refused to countenance 
any proposal which did not include this essential point. The Boer 
leaders, however, felt they could not surrender their independence 
without consulting the commandos in the field. They decided to 
elect delegates to a meeting at Vereeniging, where the issue would 
be decided. First, however, the delegates who were chosen had to 
be located and informed of the meeting. In come cases, the British 
were called upon to assist. Haig, for instance, was responsible for 
ensuring that Jan Smuts made his way safely to the meeting. In the 
Great War, Haig formed a very high opinion of Smuts. In 1902, he 
was not as admiring. 'I suppose I'll have Smuts here shortly', 
he wrote grudgingly to Henrietta. 'He was State Attorney at Pretoria, 
and was at Cambridge, so is more or less civilised. '2 
Haig was sceptical of the 'meeting of the people' scheduled for 
L5 May at Vereenigings 
I wonder who will compose 'the people'! and whether they 
will vote for surrender. I expect that if Lord K were to 
put them on half rations in the rest camps for a week or 
two they would all vote for surrender! 2 
them. They were outlawed by the Hague Convention of 1899, but were 
still in the stocks of both armies and were undoubtedly used. See 
Holt, The Boer War, p. 116. 
'Haig to Henrietta, 20 April 1898. 
2Ibid. 
Politics was superseding force in the efforts to solve the crisis. 
As the shift took place, Haig's confusion grew: 
I suppose the 'leaders' must have come to some sort of 
agreement with our Govt. before this meeting (to ratify 
some agreement apparently) could have been summoned. But 
I hope that there is no question of giving terms to these 
rebels. It would be much better to go on fighting for 10 
years than to give way in anything to them. 
The Treaty of Vereeniging was signed on 31 May. The terms were 
reasonable. Independence was surrendered, but the British made 
concessions on the treatment of ex-soldiers, the teaching of Afrikans 
in the schools, the owning of firearms and other points. 'A repre- 
sentative system tending towards autonomy' was to be introduced 
'as soon as circumstances permit it'. 
2 Haig took a remarkably 
balanced view of the settlement: 'My own opinion is that the 
proclamation is right enough provided Martial Law is maintained 
in this Cape Colony for another three years. '3 This would give the 
British time to weed out inferior or dangerous elements and 
generally to mould the country as they saw fit. 
With the war over, Haig's duties immediately changed. On 12 
June, he wrote as follows from Calvinia: 
I am busy here trying to get these Boer commandants to 
concentrate their commandoes at suitable places for General 
Smuts to see'them and arrange for them to lay down their 
arms. The difficulty is due to the absence of food in the 
district as we have cleared the country as thoroughly as 
possible outside our Blockhouse line, and I decline to 
allow them to cone South of that line until they have layed 
down their arms. 
He was given command of a district composed of a 'triangle of about 
1Haig to Henrietta, 20 April 1902. 
2Quoted from Holt, The Doer War, p. 291. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 5 June 1902. 
Haig to Henrietta, 12 June 1902. 
60 miles each side, and including the main line from Capetdwn to 
Kimberley'. 1 His force consisted of four batallions of infantry,. 
two of mounted infantry, one cavalry regiment and various artillery 
detachments. 'I am lucky to have got such a command for Peace 
tin', 2 he admitted. The appointment included promotion to the 
local rank of Brigadier General. 
As usual, Haig underestimated the amount of time required to 
restore order. In June, he anticipated that 'a month or two should 
see me on the way to England'. 
3 But progress was slow. As the 
winter wore on, his letters became increasingly despondent: 
Martial Law will soon be a dead letter but they have no 
police in sufficient numbers to keep order, and I fear the 
loyal4sts and those who have helped us will have a bad 
time. 
He focused blame in the usual direction: 
I question whether the Govt. In England know the real 
state of feeling in this Colony, and I am certain that 
the Govt. of Cape Colony know very little about the 
feeling in the Districts ... The govt. here seem like 
a lot of schoolboys, quite happy and thoughtless of the 
future. 5 
Early in the war, when British affairs were in a bad state, Haig 
blamed the government at home. 'I would disband the Politicians 
for 10 years', he suggested. 'We would all be better off without 
them! '6 The war and the peace reinforced this attitude. The Empire, 
he believed, had been built by the military. He was certain that 
it would be torn down by the politicians. 
1Haig to Henrietta, 29 June 1902. 
2Ibid. 
3Haig 
to Henrietta, 12 June 1902. 
H 4 aig to Henrietta, 13 July 1902. 
51bid. 
6ýaig 
to Henrietta., 4 February 1900. 
Häig's attitudes toward post-war South Africa reveal a"naivete 
common among professional soldiers. He was accustomed to the solving 
of problems through the application of force. He did not understand 
that the military solution is never a complete one. Force changed 
sovereignty; it did not change men's minds. The South African 
problem demanded insight and imagination which Haig did not possess. 
He could not understand why' the Bond--the traditional party of the 
Dutch Afrikaner--continued to gain a majority in the Cape Colony. 
Farm burnings, executions and concentration camps had not signs= 
ficantly altered political alignments. When Haig finally realised 
this, his reaction was characteristically simple-minded. He favoured 
suspending the constitution until a better result could be assured. 
He railed against 'windbags like Seddon and some of the other colo- 
nials'1 who did not appreciate the wisdom of this solution. He 
gave a dire warning for the future: 
Anyhow I am quite convinced that if the Politicians are 
allowed to have their way in this country that the 
country will be entirely Dutch and natives in 20 years 
time and England merely will exist at Capetown. 2 
Haig's attacks on the politicians and the colonists became increas- 
ingly virulent. His last letter from South Africa revealed a loss 
of hope: 
Things seem to be turning out badly in this colony. Fancy 
a rebel member of the Parliament (Te Water) who fled the 
country on account of his fear of punishment for his mis- 
deeds being received by the Prime Minister with open arms 
and allowed to sit on the Treasury bench with him. I went 
to the House of the Legislative Assembly the other day: it 
almost makes one ill to see the brutes arxi to hear them 
talk. 3 
Haig ended by advising 'a general smash up of all political parties 
1Haig to Henrietta, 5 August 1902. 
2Ibid. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 17 September 1902. 
and arrangements in the hopes of gathering together the least hurt- 
ful elements .. . '1 He was out of place in a political environ- 
ment where military force had suddenly become impotent. It was 
time for him to leave. 
The 17th Lancers were supposed to be one of the garrison 
regiments for post-war South Africa. Haig therefore expected to 
stay in the country for another two years. In August, these plans 
were suddenly changed. The Scots Greys replaced the Lancers, and 
the latter were sent home. Haig left with them, on 23 September. 
It was exactly three years since he had left England. During 
the time, his career had flourished. He began the war as a staff 
officer of a small cavalry force. He ended it a local Brigadier 
General in command of a large area and a massive force of all arms. 
He served in every part of South Africa and met success everywhere. 
While the careers of some officers were destroyed in the war, Haig's 
prestige had soared. At the end of the war, French wanted him at 
Aldershot and Kitchener wanted him in India. He had emerged as one 
of the men destined to shape the Army of the new century. He was 
determined to use the lessons learned in South Africa to shape 
it as he saw fit. 
'Haig 
to Henrietta, 17 September 1902. 
Chapter VII 
The Cavalry Reaction, 1902-1906 
The Boer War had two main effects upon Douglas Haig. The first 
was that it confirmed his faith in the cavalry and in the tactical 
principles at the heart of his traditional cavalry training. The 
second effect was that Haig's success as a cavalry officer in a 
mobile war gave him the exposure which projected him into the 
Army's front rank. Thus, by successfully pursuing tactical doc- 
trines of the past, Haig ironically became recognised as a soldier 
of the future. These two effects made the Boer War the pivotal 
point in Haig's career. By 1902 his development as a soldier was 
virtually complete. No subsequent event substantially altered the 
'truths' which had been-confirmed in South: Africa. From 1902 to 
1914, therefore, the focus is shifted to Haig's consolidation 
of his position in the Army and his exploitation of the reputation 
he had so far gained. 
Various explanations have been given for Haig's rise to the 
top of the Army. Terraine feels that Haig's ability was the most 
important factor. He argues that natural and acquired talents 
separated him from his contemporaries. Charteris emphasises Haig's 
character; Duff Cooper his character and ability. Haig's critics 
offer different explanations. Dixon feels ambition--the 'patho- 
logical achievement motivation'--was most important. Many others, 
Lloyd George among them, feel Haig could be ruthless and unprincipled, 
and that this allowed him to ride to the top on the backs of others. 
All of these arguments are inconclusive because they are too 
exclusive. There is no simple explanation for Haig's rise because 
that rise was not a simple process. Haig needed a wide range of 
resources, both admirable and otherwise, in order to succeed. His 
success is evidence that he possessed these resources in the necessary 
proportions. 
The search for a simple explanation has meant that a significant 
motivating force--Haig's overwhelming sense of duty--has not been 
given its deserved emphasis. Haig believed that he owed a debt to 
the British Empire. He was driven forward by a determination to 
fulfil this obligation. To do one's duty for King and Country is 
an attitude often misunderstood in today's materialistic, indivi- 
dualistic world. There is a tendency to question whether the 
desire was genuine and an eagerness to discover selfish motives 
underneath the surface. Haig's sense of duty was genuine, and largely 
unselfish. It was not, however, unique. His willingness to serve 
his country was no different from that of contemporaries of similar 
social background. Yet there was a distinguishing feature in Haig's 
case. Combined with his sense of duty was a belief that his service 
was inherently more valuable than could be that of his contemporaries. 
He had this feeling from a very early age. But it was most evident 
after the Boer War. By this time, Haig's career had taken on a 
momentum of its own. As he rose within his profession he became 
ever more certain of the rectitude of his ideals, and more determined 
to shape the Army in his way. 
Haig usually preferred to express himself through actions, not 
words. Yet he did, on one occasion write down his feelings regarding 
duty and Empire. His nephew Hugo was, in 1902, debating whether 
to leave the Army and take his place as a member of the landed 
gentry. 
1 He eventually decided to stay in the military, a decision 
which his uncle applauded: 
I think you are quite right to let Ramornie for a period. It would be absurd for a lad of your years and without any real experience of the Empire and its inhabitants to settle down into a turnip grower in Fife. Leave these pursuits 
1Hugo Haig had served in South Africa, for a time on French's staff, and later rose to the rank of Colonel. 
until you get into the doldering age! Meantime do your 
best to become a worthy citizen of the Empire. ... It 
has been your good fortune not only to become a soldier, 
but to have served and risked your life for the Empire-- 
you must continue to do so, and consider that it is a 
privilege pd not that by doing so you are losing time 
and money. 
The distinguishing feature of Haig's sense of duty--the sense of 
superiority--is evident later in the letter: 
The gist of the whole thing is that I am anxious not only 
that you should realise your duty to your family, your 
Country and to Scotland, but also to the whole Empire-- 
'Aim High' as the Book says, 'perchance ye may attain. ' 
Aim at being worthy of the British Empire and possibly 
in the evening of your life you may be able to own to 
yourself that you are fit to settle down in Fife. At 
present you are not, so be active, and busy. Don't let .. 
mediocrities about you deflect. you from your determination 
to belong to the few who can command or guide or benefit 
our great Empire. Believe me, the reservoir of such men 
is not boundless. As our Empire grows, so is there a 
greater demand for them, and it behoves everyone to do 
his little and try and qualify for as high a position as 
possible. It is not ambition. This is duty. 
Haig believed that he was one of the 'few'. His statements above 
may be taken as accurate representations of his feelings. Haig 
was ruthless and ambitious, but he believed sincerely that such 
attitudes were cleansed and sanctified when expressed in the 
interests of Empire. 
The strict sense of duty can also be seen in Haig's postº. war 
deliberations regarding his next appointment. After the Boer War, 
French wanted Haig at Aldershot, and Kitchener wanted him as 
Inspector General of Cavalry in India. Haig favoured the former 
appointment. After three years away, he was eager for a long 
spell in Britain. He was, however, sceptical about his chances of 
joining French: 
1The letter is no longer in the Haig collection, but it is 
quoted in Duff Cooper, Haig, pp. 90-92. 
2Ibid. 
I fancy the excellent house at Aldershot in which the' 
General Officer Commanding Cavalry Brigade lives, will 
oblige Lord Roberts to select the husband of 'Dear Mrs. ' 
so and so because the nursery rooms will exactly syit the 
family: --and I'll be given the Indian appointment. 
While he admitted that he 'would prefer the Aldershot Brigade of 
course', he accepted that 'the other is a fine appointment too 
with great opportunities of keeping one's hand in handling 
mounted troops. '2 The sarcasm above therefore seems to have been 
more the result of continued animosity towards Roberts than 
real bitterness over the possibility of having to go to India. 
He was ready to accept his fate wherever it led him and would do his 
duty in whatever capacity the authorities decided. As he expressed 
it, 'The main thing is to have men to command no matter what they 
call me. '3 
Haig's scepticism was, however, warranted. Roberts decided that 
the Aldershot Brigade should go to someone else. The Indian appoint- 
ment became Haig's. 
4 
This meant that he had to spend a year in 
limbo, as the incumbent's term in India did not expire until October 
1903. During this year he was, simply, Commanding Officer of the 
17th lancers. Though the lancers were at this time stationed in 
Edinburgh, Haig was not happy to return to his birthplace. When he 
first heard of the plans, he wrote that 'Edinburgh is a bad place 
for Cavalry--no drill ground and half the regiment on detachment. ' 
'Haig to Henrietta, 25 August 1902. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 5 August 1902. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 18 August 1902. 
4While 
it is not clear whether Roberts ever seriously, considered 
Haig for the Aldershot appointment, he did feel Haig was suited for the 
Indian one. He wrote to Kitchener on 20 February 1902: 'I wrote the 
King yesterday about your wish to have Haig as Insp. General of Cavalry 
in India. His Majesty will be somewhat exercised at so junior an 
officer being appointed, but I have pointed out that Haig is quite 
unusually fitted for such a position. Roberts Papers, 7101/23/122/5. 
He tried, through French, to have the station changed to Aldershot 
or York--'any place is better ... than Edinburgh'. 
' French could 
do nothing. Haig dutifully went to Edinburgh, where he found life 
exceedingly dull. He had never enjoyed the regimental routine. 
This attitude did not change when he became a commanding officer. 
After leading 2,500 men in war, leading 800 in peace was drudgery. 
While he performed his duties well, there is no doubt that he 
thirsted for action. As usual the diary is the best indicator 
of his level of activity and his style of life. The 1903 diary 
contains long periods without any entries. This reflects a lack 
of significant incidents, not a lack of time to write. Those entries 
which do exist are devoted to brief descriptions of grouse shooting, 
hunting, golf at Muirfield and the ubiquitous polo. Hardly any atten- 
tion is given to regimental matters. 
The year did provide two notable diversions. In July, Haig 
participated in the Inter-Regimental Polo Tournament as captain of 
the 17th Lancers. In the final, which took place on the 11th, 
the lancers faced the Blues before a Royal audience at Hurlingham. 
In the Royal Box with Queen Alexandra was her lady-in-waiting, 
The Honourable Dorothy Maud Vivian, the future Countess Haig. Years 
later, she described the match in her biography of her husband: 
To the surprise of all, the game did not progress as 
expected. The Blues did not seem to be getting on well. 
Their play became wild, whilst the team of the 17th lancers 
continued a steady, combined game. Everyone noted that the 
strong player who never missed, nor sent a crooked shot, 
and who kept the whole team together, was Colonel Douglas 
Haig, playing back. Many comments were made in the Royal 
Box about the Colonel's remarkable play and his alert, 
smart appearance. 2 
The Lancers won by five goals to one. The Iueen presented the cup 
1Haig to Henrietta, 17 September 1902. 
2The Countess Haig, The Fan I Knew, pp. 31-32. 
to Colonel Haig. Miss Vivian did not get to speak to the Colonel, 
who, she noted, was known at that time as 'rather a woman-hater'. 
1 
The second important event came in October when Haig was 
presented with the C. V. O. while staying at Balmoral. He described 
the event in his diary: 
His Majesty presents me with the C. V. O. and a walking 
stick. 
C. V. O. in recognition of the services which I had rendered 
in the past and would render in the future as I. G. of 
Cavalry in India, and also as 'a mark of H. M. 's personal 
esteem. ' 
The stick as a remembrance of my visit. 
2 
Haig saw the C. V. O. in a different light than military medals. It, 
and the attention of the King, were symbolic not only of past achieve- 
ments, but also of future social standing. He was thrilled to be 
a member of the King's inner circle--as evidenced by his delight 
when he-told Henrietta that 'His Majesty has desired me to write 
to him when I go to India. '3 
Haig's departure for India was delayed somewhat by his work 
on Cavalry Training, the manual which was being revised due to 
changes made necessary by the Boer War. Work on the manual 
aggravated the long-running conflict between the traditionalists-- 
men like Haig and French--and the reformers--Roberts, Hamilton and 
Kitchener, among many others. Though many issues divided the two 
groups, the focus of contention lay with the issue of mounted or 
dismounted action. The traditionalists naturally believed that 
the offensive potential of the arm had not been altered by the 
progress of military technology and that the charge was as valid 
a manoeuvre as ever. They therefore felt that mounted training 
1The Countess Haig,; The Man I Knew, p- 32. 
2Diary, 4 October 1903. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 4 October 1903. 
should receive the greatest emphasis in the manual. The reformers, 
on the other hand, felt that modern weaponry had given rise to a 
situation wherein 'knee to knee charges in future will be few and 
far between '. 1 This did not mean that the cavalry would become 
obsolete; at no time did Roberts want to abolish the arm. What he 
and the other reformers wanted was to make the rifle the cavalry's 
main weapon. Since cavalrymen could not shoot from a speeding 
horse, the majority of their fighting would, as a result, take 
place dismounted. The horse would become simply a means of mobility 
rather than a tactical weapon in and of itself. The new role of 
the cavalry meant that the arme blanche would be severely diminished 
in importance. 'Instead of the firearm being adjunct of the sword, ' 
Roberts argued, 'the sword must henceforth be adjunct of the rifle. '2 
As was mentioned at the beginning of the last chapter, the Boer 
War produced a 'range of common experiences' which were open to 
widely varied subjective interpretations. Because the war provided 
few indisputable lessons, it exacerbated the disagreements between 
traditionalists and reformers. No one questioned that the war had 
been a mobile one in which the cavalry was given an unusually large 
role. Disagreement instead centred on the quality of the cavalry's 
performance in one of the arm's greatest chances of the nineteenth 
century. Roberts felt that many of the failures and setbacks of the 
war were due to the unwillingness of cavalry leaders to recognise 
the need for new tactics. The clever, adaptble Boers had, he felt, 
proved themselves better cavalrymen. Another reformer, Erskine 
Childers, described the differences between Boer and British horsemen 
1Roberts 
to Kitchener, 2 March 1904. Roberts Papers, 7101/23/122/13. 
2Röbertb, 
preface to Cavalry Training (Provisional) I. M. S. O. 1904. The sentence was borrowed from Kitchener. See page 249. 
in a letter to Roberts: 
It was the Boer dash based on the rifle alone that cost 
us so many smarting reverses during the last year and a 
half and it was lack of dash on our side, caused largely 
by the old, inveterate, ingrained reliance on the arme 
blanche with a consequent reluctance to take a bold, logi- 
cal grasp of the immense possibilities of the rifle, that 
prevented our Cavalry from setting the example of effective 
retaliation by tactics similar to those of the Boers. 1 
Roberts opinions were virtually the same. His disappointment with 
British cavalry leadership is reflected in the fact that he dis- 
missed twenty-one senior officers, including 11 of 17 regimental 
commanders during his eleven months of field command in the Boer 
War .2 
The traditionalists argued that the cavalry had performed 
remarkably well in the Boer War, under extremely difficult circum- 
stances. Haig's pride in the arm after Kimberley and indeed through- 
out the entire war has already been shown. To him, the cavalry 
had 'saved the Empire', while the infantry or mounted infantry 
by themselves probably would have lost it. Haig did not argue 
that the cavalry's record in South Africa was without blemishes. 
But blame for the failures he laid conveniently at the door of 
the politicians and military leaders at home. Because of them, 
the supply of quality horses had been inadequate. Likewise, the 
government, he alleged, had tried to improvise by making mounted 
infantry into cavalry. Simply stated, he believed that traditional 
tactics would have been shown to be as relevant as ever, had the 
1Erskine Childers to Roberts, 4 November 1908, Roberts Papers, 
7101/23/222. In 1910, Childers published War and the Arme Blanche, (London: Edward Arnold, 1910), a convincing attack on the tradi- 
tionalists argument. But by the time it was published, as will 
be seen, authority over cavalry matters had shifted conclusively 
to the traditionalists. 
2See Spiers, 'British Cavalry 1902-1914', p. 72. 
cavalry been given the right amount of quality horses and properly- 
trained men. 
After Roberts returned from South Africa and resumed his 
administrative duties as Commander-in-Chief, he tried to use the 
authority of his office to put into practice what he believed were 
the lessons of the Boer War. The work on Cavalry Training produced 
the first great clash with the traditionalists. Roberts was deter- 
mined to make the manual into a primer on dismounted action. He 
diligently supervised the writing, rather than, as was customary, 
leaving the task to the senior cavalry officers. He was fully 
prepared for serious disagreements with Haig, as evidenced by the 
24 September 1903 letter to Kitchener: 
I am to have a meeting tomorrow of all the Senior Cavalry 
Officers about the proper method of training for their 
branch of the service. Haig, I am surprised to find, 
still clings to the old arme blanche system, and in the 
Chapter for the Revised Edition of the Drill Book, which 
was entrusted to him to write, on Collective gaining, 
there is not one word about Artillery or Dismounted Fire. 
Haig, supported by French and Scobell, insists on Cavalry 
Soldiers being taught to consider the sword the chief wea- 
pon, and the rifle as a kind of auxiliary one ... I am 
all in favour of Cavalry soldiers being bold riders, and 
endeavouring to overthrow their enemies' mounted men, but 
I am convinced that in 99 cases out of a hundred this 
will be done more effectively by Artillery and dismounted 
fire in the first instance. ' 
The clash was as Roberts expected. Haig described it as follows; 
Attend meeting of Officers under Presidency of Lord 
Roberts at War Office re Cavalry Questions. 
I strongly maintain that the chief method of action is 
the mounted role. He hotly opposes me .. .2 
The wrangle over the manual continued for some time. Roberts' 
efforts were undoubtedly made easier by Haig's eventual departure 
'Roberts to Kitchener, 24 September 1903, Roberts Papers, 
7101/23/122/6. 
2Diary, 25 September 1903. 
for India. The Commander-in-Chief was able to push through the de- 
sired reforms to the manual. He did not, by any means, change Haig's 
mind. Without the support of the cavalry's leading spokesman, the 
new manual was virtually worthless. 
The second great clash between Roberts and the traditionalists 
occurred over the issue of the lance. Roberts felt that arming 
cavalry with carbines made the lance superfluous. He therefore 
sought to abolish the weapon. Unlike Childers, Churchill 
1. 
and 
others, Roberts did not advocate the complete abolition of the 
arme blanche. Swordless cavalry, he believed, would be similar 
to infantry deprived of bayonets; the ability to surprise would be 
hindered. The reformers saw the lance as a clumsy weapon which 
impeded the cavalryman's ability to use his rifle effectively. 
The traditionalists naturally did not agree. Since they did not 
believe that the charge was a thing of the past, they could not 
accept that the lance was obsolete. The officers of the lancer. 
regiments, Haig included, were naturally most adamant in their 
opposition to Roberts. Haig expressed his opinion in a letter to 
an M. P. and former 17th Lancer: 
Personally I think our regiments of Cavalry should be 
armed in equal proportions, viz. half the Cavalry should 
have swords; the other lances ... I don't think it is 
wise to abolish the lance. 
Strategical reconnaissance must culminate in a tactical 
collision if the enemy possesses Cavalry; we want the 2 lance for this. 
The fallacy in the argument lies in the last sentence. Roberts 
correctly maintained that 'Haig ... inclines to the lance though 
1Witness 
Kitchener to Roberts, 5 May 1904: 'I think what does 
harm is young Churchill..,.,. going too far and saying chuck both lance and sword . . ', Kitchener Papers, PRO 30/57/29/Q30. 
2Haig to 'Jessel', 14 February 1903, Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 
3155, No. 334(e). 
he can have had no experience of its use in war. '1 Nor would 
the future provide him with any such experiences. As Bond argues: 
... the dogmas persisted 
that the next great European 
war would be virtually decided by a great opening cavalry 
clash, and that only cavalry armed with lance and sabre 
could defeat cavalry similarly armed ... 
Haig was caught in a vicious circle from which only foresight could 
free him. He had little of this. Like French--who claimed that 
'nothing can make me alter the views that I hold on the subject of 
cavalry'3--Haig could not or would not accept that long-range 
rifles, deadly machine guns and powerful artillery would annihilate 
Lancers before they could even attempt to prove the worth of their 
beloved weapons. 
The experience at Kimberley made it impossible for Haig to 
understand the effect which technology had had upon the cavalry. 
The relief, he believed, conclusively demonstrated the moral effect 
of the charge and therefore the continued offensive potential of the 
arm as a whole. But, as has been shown, Kimberley was not a classical 
charge. The arme blanche was not used. Success resulted solely from 
the storming of a weak position by an overwhelming force. The 
cavalry did not fight, they simply rode. The infantry would have 
had a similar, albeit slower, effect. But the magnitude of the 
occasion blinded men to its real nature. Haig saw it as the quint- 
essential cavalry action. Its effect can be seen in the following 
statement: 
... it is not the weapon carried but the moral factor 
of an apparently irresistable force, coming on at highest 
tRoberts to Kitchener, 30 June 1903, Roberts Papers, 7101/23/122/5. 
2Brian Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry, 1870- 
1914', in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard, previ- 
ously cited, p. 80. 
3French to Roberts, 6 November 1904, Roberts Papers 7101/23/30/8. 
speed in spite of rifle fire, which affects the nerves and 
aim of the rapidly dismounted rifleman. ... 
I ask those who have felt the elation of a successful charge 
or who have known the despondency which attacks those who 
have been ridden over by the horseman whom they have fired 
at in vain, whether magazine fire; which makes the shooting 
so erratic, hurried and mush less easily controlled, and 
spends the ammunition so quickly, has really so much 
changed the conditions of 30 years ago? 1 
Conditions had in fact changed radically. They had changed even 
before Haig entered the Army. Haig could vividly describe the 
scene which he himself had never experienced because it was a part 
of the cavalry dogma. Its constant repetition over the previous 
twenty years had worn a groove in his mind. 
The argument for retention of the lance was thus based not only 
on tactical but more importantly on ethereal grounds. French stated 
before the Elgin Commission of 1903 that 'if the Cavalryman is taught 
to rely-mainly on his rifle, his morale is taken away from him, and 
if that is done his power is destroyed. '2 To the traditionalists, 
cavalrymen deprived of lances were like Samson shorn. They feared 
that without the arme blanche, the cavalry spirit would dissipate. 
This spirit had thrived while the cavalry was in decline because 
it had as its base cherished military values such as bravery, devotion 
and self-sacrifice. The spirit was not a chimera. It did have a 
factual basis. In combat, no other arm fought with the same combi- 
nation of speed and proximity to the enemy as the cavalry. The 
cavalry fought at close quarters--man to man. The clash of two 
rapidly converging lines of horsemen did inspire emotions and demand 
virtues unmatched by the other arms, who mostly fought well distanced 
1Douglas Haig, unsigned review of Cavalry Training (Canada, 1907). 
in Lord Dundonald, My Army Life, (London: Edward Arnold, 1926), pp. 252-3. 
2Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in British Cavalry, 1870-1914', 
p. 109. 
from the enemy. The cult of the arme blanche and the survival of 
the cavalry spirit were a 'last desperate effort to withstand the 
depersonalisation of war. '1 But the fact remained that modern 
weaponry kid depersonalised war. Technology had severely reduced 
the number of actions in which moral factors were crucial. With 
the charge a thing of the past, the arme blanche became functionally 
obsolete and the cavalry spifit little more than a quaint piece 
of nostalgia. 
Roberts was able to abolish the lance in 1904. When combined 
with his victory on the manual, his success against the traditiona- 
lists seems impressive. But his reforms were short-lived. When the 
post of Commander-in-Chief was abolished in late 1904, he lost the 
power to convert his beliefs into policy. While he continued as 
the spokesman for the cavalry reformers, his real energies were 
shifted to the fight for Universal Service. No one replaced him 
as the bane of the traditionalists. Roberts! departure as a result 
brought a return to traditional principles of cavalry organisation 
and training. In 1907 a new Cavalry Training was published, with 
the heretical elements of the 1904 edition purged from it. In 
1909 the lance was re-introduced. By 1910, eighty per cent of the 
training schedule of the Aldershot Cavalry Brigade was devoted to 
shock tactics. The remaining time was divided equally between recon- 
naissance and dismounted exercises. Roberts' efforts had had little 
lasting effect: 
Although the Cavalry was better armed and better trained 
in 1914, it still entered the First World War as wedded 
to shock tactics as it had been in 1899.2 
1Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in British Cavalry 1870-1914', 
p. 120. 
2Spiers, 'The British Cavalry, 1902-1914', P. 79. 
Spiers cites two 'princip, 
(e7 
anomalies' in Roberts reform 
measures which the traditionalists were quick to exploit after 1904. 
The first was the incomplete abolition of the lance. The weapon 
was not abolished in India, nor was its use in parades, on escort 
duty or in other ceremonial occasions affected. Thus, by bending 
the rules only slightly, Lancers could continue to practice with 
their weapons almost as often as before. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
addressed this problem in a letter to the Pall Mall Gazette: 
There is no use in parading one thing in peace time and 
another in war, in scouring the heaths of Aldershot with 
swords and lances, but reserving the rifle, and the rifle- 
man's habit of mind for real business. We must be logical 
and whole-hearted in this matter. The change should be 
thorough. I will never believe that it has been effected 
until I see a hundred lightly equipped men, with rifles 
slung on their backs and bandoliers across their chests, 
riding behind the King's State Cara? ge, in the place of 
the present picturesque but mediaeval guard. 1 
The second anomaly was the failure of the reformers to establish 
an effective alternative mounted force. The cavalry had come 
under severe criticism from as early as 1870. Yet the mounted 
infantry, which was intended as a force able to exploit both the 
mobility of the horse and the advantages of modern weaponry, in 
fact turned out to be a queer and disappointing hybrid. It suffered 
from a lack of funding, training and enthusiasm--the latter both 
from within and without. Haig wrote to Jessel that 'no country 
can afford to maintain mounted troops of different values'. 
2 He 
was absolutely right. The existence of two types of mounted troops 
implied that the cavalry in its traditional form was still considered 
valuable and relevant. The very real failures of the mounted infantry 
in South Africa--seldom the fault of the soldiers involved--likewise 
1Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, letter to Pall Mall Gazette, 6 April 1910. 
2Haig to Jessel, 14 February 1903, previously cited. 
ö 
reinforced the idea that the cavalry was the wiser alternative. 
) 
The main reason for the success of the traditionalists was the 
prestige and power. of Haig and French. The reputations gained by 
both men in the Doer War partially obscured their antequated 
tactical principles. After the war, both men rose to various influ- 
ential positions from which they were able to frustrate efforts at 
cavalry reform. Haig, perhaps more than French, had the added 
advantage of being in other areas a genuine progressive. Within the 
Army, he was admired as one of the new breed of educated profes- 
sionals, a soldier of the future. Thus, with Haig as the cavalry's 
leading spokesman, the image of the arm as a whole was naturally 
enhanced. This again demonstrates the blend of the traditional 
and the progressive which was such a factor in Haig's development 
as a soldier and in his rise within the Army. Though seemingly 
contradictory, these two elements can be explained. Haig's progres- 
sivism was directed toward improving the administrative efficiency 
of the Army. His ideas in organisational, educational and training 
spheres were inspired by a desire for a truly professionalised 
Army. He believed that the fundamental principles of this Army-- 
its traditions--were sound, and therefore essential to preserve. 
To him, reform of the cavalry constituted an attack on these 
principles. Such reforms questioned the sacred doctrines of war. 
An attack upon the cavalry spirit eroded the Army's ideological 
core. It was therefore not to be tolerated. 
The blend of the progressive and the traditional was reflected 
in Haig's approach to his duties as Inspector General of Cavalry in 
India. According to Charteris: 
6 
1These 
anomalies are discussed in greater detail in Spiers, 
'The British Cavalry', pp. 78-79. 
ý 
The Indian Cavalry under the influence of many of its 'offi- 
cers who had served in South Africa with mounted infantry 
units was permeated with the new doctrines and looked for 
the approval of the new Inspector-General. There was a 
rude awakening. Haig would have none of it. Both at his 
inspection of regiments, and still more by means of his 
training memoranda and staff rides, he taught unceasingly 
to his cavalry in India that warfare still offered scope 
for horse and man and bare steel. 
1 
As will be seen, Haig turned the Indian Cavalry into a functionally 
efficient but tactically obsolete unit. He used his usual progres- 
sive training methods for regressive ends. An indicator of his 
priorities can be found in his schedule of inspection, an impres- 
sive piece of admin5--tration. The top of the list was dominated by 
traditional subjects: drill, order, wheeling, charging and squadron 
versus squadron mock battles. The eleventh and final item was shoot- 
ing and dismounted drill. 
Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief in India, believed in the necessity 
for cavalry reform. Though he was perhaps not as wholehearted in 
his efforts as Roberts, he did give the latter valuable support on 
the issue of the lance and on Cavalry Training. As Roberts wrote 
to Kitchener on 30 June 1903: 
I am glad to get your opinion about the lance, it will 
help me with the King, who was somewhat regretting that 
weapon having been done away with, after he had some 
conversation with Haig at Edinburgh. 3 
Since Haig was eager to train the Indian Cavalry along traditional 
lines, it is natural that he disagreed with Kitchener while the 
two worked together. This was especially the case since Roberts 
repeatedly asked Kitchener to 'keep Haig in the right line'4 on the 
1Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, pp. 27-28. 
2Schedule included in 12 November 1903 letter to Henrietta. 
Roberts to Kitchener, 30 June 1903, previously cited. 
R 
4 
oberts to Kitchener, 24 September 1903, previously cited. 
cavalry issues. 'Haig is one of the strongest supporters of the 
sword and charging', Roberts wrote on 8 October 1903. 'You will 
have to be very firm with him.. . . '1 
Four days after Haig's arrival in India, he had his first 
meeting with Kitchener. Cavalry issues naturally dominated the 
conversation. Haig recorded that Kitchener was 'quite at one 
with me regarding method of cavalry action, namely offensive 
tactics. '2 In actuality, this seems to have been wishful thinking 
on Haig's part. Kitchener had a different opinion about the 
conversation as evidenced by his subsequent letter to Roberts: 
Haig has arrived and I have had one talk with him and mean 
to have another. He seems to have a wrong idea that the 
morale of the cavalry will be injured by dismounted training. 
I have told him I disagree with this, that while I do not 
wish in any way to injure the dash and power of shock tactics 
of cavalry they must understand that whereas in the old days 
the carbine was the adjunct to the sword or lance, now the 
sword or lance must be the adjunct to the rifle and its 
practice. 
3 
A number of weeks later, Roberts' continuing aggravation over 
Cavalry Training caused him to return to the subject of Haig in a 
letter to Kitchener: 
The revised Cavalry Training is getting on, and I hope it 
will be published next month. A good deal of it was 
started by Haig, with some of whose ideas about cavalry I 
do not agree, and consequently much of his work has had 
to be rewritten. ... I consider it quite a misfortune 
that Haig should be of the Old School in regard to the 
role of the Cavalry in the field. He is a clever, able 
fellow and his views have a great effect on French ... I only hope that you may be able to get Haig to change 
his mind, or as Inspector, General of Cavalry he may do 
a great deal of mischief. 
Kitchener followed Roberts' advice, and was pleased with his 
1Roberts to Kitchener, 8 October 1903, Roberts Papers, 7101/23/122/6. 
2Diary, 3 November 1903. 
3Kitchener to Roberts, 5 November 1903, Kitchener Papers, 
PRO 30/57/29/Q. 17. 
R 
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oberts to Kitchener, 28 January 1904, Roberts Papers, 7101/23/122/7. 
subsequent conversation with Haig. On 5 May Kitchener reassured 
Roberts: 
I think someone must have given you the wrong impression 
about Haig. I have only just arrived here so I have not 
been able to go into his work in detail but I had a long 
talk and he certainly never referred to; old-fashioned 
charges, he quite agrees with what I wrote about cavalry 
Ito you and told me so more than once. 1 
In his diary, Haig confirmed that he and Kitchener had found much 
upon which to agree. 
2 
This harmony was shattered after another meeting on the cavalry 
manual a week later. This time, many areas of conflict were dis- 
covered. In a subsequent letter to Roberts, Kitchener outlined Haig's 
objections, and ended with a highly perceptive analysis of Haig's fears: 
I have had a long talk with Haig. It was not quite satis- 
factory because though he agrees with my views he always 
seems to hark back as if something more was intended or 
that he was afraid that more was intended than was said. 
The cavalry are I think evidently very nervous that 
more is intended than is written down (in the manual and 
that training for the role they can now perform with their 
rifle, they may lose the power or spirit to attack the 
enemy's cavalry when it is necessary and they have the 
opportunity of so doing. I can see no reason why they 
should not do both equally well. 
Haig's defence of the traditional cavalry principles had developed into 
a paranoia. He was afraid that to give ground on the issue of dis- 
mounted training would eventually result in the complete collapse 
of the arm. This fear caused him to distrust even the relatively 
moderate Kitchener. Had the two men continued along these opposing 
courses, a serious conflict would undoubtedly have developed. 
In fact, a conflict was avoided. After May 1904, the cavalry 
1Kitchener to Roberts. 5 May 1904, Kitchener Papers, PRO 
30/57/29/Q30. 
2See Diary, 4 May 1904. 
3Kitchener to Roberts, 12 May 1904, Roberts Papers, 7101/23/122/7. 
issue almost completely disappears from Haig's diaries and kitchener's 
letters. Haig was allowed to train the Indian Cavlary virtually 
as he wished. A serious clash was avoided because Kitchener's 
attention was distracted by other issues. He was at this time 
involved in a major confrontation with the Viceroy, Lord Curzon. At 
issue was the role of the Military Member of Council. This officer 
was junior in rank to Kitchener, and yet, by virtue of his position 
on this administrative body, could intervene in the Commander-in- 
Chief's affairs. Since the Viceroy controlled the council, the 
Military Member was essentially in Curzon's pocket. Kitchener 
objected to this interference and threatened to resign if the 
imbalance was not corrected. Haig quite naturally sided with him: 
K... would much prefer a billet such as Cromer has 
in Egypt. The C. in C. in India has really very little 
power, as all the Supply, Transport, Remounts and finance 
are under an individual called the 'Military Member of 
Council'. This is to say Lord K may order men to Thibet, 
but he does not know whether they will starve or not be- 
cause he has nothing to do with the supply arrangements. 
Such a system is obviously ridiculous. It is like a pair 
of horses in double harness without a coachman. The latter 
ought to be the Viceroy, but he has too many things to 
attend to already, even if he were capable of discharging 
such duties which the majority of Viceroys are not. 1 
The clash over the role of the Military Member was simply the focal 
point of an inevitable collision between two domineering individuals 
whose orbits unfortunately intersected. The effect was to free Haig 
from Kitchener's interference in his domain. While Kitchener was 
distracted Haig built a system of cavalry management which suited 
his designs. When the conflict with Curzon was resolved in the 
summer of 1905, the system was complete. There was by that time little 
that Kitchener could do to alter it. 
Kitchener's tolerance may also have stemmed from a conscious 
1Haig to Henrietta, 23 March 1905. 
effort to court Haigs support and influence. Haig's role in the 
affair was more than that of a loyal fellow soldier. He actively 
campaigned on Kitchener's behalf among his influential friends at 
home. This is apparently exactly what Kitchener wanted, as indi- 
cated from the letter below: 
I was astonished at K's concentration: He could think and 
talk to me of little else, and one afternoon spent over two 
hours explaining the whole case and reading me the choice 
passages from his despatches on the subject so that I might 
be quite au fait whin I get home and able to give his case 
without difficulty. 
It is not clear how much Haig influenced the final outcome. It is 
known that he went on leave soon after the above was written. While 
in England he spent considerable time with the King. The King in 
turn played a significant part in the final outcome--which was 
favourable to Kitchener. 
The relationship between Haig and Kitchener in India was 
therefore a symbiotic one. They were as a result on the most amic- 
able terms with each other ab they were at any time between the 
Sudan Campaign and 1916. The disputes of the past--which would 
rage again in the future--were temporarily put aside. Haig was 
full of praise for his chief. When he first arrived in India, he 
commented that 'already K has done a vast amount of good'. 
2 Later, 
he described him as 'far-seeing', 
3 
a compliment which would not 
have been given in South Africa or in the Sudan. Kitchener, in 
turn, supported Haig wholeheartedly. He pushed Haig's appointment 
to Major General past a balking military establishment. This 
harmonious relationship is only partially explained by the give and 
1Haig 
to Henrietta, 23 March 1905. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 5 November 1903. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 23 March 1905. 
take over the Curzon and cavalry issues. The two soldiers had a 
vast amount of mutual respect. Though they differed on important 
issues, they admired each other's honesty, integrity and devotion 
to duty. This respect and admiration could only surface in 
peacetime. In war, their differences--on subjects like staff appoint- 
ments, cavalry tactics, offfensive strategy, etc. --came to the fore 
and caused discord. 
The high degree of order and efficiency which characterised 
Haig's approach to his profession was maintained in India. This 
approach cannot be explained as simply a manifestation of the 
affinity for these qualites within the military. With Haig the 
reasons went deeper. He was consciously trying to improve the 
cavalry's image, in order to prepare it for what he correctly 
saw as a struggle for survival. To this end, he kept up an exhaustive 
schedule of inspections: 
Lucknow: I came here on Sunday morning and leave again 
next Sunday evening for Fyzahabad. My Bde. Major and 
I have had a bungalow lent to us here and every arrange- 
ment made for our comfort ... I spent Monday and Tuesday 
inspecting he 5th Dragoon Guards] and yesterday and today 
with the 6t Cavalry. Tomorrow I" have them both out 
bivouacking about 20 miles apart for reconnaissane and 
field service duties and return Saturday forenoon. 
' 
At Fyzahabad, and subsequent stations, the routine would begin anew. 
Haig aimed to make himself a familiar figure, a focal point for 
improvement. He understood that an exercise had a greater effect 
if the reaction of the Inspector was immediately apparent to all 
concerned. 
Haig saw himself as more a teacher than a judge. 'Every day 
of inspection must be a day of training', he wrote. 'The troops 
should feel after the inspection not merely that their efficiency 
1Haig to Henrietta, 19 November. 1903. 
has been tested but that they have learnt something. ' He conducted 
exercises which aimed to 'stimulate the intelligence of the men'. ' 
When appraising performance, he claimed that he was 
... most considerate as 
it is better to carry people 
with one, than to stifle keenness by mere criticisms, 
without explaining wht improvements and in what direction 
changes are required. 
This approach had, he believed, a positive effect: 
I am beginning to see some small results of my work during 
the last two years, and in most places where I inspect I 
have a number of friends who are now very glad to welcome 
me whereas my predecessors were rather unwelcome guests 
and much feared and when I started I was greeted in the 
same style. 3 
Though this was a biased appraisal, there is no reason to doubt 
that Haig made an excellent Inspector General, despite the limita- 
tions of his tactical principles. He had mellowed somewhat since 
his days as an adjutant, when he was described as a martinet. He was 
an excellent administrator who had a high regard for the value of 
professional training. These were essential qualities for the job, 
and they ensured his success. 
Another reason why Haig was successful was because he was so 
attentive to the image he presented. In the military, it is largely 
superficial qualities which inspire the ordinary soldier to admire 
and respect his commander. The soldier usually has no intimate 
knowledge of officers above the rank of captain. He appraises 
leadership abilities an the basis of how the individual looks or 
carries himself. Haig was acutely aware of this fact. While in 
South Africa, he wrote that 'I hear our staff is always considered 
'All 
quotations pertaining to Haig's approach to inspections 
are from his, 'Notes on Inspections', contained in his 1903 diary. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 26 November 1903. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 11 January 1906. 
well-dressed and clean: this has a good effect on all ranks. '1 
Cleanliness suggested highly valued qualities such as honesty, 
integrity and courage. Slovenliness suggested unreliability. Thus, 
discipline and order among the ranks could be maintained by the 
leader who made it clear, through his appearance, that he would not 
tolerate any deviation from the accepted standards of conduct. 
The affinity for order and cleanliness which characterised Haig as a 
child was therefore reinforced through its usefulness as a technique 
of leadership. 
Haig's preoccupation with his image had other manifestations. 
For instance, he was keenly aware of the importance of making a 
positive impression when he arrived at a station: 
You would be surprised at the amount of baggage and stuff 
I have to go about with-horses and clerks and office boxes 
and orderlies. I am half ashamed at the number of bullock 
waggons required to convey all this stuff to and from the 
station: so l'arrivee is most impressive ... especially for the regiment for they are not quite certain what to 
expect. 
2 
At this stage, the active cultivation of his image was quite harmless. 
But whenever superficial characteristics are used to suggest leadership 
ability, there is scope for misconception. This possibility is 
especially dangerous during times of acute strife, such as war-time. 
At these times a question can arise regarding what is the man and what 
the image, and thus the distressing uncertainty of what will be 
revealed when the image breaks down. 
Related to this problem of misconception is the dilemma sur- 
rounding the relationships between the leader and the various groups 
under his control. The military is built upon tiers of command: 
enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, officers, staff, etc. To 
1Haig 
to Henrietta, 7 August 1900. 
2Haig 
to Henrietta, 26 November 1903. 
each group, the leader must act differently. In other words, while 
Haig was able to inspire obedience and respect among the ordinary 
soldier by cultivating an image of the perfect cavalry officer, this 
tactic should not have been used with groups higher up. With 
the staff in particular, loyalty has to be based on an intimate know- 
ledge of the leader. The staff must be allowed to see through the 
mask. Otherwise, their loyalty can become blind. 
In order to function properly, the staff must be composed of 
men of high ability and intelligence who possess the coixrags to 
question and disagree with the commander. A premium must be placed 
on independence. It is up to the leader himself to make sure these 
requirements are satisfied. Few succeed. This failure to choose 
an independently minded staff is usually a result of character 
weaknesses on the part of the commander. It is easy to look to 
the staff as a convenient counterweight to criticism from outside and, 
therefore, to man it with officers whose obsequiousness can be 
assumed. Also, it is quite common for the commander to feel threatened 
by staff officers, since those officers are often the ones chosen 
to replace him in the event of failure. This causes the commander, 
consciously or subconsciously, to select men who are his intellectual 
inferiors, thus reducing the threat. Being surrounded by inferiors 
also boosts the ego of the commander and provides him with confirma- 
tion of his ability to lead. The quality of the staff is therefore 
often the best indicator of the commander's strength of character. 
Haig was, in 1905, at a critical point with regard to his on 
staff"policies. He recognised that modern war demanded a large, 
efficient staff. He was himself an excellent staff officer. But, 
during the Boer War and as Inspector General of Cavalry, he began for 
the first time to have a significant staff of his own. In choosing 
officers, he displayed many of the weaknesses outlined above. This 
is reflected in a letter to Henrietta: 
Alan Fletcher is to go to Cairo with the 17th before he 
comes out here. ... I am sorry you don't think much of 
his brain power as you doubt whether he is 'clever enough 
for the job'! The so called sharp people very often disap- 
point us or cheat or have some other draw back such as 
being disagreeable, bad-tempered, etc. All I require is 
people of average intelligence who are keen to do their 
work properly. Alan is well up to this standard and is 
most unselfish and tactful, so that I find it a pleasure 
to go about with him. 
1 
Fletcher became the model of the Staff officer Haig would employ 
for the rest of his career. As will be discussed in the last 
chapter and the epilogue, the men who made up Haig's Great War 
staff--launcelot Kiggell, John Davidson, and others--conformed to 
this model. Haig seems to have preferred blindly loyal, subservient 
staff officers to those capable of independent thoughts and actions. 
His main criterion when choosing a staff was to establish harmony. 
Honesty and integrity were therefore sacrificed in favour of 
smooth working conditions. As Haig saw it, the staff had to be a 
, band of brothers'. 
2 It is ironic that he could not tolerate men with 
the, same abilities and characteristics which he had earlier displayed 
as a staff officer. The tragedy of this weakness was that it negated 
the positive aspects of his progressive staff principles. A blindly 
loyal staff, no matter how highly organised or efficient, can be as 
dangerous as no staff at all. 
The'routine of Haig's service in India was broken in the summer 
'Haig to Henrietta, 1 September 1904. 
ZThis 
was Haig's favourite expression; with regard to the composi- 
tion of the staff. It was used throughout his writings on staff 
policy up to and including the Great War. He defined the term not 
simply as a harmonious group, but as a loyal body ready to follow 
and defend the dictates of the commander against interference from 
outside. This is discussed at length in the epilogue. See also a 
memo in the 1910 diary in which he writes 'The General Staff ... must be a band of brothers. ' 
of 1905 when he took leave in England. The visit was similar to a 
much-delayed'coming out: The social columnists welcomed the new 
entrant in the social round: 
A Fortunate Officer- 
General Douglas Haig ... is one of the most fortunate of 
the younger officers of the British Army. He is only forty- 
four years of age, and has seen plenty of active service. 
... General 
Haig, who is a very soldierly looking fellow, 
and almost rivals General Baden Powell as a cavalry expert, 
was in the famous battles of the Atbara and at Khartoum, 
and subsequently achieved no small distinction in South 
Africa, where- he was Deputy-, Assistant-, Adjutant-General of 
Cavalry. He was made a Major-General last year and few 
officers have such a promising future as he. 
The leave was full of engagements at the homes of influential 
friends and acquaintances. The level of activity was certainly a 
change from Haig's quieter habits of the past. The change was 
probably deliberate. Haig had reached a watershed in his career. 
As a young officer, he had been mainly interested in proving himself 
as a serious, determined professional. An active social life did 
not fit in with his designs. He could not risk appearing frivolous. 
By 1905, his reputation as a dedicated soldier was secure. An active 
social life then became possible, even advantageous. A familiar social 
profile was an asset to a major general in a way that it was not to 
a captain. Haig was expected to attend and to give parties. But 
the moderate approach which characterised him in the past was not 
" discarded. He continued to choose those with whom he mixed with 
the utmost care. He worked hard to be on intimate terms with the 
Royal Family.. ffis military friends were all of good background and 
traditional ideals. Politicians were avoided almost completely, 
2 
1Newspaper 
clipping from unknown paper contained in Haig Papers, 
A cc. 3155, No. 41. 
2The 
nearest Haig came to a friend from the political sector 
was Lord Esher, who, as would be expected, was without a political 
label. 
though at the same time he managed to avoid making political enemies 
in either party. 
It was in a similarly conscious way that Haig chose to marry 
during his leave. Previously, women had been a distraction, a 
danger or a bore. Suddenly, a wife became advantageous. A single 
gentleman of Haig's age and social standing was looked upon as 
either incomplete or somewhat curious. Once Haig opened his mind 
to marriage, he did not delay in finding an eligible partner to 
suit his requirements. A long, perhaps disastrous love affair 
simply did not fit in with his ambitious plans. He chose the 
Honourable Dorothy Maud Vivian, the first woman to whom he ever 
gave more than passing notice. A social columnist accurately 
described the courtship as 'A wooing not long a-doing': 
Major-General Douglas Haig, who has recently been the 
hero of an engagement, other than a martial one, received 
with his bride, the Hon. Dorothy Vivian, the honour of 
being married in the private chapel of Buckingham Palace. 
A good deal of romance surrounds the betrothal, for it is 
said General Haig and Miss Vivian only met for the first 
time on Monday of Ascot Week, were engaged the following 
Saturday, and married within a fortnight. ) 
In actual fact, the couple formally met over golf on Thursday of 
Ascot Week. They spent the next day together at the races, and 
played golf in the evening. Haig proposed on the golf course on 
Saturday, despite being forced to pose the important question 
on his feet, due to the absence of a convenient bench near to the 
hole the two were playing. They were married on 11 July. When 
questioned about his lack of deliberation, Haig is said to have 
replied that he frequently spent far less time over more important 
decisions. 
Despite the lack of deliberation, the marriage seems to have 
1Clipping from unknown newspaper, n. d., same source as previously 
cited. 
been successful, at least by the standards of the day. If ht first 
it could hardly have been a love match, it may have become one 
later. Far more important than emotions was the fact that M19 s 
Vivian suited Haig's professional and social requirements. She 
was of good family, the daughter of the 4th Baron Vivian. She had 
long and secure connections with the Royal Family, having served 
as Queen Alexandra's lady-in-waiting. Most importantly, she was fully 
prepared to play the role of the dutiful, discreet and supportive 
military wife. As Charteris described: 
Lady Haig fulfilled to perfection the difficult role that 
falls to the lot of the wife of a great man. She never 
interfered in official business, yet she was always there 
to help her husband. Her tact and intuition never failed. 
She was a discreet and sympathetic confidante and she 
strengthened his faith in his own power to overcome diffi- 
culties. She devoted every moment of her married life 
to her husband. 
Charteris went on to claim that 'Marriage brought to Haig completeness. 
" 
This is only partially true. In a social sense, his life became whole. 
But his marriage also caused a gap which would never be filled. 
The relationship with Henrietta, so important to Haig earlienAn 
his career, was never the same after he married. His letters to 
her became less frequent and dealt with more mundane topics. Henrietta 
had been her brother's confidante and mentor. She had meddled 
enthusiastically in his life and career, and she had had, on the 
" whole, a positive effect. Dorothy never completely filled Henrietta's 
role. She was less worldly-wise, scheming, self-confident and 
shrewd. Thus, while the marriage may have filled an emotional and 
social gap in Haig's life, professionally. it left him more alone. 
After his marriage, Haig was not eager to return to India. for 
the final year of his term. His reasons were professional rather 
1Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 32. 
than personal. The British Army was at this time entering 
a period 
of drastic reform. Haig wanted to make sure that the changes conformed 
to his wishes. He realised that he could not exert adequate 
influence while far away in India. He therefore tried, through 
his various connections, to land an appointment at the War Office. 
As indicated in the 6 August 1905 letter from French, these efforts 
failed: 
You know we have been trying very hard to work you into 
that appointment, but now there is no doubt you will have 
go back to India for a short time ... 
The King sent for me at Goodwood and asked me whether I 
thought there was any chance of you being appointed, so 
as to prevent your going to India. He was very keen 
about it and told me to make an appointment with Arnold- 
Forster and urge upon him the necessity for arranging the 
matter at once. 
I saw A. F. on Friday ... I feel quite certain A. F. thinks 
that the King is trying to push you into that appointment 
simply on personal grounds, and because you and your wife 
are particular friends of his. Like all political intriguers, 
he is always suspicious, and thinks people are acting as he 
would probably act in similar circumstances. 1 
The position to which French referred was the Director of Staff 
Duties. The incumbent was General Hutchinson, who still had time 
left on his term of office. Arnold-Forster, the Secretary of 
State for War, argued that Hutchinson had done nothing to warrant 
his replacement by Haig. On this occasion, the King's influence 
had ironically hindered Haig from landing a position to which, as 
was later proved, he was well-suited. 
After he returned to India, Haig continued to focus his 
attention on a position at the War Office. Though he claimed that 
he was willing to stay in the country until the end of his term, 
in truth he was burning to get back to Britain as early as possible. 
'French to Haig, 6 August 1905, Haig Papers, NLS", Acc". 3155, No. 
334(e). 
This does not contradict his usual devotion to duty. Haig believed 
that he had special talents which were greatly in need at this 
critical time. His duty, as he saw it, lay in England. His 
friends at home had the same views, as indicated by the 26 November 
1905 letter from Esher to Kitchener: 
I am confident that you would do well to install Douglas 
Haig in the W. O. in London. for a couple of years. He 
would be the most valuable link which could be formed 
between you and the government at home. ... I know 
that you would be sorry to lose him in India, but I feel 
certain that for your own purposes he would be more valu- 
able in London. 1 
A short time later, Haig described in a letter to Henrietta how 
Esher had ä. ctively lobbied the new Secretary of State, Richard 
Burdon Haldane: 
I received a letter from Esher this morning cracking up 
Haldane the new S. of S. for War like anything. Then 
towards the end of the letter he writes: 'There is only 
one change, not yet made, which Haldane must make. It is 
to put you in Hutchinson's place. I have never let him 
alone for a day since he took office on this subject. ' 
'If yoou get back here in that place for two years--the 
whole tone of Army officers and their Education will 
have undergone a change, which will recast the Army. ' 
I merely copy the latter para. to please yöu as you 
like hearing me buttered up--and send you the first para, 
to show that mY friends at home are still anxious to get 
me at the W. O. 
Though Haig claimed that 'personally I am quite happy in India', 3 
in truth he believed that every thy he spent there increased the 
risk of an Army which did not suit his designs. His letters were 
dominated by the subject of Army reform and his future role in it. 
He finally left India on 12 May 1906, five months prior to his 
end of term. 
1Esher to Kitchener, 26 November 1905, Kitchener Papers, PRO 
30/57/33/AA3. 
2H. 
aig to Henrietta, 11 January 1906. 
Ibid. 
While a modern, efficient Army structure dominated Haig's mind 
before he. managed to leave India, the tactical lessons he stressed 
there remained decidedly antoquated. The best examples of this 
tendency are found in the staff tours which he organised. It will 
be remembered that Barrow once commented that one could always 
tell upon seeing Haig's plan for a ride which text he had last read. 
In India, every tour was based on a cavalry action of the all-too- 
distant past, culled from Haig's out-of-date cavalry manuals. 
i 
There 
was no attempt to hypothesise on the nature of possible future 
cavalry actions, and organise tours accordingly. Thus there is 
again the duality in Haig's make-up: the tours were modern phenomena 
used to advance obsolete principles. Three particular rides illustrate 
Haig's approach. The first was hold at Aurangaba, d. Haig described 
the focus of the exercise as follows: 
A 'Decisive Battle' the real object in War--Strategical 
Preparation--Selection of a 'Primary' and a 'Secondary' 
Theatre of War, and Use of Entrenched Depots, illustrated 
by 1809. --Measures to be taken with regard to a 'Buffer 
State'--Employment of the Cavalry Divisions and of the 
Army Cavalry up to the 'Decisive Battle'. 
A second tour took place at Medak, and was similarly oriented: 
The Operations of a Containing Force in a 'Secondary' 
Theatre of War-- Notes on Prince Eugene's Campaign in 
Italy, 1809. 
The same reliance on the past can be seen in the third battles 
The Strategical Employment of Cavalry covering the Con- 
centration of the Main Army to one Flank--Notes on the 
Ulm Campaign, 1805.2 
The principles demonstrated by these rides were not all obsolete, 
though many definitely were. But by relying exclusively on pre- 
1870 examples in all of the tours, Haig displayed what seems an 
'See the 1905 diary for a list of Haig's favourite cavalry texts, 
the majority of which were published before the Franco-Prussian War. 
2Douglas Haig, Cavalry Studies, (London: Hugh Rees, 1907), p. viii, is the source for all three descriptions. 
intentional disregard for the technological revolution in warfare 
which had been underway for some time. 
The tours listed above were described, along with two others, 
in Cavalry Studies, which Haig published in 1907 with the help of 
Lonsdale Hale. The book is mostly too technical for this study. 
Its Introduction does, however, provide a valuable synopsis of 
Haig's cavalry theories, and of his aims in the book. In the 
opening pages, he clearly stated his thesis. War, he argued, was 
growing larger and more technical. This meant that cavalry's role 
would change in a similar fashion. The best way to understand this 
change was through staff rides. This is what Haig attempted to 
accomplish in India. His book was a compilation of his findings 
from these tours. 
Haig claimed that the Indian tours demonstrated three future 
formations for cavalry. The first was Independent Cavalry, composed 
of small groups of horseman, and designed mainly for reconnaissance. 
The second was Protective Cavalry; these were medium-sized units 
designed as a first line of security for the army behind it. These 
two formations were not new. They covered the duties which cavalry 
had fulfilled throughout its history. The third formation, Divisional 
Cavalry, was a unique concept, at least in Britain. The British 
Cavalry had never been organised on a scale larger than brigades. 
The Divisional formation was to comprise three brigades, which would 
in turn be structured according to standard patterns. This formation 
was designed for bold offence. It will be remembered that after 
Kimberley Haig had advised Hale that the British Cavalry should be 
expanded to 'At least two Divisions complete'. This meant that its 
size would be more than doubled. Haig justified this increase by 
arguing that 'The war of masses necessitates mass tactics. ' The 
organisation and training of cavalry had to adjust to this 'fact. 
To do otherwise would be 'vain, uncertain and harmful'. 
' 
Aside from the continued insistence upon cavalry's ability for 
bold offence, there was nothing unreasonable in Haig's arguments up 
to this point. He recognised that cavalry had two basic roles, 
the 'Service of Information'-or to 'discover', and the 'Service of 
Security'--or to 'cover'. 
2 These duties remained relevant and 
important. Haig was also correct when he argued, a few paragraphs 
later, that able leadership was decisive in cavalry actions. Since 
speed and mobility were essent l in cavalry operations, the officer 
had to be able to make rapid decisions and maintain order under 
extreme circumstances. Time and technology had not measurably 
changed this fact either. Nor was Haig wrong when he quoted G. F. R. 
Henderson on the overall importance of cavalry: 
Infantry and Artillery ... unaccompanied by Cavalry, 
if opposed by a force complete in all arms, are practi- 
cally helpless, always liable to surprise, and, whether 
attacking or defending, hampered by ignorance of the 
enemy's movements and bewildered by uncertainty. ... It is essential, then, for decisive success, that every 
force which takes the field against a organised enemy 
should be composed of the three arms. 
In 1907, when Cavalry Studies was published, the tank was simply 
a fantasy in the minds of quack scientists and eccentric novelists. 
The horse remained the only reliable source of mobility on the 
battlefield. Until a better source could be developed, the arm would 
remain essential, despite the whittling away of some of its functions 
by modern weaponry. 
In trying to assess the future role of cavalry, Haig paved his 





way with two basic assumptions. The first was that the cavalry was 
indispensable; the second that war was becoming larger in scope. 
From these correct assumptions, he concluded that the role of 
cavalry would increase, that 'large armies entail large numbers of 
cavalry'. 
1 It was here that his reasoning began to falter. He 
was for some reason unable to understand that though time had not 
altered cavalry's indispensability, it had drastically changed the 
arm's nature and duties. In other words, Haig embraced the future 
by, as usual, taking refuge in the past. In so doing he ignored the 
important technological developments which had occurred during the 
course of his career. It did not require extraordinary insight to 
see that the rifle and the machine gun had revolutionised warfare. 
War had become not only larger, but also more deadly, more technical 
and more impersonal. By ignoring all but the first change, Haig drew 
a curtain over his understanding of modern tattios. 
Evidence of these limitations in his ability to understand the 
technological revolution in warfare can be found toward the end of 
the introduction to Cavalry Studies. In rebutting the allegation that 
the 'day of the cavalry is past', Haig argued as follows: 
The role of the Cavalry on the battlefield will always go 
on increasing because-- 
1) The extended nature of the modern battlefield means 
that there will be a greater choice of cover to favour 
the concealed approach of Cavalry. 
2) The increased range and killing power of modern guns, 
and the greater length of time during which battles will 
last, will augment the moral exhaustion, will affect men's 
nerves more, and produce greater demoralisation amongst 
the troops. These factors contribute to promote panic 
and to render troops (short-service soldiers nowadays) ripe 
for attack by Cavalry. 
3) The longer the range and killing power of modern arms, 
the more important will rapidity of movement become, because 
it lessens the relative time of exposure to danger in favour 
'Haig, Cavalry Studies, p. 4. 
of the Cavalry. 
4) The introduction of the small bore rifle, the bullet 
from which has little stopping power against the horse. 
Haig went on to reiterate cavalry's importance as a moral weapon. 
He claimed that the arm would continue to play a part in every 
phase of the battle--'in the prologue, the principal act and 
the denouement'. 
2 Finally, he re-stated his belief in the continued 
viability of the charge, the arme blanche and the cavalry spirit. 
'All great successes', he wrote, 'can only be gained by a force of 
Cavalry which is trained to harden its heart and charge home. '3 
The above four points have been used by Haig's critics as a 
noose by which to hang him for the carnage of the Great War. Haig's 
proponents have either ignored Cavalry Studies or stumbled badly in 
their explanation of it. Yet both groups have missed the real signi- 
ficance of the book. There is no direct correlation between it and 
the tactics employed by Haig in the Great War. Haig did not send 
cavalrymen to a horrible death on the Western Front because he had 
little faith in the killing-power of modern rifles. He did not even 
pursue what could be seen as a cavalry-oriented strategy. He did 
not do so because war had, while his back was turned, changed so 
radically that it did not offer him the opportunity to make these 
mistakes. The importance of the four points, and indeed of Cavalry 
Studies as a whole, is that they were the terminus of his tactical 
thinking. The belief that 'the role of the cavalry ... will always 
go on increasing' implied a belief in the immutability of the type 
of battle which Haig first experienced at Elandslaagte. This was 




a battle in the tradition of the great military leaders whom Haig 
had studied throughout his career. But the machine gun, modern 
artillery, limited battlefields, huge citizen armies, barbed wire, 
gas, and other developments negated many of the sacred military 
truths which underlay this type of battle. Haig's stubborn 
insistence upon their continued relevance seriously hindered his 
absorption and understanding of the monumental changes in military 
science which were in progress. The era demanded an extraordinarily 
open mind, not one clouded by the tenets of Napoleon and Frederick the 
Great. While Haig had been by nature slow to accept change, his mind 
had been slammed shut at Kimberley. Only a dreadful, new type of war 
could slowly wrench it open. 
CHAPTER VIII 
Haig at the War Office, 1906-1909 
The Boer War taught Britain two main lessons. The first was 
that her isolation was neither splendid nor safe. The second was 
that her army was a disorganised, inefficient and old-fashioned 
institution. It was hardly suited for its intended task of defending 
the Empire and was certainly no match for the large conscript armies 
on the continent. Britain responded well to both of these lessons. 
There arose a feverish desire to bring both army and country into 
harmony with the twentieth century. In the diplomatic sphere, 
friendly overtures were made to France and Japan. In the military, 
there was widespread support for drastic reform. It was accepted that 
to implement this reform, men of intelligence and foresight--true 
military professionals--were desperately needed. 
As was discussed earlier, the Boer War had two major effects upon 
Haig. The first was that it confirmed his belief in antt'quated 
tactical principles. In tactical terms, therefore, he was. liot the 
man of foresight and wisdom which the country required. But he 
had always been a talented administrator. He recognised the need 
for widespread changes in the Army's organisational structure. The 
Boer War underlined this need. And because the war enabled Haig to 
be recognised as a promising young soldier (the second effect) he 
was able to put his administrative talents to good use. Timing was 
therefore crucial at this stage in Haig's career. At a time when 
the focus of reform was structural rather than tactical, Haig happened 
to be in a position to be recognised. The Boer War revealed the 
British Army as a sick institution and Haig as one of the few 
qualified doctors. 
The basic administrative defect of the British Army revealed 
by the Boer War was the absence of a streamlined bureaucracy designed 
to handle all the exigencies of an army at war. The Army had, over 
the centuries, evolved without a plan; there had never been a blue- 
print for its structure or wartime expansion. This meant that in war, 
the onus was on the chief commander to make operations run smoothly 
and successfully. If he failed or if the task grew too large for 
him, there were no reliable administrative institutions below or 
above him to compensate for his inadequacies. Such was the case in 
South Africa, where Sir Redvers Buller quickly proved himself incapable 
of handling the vast responsibilities of an army at war. When Roberts 
and Kitchener took over, matters improved, but the Army was never- 
theless ill-equipped to expand to the size required to defeat the 
Boers. 
It was clear that effective reform had to begin at the top. There 
was no point in changing specific institutions; the Army was defective 
throughout. Broad-scale changes were proposed as early as 1889-90 
by the Hartington Commission. This body concluded that the office 
of Commander-in-Chief had to be replaced by an administrative organ-- 
composed of men with separate, well-defined responsibilities--with a 
neatly subdivided bureaucracy below it. The problem with the office 
of Commander-in-Chief was that it wedded the administrative and the 
executive in a single man. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible 
for both the formulation and the implementation of Army policy. In 
neither responsibility was he aided by a coordinated group of able 
assistants. Such concentration is unthinkable in a modern, profes- 
sional army. But widespread reform of the type required had two 
prerequisites. The first was the abolition of the post of Commander- 
in-Chief. As long as the office was held by the Duke of Cambridge-- 
who occupied it for thirty-nine years--change was impossible. The 
Duke not only abhorred reform; he also retained, to the very end of 
his term, the power to block all reforming movements. He was perceptive 
enough to realise that reform would have meant the end of the Army 
as he knew it (and therefore the end of his role in it) and selfish 
enough to place personal desires before the good of his country 
and army. When the Duke left office in 1896, the second prerequisite 
came into play. What then became necessary was a Secretary of State 
for War clever enough to sort out the vast bureaucratic morass and 
astute enough to overcome conservative obstructionism in Parliament 
and Army. 
It was one thing to propose a new, efficient Army structure, 
and it was another to find men to staff it. The need for well-trained 
staff officers was another deficiency revealed by the Boer War. The 
organs for change in this area already existed. The Staff College 
had been founded over fifty years earlier. It had only to expand 
its output and improve its product. But this was not an easy task. 
It was made difficult by the widespread and persistent prejudices 
within the Army against the College, its graduates and the whole 
idea of professionalisation. These prejudices were discussed in 
Chapter IV. Though matters had improved, the College was to an extent 
stuck in its traditional vicious circle. It could not improve its 
product unless it consistently attracted promising officers. It 
could not attract these officers unless it could offer them presti- 
gious staff appointments and accelerated promotion. It could not make 
this promise because among senior officers patronage and favouritism 
were still the rule. It could not change this attitude unless it 
offered a more attractive product. The only way to break this 
vicious circle was through a complete change of attitude at every level 
of the Army. 
The inadequacies revealed by the Boer War were not confined to 
the administrative sphere. Britain required, at the peak of the war, 
450,000 men to defeat the Boers. This virtually exhausted-the avail- 
able reserves and left the homeland essentially undefended. Since 
a European conflagration in which Britain would play a part looked 
more and more likely as the new century progressed, a dependable 
reserve army, capable of expansion upon mobilisation, became a 
priority. But it was infinitely more difficult to build such a 
force in Britain than it was in France or Germany, where million- 
man armies had existed for some time. With conscription and short- 
service, mass armies were automatic. In Britain, a force on the 
continental model was impossible for two reasons. One was the 
British reluctance in the early years of the century to spend more 
than £28 million per year on her Army. A second, more significant, 
reason was the traditional British abhorrence of the standing army. 
Lord Roberts' tireless efforts on behalf of a universal service bill 
before 1914 only demonstrated that conscription was impossible in 
peacetime. The size of the reserve force was therefore limited by 
the Government's willingness to pay for it and the population's 
willingness to volunteer for it. 
All of these problems were highlighted by the possibility of 
a massive European war. The Anglo-French accord of 1904 and the 
continuing Anglo-German naval rivalry made British participation 
in such a conflict almost certain. Haig, for instance, looked 
upon the Germans as the enemy as early as 1898 when he was travelling 
down the Nile on the way to the Sudan. 
' Since Britain could not hope 
to match the military power of the German Army, the help of the 
Empire would be essential. This necessity gave rise to a whole new 
set of administrative problems, ranging from the need for similar 
weaponry to the necessity for pre-determined channels of command 
1See Chapter V, page 148. 
and standardised tactics and strategy. Uniformity was imperative. 
But uniformity required cooperation, and the institutions for 
fostering this cooperation did not exist. 
The British military effort in South Africa was examined by 
one Select Committee and two Royal Commissions. All of the above- 
mentioned general reforms, in addition to a multitude of specific 
measures, were recognised as essential. The Select Committee, chaired 
by Clinton Dawkins, met while the war was still in progress. It out- 
lined the need for a more decentralised military authority and better 
cooperation between the government and the military. The first 
Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Elgin, met in the autumn of 1902 
and studied the conduct of the war. Few sectors of the Army escaped 
criticism. The Army was condemned for its lack of preparation, poor 
leadership, outdated equipment, faulty training and inadequate staff 
work. The leaders were especially blamed for failing to listen to 
the advice of their intelligence staffs, the latter being the only 
group to receive praise. Following the Elgin Report, a committee 
chaired by the Duke of Norfolk found similar faults in the command, 
training and supply of Britain's auxiliary forces.. -the Militia, 
Yeomanry and Volunteers. 
1 
The conclusions of these various studies could not be ignored by 
the government of A. J. Balfour. There was general agreement that 
drastic reforms were imperative. Balfour responded by setting up 
a three man committee, headed by Lord Esher, which was asked to make 
1The 
main source for this chapter is Edward Spiers' Haldane: An 
Army Reformer, (Edinburgh University Press, 1980). Other sources 
used are J. Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British 
Military Strategy 1900-191. (London: Routledge and Ke n Paul, 1974); 
Stephen Koss, Lord Haldane; Sca a oat for Liberalism, 
(NNew 
York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969); A. J. Anthony-Morris 'Haldane's 
Army Reforms 1906-08', History, Vol. 56 (February 19715; dmd'; S. Bond, 
'Richard Burdon Haldane at the War Office', Army Quarterly, Vol. 86, (April-July 1963). 
recommendations for specific changes. 
I 
Esher, who had a deep concern 
for the Army, plunged enthusiastically into this task. He produced 
three massive reports in four months. The main recommendation of 
the Esher Committee was the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief 
by an Army Council. The Council was to include four military heads 
of department (Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General, Vaster 
General of Ordnance and Quartermaster General) and three civilians 
(the Secretary of State for War, Parliamentary Under Secretary and 
Financial Secretary). This was obviously the first requirement in any 
broad program of reform. In addition, the Esher Committee recom- 
mended the establishment of a General Staff on the German model, 
manned by well-trained professionals. The General Staff was to be 
not simply an administrative, but also a policy-forming body. Below 
the Army Council, each separate department would be divided into 
directorates, each with its own area; of concern. For instance, 
underneath the CGS would be the Director of Military Training (DMT), 
the Director of Staff Duties (DSD) and the Director of Military Opera- 
tions (DM0). The other three Military Members of Council would have 
their departments similarly subdivided. Finally, Esher recommended 
a clean sweep of top Army commanders--men who, he feared, would 
otherwise obstruct progress. 
Esher's advice was both wise and workable. It proposed the 
neatly compartmentalised structure which was essential in both 
war and peace. It also separated the executive from the administrative, 
and removed the possibility of one man, the Commander-in-Chief, 
acting as a drag on progress. Balfour accepted Esher's recommendations. 
On 3 February 1904, the Army Council was set up and the post of 
0 
1The 
other members of the Committee were Admiral Sir' John Fisher 
and Sir George Clarke, previously Governor of Victoria. 
Commander-in-Chief abolished. The Army Council was then supposed 
to implement the other changes propose by Esher. But progree ground 
to a halt. Balfour's Secretary of State for War, H. 0. Arnold-Forster, 
was sincerely interested in reform, but did not possess the political 
muscle to push it through. He was further hampered by an Army 
Council whose first members were weak men ill-suited to the gigantic 
tasks which faced them. The Chief of the General Staff, Sir Neville 
Lyttleton, was a dedicated soldier who unfortunately did not possess 
the energy, insight and imagination required at this critical time. 
Furthermore, Arnold-Forster faced stiff opposition from within his 
own party. His efforts at reform are a sad and complicated story 
of governmental muddle which it is not necessary to elucidate here. 
When the Conservatives were defeated in January 1906, few of the 
Esher recommendations, aside from the disappointing Army Council, had 
been implemented. 
Haig first reacted to the prospect of reform with eagerness 
balanced by scepticism. He had complete confidence in Esher, but 
he was wary of any scheme in which politicians--whom he distrusted 
as a group--were involved. His confidence was bolstered by an 
early letter from Esher in which the proposals of the committee were 
explained: 
We meet everyday in the W. O. and have done a good deal of work 
at high pressure. The ideas are, to approach all reform from 
the point of view of War. This is a novelty in War Office 
procedure. We want to make it an organisation for War, adapt- 
able to Peace. Hýtherto, the position has been very different, 
as you well. know. 
1Haig's doubts about the possibility of politicians effecting 
military reform can be seen in a 25 October 1901 letter to Brinsley 
Fitzgerald: 'The Army still seems as far off being "reformed" as 
ever: these politicians talk too much and ... "deeds not words" is what is wanted. ' Fitzgerald Papers, PP/MR/118/1/1. 
Esher to Haig, 12 January 1904, Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, 
No. 334(e). 
0 
These ideals were similar to Haig's own. Preparation for 
war, and 
the acceptance of the Army as an institution designed to fight wars, 
were at the heart of Haig's military doctrine. The Army, he believed 
should never be embarrassed by its aggressive potential, but should 
develop, even flaunt, it. This is what he had stressed in his 
exercises, training programs and staff tours since his early days 
as an adjutant. 
In the same letter mentioned above, Esher explained the Army 
Council scheme and the other proposals contained in the committee's 
reports. He confided that when the recommendations were implemented, 
'we hope to sweep out the old lot and put in new men'. Haig agreed 
with this policy. He was eager to see the Army's vast collection of 
dead wood--men who caused him such grief in South Africa--reduced. 
He was especially delighted that Esher had him in mind as one of the 
new men: 
I wish to goodness we could get you as Q$ ... but it 
would be a crime to take you away from what you are doing, 
and put you at a desk. 
Still, of thoughtful, broad-minded soldiers there is a singu- 
lar dearth. Perhaps you have no conception how barren is 
the land here: And without good men, the machine--however 
you construct it--is bound to creak. I believe that you, 
more than any, have thought out problems. If ever you 
falsify the hopes you hav? raised in all those who care for 
the Army, woe betide you! 
Haig had the same confidence in his own potential, the same lack 
of faith in the majority of the Army's senior officers. It was, 
however, unrealistic of Esher to see Haig as a possible QMG. What- 
ever his talents, he was, at the age of forty-two, far too young for 
so senior a post. 
The Esher letter started Haig on a period of intense speculation 
regarding the reform of the Army and his role in it. He at first had 
1Esher 
to Haig, 12 January 1904. 
high hopes that Esher's plans would result in positive change. For 
instance, he cautioned Henrietta not to be dismayed by the initial 
turmoil which had resulted: 
Of course there must be some confusion in the War Office 
at home after such a thorough shaking up, but I doubt 
whether it is right to call it 'chaos'. Throw into a tank 
a number of bodies of various sizes and weights, and you have 
the present state of affairs. There is bound to be a 'settling 
down' and a rearrangement of bodies which have got into unsuit- 
able places. But I feel sure that the system of Army Control 
which has been started is a sound one. ' 
After his summer leave in 1905, this attitude changed. Haig began to 
lose faith in Arnold Forster's ability to implement the Esher pro- 
posals. His dismay was aggravated by the failure of Esher, French 
and the King to secure him a post at the War Office. ' A note of 
bitterness crept into his letters: 
I have heard nothing at all about getting a place on the 
Army Council and at present I don't think a sedentary life 
would altogether suit me. 2 
This appears to have been sour grapes, as evidenced by his claim 
a few weeks later that 'I don't much care whether I go to the War 
Office or not at present. '3 Haig probably remained as interested as 
ever, though he protected himself against disappointment in case 
his willingness to assist in the reforms was ignored. Ile may also 
have been trying to distance himself, consciously or subconsciously, 
from a scheme which seemed destined to fail. 
The failure of Arnold Forster demonstrated the earlier stated 
second prerequisite for broad-scale change: a man with the political 
expertise to steer a new system past the conservative obstruction 
in Parliament and the Army. It is ironic that the man who finally 
1Haig to Henrietta, 1 September 1905. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 25 October 1905. 
3Haig 
to Henrietta, 13 December 1905. 
succeeded, Richard Burdon Haldane, was a member of the traditionally 
pacific Liberal Party who had little experience in military matters 
and who did not even want to be Secretary of State for War. Haldane 
at first had no intention of serving in a cabinet headed by Sir 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman. When a deal was made which paved the way 
for his serving, Haldane at first set his sights on the Home Office, 
but was disappointed. He reluctantly accepted the War Office, but, 
having done so, devoted himself to it entirely. 
Haldane was perhaps Britain's greatest Secretary of State for 
War. Nevertheless, this possibility should not be allowed to 
cloud the realities and limitations of his administration. He was, 
quite possibly, his own greatest admirer. Because of the post-1918 
efforts to find a scapegoat for the British failures in the Great 
War, he had a special need for self-glorification. As Spiers points 
out, the autobiographies which Haldane published after the war are 
of questionable historical value because he was 
... an author intent on self-justification. Haldane had incurred more than criticism of his reforms; he had become 
the object of a sustained personal attack in the popular 
press. He had chosen, ultimately, to reply in a highly 
personalised and polemical fashion. He had proved himself 
as able as ever in marshalling evidence and in constructing 
a lucid account. Yet his method of presentation and the 
context in which the work was produced must raise doubts 
about its value as historical evidence. The possibility of 
bias, or over-simplification, whether intentional or other- 
wise, cannot be excluded. 
The autobiographies reveal the legal skills of their author. The 
arguments are so convincing that a number of historians have been 
fooled. Stephen Koss, for instance, has reacted to Haldane's per- 
suasiveness and his ill-treatment after the war by giving him too 
iSpiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, p. 27. The autobiographies 
referred to are Before the War, London: Cassell and Company, 1927) 
and Autobiography (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929). The former 
contains the most information on the period of Army reform. 
much praise and credit for the military reforms insituted during 
his term at the liar Office. 
1 
It must be emphasised that Haldane did not originally intend 
to prepare Britain for wax, despite his post-war claims to the 
contrary: 
I became aware at once that there was a new army problem. 
It was, how to mobilise and concentrate at a place of 
assembly to be opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calcu- 
lated as adequate ... to make up for the inadequacies of 
the French armies for their great task of defending the 
entire French frontier. 2 
Haig is also guilty of encouraging this misconception. After the 
war, he dedicated a volume of his despatches to Haldane, 'in 
grateful remembrance of his successful efforts in or&. nising the 
Military Forces for a War on the Continent. '3 Though this may have 
been the effect of Haldane's efforts, it was not their intent. 
The intent was to make the Army as efficient and professional 
as possible within the strict limits of a low budget and a national 
abhorrence of compulsory service. These restrictions, not the 
requirements of a continental strategy (as Haldane later claimed), 
were the guidelines for reform. Spiers calls Haldane's post-war 
claims 'utter fabrications': 
... the paucity of the British Expeditionary Force was 
not an example of prescient thought about troop disposi- 
tions on the Western Front. The size of that force did 
not relate to a strategy, Continental or otherwise ... Any speculation about the strategic role or the military 
capability of the Force was merely an attempt to ration- 
alize a body, earmarked for war, whose sze was determined 
by the exigencies of peacetime criteria. 
1Sbe Koss, Haldane: Scapegoat for Liberalism. 
2Haldane, Before the War, pp. 30-31. 
3Quoted 
in Marshall-Cornwall, Haig as a Military Commander, p. 76. 
4Spiers, 
Haldane: An A rmyReformer, p. 192. 
Haldane reformed the Army according to his own pragmatic apprecia- 
tion of the possibilities. This reformed Army then prepared for 
war. The distinction is subtle, but important. Had Haldane intended 
to prepare for a continental war, he would have pushed for larger 
Army estimates and a compulsory service law. He would have paid 
closer attention to strategy and tactics, areas which, as will be 
seen, he virtually ignored. Had he pursued these wider goals, he 
most likely would have failed. He achieved the maximum possible. 
His reform program was a political solution to a military problem. 
As such, it was incomplete. 
It must also be emphasised that Haldane was not the author of 
the reforms credited to him. Most were those which Esher had proposed 
earlier. Some originated with the Hartington Commission. In other 
words, when Haldane arrived at the War Office, the framework for 
reform had already been decided for him. His problem was not to create 
but to implement--to fit the predetermined changes into the political, 
social, and military context. This is where his predecessors had 
failed. 
Haldane also benefited from a number of advantages which his 
predecessors did not have. Aside from his greater talents as a 
politician, he was aided by a large Liberal majority which provided 
him with five peaceful years in which to work. The fervour for 
drastic and immediate reform which put excessive pressure on 
Arnold-Forster had also abated somewhat by 1906. This gave Haldane 
an environment which facilitated a slow and smooth transformation. 
His lack of experience turned out to be an advantage as he could 
approach the problems with a completely open mind. He had the time, 
the patience and the will to make great progress. In his words, 
he came to the War Office: 
... as a young and blushing virgin 
just united to a' 
bronzed warrior, and ... it was not expected by the 
public that any result of the union would appear until 
at least nine months had passed. 1 
He used the time to good effect. His greatest asset was perhaps his 
willingness to listen to the 'bronzed warriors'. His mind was open 
enough to recognise sound advice when it was proffered. The advice 
he received, from Haig and others, was central to his eventual 
success. 
When Haldane took office, Haig's previous, pessimism was replaced 
by cautious optimism. 'Haldane cannot be worse than Arnold-Forster 
and he must have some pluck to take over the post of Secretary of 
['ar'2, Haig wrote on 13 December 1905. A while later Esher wrote 
that he had complete faith in Haldane and that he 'had never let him 
alone for a day'3 on the subject of a War Office appointment for Haig. 
At the same time that Esher was persuading Haldane, French was putting 
pressure on the King. Haig's enthusiasm for reform consequently 
returned. He became confident that Haldane would succeed, a confidence 
that was bolstered by a reasonable certainty that he would be around 
to assist: 
I had a long letter from French by last mail dated 14th 
January in which he writes 'I think there is every chance 
of the billet about which we talked being vacant within the 
next 6 or 8 months, and then there is no doubt about your 
being called upon to fill it. ' ... 'You may hope to be installed in Pall Fall by next autumn. ' 
This, I think, will be a very good arrangement for Doris 
and me ... 
Every one I hear from in the soldiering line at home, 
speaks well of Haldane, so the advent of the radicals is 
certainly of great advantage to the Army, in substituting 
him for Arnold-Forster. French seems to like him very much; 
1Quoted in Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 39. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 13 December 1905. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 11 January 1906. (Quoted in Chapter VII, p. 262). 
and the 'Army Councillors', Hubert Hamilton writes me, 
have now the spirits of schoolboys home for their holi- 
days. ' So for now at any rate things seem to be going 
well for the Army. 1 
French was referring to the Directorate of Staff Duties, the post 
he tried to secure for Haig in the summer of 1905. The incumbent, 
H. D. Hutchinson, was due to leave the Directorate in October, at which 
time Haig could take his place. 
Haldane suddenly changed these plans. He appointed Haig to the 
Directorate of Military Training, with the understanding that he would 
remain there for about a year and then be moved to the DSD. Haldane 
planned in this way to apply Haig's administrative expertise to a wide 
variety of areas. Once he had completed all that he could do in one 
directorate, he would be moved to the other. Haig was pleased with 
the idea, as evidenced by his 28 March letter to his sister: 
About a week ago I got two letters from Esher and one from 
General Lyttleton offering me the Directorate of Training. 
The former said Mr. Haldane was very anxious for me to come 
home and assist in the schemes of reorganisation, and both 
he and the King were desirous that I should accept the billet. 
Altho' called 'Training' the department also deals with 'War 
Organisation' and 'Home Defence' so that now it is the most 
important Directorate in the General Staff at the present 
time. 2 
A few days later he wrote: 
... it is a very great honour to be sent for at this 
critical time to help to decide the future organisation of 
the Empire's forces. So I ought to be thought very lucky. 3 
After a few minor complications regarding his date of appointment 
and his salary, Haig finally left India and arrived in London on 
1 June 1906. 
Haig was lucky. The timing of his long-awaited appointment was 
1Haig to Henrietta, 8 February 1906. 
2Haig to Henrietta, 29 March 1906. 
3Haig to Henrietta, 3 April 1906. 
crucial. Had he been appointed DSD in 1905, his role in the 
Army reform, and his subsequent career, would have been very dif- 
ferent. He would then have been tainted by the failures of Arnold- 
Forster. Haldane was eager to make a fresh start in terms of the 
men who advised him. When he came to the War Office, he replaced 
many officers, such as Herbert Plumer, whose minds were clouded by 
the ideas and ways of his predecessor. He might therefore have rid 
himself of Haig. Or, if Haig had been allowed to stay, it is unlikely 
that Haldane would have relied upon him to the extent which he eventu- 
ally did. Timing was important in other respects. By arriving in 
June, Haig came to the War Office six months after Haldane. The 
initial turmoil had by that time abated. Haldane was clear about 
what he wanted to do and what he wanted from Haig. When Haig arrived 
his duties were therefore clear. He could set to work with a minimum 
of preliminary orientation. Also, by the time Haig arrived, Haldane 
--due to the fulsome praise of Esher and French-had such a high 
opinion of Haig that he was prepared to give him maximum responsibi- 
lity. For Haig, DMT was hardly more than a title. His responsibilities 
went far beyond the formal duties of that office or, later, of the 
DSD. His real role was to act as trusted advisor to Haldane whenever, 
and in whatever capacity, required. As a result, he played a major 
part in every aspect of the Haldane reform program. 
Bolstered by the praise of French and Esher, and his own high 
opinion of himself, Haig returned to Britain confident that he was 
to play a major role in the Army's and the country's future. The 
ambitions of his youth were being gloriously fulfilled. His belief 
in his illustrious destiny was further reinforced by a visit to a 
spiritualist a few months after his return. As evidenced by the fol- 
lowing uncharacteristically lengthy diary entry, Haig was impressed by 
the medium's information: 
At 3 p. m. went with Henrietta to see a medium, Miss 
McCreadie ... 
She first gave her opinion on a letter re 
Bee's business--next secured a letter from me from Col. 
Ellison--she noticed my influence on the latter. I had 
come recently from abroad and was now settling down. Seemed 
to be drawing a great force around me which would be of 
assistance in the new Scheme. Ellison is most trustworthy 
fellow but lacked self-confidence. She thought a 'company 
basis' better than a 'battalion basis' for expansion of Terri- 
torial Army. Then I gave her a letter from Mr. Haldane (the 
S. of S. ). She said he was a 'very clever man'. Honest and 
far-seeing and would fight to bring people round to his opinions. 
Asked by Henrietta about me (before she went under control) she 
said she felt I wanted magnetism and had been unwell but was 
getting better. It seemed as if I would go abroad after a 
time for some special object of a wide and important nature. 
Much would depend on me. Then when under control by a little 
native girl 'Sunshine' she said that I was influenced by 
several spirits: notably a small man named Napoleon aided me. 
That it was in my power to be helped by him for good affairs 
but I might repel him if his influence was for bad, tho' he 
had become changed for better in the spirit world. I was 
destined to do much good and to benefit my country. Asked 
by me how to ensure the Territorial Army Scheme being a suc- 
cess, she said thought governed the world. Think out the 
scheme thoroughly, one's thoughts would then be put in so 
convincing a manner that the people would respond (without 
any compulsion) and the National Army would be a reality. 
She could not bring Napoleon to me when I wanted but I must 
think of him and try and get his aid as he was always near 
me. My mother too was close to me and a sister ... My 
mother threw a light around me and Henrietta and placed on 
my breast a star which illuminated all about me. 
Hugo also sent me a message. So did George, but latter feeble. 1 
Dixon argues that an interest in spiritualism and the supernatural is 
an authoritarian trait. 
2 This may be true, but the connection should 
not be laboured. The. attraction to seances was in common with the 
3 
rest of Haig's family and his class. Superstitious beliefs were a 
sign of the time, not necessarily evidence of an authoritarian 
1Diary, 20 September 1906. 
2Dixon, Military Incompetence, p. 375. 
3Hachel Haig often mentioned seances which she had attended in 
her letters to Douglas while he was in school. During the Great War, 
Haig received regular letters from his sister Janet which were purportedly 
written under the spirit influence of their deceased brother George. 
See Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 347/25. 
temperament. 
l 
Haig nevertheless did believe sincerely in the ability of 
some mediums to communicate with the spirit world. His visits to 
spiritualists were so frequent that they cannot be explained as mere 
curiousity. His sincerity is also demonstrated by the fact that he 
was discriminating. He recognised that not all mediums were legitimate. 
On one occasion he described a certain spiritualist as 'a great fraud'. 
Others, such as Miss McCreadie above, were trusted implicitly. He 
was impressed when, on another visit, the spirit of Hector MacDonald 
was raised and 'a guitar was played in mid-air'. 
3 But the sessions 
which had the most profound effect upon him were undoubtedly those 
in which he was given a glimpse of his own future. He was probably 
attracted to these because in all cases they confirmed his belief 
in a glorious destiny. A sceptic would argue that the medium was 
simply an astute judge of character who read the newspapers, had a 
good memory and had the insight to tell her subject exactly what he 
wanted to hear. 
There was, however, one particularly noteworthy communication 
with the spirit world which did not take the above-mentioned narcic- 
sistic form. On 3 February 1907, Haig wrote that he 
Received curious communication from Henrietta that Germans 
intend to invade England and that letters pretending to be 
in English but really emanating from Berlin will appear in 
the Press, accusing Haldane of aiming at conscription. The 4 
object of them, to prevent England from having a National Army. 
1The 
popularity of seances is discussed in C. Pla e, The Pre-War 
Mind in Britain, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), pp. 90-95" 
2Diary, 24 November 1908. 
3Diary, 9 November 1907. MacDonald was the hero of Omdurman who 
shot himself in a Paris . 
hotel in 1903 rather than face trial forualleged 
sexual relations with a young native boy in Ceylon. 
4Diary, 
3 November 1907. 
Henrietta, perhaps because she had a greater quantity of idle time, 
was even more of an enthusiast for seances than her brother. This 
interest, combined with a continued concern for his future and career, 
often resulted in curious correspondence such as the above. Haig 
felt that the information in this case was important enough to pass 
on to Haldane. The latter, betraying his rationalism, 'thought it 
most interesting, but not from the spirit world'. 
1 
The difference of opinion with regard to the spirit world 
was one of many areas in which Haig and Haldane diverged. Their 
personalities could hardly have been more different. They never- 
theless got on splendidly. This was no doubt because they had similar 
goals with regard to reform of the Army and realised the assistance 
each could give to the other. Shortly after taking office, Haldane 
told the House of Commons that 
The rim one comes across, the new school of young officers, 
entitled to the appelation of men of science just as much 
as engineers or chemists, were to me a revelation; and the 
whole question of the organisation of the Army is fraught 
with an interest which, I think, is not behind that of the 
study of any other scientific problem. A new school of 
officers has arisen since the South African War, a thinking 
school of officers who desire to see the full efficiency from 
new organisation and no surplus energy running to waste. 2 
Terraine uses the above as proof of Haldane's high opinion of Haig. 
3 
In fact, the statement was made prior to Haig's return from India, 
before Haldane met him. But Haig did fit the description of the 
'new school of young officers'. Once Haldane met Haig, he realised this. 
'When he arrived in London', Haldane later wrote of Haig, 'he grasped 
the situation completely and gave invaluable advice' Haldano was 
1Diary, 4 February 1907. 
2Parliamentary Debates, 8 March 1906. 
3Terraine, Douglas Hai i The Educated Soldier, p. 44. 
4Haldane, 
Autobiography, p. 199. 
an astute judge of character. His praise of Haig should be taken at 
face value. Haldane felt that Haig possessed a 'first-rate General 
Staff mind'. ' When it is borne in mind that the British conception 
of the General Staff was traditionally that of an administrative 
rather than a technically creative body, this seems an accurate 
appraisal. 
Haig, in turn, was immediately impressed with Haldane. He 
soon found that Haldane conflicted with his preconceptions regarding 
politicians. Haldane, Haig wrote after their first meeting, 'is a 
big fat man with a kind, genial face. One seemed to like the man 
at once. '2 The next day he described the Secretary of State for 
War as Ia most clear-headed and practical man. Most ready to listen 
and weigh carefully all that is said to him. '3 Haig's attitude toward 
politicians was built upon ignorance. They were a group with which 
he seldom associated. Ignorance gave rise to distrust, disrespect 
and even fear. His experience with Haldane, though entirely posi- 
tive, did nothing to change this attitude. The prejudices remained 
and would become even more bitter during the Great War. 
After he left Haldane's service, Haig wrote the following to 
a fellow officer: 
It is a good thing to see the inside of the War Office 
for a short time, as it prevents one from having any respect 
for an official letter .. .4 
This was just professional snobbery. What Haig should have learned 
at the War Office was that there was little difference between soldier's 
and politicians--at least as far as their methods were concerned. Haig 
1Haldane, Autobiography, p. 199. 
2Diary, 9 June 1906. 
3Diary, 10 June 1906. 
4Quoted 
in 14arshall-Cornwall, Haig as a Military Commander, p. 76. 
need only have looked at himself for proof of this point. For 
instance, he was impressed with tricks of Haldane's such as the 
following: 
Attend lecture at 3 P. M. in RUSI on Swiss military system. 
Mr. Haldane in chair. A very crowded meeting, many no 
doubt hoping to have a go at H. after the lecture. But 
he found it necessary to attend to business, so left before 
discussion bean: --a wise proceeding. 
Nor was Haig above such tactics. He was adept at courting favour and 
at sidestepping opposition. He could easily sanction devious practices 
if he felt they were for the good of the Empire. He possessed these 
attributes before he entered the War Office, but refined them during 
his time there. For instance, there is evidence of a mild conspiracy 
between Haldane and Haig, behind the back of Sir William Nicholson, 
in the following entry: 
About 5 o'clock CGS sent for S. of S. then I was sent for and 
Kiggell. 
S. of S. explained to me his views as if I was in complete 
ignorance. Kiggell nearly gave the show away by turning o 
me and stating that he believed 'those were my views etc. ' 
When Haig left the War Office, he made sure that his policies would 
survive by cleverly installing the rather malleable Sir launcelot 
Kiggell in the DSD and then directing him accordingly from India. 
While Haig could excuse these practices by seeing them as part of 
a righteous purpose, this made them no less devious--or 'political'. 
With the background of the Haig-Haldane relationship now complete, 
the focus can be shifted to the content of the reforms they effected. 
Soon after the election in January 1906, Haldane went on a short retreat 
in Scotland with his Military Secretary, Colonel Gerald Ellison. 
There they found the atmosphere and privacy conducive to a detailed 
1Diary, 12 January 1907. RUSI is the Royal United Services 
Institute. 
2Diary, 4 November 1907. 
contemplation of military problems. When they returned to London in 
late January, they were ready to lend substance to the Esher frame- 
work for reform. The reform programme can be broken down into three 
general areas. The first centred oncýthe iestruoturing of Army commands, 
the creation of a reserve army, and the formation of the British 
Expeditionary Force. The second area involved the development of 
a General Staff, the third of an Imperial General Staff. Of these 
three areas, the most important and the most difficult was the 
first. The formation of an easily mobilised force was Haldane's 
most significant test of political acumen. The Esher report provided' 
few guidelines. Though Ellison had previously studied the problem, 
1 
Haldane was otherwise virtually on his own. His predecessors had 
stumbled in this area and, as a result, proceeded no further. If Haldane 
could succeed, he would pain the necessary momentum to bring about the 
required broad-ranging reforms. 
In forming a reserve army, Haldane benefitted considerably from 
the failures of his predecessors. Both Arnold-Forster and W. St. 
John Brodrick had tried to create a reserve by altering the terms of 
service of the regular Army. In other words, by juggling the time 
spent with the colours and reserves, these men hoped to build the 
necessary back-up force of the required size. This practice was 
similar to that of the Continental Armies, but did not have the 
essential component--compulsion--which alone ensured success. In 
Britain, under such a system, the size of the reserve would necessarily 
be limited by the number of men willing to volunteer for an extended 
term in the Army. They had essentially to make the Army their career. 
'In 1898, the then Captain Ellison published Home Defence (London: 
Edward Stanford, 1898), in which he discussed the possibility of 
raising a reserve force from the raw material of the Militia, Yeomanry 
and Volunteers, the policy which was eventually adopted by Haldane. 
The number of men willing to do this had always been very small. 
A reserve force, no matter how the terms of service were played with, 
could not, therefore, grow to an adequate size. The solution, as 
Haldane saw it, was to tap a different source of manpower: men who, 
though unwilling to make the Army a career, would agree to being part- 
time soldiers. This source already existed. The auxiliary forces-- 
Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry--were composed of civilians willing 
to serve their country--if only on a part-time basis. 
The best idea, therefore, seemed to be to convert the old three- 
tiered system of Regulars, Militia and Auxiliaries into a two-tiered 
one of Regulars and Territorials. 
1 
But, while the auxiliaries consti- 
tuted a ready source of manpower, they were by no means a dependable 
one. Haldane's task was not simply one of unifying the Militia, Yeo- 
manry and Volunteers and changing their name to the Territorial Army. 
The Auxiliaries were incompetently led, improperly trained, inadequately 
supplied and hopelessly disorganised. They were neither intended nor 
prepared for service overseas as a reserve army. Their supply of 
men was prey to the whims of national conscience. Each of the auxiliary 
units was raised on a local level. Their standards thus varied accord- 
ingly. From this raw material Haldane had to create a force which 
could be mobilised at the outbreak of war and, after a short period 
of preparation, be ready to fight. It had to be a force capable of 
rapid expansion in wartime. Uniformity--of training, supply, command 
and organisation--was the key requirement. 
The Auxiliary forces had, therefore, to undergo a drastic trans- 
formation. They had to become a military force complete in all arms 
and services. The process of transformation entailed a complete 
'The Militia was not technically one of the Auxiliary forces, 
but a separate and distinct body. For simplicity's sake, Auxiliary will, throughout this chapter mean the Yeamanfyý'Volunteers and Militia. 
surrender of each force's original identity. It was here that the 
real difficulties, ones which Haldane did not even anticipate, arose. 
The Auxiliary forces had a distinguished reputation which, though 
disproportionate to their actual military value, could be translated 
into political power and influence. This was due to the fact that 
the officers were usually members of the landed gentry and were 
either M. P. s or were able in other ways to exert significant influence 
in the political sector. The Militiamen were especially reluctant 
to surrender their identity. Their force was the oldest under the 
Crown, older in fact than the Regular Army. The Vounteers and 
Yeomanry, though neither as old nor as adamantly opposed to amalgama- 
tion, were nevertheless determined to be difficult. Their reluctance 
was partly based on the proposed structure of the Territorial Army. 
Haldane intended to organise the force around uniform county associa- 
tions which would be in charge of recruiting and administration, but 
not command. The latter would be shifted to the Crown and the 
General Staff. Hitherto, both administration and command had been 
in the hands of the local commanding officers of the individual 
units. They could essentially do what they liked with their force. 
These officers correctly perceived that what the Government intended 
to do was to leave them with the dreary responsibility of organising 
and administering their forces, while depriving them of the glory of 
command. 
Haldane, unaware of the difficulties he was to encounter, assigned 
the details of the transformation to a Territorial Army Committee, soon 
nicknamed the 'Duma'. It was an unofficial committee, chaired by Esher, 
which included representatives from the Army, Government, Auxiliary 
forces and interested citizenry. Each group, eager for proper repre- 
sentation, tried to pack the committee. The Duma soon swelled to 
unmanageable proportions and achieved little more than selfish 
bickering. It was, from the beginning, ill-equipped to handle the 
massive tasks assigned to it. Haig recognised this problem after 
his second meeting: 
Attend 'Duma' at 11 o. c. Officers of very different views 
on the committee. The Duke of Bedford represents the 
Militia element. Jack Sealey a yeoman seems to think that 
the country requires no Army as long as the Militia and 
Yeomanry are kept up. 1 
After the following meeting, he commented that. 
The Militia officers seem afraid their force will disappear 
if placed under the 'County Associations' and are anxious 
to remain under the War Office. 2 
Haldane finally acknowledged the Duma's incapacity and disbanded it 
on 15 June. The vehement opposition to his proposals startled him 
and left him floundering without an answer. He had not expected 
self-interest of this degree. His ignorance resulted in part from 
his tendency to delegate considerable authority to subordinates 
without himself acting as an attentive overseer. 
Haldane next decided to call together the basic elements of the 
Duma into a smaller committee, for talks which he mistakenly hoped 
would be bilateral. The ferocious opposition did not, however, abate. 
These elements could not be dealt with in a bilateral-'for' versus 
'against'--manner because the opposition was not of one mind. The 
interests and motivation of the Militia differed widely from that 
of the Yeomanry and Volunteers. The former were mainly interested in 
preserving their traditional exclusivity, while the latter two 
objected more to the specific mechanics of the change. But, if the 
Militia could Be tamed, there was a good possibility that the other 
1Diary, 12 June 1906. Haig joined the Duma immediately after his 
return from India and so could only attend the last four meetings. 
2Diary, 13 June 1906. 
two groups would come around to the idea of a single force: With 
this in mind, Sir Frederick Stopford, the DMT, proposed a deal which 
would allow the Militia to retain its cherished identity in exchange 
for an agreement that troops could be sent abroad, in some cases 
as individual drafts to reinforce Regular Army units. Haig recorded 
the reaction to this proposal in his diary: 
Impossible to get Militia officers to agree to wishes of 
W. 0. Council, namely to provide drafts for the army in the 
field instead of expanding the Regular Army. Some are willing 
to supply 'companies' where required--so these sign papers 
i to that effect, remainder sign to go abroad as 'Battalions'. 
This was not a workable solution, since a uniform policy was required. 
Haldane was again defeated. There appeared to be no room for compro- 
mise. The whole basis of the two-tier system was threatened. 
Haig retired to Tarasp and Pontresina during the latter part of 
June, while Haldane desperately tried to find a new basis for agree- 
ment. At Tarasp, he met Leopold de Rothschild, who remained a friend 
for the rest of his life. 
2 Upon his return, Haig was asked to 'form 
a committee and call in from time to time anyone whose presence ... 
necessary. '3 Haldane was trying to defeat the opposition by dividing 
it into distinct groups and dealing with the interests of each sepa- 
rately. This was a far more realistic approach than the earlier 
bilateral one.. It aimed at building a solid core of supporters 
capable of eventually over-powering: the more obdurate groups. - 
One element in this new plan was visits to Auxiliary forces' 
headquarters, where Haldane would try to convince his opponents of 
the merits of his plan. Haig, as a distinguished member of the Regular 
1Diary, 27 June 1906. 
2During the Great War, Rothschild regularly sent gifts of expensive food and wine to Haig. See Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 214(a). 
3Diary, 
25 August 1906. 
Army, often accompanied him. Haig's single-mindedness and'lack 
of patience with the opposition meant that he was not always the 
best person to act as negotiator. During this period he concentrated 
on convincing the commanders of the Yeomanry and Volunteers. The 
former were relatively easy to sway, as they had neither the 
size nor the solidarity of the Militia. Also, as a mounted force, 
they were probably impressed by the presence of one of Britain's 
most distinguished cavalrymen. They objected not to the idea of 
amalgamation, but to the subsequent policies once amalgamated. 
Haig dealt with these objections with characteristic forcefulness: 
Meeting at 11 with certain Yeomanry officers who had been 
invited to come and discuss questions with me. Lord Scar- 
borough had made proposals for I. Y. to do advance guard cavalry 
work, but stipulated 'no extra training'. I told him straight, 
that would be impossible. 1 
He was not as successful at controlling the Volunteers. He wrote to 
Esher that 'they won't have the associations constituted as proposed 
at any pricel'2 Haig found this reluctance loathsome and somewhat 
surprising. He could not understand the objections to such a 
workable system. The Auxiliaries objected because they correctly 
equated progress with extinction. They fought for the survival of 
cherished albeit obsolete institutions. Their obstructionism was 
similar to Haig's attitude toward cavalry reform. The cavalry was 
another victim of progress. But this similarity did not inspire 
sympathy in Haig. 
These were extremely trying times for Haldane and his aides. 
The unexpected vehemence of the opposition made its effect all the 
greater. He grasped wildly at solutions, most of which proved 
1Diary, 6 September 1906. 
2Hai to Esher, 9 September 1906. Haig Papers, NLS, 'Ace. 3155, 
No. 334(e). 
ineffectual. Haig's activities were likewise dominated by'frustration 
and disappointment. The bitterness gave rise to ill-temper. As the 
diary entry'fdr 12 November shows, matters had not 'settled down' 
as quickly as he had earlier predicted to his sister: 
At 3: 30 go to House of Commons to see Sec'y of State 
in his private room there. Military Members have raised 
difficulties on question of reorganising the Militia. 
That seems only an excuse to show they are really angry 
because S. of S. does not consult them enough! 
Get back to W. O. at 5: 15 p. m. and see CGS. He very shirty. 
Tells me not to be absent on Saturdays without his approvall 
and wants all papers from S. of S. to be given him at once. 
This not my affair as these papers go to him before coming 
to me, but shows how angry he is. The result o someone stir- 
ring him up, no doubt Douglas backed by Miles: 
' 
Six weeks later there was a similar entry: 
Amend leaflet (with General Miles) which is to go to Press 
to explain the new organisation. 
Fleetwood Wilson comes into my room during the operation 
and criticises severely the way in which he has been ignored 
in the matter of the new scheme. Miles also finds fault. 
In afternoon I went to Miles' room with Ellison and worked 
out data on which non Regular reserves is to be calculated. 
We are to meet at noon tomorrow with Wilson. 
A terrible day of criticism, but some progress made notwith- 
standing! 2 
Miles, Wilson and Douglas, 
3 
among others, objected to Haig because 
of his membership in Haldane's inner circle, from which they were 
excluded. The hurt feelings, bruised egos and selfish obstructionism 
were not new experiences for Haig. The atmosphere in the War Office 
was not markedly different from that of the Army outside. The situa- 
tion was, however, made more complex by the wide variety of opinions 
'Diary, 12 November 1906. 
2Diary, 13 January 1907. 
3Miles 
was Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Miles, Director of 
Organisation and Recruiting. ' Wilson was Ht. Hon. Sir Guy Fleetwood 
Wilson, Director General of Army Finance, 190+-1908 and Member of 
Supreme Council of India, 1908-1913. Douglas was General-Sir Charles 
Douglas, Second Military Member of Army Council, 1904-1909. 
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among the interested parties. Despite this complexity, Haig retained 
his characteristic aplomb and remained confident of success. 
Haldane was not nearly as confident. During the autumn recess, 
he retired to Cloan, where he studied the situation in private. 
When he returned, he proposed the entire abandonment of the Territorial 
Army scheme. Ellison, Haig and Lord Lucas, the Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary, managed, however, to stiffen his resolve. Haldane was 
re-invigorated by the support from his aides, and was grateful for 
it. On 2 January 1907, Haig noted that, 
Kind letter from Mr. Haldane received this morning. He 1 
means to go straight ahead and stand or fall by his scheme. 
The struggle with the recalcitrant Auxiliary commanders continued until 
mid-February. It need not be recounted in detail. While Haldane could 
have tried to force the new program upon the local commanders through 
legislation, without their consent, he would in so doing have encoun- 
tered considerable resistance in Parliament. Also, Haldane realised 
that the success of the Territorial Army depended on the willingness 
of ex-Auxiliary members to join it. This willingness would evaporate 
if legislative force were used. 
The Volunteers and Yeomanry, through a series of intricate deals 
and agreements, finally accepted the Haldane scheme. The Militia, 
however, remained intransigent. This meant that some legislative 
coercion became inevitable. Haldane in the end decided to abolish 
the Militia, but placated its membersty forming a Special Reserve to 
act as an immediate reinforcement to the Regular Army. It was under- 
stood that the Special Reserve was to be the personal refuge for the 
displaced Militiamen. The Militia would lose its name, but not, it 
was argued, its identity. This did not mean that the two-tier 
1Diary, 
2 January 1907. 
system was abandoned. The basis was still Regulars and Territorials, 
but with the Special Reserve as a rather curious adjunct to the 
former. It was exactly the exclusivity which the Militia coveted. 
Though some diehards remained, the Special Reserve idea sub- 
stantially weakened the Militia opposition. Haldane did not at first 
realise this. By mid-February, he was still vacillating, and was 
doubtful of his chances in Parliament. Advice from Esher, first ten- 
dered in the following letter, but afterwards often repeated, proved 
valuable. 
You have got to chose between a certain amount of opposi- 
tion in the H. of C. and a loss of personal prestige in the 
country. To my mind the position is not doubtful. You can, 
with your large majority, risk the former. You cannot risk 
the latter. 1 
Haldane probably had this advice in mind when he presented his 
second Army Estimates to Parliament on 25 February. Before a packed 
Commons, 
2 he explained his proposals regarding the Territorial Army. 
He was testing members' reactions to the scheme, and, even more impor- 
tant, he was appealing beyond the Commons to the Nation. He spoke of 
the fine traditions of the Auxiliary force; but stressed that twentieth 
century conditions in politics and warfare made consolidation and 
modernisation of Britain's reserve forces imperative. Sacrifices, 
he emphasised, had to be made. The speech, which lasted three hours 
and twenty minutes, was well received. Haldane had the mandate to 
proceed as he wished. 
The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act (TARFA),; formally drafted 
in January, did not receive its first reading until 4 ? arch 1907. 
The bill contained three major provisions. The first dealt witch the 
IQuoted in Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, p. 105. 
2The House was so full that Haig had to endure the three-hour 
speech on the arm of a chair. See Diary, 25 February 1907. 
formation of the Territorial Army. The second stipulated that the 
force was liable for service anywhere in the United Kingdom and that 
its size would be determined by Parliament. It further stipulated that 
the force would be divided into separate commands, complete in all 
arms and services. The third provision covered the creation of the 
Special Reserve. Throughout the process toward final approval, 
the opposition which Haldane expected did not materialise. M. P. s 
who, because of their close affinity with the Auxiliary units, 
opposed the bill were in most cases seen as selfish and short-sighted 
and were therefore ignored. 
1 The bill was passed by 286 votes to 63 
on 19 June 1907. It went into effect on I April 1908. 
The passage of TAL FA marked the end of the first phase of Haig's 
service at the War Office. The Territorial Army sheme had dominated 
his activities over the previous eight months. It was not work 
which was ideally suited to his talents. He was unused to crowded 
meetings and had little patience for different opinions. His dis- 
comfort among strangers and his at times self-righteous attitude 
made him not very effective at negotiation, though he did provide 
valuable aid in working out the mechanics of the scheme. Haldane rea- 
lised that Haig's manner could be a hindrance to progress, but sup- 
ported him in spite of this. 
2 He probably realised that once TAfFA 
1Corelli Barnett, in Britain and Her Army (London: Allen Lane, 
1970), p. 366, arges that TARFA was 'savagely attacked during its 
passage through both houses of Parliament'. In fact, as Spiers points 
out in his chapter dealing with the act (H.. ldariet: An Army Reformer, 
pp. 92-115), M. P. s found the bill excessively dull and few of the 
debates were well attended. 
2As discussed on page 296, many senior officers in the War Office 
and the Army as a whole resented the influence that the relatively 
young Haig had with Haldane. Spiers (Ibid., pp. 151-153) discusses 
this and quotes a letter Haldane wrote to Esher after Haig left the W. O.: 
'Haig always infuriated Miles by his manner, and it may be. easier now. ' Miles was by that time Quartermaster General. 
I 
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was passed negotiation would give way to administration, a task at 
which Haig was more suited. 
At the same time that the Territorial Army was being devised, 
Haig and Haldane were concerned with the formation of the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF). While this was an extremely important 
task, it was not nearly as difficult as the formation of a reserve 
army. There was no significant opposition to Haldane's plans in this 
area. 
I 
The BEF was formally created in an Army Order issued 1 January 
1907. The order set up a field force of 120,000 men which was designed 
to be organised in such a way as to be capable of rapid mobilisation 
on the outbreak of war. Before 1907, an expeditionary force did not 
exist. The British Army was at that time little more than a collection 
of regiments, with only one properly organised corps at Aldershot. The 
Army Order provided for the coordination of this disorganised mass 
into one cavalry and six infantry divisions. With the subsequent pas- 
sage of TARFA, the two-tier system--as Haldane intended it--was a 
reality. 
The BEF created by the Army Order of 1 January 1907 was essentially 
the force that went to war in August 1914, with the rapidity that 
was intended. But it must again be emphasised that neither the 
size nor the composition of the force were dictated by a. continental 
strategy, as Haldane later claimed. The Army Order was a pragmatic 
response to financial exigencies. Army Estimates were frozen at 
£2R million. There was in fact significant pressure to lower them. 
Tn its pre-1907 form, the Army was wasteful and inefficient. 
By consolidating into seven major commands, waste could be reduced 
'The 
relative ease of the task is demonstrated by the fact 
that Haig hardly mentions the work done on the BEF in his. diaries. 
The entries during this period are dominated by the descriptions 
of the wrangles over the Territorial Army. 
and the Army could reach its maximum size, given the financial 
restrictions. It was even necessary to dispose of a number of 
field batteries and infantry batallions (including two from the 
Guards) in order to make ends meet. It is significant that the 
Cavalry, probably due to Haig's influence and the evidence of the 
Boer War, was not touched. 
The Army Order creating the BEF did not mean that Britain was 
suddenly equipped with a force of 120,000 men ready to fight on the 
continent within fourteen days. This was the intent; the actuality 
would follow years of hard work. It was to this problem that Haig 
directed his attention after the fight for TARFA was won. His tasks 
in this area varied widely. He organised staff tours, made mobilisa- 
tion plans, carried out mock embarkations and disembarkations, 
inspected troops and devised training schemes, in addition to many 
other chores. The emphasis was upon uniformity, efficiency and 
preprcdness, which meant that Haig was particularly well-suited 
to the work. Technically, he had become DMT on 28 August 1906, but, 
as mentioned previously, his tasks were not confined to the formal 
duties of that directorate. Haldane used Haig's talents where they 
seemed applicable. 
Shortly after Haig became DMT, Haldane commented that 'he has 
impressed me greatly by the change for the better initiated even 
in his first fortnight. '1 Spiers writes as follows of Haldane's 
reliance upon Haig: 
.. he came to rely upon officers who sympathised with his own objectives, who could think clearly and who grasped 
the detailed implications of Army Reform: he came to rely, 
above all, upon Douglas Haig. 2 
1Haldane to Esher, 8 September 1906. Quoted in Spiers, Haldane: 
An Army Reformer, p. 150. 
2Ibid., 
p. 150. 
In appraising the Army reform of the Liberal Government, it must 
be kept in mind that Haldane was above all a politician. He approached 
his office with certain goals and used all of his political talents 
to accomplish them. His main goal was to implement the Esher Report-- 
to make the restructured Army outlined in that report a reality. 
Once the main framework was established, the details were handed 
over to men like Haig, with Haldane acting as a passive, and at times 
not very attentive, overseer. Haldane was not bothered by trifles. 
This meant that the detailed content of 'his' reforms reflected not 
so much his thinking as that of his closest advisors. 
As Spiers points out, one of Haldane's methods was to rely 
heavily on, and allow wide lattitude to, those who 'sympathised with 
his own objectives'. The other side of this policy was that he 
ignored those who disagreed with him. This meant that the liar Office 
was dominated by Haldane men--men implicitly loyal to their chief and 
his plan. Others, because they differed with the Territorial Army 
scheme or another facet of the Haldane plan, were not called upon to 
contribute. These included men like Plumer, Roberts and Henry 
Wilson who, especially in the fields of tactics and strategy, had much 
to offer. The loyalists, on the other hand, were-rewarded by being 
allowed a free hand to shape the Army as they saw fit. In Haig's case, 
this meant that War Office coffers were thrown open for an extra- 
ordinary number of cavalry staff tours and other exercises which were 
basically a continuation of the traditionalist practices which had 
been, the norm while Haig was in India. Pouch of the cavalry reaction 
which dominated the pre-war years, such as the re-Institution of the 
lance and the publication of the revised Cavalry Training, though 
by no means implemented by Haldane, was conducted with his tacit 
approval. Haldane apparently did not feel that these matters were 
his concern. Perhaps they were not. Yet it must be emphasised that 
he provided an ideal environment in which Haig's conservatism could 
thrive, sheltered from the censure of those of different mind. 
One area in which this arrangement was particularly evident 
was in the matter of the Territorial Artillery. A basic principle of 
the Territorial Army was that the force was to be complete in all arms. 
This was a plan which was simple to formulate, but difficult to 
administer. The modern guns to equip properly the reserve army 
did not exist. In addition, modern artillery tactics required a level 
of training and instruction which was impossible to implement within 
the short training period of the Territorial Army. Lord Roberts 
reacted to the prospect of ill-equipped and ill-trained batteries 
by rejecting the whole idea of an artillery contingent for the 
Territorial Army. He was supported in the Commons by Arthur Lee, 
who argued that half-tininedbatteries armed with ancient guns would 
be no match for the professional artillerymen of Germany. Roberts 
maintained in the Lords that the Territorials would not 'in spite of 
their numbers, be of the slightest use in the field'. They would, he 
argued, be a 'positive danger'. 
1 
Esher, in support of Haldane, countered that 'It is a question 
not between Regular Artillery and Half-trained Artillery, but 
between Half-trained and none at all. '2 It was actually a question 
of quantity and quality, and whether it was right for the former to 
exist without the latter. Roberts was clear on this point. When 
he campaigned in favour of Universal Service, he aimed at both 
quality and quantity. He desired a system which ensured a large force 
of men and the time to train them properly. Though he continued to 
1Parliamentary Debates, 12 March 1908. 
2Ibid. 
struggle for this system until 1914, TARFA essentially defeated him. 
TARFA provided the large force, but skimped on the training. Roberts, 
the soldier, abhorred this idea. Haldane, the pragmatic politician, 
saw it as the only available solution to the nation's needs. He 
accepted the half measure because it satisfied his basic aims. He 
was not overly interested if the force he created was technically 
deficient; the important point was that it existed. The technical 
aspects were the concern of the Army proper, not his Ministry. If 
quality suffered, it was not his fault, but that of a parsimonious 
nation. 
Onthe question of Territorial Artillery, however, Roberts 
was right. He was, after all, an artilleryman. Roberts realised 
that the impending European conflagratiion would be disastrous for 
British reserve gunners if Haldane's policies were not changed. 
To his mind 'none at all' would be better than 'half-trained'. Haldane, 
on the other hand, was concerned more with the political exigencies 
of 1907 than with' the military problems of the future. He rejected 
Roberts' advice because Roberts, while fighting for Universal Service, 
had worked at cross purposes to the campaign for TARFA. Haldano 
therefore accepted the advice of his loyalists on the subject of 
artillery--men like Haig who, as has been seen, had little respect 
for or knowledge of the arm. 
Haig's support of Haldane on the subject of the Territorial 
Artillery was maintained in spite of his direct experience of 
the low standard of both Regular and Auxiliary gunners. 
' As DMT, 
he staged a number of field firing exercises which were designed 
to 'bring the musketry and artillery "fire" schools into close 
1They 
would still have been called Auxiliaries because TARFA 
had yet to come into effect. 
touch. '1 At these exercises, Regular Artillery, Royal Horse Artillery 
and batteries from the Auxiliaries practised together. The idea was 
that the Auxiliaries would learn from the professionals. Haig soon 
found, however, that the standards of the latter were not worthy 
of imitation. On 25 June 1907, he found that the firing of the 
Greys and 18th Hussars was 'Not Good. I make a few remarks re cut 
and dried schemes. '2 'Cut and dried', it will be remembered, was 
Haig's favourite expression when criticising performances which 
appeared to be straight from the manuals and took no account of 
actual conditions. Later, he wrote the following about an exercise 
involving both Regular and Auxiliary batteries; 
Ride to where Battalion Volunteer Artillery are in position 
with Scots' Greys. Find Leach commanding guns and squadrons 
and generally meddling with all and sundry. 
Operations rather a farce. 
3 
These complaints were similar to ones made years earlier when Haig 
was assistant to Keith Fraser. He emphasised that 'freedom of 
subordinates must not be interfered with'. 
4 
But he made hardly any 
comments , on' the technical aspects of the firing: the aim, range, 
accuracy, cover, organisation, etc. While he may have been right 
on the other points, it is questionable how valuable his artillery 
inspections and advice were if his Boer War experience--whith', had 
such a profound effect upon him--taught him to have little respect 
for the arm's potential. 
During his remaining time as DMT, Haig concentrated upon turning 
the BEEF and Territorial Army into forces capable of going to war. 
1Diary, 10 June 1907. 
2Diary, 25 June 1907. 
3Diary, 4 July 1907. 
4D 
iary, 27 June 1907. 
With regard to the Territorial Army, this initially meant 
working 
out the size of the force and the quotas to be raised by the 'various 
county associations. Haig, ignoring political and financial limita- 
tions, at first envisaged a force of 900,000 men. Haldane saw this 
for the fantasy it was and sought a more realistic figure of 300,000. 
He was not, in the end, even able to raise this number. Haig was 
better suited to devising the logistical and administrative details 
(other than the size) of the Territorial Army. During May 1907, he 
worked out plans for the formation of a transport section for the 
force. Later in the same month, he concentrated upon infantry 
training procedures. The immense amount of work and the elementary 
nature of it reflects the inadequacy of the Auxiliary forces prior 
to their amalgamation. The raw material of the Territorial Army 
was indeed raw. 
Haig put these somewhat mundane tasks behind him when he left 
the DMT for the DSD in November 1907. The duties of the DSD were 
more suited to his interests and talents. Haldane, as will be 
remembered, wanted Haig for the DSD"in early 1906, but felt unable 
to remove Hutchinson. When the latter's term was complete, the change 
could take place. But, when Haig moved from DMT to DSD, both direct- 
orates were re-designed to suit his abilities. He explained in his 
diary: 
Meeting in S. of S. 's room at 11: 30 a, m. CGS 
[Lyttleton 
Kiggell and myself, with Mr. Haldane. 
Sir N. Lyttleton took papers which I gave him last night 
showing proposals for rearrangin duties in DSD and DMT 
on the lines that all education except Staff College) 
pass to UMT and war organization go to DSD. By this means 
DS1) will have sufficient officers to work out 'Principles 
of employment of troops' and other fundamental questions 
which have hitherto been ignored. 
Sir N. gave papers to S. of S. stating that they summa- 
rised his views. This very satisfactory considering his 
opposition hitherto! S. of S. congratulated him on the 
far reaching nature of the changes contemplatedtl 
This was Haldane's, and Haig's, way of ensuring that the most important 
tasks would be handled by the person they both agreed was most capable 
of handling them. 
Haig had always believed that efficiency in wartime was impossible 
without a well-trained, professional staff. The obstacles to the 
formation of a Briti General Staff on the German model have been 
discussed at length. As DSD, Haig was finally in a position from 
which he could remove some of these obstacles. He sought to increase 
the output of the Staff College, improve the quality of its product, 
and make sure that its graduates were favoured with prestigious 
staff appointments and accelerated promotion. At the same time he 
had to change the attitudes of the Army's conservative elites, men 
who had a low opinion of the College and were generally reluctant 
to rely on a staff in wartime. There was, in addition, a very com- 
plicated problem facing Haig-one which he probably did not completely 
understand. This centred on the traditional British confusion over 
the role of a staff. There was uncertainty as to whether the Army 
required a purely administrative staff--as had been the custom in 
the past--or a 'brain of the trmy'. If the Army wanted the latter, 
not only new institutions, but an even more radical and widespread 
change of attitude was required. Promising young soldiers had to 
be taught to think creatively about grand tactics and strategy. 
Senior officers open-minded enough to teach them had to be found. And, 
'old soldiers' had to be convinced that the days of Britain's omni- 
potent commanders were gone. 
While Haig may not have totally understood the above complexity, 
IDiary, 8 November 1907. 
he was certainly aware of it. His awareness was stimulated by a 
letter from Kitchener, dated 28 April 1908, in which the problems 
in forming a British General Staff were discussed. Kitchener, 
despite his previous adherence to the concept of the omnipotent 
commander, displayed uncharacteristic insight: 
My dear Haig, 
You are I think much hampered in England in the training of 
the General Staff in their proper duties, by the to my mind 
fatal division that exists between what is called the admini- 
strative and technical functions, and those of military 
training. 
In war remember every additional channel of communication 
of orders is a danger. Every additional unnecessary staff 
non-combatant is a drag on the fighting line. 
We all agree that the higher art of war should be thoroughly 
learned and practised by the General Staff so that they may 
be in a positibn, to advise the General in command how to 
conduct the operations with certainty and without risk of 
failure at all times and under all circumstances with the 
object of placing his men in the most advantageous positions 
to meet the enemy. To enable the General Staff to do this 
an accurate practical knowledge of the effect of Time and 
possibilities is essential. The divorce of administrative 
and technical and their non-practice in peace by the General 
Staff to my mind introduces grave risks of serious mistakes 
in the advice given to a General by his General Staff officers. 
To employ some General Staff officers on administrative duties 
as established in England would not in my opinion meet this 
difficulty. 
Napoleon's staff were more engaged in discussing onions than 
strategy or tactics. The best soldiers will not fight unless 
they are fed and supplied with fighting necessities. Theoreti- 
cal training in these matters however elaborate is apt in 
practice to lead to quite wrong conclusions sometimes pre- 
venting advantages being taken of an opportunity through 
fear of running an unknown risk at others of wildly starting 
operations and finding out later that they cannot be carried 
through, both of these in war spell failure. 
I hope you will consider these points when laying down what 
the duties of the General Staff are in war and peace which 
as you say is undoubtedly a preliminary step of the utmost 
importance in the formation of a General Staff. 
KITCIIENERi 
In view of the above letter, Kitchener should perhaps be partially 
'Kitchener to Haig, 28 April 1908, Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, No. 334(e). 
excused for his reluctance to delegate authority to his staff. He 
believed that the study of war had to be approached holistically, 
that the staff officer had to be able to perform all the tasks-- 
whether administrative or technical--which arose in war. It is 
possible that Kitchener rejected the advice of his staff officers, 
or did not seek it, because he was not confident that they were 
trained in this way. He controlled everything himself because his 
abilities were the only ones in which he was supremely confident. 
Had capable staff officers been available, his attitude might have 
been different. 
Kitchener's letter outlined the major problems which faced Haig. 
He had to create the institutions and encourage the attitudes which 
would produce officers trained not only as administrators but as 
technical thinkers. At the same time, he had to ensure that 
there was no confusion between these two functions. lie then had to 
'sell' these new staff officers to older commanders used to the 
techniques of Victoria's small wars. If he failed at any of these 
monumental tasks, the result would be a system nearly as chaotic 
as the old one. There are two main reasons whay Haig was not the 
man for these tasks. The first was his mixture of administrative 
progressivism and tactical dogmatism. lie had been chosen to reform 
the British Army because his organisational talents were considered 
valuable at a time when the Army was badly in need of structural 
reform. His limitations at the War Office were revealed whenever 
an open mind to progress in strategy and tactics was required. A 
new age of military science had dawned, and it was one in which 
Haig's cavalry mind was out of place. His Boer War experiences 
had rendered him virtually unable to see the mistakes in his tactical 
thinking. While Haig was perhaps the best man to establish the 
institutions necessary for a 'brain of the army, he was ill-equipped 
to start it thinking or to benefit from its thoughts. 
A second, equally important, reason for Haig's inadequacy was 
that his attitudes seem to have been not altogether different from 
those of the men whose minds he had to change. Haig often expressed 
a belief in the value of highly trained, independent staff officers. 
There was, however, a marked difference between principles and 
practice. It will be recalled that he once wrote of his preference 
for loyal men of average intelligence. This preference survived 
until 1918, when Herbert Lawrence, a strong-willed, individualistic 
officer, was forced on Haig as his Chief of Staff. Up until that 
time, his closest advisors did not conform very well to the model 
of the perfect staff officer. Haig surrounded himself with men 
whose loyalty to and admiration for him hindered them in the perfor- 
mance of their duties. Three of these men--Charteris, Kiggell and 
J. H. Davidson--formed the nucleus of Haig's Great War staff. During 
the war they formed an effective barrier between Haig and the realities 
of the conflict. Their perfbraance is the best evidence of Haig's 
inconsistencies with regard to the ideal staff officer. This 
point will be argued in greater depth in the Epilogue. But it is 
important to emphasise at this stage how the Great War revealed Haig's 
true attitudes toward the staff. Before the war he echoed the reformist 
line and advocated a staff on the German model. But his heart was not 
completely in it. When war came, he behaved like the traditional 
omnipotent commander. While he may have sympathised with everything 
about which Kitchener wrote, his basic nature prevented him from 
implementing the policies completely, or adequately applying them 
to himself. 
Haig's administrative achievements in the formation of a British 
General Staff were nevertheless considerable. He carried out espe- 
cially noteworthy reforms of the staff training programme and the 
policies toward employment of staff officers. For instance, one 
week after becoming DSD he convinced the CGS that in future all 
commanding officers should be forced to take the staff officers 
supplied them, rather than being, allbwed to choose their own. 
I This 
effectively limited patronage, an anathema to professionalism. Haig 
also worked out a system whereby important staff positions with the 
Territorial Army would be given to graduates of the Staff College, 
thus extending the areas in which valuable experience and responsi- 
bility could be gained. 
2 In the training of staff officers, Haig 
noted the following plans on 2 February 190ß: 
Motored with Blair and Kiggell to Staff College where 
Mr. Haldane and Ellison joined us about noon. 
Considered steps necessary to enlarge Staff College to 
extent of 22 students. Lunched with Commandant (General 
Henry Wilson). After lunch I explained my scheme for 
creating a number of War Schools. Mr Haldane much pleased 
and said he would arrange to find money for both. 3 
The War Schools were to be institutions at which senior staff officers 
would actively study higher strategy and tactics. They were designed 
to imitate the German practice of continuing education for senior 
officers. and were thus an essential complement to the elementary 
instruction provided by the Staff College. Though Haig cannot be 
blamed for the failure to adequately implement the War Schools scheme 
before the war, the schools are nevertheless another example of 
his limitations as a military reformer. He recognised the necessity 
of institutions which encouraged creative thought, and could at times 
1See Diary, 16 November 1907. 
2See Diary, 4 January 1908. 
3Diary, 
2 February 1908. 
set them in motion, but did not himself extend this progressive 
attitude to a personal examination and periodic re-evaluation of 
his own military doctrine. 
Another example of Haig's limitations lay in the publication 
while he was DSD of Field Service Regulations. The manual, which 
came in two volumes, was the first of its kind in British military 
history. Volume I dealt with Operations, Volume II with Organisa- 
tion and Administration. It must be emphasised that FSR was not 
Haig's creation. The work was begun in 1904 by Colonel Walter Adye 
of the DSD. The publication had, however, been blocked by rivalries 
within the War Office. Upon becoming DSD, Haig devoted himself to 
removing the obstacles in the way of publication. This was his 
main achievement as far as the FSH was concerned. His efforts 
included organising staff tours for testing the manual's precepts, 
which convinced those who doubted its viability. Some senior 
officers were, however, not convinced, and had to be dealt with 
differently. At one meeting, General Miles ridiculed the FSR in an 
uproarious speech which had everyone--except Haig--laughing. When 
he finished, Haig took the floor and angrily answered that if Miles 
... will tell us what we ought to do instead of pulling 
everything to pieces, we shall get on much better. Let us 
have some system to start with, and if it is not perfect 
we can improve it. l 
It was determination of this sort which forced the final approval 
of the FSR in December 1908. 
Corelli Barnett writes as follows on the publication of the 
FSR in his book Britain and Her Army: 
1Quoted in Duff Cooper, Haig, pp. 106-107. Duff Cooper does 
not state that- the individual in question was Miles, but Spiers (Haldane: An Army Reformer, p. 152), points out that it was indeed 
him. 
-312- 
Without these manuals ... the colossal expansion of 'the 
British and Dominion Armies during the Great War must have 
resulted in military chaos. 1 
Terraine calls it a 'major, but almost entirely forgotten contribution 
to later victory'. 
2 The manual did fill an immense gap in Britain's 
military preparedness. It was intended to be a guide for the Army's 
new breed of professional staff officers, providing them with a 
detailed manual covering every conceivable contingency which could 
arise in war. As such it stressed a level of order, efficiency, 
precision and standardisation which was previously lacking. FSR-was 
of significant value during the Great War. It was a modern development, 
but Haig should not be given credit for its modernity, as both Terraine 
and Marshall-Cornwall suggest. Since it was not his creation, it should 
not be treated as a reflection of his military doctrine, another mis- 
take which Marshall-Cornwall makes. He uses the manual as proof 
that Haig's tactical dogmatism--at least as far as the cavalry was 
concerned--had mellowed. He cites the following from FSR, Volume It 
Ability to move rapidly and to cover relatively short 
distances in a comparatively short time gives cavalry 
power to obtain information and to combine attack and 
surprise to the best advantage. The fact that it is 
armed with a long range rifle s endowed it with great 
independence, and extended its sphere of action. 3 
The above is not an example of a 'more realistic principle', as 
Marshall-Cornwall argues. It is no different from the beliefs 
Haig professed in 1902. He was never opposed to firearms for the 
cavalry; he only rejected the complete replacement of the arme blanche 
by rifles and the resultant dismounted offensive role. 
1Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p. 363. 
2Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 43. 
3Field Service Regulations, (H. M. S. O. 1909), Volume I, p.. 12. 
4Marshall-Cornwall, 
Hair, as a Military Commander, p. 75. 
On the subject of dismounted action and the arme blanche, 
Haig's attitude had not changed at all. At the same time that 
he was working on the FSR, he was also completing Cavalry Studies 
and pushing for the reinstitution of the lance. On 12 February 
1909, he noted in his diary that he argued with Winston Churchill 
about the value of the lance and the sabre. 
' 
While DSD he staged 
a large number of cavalry staff tours and manoeuvres. Their content 
was influenced by him. The supervision of these exercises was not 
one of his duties as DSD. He attended them so as to be certain 
that heretical doctrines would not be practised. This is clear from 
the following: 
Rode over to Uffington Camp with my Staff and attended meeting 
at 10: 30 a. m. of Brigadiers and C. O. s with Inspector General 
(Sir J. French). Latter very complimentary to me--said I had 
nothing to gain from the extra work I had undertaken in train- 
ing the Cavalry Divisions etc. etc. but gave vent to some real 
heresies such as chief aim of Cavalry Division in battle is 
their rifle fire: led horses to be moved and men need not b 
close to them. Cavalry should always go for its adversary. 
The prospect of Haig clashing with French over cavalry doctrine 
was a novel one. French, it will be recalled, wrote in 1903 that 
nothing could make him alter the views that he held on cavalry. Yet 
something had changed his mind, however slightly. Haig's mind remained 
unaffected. 
Another general misconception surrounds Haig's role in the 
formation of an Imperial General Staff. In preparing the way for 
an agreement among Britain's imperial partners, Haig did what he could 
do best: he prepared studies, worked out proposals, and made intricate 
plans pertaining to the unification, standardisation and cooperation 
of the forces of the Empire. All this was exceedingly valuable work. 
1Diary, 12 February 1909, 
2Diary, 11 September 1907. 
Haldane commented as follows on Haig's effort: 
Phen the General Staff was in full operation, he and 
Nicholson set to work to do what I proposed to them. They 
expanded the organisation so as to make it one not merely 
for Great Britain but for the Dominions and India. When 
this scheme was completed, there was held in London in 1909 
a Dominion Conference on military affairs. The last confer- 
ence had failed so far as these matters were concerned 
because of the desire of the old War Office to centralise 
authority. But we were now able to say that the Dominions 
and India could remain completely autonomous. All we asked 
of them was that they should organise on our pattern local 
sections of their own of the General Staff, and should appoint 
to them officers who had a General Staff training at head- 
quarters and in the Staff College. ... Haig worked out 
the 
details of the plan, and Nicholson embodied them in admirable 
drafts for the assistance of the Colonial and India Offices. 
I could not have had finer help than I got from these two. 
1 
Haig's achievements should not be underestimated. But neither should 
they be exaggerated. The creation of the Imperial General Staff 
was above all a political achievement. It involved the subtle and 
careful-handling of men with a wide variety of interests. This was 
not Haig's domain. 
When the Colonial Conference met for the final debate on the 
Imperial General Staff in April 1909, it is clear that Haig, both 
literally and figuratively, took a back seat: 
I had a most interesting forenoon yesterday. I met Mr. 
Haldane and attended the Colonial Conference with him. 
.. 
At 11 o'clock Nr. Haldane took his seat on Lord 
Elgin's right. The latter presided. The Premiers were 
sitting on a horseshoe table on each side of him in order 
of seniority of the Colonies.. .. We ... had chairs 
placed for us behind Haldane. The latter made a short 
speech of twenty minutes explaining our organisation, and 
ended with a motion for the Conference to adopt. All the 
Premiers then spoke in turn--all very patriotic. Ns. 
Haldane's speech was very well received ... His motion was also agreed to. The latter practically creates the 
Imperial General Staff and puts 50 per cent on to the value 
of the General Staff. 2 
The successful conclusion of the Imperial Conference completed Haig's 
1Haldane, Autobiography, 199-200. 
2Diary, 21 April 1909. 
major tasks at the War Office. He began with the framework of 
reform provided him by Esher and Haldane. Between 1906 and 1909 
he added substance to their skeletal ideas for the Territorial Army, 
the General Staff and the Imperial General Staff. After April, he 
spent the rest of the year on mundane tasks which no doubt he would 
have preferred to leave to someone else. He had, he felt, done all 
that was required of him and was ready for a new challenge. His 
chance came in October when he went to India to become CGS there. 
The years in London had been eventful ones. Haig's days were 
spent busily at the War Office, his nights at the social gatherings 
or in consultation with Haldane until very late. While Haldane 
was used to this level and type of activity--to long nights, rich 
food, strong drink and huge cigars--Haig was not. His fitness 
declined. His physical activity dwindled and he put on weight. 
I 
The stress and unhealthy lifestyle affected his physical condition, 
which was in turn exacerbated by his usual hypochondria. He took 
trips to continental spas, arxi consulted a number of medical 
practitioners, some of whose methods were rather questionable. 
z 
During 1908, he became seariously 1 ill with a mysterious illness which 
confined him to bed for over a month. He recovered completely, but 
did so with a firm conviction that this was not the type of life 
for him. 
IOn this subject, Haig wrote the following in his diary on 18 
January 1908, from Sandringham: 'General Sir George Higginson 
arrived. He was here with me ten years ago. My weight then 11.8, 
the same as his. Now I am 12 st. 11 lb. and he is still the same. He 
remembered as an Eton boy seeing the King christened. He is now 82 
years of age and just as fit as he was ten years ago. ' 
2For instance, there is the following from the diary, 7 February 
1907; 'Henrietta gets a Dr. Moore, a magnetic health giver to come to 
treat me. ' The treatments with Moore continued almost daily for over 
a month. 
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In February 1909, Haig attended a performance of An Englishman's 
Home. The play depicted an invasion of Britain by a continental army 
and ridiculed the lack of preparation by the people. When it was first 
performed it had a profound effect upon Londoners. Army recruiting 
figures suddenly rose. Haldane, recognising its propaganda value, 
even donated War Office funds toward the play's continued production. 
Later, however, it became something of a cult phenomenon, with the 
audiences laughing during the parts when they were supposed to be 
dutifully shocked. This was hardly Haig's experience; 
It is very extraordinary how the play draws crowded houses 
every night, and how impressed the audiences seem to be with 
the gravity of the scenes. I trust good may result and 'uni- 
versal training' become the law of the land, but for myself 
last night's performance was not an interesting sight--the 
incapacity of the who'e of the people in defending their 
homes was disgusting. 
After three years of incessant work modernising his country's Army, 
weaknesses such as the play depicted rankled with Haig. He had, 
since 1897, seen the Germans as the probable enemy in Britain's next 
great war. His knowledge of the German Army caused him to take 
this prospect seriously. 
From the beginning of his time at the War Office, Haig saw his 
main purpose to be the preparation for war. Haldane saw his as that 
of tailoring a new army to fit the national mood and budget. But 
by 1909, the two were agreed with regard to the future: 
Lunched with Mr. Haldane and walked with him to the House 
of Commons. No one else at lunch. We discussed objects for 
which Army and Expeditionary Force exist. He is in no doubt 
--viz. to support France and Russia against Germany and per- 
haps Austria. By organising war may be prevented. z 
1Diary, 
3 February 1909. 
2Diary, 18 February 1909. As a sidelight, this may at first seem to contradict the argument on page 280 that Haldane made up his fore- 
sight in retrospect. In fact it does not. The continuing Anglo-German 
naval rivalry and other disagreements between the two countries had, by 1909, convinced Haldane and most in Britain that Germany would be 
In the end war was not prevented. But neither Haig nor Haldane ever 
had any doubts that they had done the best they possibly could to 
prepare the country. Haldane argued this point at length in Before 
the War. Haig made similar arguments during and after the war. 'The 
organisation of the Army for War' , he wrote, dated from the time 
he 
and Haldane were together at the liar Office. Until that time, 'no 
one knew for what purpose our Army existed! '1 
Neither Haldane nor Haig were the best judges of their accom- 
plishments. The work of both was incomplete because of their respective 
limitations. Haig's was limited by his blinkered approach to strategy 
and tactics. Hid belief in the sanctity of traditional cavalry 
prevented a complete understanding of the changes in military science 
which were in progress. For instance, though he accepted the value 
of the machine gun and modern artillery, he believed that both could 
be incorporated into a strategy in which the cavalry's role remained 
a constant. Likewise, though he recognised the likelihood of a 
European war and appreciated the size and strength of European armies, 
he did not ponder the possibility that the clash of these great armies 
would result in a war completely different from those of the past. 
Haig erred because he failed to understand that the science of war 
is ever-changing. For this reason, the Army he helped to create-- 
though superficially more efficient--in tactical terms was based 
on the fundamentals of the Victorian age. A further limitation was 
the fact that Haig seemed to see an administrative solution to every 
the enemy in an impending war. He no doubt kept this in mind during 
his reform of the Army. But the size of the Army he created--a small fraction of German strength--is adequate proof that the German threat 
was not, as he argued, the primary motivation behind his reforms. 
2Haig to Haldane, 18 November 1918. Quoted in Marshall-Cornwall, 
Haig as a Military Commander, p. 77. It has not been possible to locate the original of this letter. 
problem. He apparently did not understand that reforming 
men's minds, 
or his mind for that matter, was far more difficult than setting 
up a new institutional framework. Haldane, on the other hand, was 
limited by his pragmatic acceptance of what he could and could not 
accomplish. He reformed only what could be reformed. What he 
could not change, or was not bothered to change, he left alone. 
Haldane and Haig formed an effective political partnership. They 
exchanged loyalty to each other for assistance in implementing 
each other's pet projects. Their achievements were above all poli- 
tical ones, achieved through compromise, and therefore incomplete. 
The time which Haig spent at the War Office was in keeping 
with the new focus to his career which began after the Boer War. 
As was discussed at the beginning of the last chapter, from 1902 
to 1914. Haig consolidated his position within the Army. His service 
under Haldane enhanced his career prospects significantly. He demon- 
strated his devotion to the Army and his acceptance of the need for 
reform. Though he worked for a Liberal Government, he successfully 
avoided party ties. It was, and is, safe to assume that he would 
have worked equally as hard had the party in power been different. 
In other respects, however, the period had little effect upon him. 
It did not cause him to re-think the military doctrines which had 
been confirmed by the Boer War. There was, perhaps, a negative 
aspect to his service in the War Office. Ever since his association 
with Fraser in 1894, his duties had been predominantly administrative. 
His only experience of direct command of fighting men was during a 
brief and unspectacular period in the Sudan Campaign. Since that 
time he had been either a staff officer or a senior commander with 
mainly administrative duties. His service with Haldane was a continua- 
tion of this trend and thus a reinforcement of the attitude3 and habits 
it engendered. Haig had, perhaps unintentionally, developed into a 
'paper' general. For too much of his career, he was too far removed 
from experiences associated with commanding men in combat. The gulf 
between him and the common soldier was dangerously wide. Unfortunately, 
Haig had neither the insight nor the capacity for self-examination 
to correct these inadequacies. 
CHAPTER IX 
On the Eve of War, 1909-1914 
While at the War Office, Haig possessed a great deal of power and 
influence. His relationship with Haldane allowed him to shape the 
Army virtually as he wished. After such an arrangement, any subse- 
quent appointment--short of active service-would have been by nature 
anti-climactic. It is nevertheless curious that Haig next went to 
India as Chief of the General Staff. He never particularly enjoyed 
service ih India, particularly because of the way it distanced him 
from the military issues in Britain. This was particularly relevant 
in 1909. Haig was certain that a great European war loomed. He be- 
lieved that Britain had no more than three years to prepare herself. 
1 
The time would have to be used wisely if outright disaster was to be 
avoided. Yet at this very moment Haig chose to leave the centre of 
activity and escape to its outer perimeter. 
The system of military administration in India had changed since 
Haig left in 1906, but it was no less chaotic than before. The 
Kitchener-Curzon argument had, it will be recalled, centred on the 
authority of the Commander-in-Chief and the First Military Member. 
Kitchener's victory resulted in both posts being subsequently occupied 
by one man. This was, however, an incomplete reform. There were no 
corresponding changes in the administrative apparatus connected to 
each office. The posts were simply joined, not amalg3mxted. Each 
had its own intricate, and totally distinct, network of officials 
ranged beneath it. Sincd.. both posts were held by one man, some 
comic, but no less serious, problems resulted: 
It was inevitable that ... all important cases came before the Commander-in-Chief twice, each time submitted by dif- 
ferent subordinates, who probably each advocated different 
and often contradictory solutions of the same problem. Cases 
1See the 27, April 1909 letter from Haig to Kiggell, gpoted on 
page 325, for an example of Haig's thoughts on the impending war. 
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were not unknown of the Commander-in-Chief disagreeing 
with himself as Army Member. 
1 
This was ordinarily the sort of tangle Haig delighted in unravelling. 
The problems were no more complicated than those he had encountered 
at the War Office. But, as CGS, Haig would not be able to reform 
the system. He could suggest changes but he could not himself 
initiate policy. He would have to tolerate the mess and and try to 
accomplish things in spite of it. 
The memory of past problems and the anticipation of future ones 
in an, Indian military system which had not improved at first caused 
Haig to decline the post of CGS when the Commander-in-Chief, Sir 
O'Moore Creagh, offered it. As he described on 15 March 1909: 
He asked me to go to India as his Chief of Staff. I declined 
at first saying that I was so fully engaged on the Imperial 
General Staff and other important matters-besides the Simla 
people were such a crooked lot I could not work with theml 
He replied that he would like to join with me in ousting 
the rascals! and said I could think the matter over for a 
weekl2 
To Kiggell, he gave more personal reasons for his reluctance: 
Personally I would rather stay at home, besides it means 
leaving the children here, and my wife coming out with me 
and visiting them each winter etc. 3 
Creagh persisted and Haig finally relented. There is nevertheloss 
uncertainty as to why, in view of the above reservations, Haig 
accepted the post. 
1 Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 50. 
2Diary, 15 March 1909. Haig at first referred to the st as 
Chief of Staff than, later, Chief of the General Staff. (CGSr. Both 
are the same, though the General Staff was not technically in existence 
in India before Haig arrived. For convenience, Haig's position will 
hereafter be referred to as CGS. 
3Haig to Launcelot Kiggell, 24 April 1909, Kiggell Papers, I%1. 
The letters from Haig to Kiggell are all from this source and will hereafter be referred to as 'Haig to Kiggell', followed by, the 
date, with the citation in parentheses. 
Timing might be one explanation. At the same time that Haig 
thought his best work at the War Office was complete, no better appoint- 
ment than India arose. As he advanced up the military ladder, the 
number of available assignments decreased. They were possibly made 
fewer as a result of the bruised egos which Haig caused am hg his 
senior officers at the War Office. These men were powerless to affect 
Haig's future as long as he remained under Haldane's wing. But, when 
he emerged from beneath it, they could make things difficult for 
him. Finally, the move from DSD to CGS India seems curious in Haig's 
case only. It was actually an ordinary, if slight, move upward. It 
is strange in Haig's case because the title of DSD was always an 
inadequate description of the power he actually held. But this power 
had been supplied by Haldane; it was not easily convertible outside 
the War Office. Within the Army as a whole, Haig was simply DSD, a 
Major General with little seniority, only forty-eight years old, and 
a bit of a headache to many of his superiors. CGS India was the beat 
he could expect. 
This still does not explain why Haig escaped to the Indian 
backwater when he could have stayed at the War Office. The best 
explanation is the standard one: duty. This is demonstrated in two 
letters to Kiggell. The first, dated 21+ April 1909, outlined what 
Haig felt his duty entailed: 
. Sir O'Moore Creagh has asked me to go to India as his Chief of Staff. At first I refused, but as he pressed 
me, and, on thinking the matter over, and looking at the 
importance of starting a General Staff in India, weeding 
out Simla and developing the Imperial General Staff, I 
thought it best I should go. 1 
He elaborated on this three days later: 
1Haig to Kiggell, 24 April 1909. The 'crooked lot' at Simla were 
the British officers rho had-spent their entire careers in the Indian Army and whom Haig considered an obstacle to progress. 
As regards meeting 'the storm' which we all foresee, it' seems 
to me that it will take a long time, we'll win by wearing 
the enemy out, if we are only allowed three more years to 
prepare and organise the Empire. And it is of vital impor- 
tance to have the machinery available in India trained as 
soon as possible to turn out Staff Officers who may be of 
use when the time comes, and the resources of that country 
organised for Imperial needs, instead of only for India's 
at present. It was this idea that made me accept Sir O'M's 
offer, and I honestly believe that I can do more good with 
him than here during the next three years. He is most 
anxious to work on sound lines and it is for the G. S. here to 
do its utmost to help him. 
The Indian appointment was therefore an important if unpleasant 
responsibility in the task of preparing the Empire for war. Haig 
accepted his duty with characteristic self-sacrifice. Once he agreed 
to the appointment, he dedicated himself to it and began to formulate 
ambitious plans. 
Before he could leave, however, there were a number of important 
matters which required his attention. In July, he paid a last 
visit to King Edward VII at Balmoral. The King, who had been such a 
gracious benefactor, died the following May. While at Balmoral, Haig 
was created K. C. V. 0. There were also important matters pertaining to 
the Army. Haig delayed his departure long enough to attend the 
cavalry manoeuvres at Uffington and to complete important work on the 
Cavalry Division. During this period he also began to look ahead to 
India. He arranged details regarding his staff. and briefed himself 
on problems he would encounter at Simla. Some of the information 
he received had an ominous quality: 
Mr. Azziz-Uddin ... in Criminal Intelligence Department 
lunched. His experience in 34 years of British service is 
'Fraud triumphs'. He attributes unrest and secret societies 
in India to Curzon--thinks Lord Kitchener a 'fraud'. Stated 
in a month assarL, Lnations would begin in England and India, 
possibly Curzon. 
1Haig to Kiggell, 27 April 1909, (1/2). 
2Dairy, 13 November 1909. 
Haig noted this information, and made special efforts to find out 
as much as possible about the Intelligence network at Simla. 
An important matter requiring Haig's attention was that of a 
suitable replacement at the DSD. He felt it was imperative that 
someone be found who could be trusted to uphold his established 
principles. He sought advice from Kiggell, with whom he had often 
worked closely at the DSD. The correspondence between Haig and Kiggell, 
(though only the former's letters survive) provides valuable insight 
into their particular relationship and-also into Haig's treatment 
of subordinates. Ten years earlier, Haig had been the protege, while 
French and Wood were his patrons. By 1909 he had advanced to the 
stage where his old mentors were either retired or had become competi- 
tors for high appointment. Haig, in consequence, shifted from protege 
to patron. His close associates, for the rest of his career, were 
subordinates who were dependent upon him for recognition, and upon whom 
he depended for support, devotion, loyalty and admiration. 
Kiggell was eventually chosen to become DSD. It does not appear 
that this was Haig's original intention. He first asked only for 
advice: 
.. it is so important to get a suitable man to replace 
me here, that I am anxious to have your ideas as to a likely 
officer .. .1 
It is obvious that Kiggell, in reply, congratulated Haig quite 
profusely on his appointment. This prompted the usual false modesty 
from Haig. 'I confess that I wish I possessed half "the value" at 
which you estimate mei'2 The depth of Kiggell's admiration and the 
similarity of their views soon convinced Haig that Kiggoll was the 
'Haig to Kiggell, 24 April 1909, (I/1). 
2Haig to Kiggell, 27 April 1909, (1/2). 
I 
suitable replacement. 'If I can only arrange to get you here, while 
I am C of S in India', he wrote on 18 May, 'we might do much towards 
creating the beginnings of an Imperial General Staff. '1 Haig needed 
someone who he could trust to be of like mind and who would be open 
to advice. Kiggell fit these requirements very well. He was as 
enthusiastic as Haig on the subject of military reform and, perhaps 
equally important, as conservative as Haig with regard to cavalry mat- 
ters. 'I am very eager that you should succeed me here in order to 
ensure continuity', Haig wrote; adding 'not to mention that you are 
the best man for the job. '2 
Kiggell, a man of evidently low self esteem, doubted that he 
was indeed the 'best man'. This was perhaps all the better for Haig, 
who usually preferred the self-effacing sycophant to the brash 
opportunist. It was not difficult to convince Kiggell that he was 
suitable. 'I don't agree with your views on Brigadier Kiggell', 
he wrote on 21 May, 'nor do you correctly value the importance of 
"continuity". Haig continued: 
I agree that it would be well that DSD should be a Major 
General but then the officer who is selected should be 
promoted--not a less qualified man selected because of 
his rank!! 
Haig finally persuded Kiggell to take the post. He described the 
selection as a 'triumph for ability and honesty over incapacity and 
intrigue'. With virtue triumphant, he concluded that he had 'great 
hope for the future of the General Staff' .4 He could feel safe 
about leaving the War Office. 
IHaig to Kiggell, 18 May 1909, (I/3). 
2Ibid. 
3Haig to Kiggell, 21 May 1909, (I/4). 
4Haig 
to Kiggell, 3 July 1909, (I/5). 
Haig arrived in Bombay on 22 October 1909. Though far 
removed 
from the War Office, his attentions did not long stray from matters 
there. He sent fornightly letters of great length to Kiggell. Although 
these letters consisted mostly of advice and suggestions pertaining 
to Kiggell's duties as DSD, Kiggell treated them as something just 
short of commands. This was probabaly what Haig wanted. In July 
1910, Haig was faced with the possible loss of his valuable collab- 
orator. Kiggell was offered the post of Commandant of the Staff 
College. Indications are that he was eager to take it. Haig's 
reaction--a combination of firmness and flattery-is revealing: 
On no account should you go to the Staff College. The 
development of the General Staff will be thrown back for 
many years if you leave your present job now. 
Besides with as many talkers at W. O. -Aldershot--Camberley 
and elsewhere who know not what war really is, nor Clause- 
witz' fundamentals, the whole show may be wrecked unless 
you are in a responsible position and able to put a stopper 
in the windbag's mouths! I already see from your discussion 
at the Staff College Conference a tendency to split hairs, 
and a desire for precise rules to guide officers in every 
conceivable situation in war. This wants watching. Only a 
man of character like yourself can produce the right correc- 
tive. ... But you must remain where you can insist on 
principles of employment of the Army being thoroughly sound. 
Though it meant passing up a valuable appointment, Kiggell agreed 
to stay. 
2 
A frequent topic of Haig's letters was the training of staff 
officers. Kiggell regularly sought advice on changes in the Staff 
College curriculum, which Haig gladly provided. He also asked Haig 
for his views on prospective candidates, some of whom Haig black- 
balled. When Kiggell considered reforms of the entrance exam, Haig 
replied in a revealing manner. The memory of 1893 was still fresh. 
1913. 
'Haig to Kiggell, 14 July 1910, (1/7). 
2Kiggell later became Commandant of the Staff College on 9 Octobor 
Haig pondered whether a formal examination was even necessary. If 
the authorities insisted on one, then at least the mathematics por- 
tion should be dropped; 
It seems to me to be almost impossible to set a simple 
mathematical paper without having catch questions in it. 
At any rate the fact remains that the mathematical examina- 
tion has not been a success. Both Brathwaite and myself 
failed to pass the examination in mathematics in the Staff 
College, and neither of us have found any need for a more 1 
thorough knowledge of mathematics than we already possess! 
Though Haig's bruised ego is easily visible behind the recommendations, 
they were nevertheless practical. His advocacy of a system of 'compe- 
tition ... 
in military subjects only', 
2 
as opposed to one which 
included subjects like English composition and foreign languages, 
was wise. 
With Haig absent from the War Office, the attacks upon the FSR 
were renewed. Haig tried to stiffen Kiggell's resistance to this 
evil influence with letters like the following, dated 15 June 1911: 
As regards the Adjutant General's attack on Field Service 
Regulations ... Taken as a whole the book is in my opinion 
excellent, and (given the determination to make things run 
smoothly) the principles being absolutely sound can be easily 
applied without friction! The Adjutant General should be 
asked to put forward his amendments for criticism, not merely 
by the War Office, but by the whole of the General Staff in 
India and the Dominions; it would cause a great deal of 
trouble if any change in priniples were started now, and any 
such change ought not to be made without full discussion and 
the general concurrence of all concerned. 3 
Haig took attacks on the FSR very personally. He had worked hard to 
see the manual published. He repeatedly emphasised that its real value 
lay in its very existence. In other words, imperfect though it may 
have been, it was still better than no manual at all, and its complete 
1Haig to Kiggell, 27 April 1911, (I/il). 
2Ibid. 
3Haig 
to Kiggell, 15 June 1911, 
abandonment would mean chaos in wartime. This meant that Haig enter- 
tained only very minor criticisms of the manual and was pained by 
any discussion of its total tejection. 
Haig's stance was justified. The Army did not have time to 
scrap the manual and begin anew. But the persistence of the opposi- 
tion and Haig's own stubbornness made him intransigent and at times 
contradictory. For instance, it has been noted how he scorned the 
'windbags' at the War Office who sought 'precise rules to guide 
officers in every conceivable situation'. Yet Haig's approach to the 
staff tours he conducted in India was not measurably more flexible. 
As he confessed: 
... I have tried to preach 'the doctrine' as laid down in FSR. ... and have quoted chapter and verse so that 
the General Staff here may interpret the regulations in the 
way in which I believe is intended. 
There was a strange mixture of the dogmatic and the flexible in Haig's 
approach to the FSR. He encouraged flexibility as long as the bounda- 
ries of improvisation were set by him. 
This point is demonstrated later in the letter to Kiggell 
quoted above. In it he attacked Charles a'Court Repington, Military 
Correspondent of The Times. Repington criticised the FSR because it 
did not set forth a clearly defined strategy for the employment of the 
B. E. F. Haig answered: 
.. I can only feel thankful that his training manual was 
not in the hands of our army because we must undoubtedly 
have achieved disaster. 2 
In his report on the 1911 Indian Staff Tour, Haig renewed the attack 
upon Repington and his followers: 
on the issue of the lance. 
1Haig to Kiggell, 13 July 1911, (1/18). 
2Ibid. Repington was, incidentally, one of Haig's closest allies 
Certain critics of the British General Staff and of our 
regulations have recently argued that a doctrine is.. 
lacking. . ... the critics urge 
that the British General 
Staff hesitates to teach and to publish a clear line of 
action. The reason seems to be that unless some such 
definite doctrine is decided and inculcated in time of 
peace, action in war will be hesitating and mistakes will 
be made. The critics seem to lose sight of the true nature 
of war, and of the varied conditions under which the British 
Army may have to take the field. It is neither necessary 
nor desirable that we should go further than what is clearly 
laid down in our regulations. If we go further, we run the 
risk of tying ourselves by a doctrine that may not always be 
applicable and we gain nothing in return. 
' 
Haig continually emphasised that 'with our normal Army of 6 Divisions 
we must try to have a little generalship. '2 He correctly grasped 
that British strategy would be determined largely by the actions of 
Germany and France. Britain had to be the wily improviser. Haig's 
appreciation of this fact was undoubtedly wise. 
The wisdom in the above argument is, however, misleading. It 
must be remembered that with Haig there was often a separation of 
principles and pratice. As will be shown in the epilogue, though 
Haig expressed the need for flexibility in 1911, this does not neces- 
sarily mean that flexibility characterised his approach to command 
from 1916-1918. This is an assumption which Terraine mistakenly makes. 
For instance, he comments on the 1911 staff tour as follows: 
The tactical flexibility (not to be confused with strategic 
opportunism) became Haig's settled view. When war broke out, 
he had not departed from it by one jot. India was, in truth, 
the finishing school of his military education. 3 
It is likewise imprecise to call Haig's Indian tour of duty 'the 
finishing school of his military education'. The statement suggests 
1Douglas Haig, 'Report on the 1911 Staff Tour held by the Chief 
of the General Staff, India', Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 85, 
(no page numbers are provided). 
2Haig to Kiggell, 13 July 1911, (1/18). 
3Terraine, Douglas Haig: theEducated Soldier, p. 49. 
successes which did not actually occur. A few sentences in a staff 
tour report should not be treated as, indicative of twenty-six months' 
service. Terraine mistakenly relied heavily on the Charteris bio- 
graphy in his treatment of this portion of Hai g's career. Charteris' 
book, though valuable as a whole, is faulty for two reasons. The 
first is that Charteris wrote almost entirely from memory. He 
did not have access to the Haig Papers nor to the correspondence of 
Haig's contemporaries. His accounts of specific conversations, which 
Terrain often quotes verbatim, are not reliable. The second fault 
arises from Charteris' purpose. He aimed to enhance the image of a 
man whom he, most of the time, blindly admired. As a result, he 
exaggerated Haig's successes and ignored or glossed over his occasional 
failures. 
The evidence in the diaries and the letters to Kiggell indi- 
cates that, while Haig was in India, disappointment and failure over- 
shadowed success. It must be emphasised at the outset that Haig's 
failures in India arose not from personal shortcomings, but from 
the impossibility of achieving significant progress under the inef- 
ficient and disorganised system of military administration which 
existed in the country at the time. He failed at goals which were 
impossible to achieve. Haig was nevertheless not one to admit 
failure. In his blackest moments he consistently claimed that he 
could see progress being made. 'The work here', he wrote on 18 May 
1911, 'is very interesting and progress in many ways apparent and 
so cheering. '1 But while in India, statements like this--in contrast 
to earlier periods--were rare. This statement was in fact made after 
Haig's spirits were buoyed by the confirmation of his early return 
1 Haig to Kiggell, 18 May 1911, (I/13). 
to Britain. Underneath the surface the situation was not bright. 
It must be remembered that Haig went to India with two goals. The 
first was to develop the Indian General Staff according to the format 
established by Haig as DSD. The second goal was to put the Indian 
Army on a war footing. The Army had always served a peacekeeping 
function. It was designed to control the incessant internal quarrels 
which characterised Imperial India. Haig wanted to direct the focus 
from the internal function toward India's responsibility via a via 
the safety of the Empire within the world picture. He had bold 
plans for India's contribution in what he now regarded as the 
inevitable European war. 
Haig's achievements in both areas fell far short of his hopes. 
The reason for this failure was the monolithic obstructions referred 
to above. which were built into the Indian military bureaucracy. Those 
who had long operated within this system did not appreciate outsiders 
eager for change. Haig soon found that he was one against many and, 
as such, quite powerless. Even Creagh, who had promised to help 
him 'oust the rascals', in fact turned out to be one of the rascals. 
As Marshall-Cornwall points out. Creagh was a veteran of forty years' 
service in the Indian Army. He 'by no means approved of all the 
reforms instituted by his ruthless predeceseor'1--i. e. Kitchener. 
Haig had earlier supported Kitchener and now sought to extend his 
reforms. He and Creagh were therefore destined to disagree. 
Haig was struck not by Creagh's recalcitrance, but by his general 
weakness of character: 
... the C. in C. wishes to oblige the Viceroy because the latter is so agreeable to him, and says that he (the Chief) 
should not pay house rent but that his residences should be 
IMarchall-Cornwall, Haig as a Military Commander, pp. 77-78. 
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furnished and kept up like that of a Lord Governor of'a 
Province! So you see there is much need for the 'reasoned 
opinion' on the General Staff to counteract these evil 
influences. l 
When his appointment to the Aldershot Command was confirmed in late 
1911. Haig predicted what effect his departure would have: 
I expect the Viceroy and the C. in C. will be glad 
when I cease to be CGS here. The Viceroy is not at all 
pleased with the lines taken in-the G. S. memo ... and 
the poor C. in C. is under the influence of us both, and 2 
has consequently given contrary opinions from time to time! 
Within such an environment, there was little that Haig could accom- 
plish. Charteris indicates that he tried to reform the 'canonisation 
of duality' which he saw as the problem of the Indian system. He 
3 
suggested wide-ranging administrative reforms designed to streamline 
the system in a manner similar to that which had been implemented in 
Britain. But in Britain he was surrounded by men of like mind to 
his own. With the opposite the case in India, he failed. By him- 
self, he achieved only a few insignificant changes. Terraine excuses 
these failures by claiming that 'his real work lay elsewhere. in guiding 
the minds of officers towards the problem of fighting a European 
enemy. '4 This is simply not true. It cannot be denied that administra- 
tive reform of the Indian General Staff was one of Haig's stated pri- 
orities. This made his inability to achieve reform all the more 
disappointing to him. 
Without the desired administrative reforms, 'guiding the minds 
of officers in India' became an extremely difficult task. For instance, 
when Haig tried to devise plans for mobilising the Indian Army in the 
1Haig to Kiggell, 29 June 1911, (1/16). 
2Haig to Kiggell, 29 September 1911, (1/24). 
3Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 49. 
4Terraine, 
Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 47. 
event of war against a European enemy, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, 
intervened and ordered Haig to destroy the plans. 
I Though Haig's 
staff tours were successful (according, at least, to him), in other 
areas he was frustrated by his inability to improve the staff training 
system: 
General Wapshare and 2 of his staff came to fetch us at 
8 a. m. and drive to cavalry school. 
We walked around school before breakfast. 
Am much annoyed at way in which all work is held up, and 
keenness of staff dampened by delay in issuing Army Order 
authorising opening of School. Delay is due to the o posi- 
tion on the part of Sir R. Scallon (Sec't' Army Dept. 
) 
and 
Financial Department (Fleetwood Wilson). 
A few days later Haig expressed his irritation with cavalry officers 
who had 'forgotten to look to parade slates from War point of view. ' 
In this area, there had been a regression from the standards he 
remembered; 'When I. G. Cavalry I was very attentive to these points. '3 
Reflection upon his previous tour of duty also resulted in the fol- 
lowing complaint: 
Rode with Wapshare to the 2nd Lancers lines ... A very 
senior lot of officers. Much the same as when I inspected 
5 or 6 years ago. Major Maxwell, Pritchard etc. in same 
rank! ... Difficulty to have efficiency in the I. A. with 
such slow promotion. 
There was very little which Haig found to praise in his diaries or 
letters to Kiggell. India was a backwater, and there was little Haig 
could do to alter this fact. He was forced to lower the expectations 
1See Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 61. Both Terrains 
and Marshall Cornwall refer to this affair and emphasise the encourage- 
ment Haig gave to his subordinates to disobey the Viceroy's directives. 
But the only source for this is Charteris and no other verification 
is available. 
2Diary, 20 August 1910. 
3Diary, 22 August 1910. 
4Diary, 
31 March 1911. 
he had formed before leaving Britain. 
Another problem which worried Haig was the precarious loyalty of 
the Indian soldier. The reminder of the Mutiny was as fresh as ever. 
Haig recorded some random notes on this subject not long before he 
left India; 
We have reverted to the conditions which prevailed when 
John Lawrence spoke of safety rather than power as the 
primary requirement of the Army in India. 
At present Army's special function is as a reserve of the 
forces of law and order. It being a mercenary Army its 
loyalty must be bought and cannot be presumed. 
Danger of sweating the Indian Army in the cause of military 
efficiency. 
Danger of giving Sikhs a partial monopoly of military 
service. 
If it is considered that one of Haig's stated goals was to re-direct 
the focus of the Indian Army, the above is proof that he was unable 
to do so. His diaries and letters show that towards the end of his 
tour questions of internal stability occupied the greater part of his 
attention. 
Haig did institute a number of significant policies designed 
to ensure the loyalty of the Indian soldier. He described these to 
Kiggell on 31 August 1911: 
In the Indian Army we have not only to train officers for 
war but also how to keep the mercenaries loyal! We are 
therefore sending an officer from Headquarters to Division 
occasionally to explain what is going on at a meeting of the 
G. O. C. and C. O. s of the Indian units. From what I hear the 
ignorance of some of the old officers regarding the various 
Indian societies and what has been going on for years is 
remarkable. We are also arranging for a certain number of 
regimental officers to tour the districts from which they 
recruit to get to know the Indians of some importance and 
also the civil officials. The latter must work hand in hand 
with the soldier now in order to combat the enemy who is 
already in the field you may say. I think the General Staff 
has made a good beginning ... in meet . n4 the internal enemy. 
2 
'Diary, 17 August 1911. 
2Ha. ig to Kiggell, 3 August 1911, (1/22). 
This was a more progressive method of dealing with the mercurial 
loyalty of the Indian soldier than had existed prior to Haig's 
arrival. He must be given credit for wisely realising that it was 
easier to ensure stability through understanding than through 
coercion. 
It has already been shown how Haig's letters to Kiggell present 
a fresh picture of his Indian tour of duty. The disappointment which 
he felt apparently caused him to look outward, in two main directions. 
One area upon which he focused his attention was the Middle East, 
specifically with regard to German intentions there. Haig believed 
that the Germans had by 1911 accepted British naval supremacy. This 
caused them to focus upon 'weakening us on land first of all with a 
view to obtaining sea supremacy eventually'. 
1 He described how this 
would happen in a letter to Kiggell dated 5 April 1911: 
I see(Germany) has got the concession to connect the Baghdad 
line with the Syrian railways. ... She can now threaten Egypt when the time comes. Her next step will be to squeeze 
Persia and so threaten Afghanistan and India. ... Per- 
sonally it seems to me that Germany's objectives should 
be to threaten India and cause us as much trouble and expense 
in this country as possible. Also go for Egypt. Curry 
favour with Japan so as to make us detach and reduce the 
fleet in Home Waters to such a size as she can tackle. Then 
she might occupy the low countries .. .2 
Haig's predictions corresponded in theory at least to the policies 
Germany eventually pursued. He never underestimated German inten- 
tions or power. This was the area in which he was most politically 
astute. He criticised men like Hardinge who were not equally pres- 
cients 'I fear few of our diplomats ... realise what German power 
is..,, 
3 
IHaig to Kiggell, 5 April 1911, (1/8). 
2Ibid. 
31bid. 
This fear made him increasingly eager to return home. His 
early return was the other focus of concern in the letters to 
Kiggell. He did not want to be caught in India when the confronta- 
tion began. As he wrote on 18 May 1911: 
. the situation at home is more important at the present 
time than India and I shall be glad to be close at hand to 
discuss personally, the many important questions which may 
be under consideration by the General Staff. 
This was a significant departure from his earlier letters in which 
he justified his presence in India. The first mention of an early 
return to Britain occurred on 5 April 1911, when Haig was only halfway 
through his term of service: 
I much appreciate the friendly remarks about myself and 
what you want me to become in the near future. I am really 
proud of the confidence which you place in me when as you 
know you did all the hard work for me as DSD1 ... As to 
going to Aldershot there are too many applicants I expect 
for that billet for the powers to [sic] be to think of me. 
In any case I have never asked for an appointment and I 
don't intend to begin now-besides I am. full of work here 
and could not leave those who have most loyally supported 
me in difficult times for another year at least. I should 
then gave done three training seasons out of my allotted 
four! 
Haig did not have to ask for the Aldershot appointment; Haldane gave 
it to him five weeks later. His feelings of obligation did not 
prevent him from leaving his loyal supporters earlier than he had 
planned, on 23 December 1911. He assumed the Aldershot command 
in the following March. 
Before he left India, Haig arranged the transfer of two members 
of his personal staff--Captains H. D. Baird and John Charteris. 
The arrival of these two men at Aldershot was pejoratively referred 
to as the 'Hindu Invasion' by the regular Ist Corps staff who resented 
1Haig to Kiggell, 18 May 1911, (1/13), 
2Haig to Kiggell, 5 April 1911, (I/8)0 
the intrusion. Haig's action is an example of his contradictory atti- 
tudes toward the staff. At the DSD, he worked to rid the-system of 
patronage. He sought professionalisation through a system of pro- 
motion based on merit and experience. He tried to make sure that 
graduates of the Staff College were rewarded with valuable staff posi- 
tions. Yet there is again the divorce of principles and practice. 
Neither Baird nor Charteris had p. s. c. s. They had very little staff 
experience, and had spent the majority of their careers in India. 
They appear to have been chosen simply for their ability to get on 
well with their superior. 
The Haig-Charteris relationship deserves special examination 
because of the light it sheds on Haig's character. methods of command 
and attitude toward subordinates. On first inspection, Charterin 
seems antithetical to Haig's conception of the perfect staff officer. 
As Charteris himself maintained, Haig had 'an aversion for the hard- 
bitten man and[a]fondness for Caesar's fat counsellors'=1 he preferred 
quiet malleable gentleman of 'average intelligence'. Charteris was 
brash, outspoken, impolite, unkempt2 and of considerable intellect. 
But he was above all loyal, to the extent that he sometimes placed 
loyalty to Haig over loyalty to the truth. Like Haig, Charteris 
3 
1John Charteris, At G. H. Q, (London: Cassell, 1931), p. 12. 
2In 
a letter to his wife dated 7 April 1915, Haig referred to 
Charteris as 'dirty and fat'. See Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 
141. There are similar comments in other letters to Lady Haig. 
3Examples 
of this tendency will be given in the epilogue, but it 
is well to relate the incident when Charteris tried to raise Haig's 
temporarily low spirits by taking him to a prisoner of war camp so 
that he could see the poor condition of the German soldiers there. 
Charteris made sure all the able-bodied prisoners were removed prior 
to the visit. The trick was also played on Lloyd George. While 
documentary proof for the story cannot be found it is mentioned often 
enough to give it a fair measure of plausibility. See K. Strong, 
Men of Intelligence, (London: Cassell, 1970), p. 28; H. Gough, The 
placed a high value on staff harmony. He could antagonise those 
outwith the staff, but was otherwise one of Haig's 'band of brothers'. 
Haig recognised these qualities in Charteris. The fact that he 
could ignore Charteris' annoying habits and traits in the interest 
of loyalty and harmony is the best proof of how important these 
qualites were to Haig. 
The circumstances of their first meeting provide additional 
insight into the Haig-Charteris relationship. Charteris, a Royal 
Engineer, was supervising the construction of a pontoon bridge. Haig, 
on one of his tours of inspection as CGS, consulted with Charteris on 
the details of the work. He received a crisp and lucid account. 
Though Haig was not scientifically minded, it will be remembered 
that he did enjoy observing and recording technical processes. 
Charteris' eloquence no doubt impressed the inarticulate Haig. 
Soon after this meeting, Charteris was found a place on Haig's 
personal staff at Simla. 
' They discovered that they shared a fasci- 
nation for detail and an ability to effect order out of chaos. Their 
relationship consequently grew. Charteris remained at Haig's side 
until early 1918 when pressure from the War Office and Lloyd George 
resulted in his dismissal. His responsibilities went far beyond 
the standard ones of a staff officer. Haig relied on Charteris 
in all affairs, whether personal or professional. 
2 Their relationship 
Fifth Army, (London: Hodder. 'and Stoughton, 1931), p. 211= and Lloyd 
George War Memoirs, p. 1316. 
1The 
source of this information is Marshall-Cornwall, Haig 
Military Commander, pp. 81-82, though no dates are given. 
2During the Great War, for instance, Haig sent Charteris home 
to sell his automobile and to help Lady Haig move out of Government 
House, Aldershot. Uaig also sent Charteris to the Balkans at the 
start of the 1912 Balkan War, but Charteris was soon ordered home 
by a rather perturbed War Office. 
was always symbiotic. Charteris was Haig's private secretary, A. D. C., 
moral support, guardian, confidant and friend. He provided Haig 
with companionship, loyalty, reassurance and, perhaps most important, 
a sense of his own superiority. Charteris accepted his status as 
Haig's )principal boy' and apparently enjoyed the teasing from Haig 
which went along with this role. 
1 He thrived within his position of 
social and professional subservience. Haig was his hero, and there 
is no doubt that Charteris made this clear. In return, Charteris 
was allowed to bask in the reflected light of his exalted superior. 
Ha. ig's period at Aldershot was the brief calm before the 
storm. He had risen to the highest troop command in the British 
Army, and yet was only fifty years old. Despite his relatively late 
start in the Army, he had been promoted past all his contemporaries 
in age. This must have given him immense satisfaction. Equally. 
satisfying was the fact that India, with all its disturbing back- 
wardness, was comfortably behind him. He was back in Britain, 
where he could patiently await the inevitable. Charteris describes 
Haig's Elysium as follows: 
For the first time in his married life he was settled 
in a real home. Government House, if not palatial, was 
spacious, and in those pre-war days it stood in country 
surroundings. Happy in the reunion with his family, Haig 
set himself to the just admixture of the life of a serving 
officer and a country gentleman. 2 
Haig golfed, hunted, fished and generally kept active. fie partici- 
pated in the most prestigious of social functions. He again visited 
1Esher 
was one of many to refer to Charteris as the 'principal 
boy'. See Esher to Haig, 21 October 1916, Haig Papers, NLS, Ace. 
3155, No. 214(f). In the previously-quoted 7 April 1915 letter to 
his wife, Haig described the many April Fools jokes which he and 
his staff had played on Charteris. Lady Haig, in The Man I Knew, 
relates similar incidents when Charteris was the brunt of-some 
rather childish jokes (See p. 108). 
2Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 64. 
fortune tellers and mediums who predicted nothing but success and 
glory. There was fulfilment in his life which, when combined with 
his usually immense self-satisfaction, brought him serenity. 
The Aldershot command was composed of the 1st and 2nd Divisions 
and the Ist Cavalry Brigade. Upon mobilisation, this force was to 
become the 1st Corps of the B. E. F. When still in India, Haig commented 
upon his future assignment in a letter to Kiggell: 
I had a very nice letter from Lord Haldane last mail 
.. He ... said that he thought there was a good deal to be done at Aldershot. I am glad at this as I 
should feel nervous at taking over the command in 'abso- 
lute efficiency'. 1 
Haig made 'absolute efficiency' his goal. It was the type of task 
for which he was naturally suited. He was interested in every 
aspect of the command, including, significantly, the budding air 
arm. But, as always, a disproportionate amount of attention was 
paid to his beloved cavalry. It is not necessary to elucidate all 
the minor tasks in which Haig engaged in order to prepare his command 
for war. The proud record of the 1st Corps during the opening months 
of the Great War is sufficient testimony to Haig's success as organiser, 
educator, trainer and commander. 
The Aldershot Corps received its first significant test in the 
autumn of 1912. Large scale manoeuvres--more ambitious than any 
previously held--took place in East -Anglia. Haig's 1st Corps, the 
'Red Force', was pitted against the 2nd Corps, or 'Blue Force', com- 
manded by Lieutenant General Sir James Grierson. Haig was reinforced 
by Allenby's Cavalry Division, which gave him numerical superiority. 
Haig played the role of the European invader, while Crierson was 
scripted to fall back for the defence of London. Through the superior 
IHaig to Kiggell, 29 June 1911, (1/16). 
use of his air arm, Grierson cleverly out-manoeuvred Haig, 
end was 
generally agreed the winner. 
After the manoeuvres, a conference was held in the Qreat Hall 
of Trinity College, Cambridge. The commanders were supposed to 
explain and discuss their actions and outline the lessons to be 
learned. Haig, never adept at self-expression, foolishly abandoned 
his prepared speech and attempted to extemporise. According to 
Charteris, 
... he became totally unintelligible and unbearably 
dull. The University dignitaries soon fell fast asleep. 
Haig's friends became more and more uncomfortable; only 
he himself seemed totally unconscious of his failure. 1 
Charteris was right; Haig did not notice the effect of his speech. 
He described the event in his diary: 
I am c. lled first to explain my operation as C. in C. 
of Red Force. I think my remarks well received. Grierson 
followed. Then French. His criticisms especially on the 
strategic value of Cambridge were not much thought of. 2 
Haig's clumsiness in verbal communication, produced some amusing 
anecdotes, 
3 but was otherwise not important. It should not distract 
attention from two significant issues to arise from the 1912 manoeu- 
vres. One was the way Grierson had more readily grasped the impor- 
tance and utility of a technological innovation. Delay in this 
area proves costly in wartime, when technological progress always 
increases in speed. The second point concerns the comment regarding 
French. Neither the comment itself nor the issue was particularly 
1Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Hair, pp. 55-56. 
2Diary, 19 September 1912. 
3The best one is when Haig congratulated the winners of an inter-regimental cross-country race by saying 'You have run very 
well. I hope you will run as well in the presence of the enemy. ' The source is, again, Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, p. 65, 
and is therefore open to question. 
important. It is, however, significant as an indicator of the rift 
which was developing between Haig and French. 
This rift widened as a result of the Curragh Mutiny which 
exploded from the Anglo-Irish troubles in March 1914. Home Rule, 
passed in January 1913, was due to be enforced in June 1913. Protestant 
Ulster, opposed to the bill, organised a force which by March numbered 
100,000 men, of whom half were armed. Violence seemed certain. Mili- 
tary action seemed the only legitimate response. The problem was 
complicated by the fact that many senior officers were Ulstermen 
who were actively opposed to Home Rule. Faced with this perplexing 
situation, the Secretary of State for War, J. E. B. Seely, and the 
CIGS, Sir John French, summoned the commander of the forces in Ireland, 
Sir Arthur Paget, to London. Their meeting, also attended by the 
Adjutant General Sir Spencer Ewart, resulted in a confusion over the 
correct policy to pursue. Paget subsequently went back to Ireland 
and, taking matters somewhat into his own hands, explained to his 
officer corps that in the event of a clash with the Ulster Volunteers, 
officers from Ulster would be given leave of absence for the duration. 
All other officers, Paget maintained, would have to fight or resign. 
Brigadier General Hubert Gough, commander of the 3rd Cavalry 
Brigade, stationed in Ireland, was born in Ulster. He was not, however, 
able to benefit from Paget's 'escape clause' because he was not at 
that time an Ulster resident. Since he could not countenance fighting 
his countrymen, he chose immediate resignation. Fifty-eight of his 
subordinate officers followed, his example. 
i Suddenly, with war 
on the horizon, the officer corps of the British Army was in danger 
of disintegration. 
'There 
were, in all, seventy officers in Cough's tripdo. 
Haig was golfing with Lady Haig at Littlehampton when 
the crisis 
exploded. News of it reached him via the following letter from his 
Chief of Staff, Brigadier General John Gough, Hubert's brother, 
dated 20 March 1914: 
My dear General: 
This afternoon I received a telegram from Hubert 'Have 
been offered dismissal service or undertake operations 
against Ulster' and ending up 'have accepted the first 
contingency'. 
You know my visas which mean everything to me. I wired 
back to Hubert 'I will not fight against Ulster if you 
are dismissed, my resignation goes in at once'. 
I told General Lomax that I was going to London to see 
if it was true Hubert was to be dismissed and if a fact 
to resign my commission. 
So far I have only been in telephone communication with 
Sir J. French and Seely's private sec'y and I gather 
that there may have been a mistake. So I will go to the 
War Office tomorrow morning and find out for certain and 
then act according to my conscience. 
It is only right that I should keep you informed of what 




Haig responded with the following telegram: 
Hope you will not act precipitately I feel equally strong 
on the subject as you there is no question of Army fight- 
ing against Protestants or against Catholics our duty is 
to keep the peace between them. 2 
Haig aimed to save the Army, his command. and his own career, all of 
which were threatened by the Curragh crisis. The above telegram 
is the first indicator of the intentionally vague approach which 
Haig was to take throughout the crisis. He certainly could not 
have felt 'equally strong on the subject' as Cough, who was willing 
to sacrifice his career. Nor did he make it clear how the Army was 
1John Gough to Haig, 20 March 1914, Haig Papers, NLS, Acc. 3155, 
No. 91(a). All Curragh correspondence is from this file. 
2Haig to J. Gough, telegram, 21 March 1914. 
to 'keep the peace' without risking violence against Ulster. This 
intentional equivocation (a talent perhaps learned at the War 
Office) eventually enabled Haig to slip through the crisis completely 
unscathed. On this particular occasion it had the desired effect. 
Gough replied that he had given his resignation to Seely's secretary 
but had asked that it be held until the future was more certain. Haig 
had shrewdly prevented the loss of a valuable member of his staff. 
Haig returned to London the next day and urged Haldane to use 
his influence to calm the crisis. Though Haldane was essentially 
powerless, he did make a speech in the House of Lords on the 25th 
in which he claimed that the Government had made no plans to use the 
Army to coerce Ulster. This did not soothe the disgruntled officers 
and only embarrassed the Government. At the same time the Cabinet 
drafted a document which declared that the incident was a misunder- 
standing and that the resignations of Gough and his men would not 
be accepted. The document disingenuously added that all British 
officers had to obey the orders of the Army Council. Hubert Cough, 
pushed this far, was not prepared to accept something so inconclusive. 
He demanded a guarantee that he would not be called upon to fight. 
Seely, French and Ewart, in a private meeting called without the 
knowledge of the Prime Minister, amended the original Cabinet docu- 
ment to include this guarantee. 
When Asquith learned of the amended document, he was furious. 
The affair implied that his ministry was so weak that it had to make 
deals with its Army officers on the conditions of their service. 
More important, the assurance given to Gough was a slap in the face 
for the Southern Irish, who took it as proof that the Government 
was not prepared to enforce Home Rule. In response to this embarrass.. 
went, Asquith demanded that Seely, French and Ewart repudiate the 
amendment or resign. All three chose the latter. French explained 
why in a letter to Haig: 
My dear Haig: 
The Adjutant General and I have resigned our appointments 
and our resignations have been accepted by the Govt. The 
issue was a purely personal one, absolutely unconnected 
with any political consideration whatever. We should not 
have taken the step if we had not been quite confident 
that all officers, non-commissioned officers and men would 
continue to carry out their duties in the same loyal and 
whole-hearted manner which has ever characterised the Army. 
I feel confident,. therfore, that I may rely upon you to 
maintain discipline at the same high standard as hereto- 
fore and to allay and remove by your own influence any 
feeling which may exist in regard to what has recently 
occurred. 
Yrs. sincerely, 
J. D. P. Frenchi 
With Seely, French and Ewart gone, the Cabinet could save face. 
The amendment was subsequently repudiated, but quietly allowed to 
stand as far as Gough was concerned. 
Haig's attitude toward the Curragh crisis was expressed in his 
diary the day before French resigned: 
At 12 o. c. I held meeting of G. O. C. s of Divisions and 
Brigades--about 14 present. Pointed out danger of disrup- 
tion in Army to Empire and begged them to induce regular 
officers to give up dabbling in politics. We were all 
united to do anything required short of coercing our fel- 
low citizens who have done no wrong. 2 
The contradiction in the last sentence is conspicuous. Terrain© 
notes it, and quoting Robert Blake, explains that Haig had not 
himself found 'an easy escape from the conflict of loyalties. '3 This 
is partially true, but it is more accurate to see the statement as 
a continuation of the approach taken in the telegram to John Cough. 
1French to Haig; the date of this letter is unintelligible, but 
it was probably written on 26 March 1914. 
2Diary 25 March 1914. 
3Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 65" 
The rather flimsy assurances given by Haig echo those of Haldane in 
the House of Lords. Both statements satisfied their audiences but 
were not intended to be tested. It is rather ironic that while 
Haig was cautioning his men not to dabble in politics, he was using 
'political' tactics to handle the crisis. He was giving his men 
the concrete assurances they required while at the same time 
hoping that his bluff would not be called. 
Haig's efforts were directed at preserving the cherished inte- 
grity and prestige of the officer corps, particularly that of the 
cavalry. He felt that Asquith and Seely were to blame for tte 
crisis and wanted to ensure the British public continued to feel the 
same. . He was determined that odium and 
blame should not be cast upon 
the Army. To avoid such a catastrophe, it was necessary to steer 
a clear course between those groups who opposed the use of the Army 
to coerce Ulster and those who felt it was the Army's duty to enforce 
the will of the Government. French's resignation destroyed the hope 
of finding such a course. Haig correctly perceived that the resigna- 
tion would be seen not as 'a purely personal matter', as French had 
maintained, but as an acceptance of blame. Haig felt that French 
had weakly agreed to carry a burden of guilt which rightfully belonged 
to Asquith. The Government had squeaked through, while the reputation 
of the Army had been tarnished. French's mistake was so severe that 
Haig never forgave him. On 13 October 1916, the occasion of a visit 
by French to the WestErn Front, Haig wrote the following to Rothschild: 
As F. is a British F. M., I sent a guard of honour and an A. D. C. to receive him, and say that if he wished to visit the British battlefront arrangements would be made. lie 
wisely I think decided not to come to the British Army. 
Many of us do not forget ... how ho sacrificed the whole Army during the Irish crisis before the war. 1 
1Haig to Leopold de Rothschild, 13 October 1916, Haig Papers, 
NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 214(a). 
Haig added that he doubted whether many officers would be at all 
keen to welcome [French) if he had come back'. 
' Haig's attitude is 
illustrated by a comparison of his treatment of French and 
Hubert Gough. Gough's resignation was over a utter of principle 
and honour; it therefore was seen by Haig to uphold the integrity 
of the officer corps. Haig subsequently harboured no ill-feeling 
toward Gough over the crisis. The same held true for John Gough 
who remained one of Haig's most valued assistants, until his death 
in the early months of the war. French, on the other hand, had 
shown himself to be weak and easily manipulated. Haig as a result 
scorned him, and the rift between the once-close officers became 
permanent. 
In the late spring of 1914, the Curragh affair drifted slowly 
into the background, though it permanently scarred the Army. Besides 
dividing men like French and Haig, it left the Army as a whole with 
a bitter distrust of the Liberal Party. But the officer corps at 
least survived intact, if somewhat bruised. These men devoted the 
spring and summer to the fine-tuning for war. The pro-war calm which 
has been noted by so many of the 1914 generation was evident oven 
in the Army. Haig's diary demonstrates this false calm. The frenzy 
of the previous years had abated. Between the Curragh crisis and 
mobilisation, there are hardly any entries. Those that exist are short, 
unspectacular and mostly concerned with non-military matters. It was 
as if the serious preparation for war was complete,, and the combatants 
were content to sit and wait for an issue over which to fight. 
When the issue came, few immediately recognised its importance. 
Charteris claims that Haig was alarmed by the assassination of the 
1Haig to Rothschild, 13 October 1916. 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 18 June, and ordered his staff 'to study 
its implications. 
1 This is probably true, but the diary does not 
bear out this urgency. The assassination is not even mentioned. 
Nor do the entries which follow that. of 28 June show any of the 
same concern which Haig displayed during the Agadir Crisis or the 
1912 and 1913 Balkan Wars. The details of how a world war arose 
from the relatively insignificant murder of a European monarch need 
not be recounted here. Before long, events assumed a momentum of their 
own. On 1 August, France and Germany ordered their mobilisations. 
Britain began hers three days later. 
On 4 August--the first day of British mobilisation--Haig 
wrote an urgent letter to Haldane. In response to the popular appeal 
to appoint Kitchener the Secretary of State for War, Haig commented 
as follows: 
I make so bold as to write that you will, even at 
great personal inconvenience, return to the War Office 
for as long as war lasts and preparations are necessary. 
No one knows the details of the problems of organisation 
as you do! This war will last many months, possibly years, 
so I venture to hope that our only bolt (and that not a 
very big one) may not suddenly be shot on a project of 
which the success seems to me quite doubtful--I mean the 
checking of the German advance into France. Would it not 
be better to begin at once to enlarge our Expeditionary 
Force by amalgamating less regular forces with it? In 
three months time we should have quite a considerable 
Army, so that when we do take the field we can act deci- 
sively and dictate terms which will ensure a lasting 
peace. 
I presume, of course, that France can hold out even though 
her forces have to fall back from the frontier for the 
necessary time for us to create an army of 300,000. 
Forgive me for bothering you with a letter, but I do see 
great advantages for the Empire of having you at the War 
Office at this time .. .2 
1Charteris, Field Marshal Ear, p.. 75" 
2Haig to Haldane, 4 Ault 1914, Haldane Papers, ITS, Ms. 5910, 
ff. 251. 
Haig felt the worry of a father whose only son was going off to war. 
The B. E. F. belonged to him and Haldane. He was disturbed that its 
fate was now in the hands of men neither familiar with it nor 
sympathetic to its spirit. Haig's experience of Kitchener had 
taught him that he was not the organisational genius which many thought 
him to be. In a postscript, he again exhorted Haldane to return to 
the War Office. 'We have a mass of undeveloped power which no 




Haig's experiences in the Boer War are easily visible behind 
the recommendations to Haldane. In South Africa, Haig saw how the 
early momentum was given to the Boers because the British began 
with a force which was not ready for war. This meant that the 
British could not dictate the peace even after an apparent victory 
was gained with the capture of Pretoria. But Haig did not immediately 
realise that circumstances were decidedly different in 1914. The 
British were not dealing with a small, untrained Boer army, but a 
huge, finely-tuned German force which had to be met immediately. 
Haig's letter reveals an astonishing political blindness. The idea 
of waiting for the formation of a 300,000-strong army, though perhaps 
wise in theory was formed in a political vacuum. Haig did not 
consider the effect upon the French that a defy would produce. For 
three months, France would have had to bear the brunt of the German 
attack alone. Though the B. E. F. did not promise much of a physical 
effect in countering this attack, it did promise a psychological one. 
And, while Haig was prescient in predicting a long war, he did not 
extend this prescience to a consideration of the effect an occupying 
1Haig 
to Haldane, 4 August 1914. 
force deep within the French frontier for this period of time would 
have upon the morale of the population. The ignorance of these consi- 
derations by a general who placed such great emphasis upon morale 
factors is inexplicable. 
Haig soon overcame this initial blindness. Over the next ten 
days, he emerged as one of the wisest of counsels in Britain. This 
was partly due to the inadequate consideration of the realities 
of war which characterised British military and political leaders. 
There was superficial readiness--the B. E. F. was finely 'tuned 
and mobilisation seemed completely planned--but the deeper questions 
and complexities of war had not been grasped. French and Henry 
Wilson, for instance, would not have advised a delay of three months 
because neither believed that the war would last that long. The 
depth of British ignorance became apparent at the War Council which 
first met on 5 August. For the first time the detailed plans between 
the French and British General Staffs were revealed to the generals 
whose actions they governed. Yet despite the intricate plans for 
mobilisation and for cooperation with the allies, the immediate conse- 
quence of real war was chaos. This was due to a lack of flexibility 
on the part of the planners. The B. E. F. was supposed to concentrate 
behind the French left at Maubeuge. From there the force was to take 
up the left flank. Mobilisation plans had been formulated according 
to this design. But because the British mobilised three days later 
than the Germans and French, a concentration at this point became 
too dangerous. There was no contingency plan. It was up to the 
War Council to develop one rapidly. 
At the War Council confusion reigned. Ideas for the use of the 
B. E. F. --most of them ludicrous--came from all directions. The most 
deluded was French, who had earlier been appointed Commander-in-Chief 
of the B. E. F. His lack of understanding of the British role vis 
ä 
vis France makes Haig's initial mistakes seem tame. French proposed 
taking on the full might of the German Army at Antwerp. Here, he 
surmised, the British could be reinforced by the Belgian and Dutch 
Armies (he wrongly assumed the latter to have been Allies). Haig was 
angry and upset by French's obvious lack of preparation for his 
lofty command. He wrote of the meeting in his diary: 
Personally, I trembled at the reckless way Sir John French 
spoke about 'the advantages' of the B. E. F. operating from 
Antwerp against the powerful and still intact German Armyi 
So, when it came to my turn to speak, I formulated a number 
of questions to bring out the risk we would run of 'defeat 
in detail' if we separated from the French at the outset of 
the campaign. 'Have we enough troops with the Belgians, to 
carry on a campaign independently of the French, or do we 
run excessive risk if we act separately, of defeat in detail? ' 
and 'What does our General Staff know of the fighting value 
of the Belgian Army? 'Y 
Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, fortunately vetoed 
French's proposal by stating that he could not guarantee the safe 
passage of the B. E. F. to Antwerp. 
While he had the floor, Haig continued by outlining four addi- 
tional considerations. Though these were discounted by most of 
those present, they turned out to be profoundly sagacious. The 
first consideration was that since Britain and Germany would be 
fighting for their existence, neither would acknowledge defeat after 
a short struggle'. Haig urged the Council to 'organise our resources 
for a war of several ears'2 The second point was that Britain had 
to begin building a huge army. Haig mentioned one million men as the 
initial target. Thirdly, in order to train the huge force, it was 
necessary to withdraw some officers and N. C. O. s from the B. E. F. in 
order to form the vital experienced nucleus. Lastly, after being 
1Diary, 5 August 1914. 
2Ibid. 
informed of the secret arrangements with France, Haig changed his 
mind regarding the timing of the British effort. He urged that 
the largest possible portion of the B. E. F. be sent to a suitable 
place in France as soon as practicable. Had the wisdom of all 
these proposals been accepted immediately by all concerned, the 
character of the British war effort may have been different. 
As the days sped past, Haig's confidence in French disappeared 
completely. Since he believed that his loyalties to his nation took 
precedence over those to his superior officer and one-time friend, 
Haig made his reservations known. From the very beginning he took 
steps which hastened French's downfall. On 11 August he noted that: 
The King and Queen arrive at Aldershot at 12 noon ... 
The King seemed delighted that Sir John French had been 
appointed to the Chief Command of the Expeditionary Force. 
He asked my opinion. I told him at once, as I felt it my 
duty to do so, that from my experience with Sir John in 
the South African War, he was certain to do his utmost 
loyally to carry out any orders which the Government might 
give him. I had grave doubts, however, whether his temper 
was sufficiently even or his military knowledge sufficiently 
thorough to enable him to discharge properly the very diffi- 
cult duties which will devolve upon him during the coming 
operations with the Allies on the Continent. In my own 
heart I know that French is quite unfit for this great com- 
mand at a time of crisis in our Nation's history. But I 
thought it sufficient to tell the King that I had 'doubts' 
about the selection. 1 
Haig was balancing precariously on the line between duty and opportu- 
nism. Whether he stepped over the line--, at this time or later in the 
war--continues to be a matter of some controversy. 
Haig's 'grave doubts' arose from his recent disagreement with 
French over cavalry tactics, from the ill-feeling over the Curragh 
affair and from French's behaviour at the War Council. Had fiaig 
kept to these issues, the rectitude of his actions would not be open 
to question. Instead, he padded his argument with 'evidence' from 
'Diary, 11 August 1914. 
the pre-1909 period. This was pure fabrication. It must be kept 
in mind that prior to 1909, Haig raised no significant obmplainto 
about French's abilities as a commander. On 13 August, however, 
he wrote a long entry in his diary in a tone which was obviously 
directed toward future generations of historians: 
I... feel the greatest confidence that we will give a 
good account of ourselves, if only our Higher Command give 
us a reasonable chance! ... I have an uneasy feeling lest 
we may be thoughtlessly committed to some great general 
action before we have had time to arsorb our recruits. 
... This uneasy 
feeling which disturbs me springs, I 
think, from my knowledge of the personalities of which our 
high command is composed. I have already stated somewhat 
briefly my opinion of Sir John French's ability as a Com- 
mander in the Field. His military ideas often shocked me 
when I was his Chief of Staff during the South African 
War. ... 
With all this knowledge of the Chief ... behind me, I 
have grave reasons for being anxious about what happens to 
us in the great adventure upon which we are now going to 
start this very night. However, I am determined to behave 
as I did in the South African War, to be thoroughly loyal 
and do my duty as a subordinate should, trying all the 
time to see Sir John's good qualities and not his weak ones. 
i 
During the South African War Haig roundly criticised Kitchener, 
Roberts and a host of other senior officers. French, on the other 
hand, received nothing but praise. When French was appointed CIGS 
in 1911, Haig wrote that he thought this was the 'best selection'. 
2 
The validity of the above criticisms are therefore open to serious 
question. Haig had justifiably lost confidence in French, but it is 
not clear why he felt the need to maintain that this lack of 
confidence had roots reaching to the Doer War. He perhaps'feared 
that, since he was French's logical successor, his actions would be 
seen as gross opportunism unless he demonstrated that his misgivings 
had existed for some time. At any rate, these fabrications cast a 
1Diary 13 August 1914. 
2Haig to Kiggell, 18 May 1911, (1/13). 
shadow over what is essentially a demonstration of his loyalty to 
the Empire and his determination to block anyone who he perceived 
as a threat to the Empire's safety. 
On the next day, 14 August, Haig embarked for France. The 
mobilisation plans, at least those pertaining to embarkation, had 
worked so well that he had only to worry about getting himself ready. 
But there was never any question that he would be ready. On the 13th 
he wrote that 'in all my dreams I have never been so bold to imagine 
that, when ... war did break out, I should hold one of the most 
important commands in the British Army. '1 This, too, seems to have 
been written for future generations. Haig's humility was so rare that, 
when expressed, its hollowness was conspicuous. Since entering the 
Army thirty years before, he had advanced resolutely toward his goal 
of high command. With every step he took, he kept his mind finely 
focused on the European war which he was certain lay ahead. August 
14 was the fulfilment of an ambition and, in many ways, a destiny. 
His departure was in keeping with his approach to life and 
his approach to war. Henrietta and Willie Jameson motored from London 
with many bottles of the finest champagne. Haig and his personal 
staff joined them in the drawing room of the hotel at which they were 
staying. The group drank to 'success and a safe return' 
t It was all 
very genteel. No sadness nor tears were noted. There seems to have 
been no awareness of the turmoil which would follow. No one seemed to 
sense that in four years the world this group had known, and the 
society that had produced Douglas Haig, the gentleman-soldior, would 
be forever altered. That night, Haig boarded the Connie Castle and 
went to war. 
1Diary, 14 August 1914. 
2Ibid. 
EPILOGUE 
The Great War 
The pre-war career of Douglas Haig spanned a period of profound 
change in all aspects of military science. Haig embraced some of these 
changes, and rejected others. The obscurantist elements of his think- 
ing, though questioned by men like Roberts and Childers, were not 
seriously challenged in war prior to 1914. The Sudan Campaign and 
the Boer War were sufficiently vague experiences for a stubborn, 
traditional cavalryman like Haig to interpret them as he wished. 
The real challenge to Haig's military beliefs came during the Great 
War. The fighting on the Western Front was not open to similarly 
wide interpretation. The Great War conclusively demonstrated that 
the glorious days of the cavalry were past. It made tactical conserva- 
tism costly and dangerous. It highlighted the important military and 
political developments of the previous century, and thus demonstrated 
where and how Haig's own perception had been faulty. 
The aim of this thesis has been to chart Haig's development as 
a soldier. It has been shown how he was shaped by personal, profes- 
sional and social forces. A more complete picture of Haig on the 
eve of war than has heretofore been available has, it is felt, been 
achieved. It is not necessary to continue this study with a detailed 
description of Haig's role in the Great War, for it seems that, by 
1914, Haig's development as a soldier was virtually complete. A 
fitting epilogue would therefore explore the problems of command 
which arose in the Great War and analyse Haig's chances, based on 
his pre-war record, of meeting them. 
As was previously mentioned, Haig begin the war as Ist Corps 
Commander. It was in this capacity that he took part in the demora- 
lising retreat after Mons, the inspired advance from the Marne and 
the inconclusive Ist Battle of Ypres. It was also as lot Corps Com- 
mander that Haig formed his opinion of the war and how it could be 
won. After the 1914 battles Haig was convinced that 
. as soon as we were supplied with 
the ample ammunition 
of high explosive, we could walk through the German lines 
at several places. In my opinion the reason we were here 
Chad not advanced was primarily due to our want of Artillery 
and secondly due to our small numbers last November. 
l 
The opinion underwent little alteration during the course of the 
war. The emphasis was placed firmly upon numbers, not execution. 
The fighting in 1915 was as frustrating and inconclusive for 
Haig as for the rest of the country. In late December 1914, he 
had been promoted to Ist Army Commander as a result of the administra- 
tive restructuring made necessary by the huge expansion of the Army. 
The promotion was due more to Haig's pre-war reputation than to any 
wartime achievements. Perhaps the most important battle for him 
in this new capacity took place at Neuve-Chapelle from 10-13 March. 
Neuve-Chapelle was unique among Great War battles. Due primarily to 
a shortage of ammunition, the preliminary bombardment was kept to 
thirty-five minutes, one of the shortest in the war. The limited 
bombardment meant that surprise was maintained and, as a result, 
the first objectives were reached with relative ease--two more 
rarities in the war. A lack of reserves, however, prevented exploita- 
tion of the initial British advantage. 
Neuve-Chapelle is important not for what it taught Haig, but 
for what he did not learn. What he should have noticed was the 
importance of things small: short bombardments, limited objectives, 
limited fronts and battles of a few days' duration. The problem of 
reserves clouded the recognition of these subtleties. The reaction, 
by Haig and by other senior commanders, was that if Neuve-Chapello 
was partially successful, complete success would result from the 
expansion of all of its elements. Subtlety, cleverness, deception 
1Diary, 22 January 1915. 
and surprise were henceforth smothered by the emphasis upon things 
large: lengthy bombardments, massive concentrations of men, extended 
fronts, unrealistic objectives and battles lasting several months. 
A similar problem of manpower to that which clouded Neuve- 
Chapelle brought about Haig's promotion to Commander-in-Chief in 
late 1915. In the Battle of Loos (25 September to 8 October), Haig 
was prevented from exploiting an early advantage because of a shortage 
of reserves. It subsequently transpired that this time the extra men 
had been available, but that French had failed to push them forward 
at the opportune moment. French was placed in an embarrassing posi- 
tion. He foolishly reacted by denying any error. This cast Haig 
as the innocent victim of his superior's incompetence and duplicity. 
Haig astutuely realised that the time had come to make his claim for 
French's position. He made wise use of the issues arising from 
the battle and effectively masked the personal squabbles which had 
divided him and French over the previous three years. In discussions 
with Kitchener, Haldane and the King, he questioned French's fitness 
for command, alleged that he had been wronged over Loos and subtly 
cast himself as the man to lead Britain to victory. The issue of 
national survival conveniently obscured the ambition which had 
always motivated Haig. 
Haig's highly admired moral qualities, along with the support of 
his influential friends, gave him security as Commander--in-. Chief 
to a degree which French never enjoyed. As Lloyd George eventually 
realised, Haig's position was virtually unassailable, to criticise 
him was exceedingly dangerous. The result was that the war became 
Haig's and the emphasis upon large-scale actions became British 
military policy. The Somme and Passchendaele--the longest battles 
in British history, involving the most men and the greatest number of 
casualties--are the everlasting symbols of the Haig approach. In 
both battles, the first day's objectives were reached in the final 
months. Both began with plans of a dramatic breakthrough and ended 
with the weak justification that at least the Germans had suffered 
more. Both battles are, nevertheless, measures of Haig's courage, 
determination and strength of character. These qualities brought 
Haig and the nation through the German offensive of 1918, and later 
brought victory in November of the same year. 
Victory in turn brought Haig an earldom, a grant of £100,000, 
and the estate at Bemersyde. Haig remained as dignified and quietly 
self-assured in peace as he had been in war. Unlike Haldane, Wilson, 
Lloyd George and French he made no effort to justify his war record. 
He apparently felt, probably with good reason, that his beat defence 
was to maintain a stoic silence. His work with the British Legion 
enhanced his image of unselfishness and devotion. It is neverthelesso 
a pity that he did not leave a record of his feelings about the war, 
but instead left it to others to surmise them. Part of the controversy 
Haig is due to the fact that his reflections died with him on 
19 January 1928. 
If costs are ignored or excused, Haig's character, determination 
and courage seem admirable. But can the costs of Haig's megalithic 
battles be conveniently brushed aside? It is hero that historians 
disagree. Few (perhaps only Dixon) seriously question his moral 
qualities. The disagreement instead centres on whether he is to 
be blamed for the enormous loss of life which took place under his 
command. Those who take Haig's side, among them Terraino, argue that 
high casualties were the unavoidable cost of victory. They praise 
Haig for being able to see the way to victory despite the mounting 
losses which damaged the resolve or distracted the attention of others. 
They naturally ridicule suggestions that the war could have' been won 
in a more economical way. Haig's critics, Dixon, Fuller and Wolff, 
among others, feel that the lengthy casualty listen are the symbols 
of his shortcomings as a military leader. They acknowledge that he 
achieved victory, but question its enormous cost. They readily offer 
detailed descriptions of a more economical way in which the war could 
have been won. 
Both sides have focused too intensely upon numbers. The question 
of costs has polarised opinion to such an extent that the military 
realities of the war have often been misunderstood. Historians have, 
in a manner remarkably similar to Haig, failed to recognise the war's 
small alternatives--the only alternatives which in fact existed. Haig's 
ability to notice and exploit these alternatives is the only legitimate 
basis upon which his command can be judged. It is, however, first 
necessary to understand the restrictions which the war imposed upon 
Haig. In order to win, the British had to defeat the German Army. 
This was true wherever British forces were concentrated and in 
whatever order Germany's allies were met. The war also had to involve 
large casualties. It is foolish to believe otherwise, given the 
gargantuan armies and enormous firepower of the combatants. The war 
also had to be fought in the trenches. Static warfare was not the 
result of any commander's stupidity. Movement in warfare is doter- 
mined by the interplay of firepower and mobility. In 1914, firepower 
was in the ascendancy. It was virtually impossible to move largo 
numbers of men across a battlefield without exposing them to the 
deadly fire of rifles, machine guns and artillery. Mobility was 
further limited by the concentration of large numbers of men into 
relatively small, often rain-soaked, battlefields. Contrary to Haig's 
prognostications in Cavalry Studies, 'the future' did not give rise 
to a greater role for the cavalry, but rather to the indispensability 
of the spade. The Western Front was, in other words, a bottleneck 
for which the trench was the only answer. 
Strategy in the Great War was therefore severely limited because 
there was no escaping trench warfare. But strategic impotence meant 
tactical predominance. There are two basic ways to conduct a trench 
war. The first relies upon time--the dreadful inevitability of 
attrition. By itself attrition is a passive policy. It is the safe 
way for a numerically superior force to win a static war. If equal 
losses are maintained, attrition gradually meanders its way toward 
a favourable conclusion. The second method, which relies upon tactics, 
allows the commander to influence actively the course of the war. It 
is here that the small tactical alternatives come into play. By 
taking advantage of these alternatives (or, in fact, by making them) 
the commander can favourably alter the balance of losses. Attrition 
remains a factor, as it always does in a static war, but it in no 
longer the only factor. Risks are introduced, but the war can be 
shortened and lives saved. 
Alternatives involving surprise, deception and subtlety have 
already been discussed. A detailed examination of the war would 
undoubtedly reveal other alternatives, specific to particular battles. 
In order to take full advantage of these, the commander had to be 
open-minded, perceptive, imaginative and adaptable. In the Creat War, 
the German commanders seem to have exhibited these qualities to the 
greatest degree. This is understandable in view of the challenges 
which faced them. The German Army's tactical creativity resulted in 
part from its numerical inferiority. Tactics such as the creeping 
barrage, elastic defence, the use of gas and innovations in fortifi- 
cation were inspired by a realisation within the Certran Army that a 
war of attrition could not be won. The Russians, on the other hand, 
were the least imaginative in part because they believed they had 
an inexhaustible supply of men. They were confident of the favour- 
able progress of attrition and perceived no need to be creative. 
The analysis of Haig's command must therefore take into account 
the restrictions imposed by this war and must centre upon tactics. 
The relevant point of contention is whether or not he displayed the 
tactical creativity essential to minimising losses. Was he sufficiently 
adaptable to adjust to the war's unique'conditions and to exploit 
the full potential of the innovations--aeroplanes, tanks, barbed wire, 
gas, mechanized transport, etc. --which were used extensively for the 
first time in this war? If he was not sufficiently adaptable, or if 
he failed to perceive that a radical adjustment was necessary, does 
it then follow that he should be blamed for wasting British lives? 
Haig's admirable courage and determination would have been of 
little consequence had he not commanded men of extraordinary dura- 
bility. His ability to continue fighting was, more accurately, theirs. 
While he may have had little experience or understanding of these men, 
he did have an uncanny appreciation of the strains they could and would 
bear. It is therefore a possibility that, in a manner similar to the 
Russians, Haig did not feel the need to be tactically creative. Ho 
was never forced into a position where the survival of his army 
depended upon his ability to innovate. Confident of the resilience 
of his men, he may have felt safe to let attrition take its course. 
Since he was by nature cautious and conservative, he may not have 
felt comfortable trying to influence this course in any radical tort 
of way. This hypothesis is supported by Haig's cavalry background. 
The cavalry was the only arm of exploitation of which Haig had suf- 
ficient experience or in which he felt trust. Deprived of this impor- 
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tant tool, Haig perhaps did not search for new methods of exploita- 
tion. Instead, he may have cautiously chosen to rely on the established 
tactics (magnified many times) which in the past had produced opportuni- 
ties for the cavalry, in the vain hope that the traditional formula 
would remain potent. 
The argument is plausible, but it is an incomplete explanation 
for Haig's conduct. It also introduces an element of conscious 
choice; it assumes that Haig would have been able to adapt had he 
decided that it was necessary. This is a very big assumption. Terraine 
admitted that Haig lacked the 'critical mind' which would seemingly 
be an essential prerequisite to tactical creativity. Haig's pre-war 
career abounds with evidence of this deficiency. His stubborn support 
for traditional cavalry was in part an inability to understand the 
progress of military technology. His interest in scientific innovations 
-, as his early travels in India and Australia demonstrate--seldom went 
beyond a superficial fascination. The 1912 manoeuvres reveal his 
difficulties in imagining the new tactics which innovations like the 
aeroplane inevitably implied. The squandering of the cuxprize potential 
of the tank on the Somme (after the battle had become futile) can be 
seen as a continuation of his pre-war tactical rigidity. 
Haig's adaptability was probably further restricted by his unquoo- 
tioning faith in certain military principles. His belief in the cavalry 
was not only an inability to understand progress, it was also an almost 
religious devotion to the offensive pattern which preceded the cavalry 
charge. Kimberley, and the years spent arguing with Roberts, Childers 
and Dundonald, had hardened this faith into dogmatism. A further 
study of the Great War will probably reveal that the most profound 
effect of the cavalry upon Haig's command was in the way it vino him 
cling tenaciously to his sacred strategy despite its functional 
irrelevance in this war. Haig's cavalry background did not cause him 
to send forth waves of cavalrymen against German machine-gunners. It 
did not even cause him to expand the cavalry, as Liddell Hart alleges. 
' 
It did, it seems, cause him to work for a breach of the enemy lines 
and a turning of the flank, the two steps which in the past had 
preceded the release of the cavalry. While this formula was not 
obsolete (with the tank as the mobile arm it would be reborn) it was 
out of place in the Great War, where a breakthrough was impossible 
until the latter stages. As Edmonds wrote, the Western Front was like 
a prolonged siege and needed to be treated as such. It was 'an 
artillery and engineering war and 
[Haig) tried to make it a cavalry 
war'. 
2 
A lack of imagination and a steadfast faith in the cavalry 
rendered. Haig tactically rigid even before the war. It can also 
be argued that, the above reasons aside, Haig was by nature rigid 
and closed-minded. Barrow confessed that he was 'as a rule intolerant 
of any opinion that differed from his own'. 
3 
From youth, his develop- 
ment had been toward pedantry and dogmatism and away from open-mindedness 
and tolerance. This rigidity was further tempered during the war by 
a change in his-religious outlook. Prior to 1914, religion, though 
important to Haig, had not influenced his career in any perceivable 
way. In wax, it became his most important source of strength. As 
1Liddell Hart, in his History of the First World War, P. 35, cites 
the fact that forage was the shipment of greatest bulk in the cross- 
channel transport during the war as proof of Haig's over-reliance 
upon the cavalry. In making this point, he disregards the fact that 
all transport between the distribution points and the trenches was by 
horse or mule. As the Army increased in size, so did the number of 
pack animals and the food required to feed them. The number of cavalry 
horses actually showed the greatest proportional decrease in relation 
to other components of the Army during the war. 
2Edmonds to 'Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edmonds Papers, I/ZB/5a. 
3Barrow to Wavell, n. d., Allenby Papers, 6/III. 
Charteris maintained, Haig believed he was 'the predestined' instrument 
of Providence for the achievement of victory'. The conception of 
himself as a 'child of destiny' made Haig 'genuinely convinced that 
the position to which he was called was one that he and he alone 
in the British Army could fill. '1 
A well-functioning General Staff could have partially countered 
Haig's rigidity and aided his adjustment to this unique war. A pro- 
ficient staff was especially important because static wars are by 
nature staff wars. Wellington did not need an efficient staff at 
Waterloo because the entire battlefield was within his field of 
vision. He was immediately aware of the effects of his orders. Like 
a puppeteer, he was omnipotent. In contrast, Haig had to control 
an army of two million men from an isolated chateau twenty-fivo miles 
from the front. A staff had three essential functions. The first 
was to communicate with the front, the second to provide intelligence 
on the enemy and the third to provide tactical insights based on the 
information from the first two areas. Haig fully understood these 
functions of the staff. A great part of his career was devoted to 
preparing men for them. But, especially with regard to the staff, 
there had always been in Haig a separation of principles and practice. 
A staff is only as effective as the commander wants it to be. In 
the case of Haig, it appears that personal characteristics rendered 
him, even before the war, incapable of benefitting fully from a 
modern, professional staff. Evidence from the war suggests that, 
at least until 1918, Haig was unable to abandon his preference for 
weak, servile staff officers. Both sides in the Haig argument 
agree that Haig's staff failed at its duties. It probably failed 
because Haig chose to command like Wellington. 
1Charteris, Field Marshal Earl Haig, pp. 180-181. 
One very significant reason for the staff's difficulty with 
its first function was the impediment caused by Haig's extraordi- 
narily high level of optimism. Optimism in wartime is essential, 
but it should not be unreasonable or blind, as it appears to have 
been with Haig. The effect of Haig's optimism was magnified by the 
high value which he gave to loyalty. A lack of optimism may have 
been equated with disloyalty, and thus a staff officer's status 
could have depended in part on his willingness to echo Haig's views 
of the war. At GHQ, a perception of the war developed which was 
increasingly divorced from reality. For instance, when presented with 
evidence of a counter-attack at Cambrai in late 1917: 
Charteris refused to have these movements shown on the 
location map ... saying he did not accept the evidence 
and in any case he did not want to weaken the C. in C. 's 
resolution .. .1 
When maps from the Passchendaele front began to show the impossibility 
of conditions there, GHQ ordered that they no longer be cent? The 
prison camp capers involving both Haig and Lloyd George have already 
been mentioned., 
Lloyd George felt that examples such as those mentioned above 
were evidence of Haig's, and the staffs, almost criminal deception. 3 
But Liddell Hart correctly perceives them as the pervasive effects 
of Haig's optimism. 'Good intentions', he wrote, 'paved the path to 
"Passchendaele" ' .4 Optimism became a staff policy from which divoruion 
was inexcusable. Thus Haig reacted to the less sanCuino information 
'Marshall-Cornwall, Haig as a Military CommRnderj p. 252. 
2This 
episode was first described in a leeter from J. F. C. 
Fuller to The Spectator, 10 January 1958. Similar accusations aro 
made by H. Gough in Soldiering On,. (London: Arthur Barker, 1954). p. 142. 
3See Lloyd George, War Memoirs, pp. 1265,1296-97,1316, otc. 
4Liddell 
Hart, Through the Fog of War, p. 55. 
from the War Office Intelligence Chief (MacDonogh) by claiming that 
he received information from 'tainted sources'. 
' On another occasion, 
Haig criticised a cavalry commander who had written a despondent 
letter to his wife by claiming that 'cavalry commanders above all 
should be hopeful. ' He continued by complaining 
how difficult it is even in the Army to make people 
realise how we are beating the Enemy, unless one is actually 
on the front where the battle is going on, and one can see the 
ground gained, state of enemy prisoners, etc. .. 02 
Colonel Rankin, the cavalry commander in question, had in actuality 
spent more time at the front than Haig. But Haig had the benefit 
of his loyal staff, who fed him with the sort of information he 
wanted to hear. This level of optimism made for painful realisations 
when the actual war was occasionally revealed. Kiggell, the Chief 
of Staff, for instance, broke into tears when he saw the conditions 
at the front for the first time after the Flanders offensive of 
1917.3 While the staff can to some extent be blamed for their 
tendency to mislead Haig, it is indeed questionable whether Haig 
would have tolerated a staff officer who consistently supplied him 
with information which contradicted his sanguine preconceptions. 
Haig can likewise be partially blamed for his staff's diffi- 
culties with its second responsibility, that of gathering intelligence. 
Charteris, Haig's Intelligence Officer until late 1917, has been 
widely condemned for providing Haig with false or inaccurate informa- 
1See Diary, 15 October 1917: 'I cannot think why the War Office 
Intelligence Department gives such a wrong picture of the situation 
except that General MacDonogh is a Roman Catholic and is (perhaps 
unconsciously) influenced by information which reaches him from 
tainted (i. e. Catholic) sources. ' 
2Haig to Lady Haig, 13 August 1917, Haig Papers, NIS, Acc. 3155, 
No. 147. 
3Liddell Hart first disclosed this information in The-Spectator, 
1 March 1958. 
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tion. He has, more than any other staff officer, been the 'scapegoat 
for what the Haig proponents see as the few faults of Haig's command. 
But the intelligence reports which are available suggest that Charteris 
was surprisk4y proficient at gathering information on the enemy, 
given his lack of experience in this field. He consistently provided 
accurate estimates of German strength and numbers, and was adept at 
guessing enemy intentions. For instance, he predicted exactly when, 
where and how the 1918 offensive would materialise. 
1 There were, 
admittedly, serious problems with the intelligence supplied to Haig. 
These lay in the nature of the information gathered and in the inter- 
pretations given to this information. Intelligence staff are supposed 
to collect hard evidence of enemy strengths and weaknesses, and clues 
to future intentions. This is the information which is most helpful 
to offensive and defensive planning. As indicated above, Charteris 
skilfully supplied data of this sort. Unfortunately, this was not the 
only area which received his attention. A large amount of his time 
was also spent analysing the state of German morale. Enemy morale 
is usually the concern of propagandists. It is a subjective concept 
which is extremely difficult to measure and understand. Morale 
factors should not ordinarily be used in the formation of offensive 
policy, as they appear to have been during Haig's command. 
Haig assumed that victory would come with the collapse of German 
morale. He was, in a sense, right. But, as was the case in South 
Africa and the Sudan, the importance which Haig gave to morale factors 
caused him too look too enthusiastically for evidence of emotional 
deterioration. For instance, he regularly visited prisoner of war 
camps to inspect the German captives. He naturally found emotional 
'See 'Notes on German Intentions', compiled by J. Chirt©ria, 
contained in Haig War Diary, following entry for 6 December 1917, 
Haig Papers, NLS, Ace. 3155, No. 120. 
wrecks who confirmed his preconceptions. Charteris sifted through 
captured soldiers' letters in a diligent search for evidence of 
despondency or pessimism. He too found what he wanted. He also 
kept a running account of the food value of the rations given to 
the German soldiers in the trenches. He recorded evidence of malnutri- 
tion long before there was any noticeable diminution in the fighting 
value of those troops. The intelligence staff apparently tried to 
show not simply how the Germans could be beaten, but also attempted 
to demonstrate that they were beaten. -The'latter would have become 
obvious when it became a fact. The data on morale factors diminished 
the value of more accurate findings on enemy strengths and intentions. 
GHQ appears to have had a false conception of the state of the German 
Army and Nation. From early 1916, victory was assumed to be simply 
around the corner. This meant that, in strategic planning, emphasis 
was placed on a knockout blow--an impossibility until late in the 
War. 
1 
The staff did not offer tactical insights (the third function) 
because Haig apparently did not want assistance of this type. His 
belief that he alone knew the right way seems to have precluded 
his seeking advice on tactics. The staff's responsibility was 
mainly administrative. 'In many ways D. H. is his own Chief of Staff' 
Charteris wrote. 'His Chief of Staff has little to do except to coo 
that things go smoothly. '2 Esher praised Haig in a similar manner. 
by claiming that Haig's General Staff was 
1J. H. Davidson, Haig's Chief of Operations, admitted in WOK: 
Master of the Field, p. 32, that because of faulty advice from hits 
Army Commanders and inaccurate intelligence, Haig conducted the 
entire Flanders Offensive of 1917 with the emphasis firmly upon a breakthrough and knockout blow. 
9 
2Charteris, At G. H. Q., P. 74. 
... an excellent machine, 
formed to carry out his ideas 
and intentions. They intitiate nothing. All initiative 
remains with him. 
' 
This appears to have been the arrangement which Haig wanted. As 
Terraine maintains, despite the inadequacies of the senior staff offi'. 
cers, 'it is wrong to assert ... that Haig was a bad judge of men. '2 
His rise in the Army was aided by his astute ability to recognise 
men of value to him professionally. In the same way, he quite inten- 
tionally chose a staff composed of men of 'average intelligence' who 
could be trusted to be loyal and supportive-a'band of brothers' united 
against outside interference. It is probably not a coincidence that 
the only senior staff officer who was in any way forced upon Haig 
(Herbert Lawrence) also turned out to be the most strong-willed, inde- 
pendent and effective one. While it is impossible to generalise about 
the characters of every staff officer, it does seem true that the men 
closest to Haig (and those who would have had the greatest effect upon 
him) were above all subservient, pedantic, unimaginative and, as 
Terraine rightly argues, 'too much in awe of papa'. 
3 
The staff seems to have confx i1 to Haig's rigid preconceptions 
regarding the war when it should have acted as an inspired body 
capable of helping him to adjust to the very difficult challenges 
which he faced. This result is understandable when Haig's pro-war 
character and attitudes toward the staff are considered. The staff's 
deficiencies were doubly unfortunate since Haig had many of the 
qualities essential to effective leadership. He was determined, 
devoted, courageous and self-confident. He looked acid acted like a 
'Viscount Reginald Esher, Journals and Letters, (London: Nicholson 
and Watson, 1938), Vol. No p. 30. 
2Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, p. 176. 
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leader. He knew how to inspire his men and somehow enabled them to 
remain confident of victory. He was also an efficient organiser 
and administrator--essential qualities in this war of million-man 
armies. But, instead of enhancing these qualities, the staff seems 
to have exacerbated his negative characteristics. They appear to 
have fueled his optimism, encouraged his sense of omnipotence and 
failed to counter his rigidity. 
The personal factors affecting Haig's command and his choice of 
a staff, indicate that his character, more than any other factor, 
prevented him from becoming the type of commander ideally suited 
to this type of war. In answer to statements of this type, Haig's 
proponents often argue that he was the 'best of the bunch'-that no 
one else was better suited for chief command. This statement is 
probably true, but there are limitations to its significance. One such 
limitation lies in the meaning of the word best, a difficult term to 
define in relation to the Victorian Army, in which there was little 
consideration of fitting the right man into the right job. Promotion 
in this Army was based on vague and general appraisals of the officer's 
qualities; the criteria used often had little to do with his fitness 
for wartime command. Haig was definitely the 'best' soldier in 
December 1915, but this meant that he was the best according to 
Victorian standards, not necessarily the best for, chief command in 
this particular war. He would perhaps have been more successful as 
an Army Commander, quartermaster General or Chief of Staff--in other 
words, any position in which leadership and administrative skills 
were more important than tactical prowess. Haig became the 'best' 
soldier because his administrative skills were highly relevant at a 
time when the Army was badly in need of organisational reform. Unfor- 
tunately, he became Commander-in-Chief when the Army most needed a 
tactician. 
Another limitation to the statement that Haig was the best of 
the bunch is that the bunch was a decidedly poor lot. Thus, the 
argument over Haig's relative quality in fact goes a long way toward 
explaining his absolute inadequacy. The British Army was the strati- 
fied product of a stratified society. Only a certain type joined, 
and only an even more select type was promoted to high command. 
The possibilities for variation on the Haig theme were not wide. 
Repington and Fuller are two examples of independently-minded officers 
who failed to realise their full potential because they did not conform 
to the status quo. A criticism of Haig is therefore inevitably a 
criticism of this Army. It was an army which for years had been 
geared toward the production:, of omnipotent commanders for Victoria's 
small wars. The Army was isolated from public examination and from 
the military developments in the rest of the world. Some of the 
faults of the system were exposed in South Africa. After the Boer 
war, changes were made. The Army began to come to terms with the 
twentieth century. But many of her senior officers found it difficult 
to abandon traditional habits. An example of the unsteady and lengthy 
process of modernisation is Haig, who espoused many of the now trends, 
but had problems applying them to himself or understanding their 
manifold implications. After the Boer War the British Army needed most 
what she could not have: time. She needed time to clear the system 
of men whose minds were mired in the past. 
For thirty years Haig prepared for a type of war which never came. 
It is unreasonable to expect that he,; or anyone, should have been 
fully ready for the Great War, which surprised nearly everyone. It 
is not unreasonable to expect someone in his position to have adjusted 
once the character of the war became clear. It is in adjusting that 
Haig seems to have been most inadequate. A detailed study of 
Haig's conduct in the Great War, following from the findings of 
this thesis, would probably support the allegation of his inability 
to adapt. It would probably support the premise that Haig's develop- 
ment as a soldier was virtually complete by 1914, and that he did 
not, or could not, significantly alter his attitudes and habits 
after that time. It would probably also show that Haig succeeded 
in war by following virtually the same course which brought success 
in the pre-wax Army. Ambition, determination, confidence and an 
unquestioning devotion to traditional military principles; not 
brilliance, imagination, flexibility or creativity; brought profes- 
sional advancement and victory in battle. In the end, Haig won. But 
by 1918, victory was not the simple concept it had been in 1897 or 
1902. When Britain became a people at war instead of, simply, an 
army at war, there arose a corresponding change of values, a change 
in the definition of victory. Costs had to be considered. 
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